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Abstract
This thesis examines from an international political
economy(IPE) perspective the determinants and the
effectiveness of the EC's protective measures against
Korean exports to the EC market. Both the determinants
and the effectiveness of protective measures, in
countries which adopt such restraints, have been very
controversial issues in the academic world.
Through broad and industry-specific case analyses, I
found that approaches regarding determinants of
protectionism in the IPE literature are not fully
applicable as determinants of EC protectionism against
Korea and I extracted several determinants which are more
relevant to the issue of EC-Korea trade protectionism.
These are primarily divided between economic and
political determinants. The economic determinants include
1)a causal relationship between protectionism by the
United States against Korea and protectionism by the EC
against Korea, 2)Korea's neo-mercantilist policy approach
and concentration of exports on a limited range of
products, and 3)inter-industry trade structure between
the EC and Korea, such as growing trade disputes in
specific sectors. The political determinants, I found,
are l)political expediency of the EC's protectionism
against Korea, which can be seen in examples of EC's
policy implementation procedures, such as low rate of
actual imposition of the EC's import restraints, and the
use of anti-dumping investigations as a preliminary
gambit in order to obtain concessions, and 2)a form of
" Japan Complex" effective against Korean exports to the
EC.
In addition to the above determinants, there are some
specific determinants(or specific procedures and
incidents) in connection with individual industries--the
EC's inconsistent policy implementation and the clerical
errors due to the growing workload of the EC
Commission(textiles
	 and	 clothing	 case),	 business
vii
cycle(iron and steel case), the EC's retaliation against
closed markets abroad, and the successful experience of
Italy and France in restricting imports of Korean
footwear through VER5 (footwear case), and EC's built-in
protectionism and failure in demand forecast, and the
deep-rooted distrust of Korean CTV exporters by the
EC(CTV case).
In order to analyse the effectiveness of protective
measures, I began by examining approaches by David Yoffie
and Patrick Messerlin. For the test of these approaches,
I examined the effectiveness of EC's import restraints
against Korean products by comparing how Korea's exports
of those products changed, in terms of volume and value,
following EC action. My findings are that the EC's
protective measures were successful in all cases
excepting one: the footwear products from Korea, the
imports of which continued to increase during the 1987-
1991 period despite EC restraints. I found that the major
determinant of effectiveness of EC's VERS was Korea's
international competitiveness in terms of revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) ratio of the subjected
products.	 Specifically,	 Korea's	 strong
competitiveness(and some weakening of EC's
competitiveness) in footwear contributed to the continued
increase in shipments of Korea's footwear to the EC
market. In contrast, EC's VERs against iron and steel
products, in which the EC has maintained international
competitive strength, were very effective in reversing
growth of imports from Korea. Additionally, EC's
impositions of AD duties proved to be very effective as a
means of protecting EC industries against foreign threat;
all Korean products subject to EC's AD measures showed a
declining trend in exports to the EC market during the
1987-1991 period, regardless of any weakness or strength
in international competitiveness of subjected products.
I concluded that the ineffectiveness of import
restraints, suggested by David Yoffie for U.S.-NIE5
trade, does not apply to EC-Korea trade. Patrick
viii
Messerlin's approach, however, is applicable in the EC-
Korea trade. I also found that arguments which only link
job losses in the EC with foreign imports are flawed. EC
companies face job losses not only as a direct result of
Korean imports, but also from the inability of EC
industry to restructure, and the remedial action taken by
them to counter Korean competition--such as
reorganization and rationalization of EC companies,
offshore processing activities in cheap labour cost
countries for major labour-intensive processes, and
automation of production facilities.
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1Introduction
1. Major Issues of World Trading Environment Around EC
and Korea
1-1 . Introduction
Louis Turner argued "trade politics has always been an
arena in which the motes in one's opponents' eyes have
always seemed mountainous, while one's own vision has
been crystal clear."1
1-us argument is well applicable to the current situation
of the world's trading order. Each country is blaming the
current problems of international trade upon faults and
results of self-interest seeking by its trading partners,
not recognizing its own problems. Most countries are
involved in providing subsidies to at least some of their
domestic industries and/or protecting them from foreign
imports through invoking various industrial and trade
policy instruments. Therefore, the principle of free
trade--"no tariffs, licenses or quotas on imports or
subsidies on exports;no collusive agreements between
governments, collecting marketing agencies, monopolies,
multinational or otherwise; and no barriers to
international payments or transfer payments of funds"--2
can not be found in its pure form anywhere in the world.
In an ideal world, each country would accumulate wealth
through specializing in products with natural absolute
and comparative advantages.3 In reality, these
comparative advantages of individual countries have been
more than arbitrarily complemented through government
involvement in industrialization and trade promotion.
Every country has been engaged in manipulating trade
through a wide variety of different industrial and trade
policies, 4
 regarding "trade not as an exchange in which
all nations can gain, but as a war won by running a trade
surplus and lost by having a deficit." 5
	"In the West,
countries that had formerly been highly dependent on
international trade resorted to a variety of
restrictions, including not only protective tariffs but
also more drastic measures such as physical import
2quotas, and import prohibitions, stimulating their own
exports by granting export subsidies and other measures
at the same time (trade under neo-mercantilism)."6
Furthermore, Lester Thurow has called "a carefully
worked-out strategy of protection for U.S.industries
against imports from Japan, Europe and many Third World
countries such as a package of protectionist measures,
from tariffs and quotas to administrative and legal
barriers, and retaliation against closed foreign markets,
arguing that it is wrong to rely on free trade and the
law of comparative advantage(strategic or managed
trade)." 7 However, the protectionism harms both the
protectionist country and the target country. "There is
no doubt that protection in the developed countries has
limited the scope for export expansion by the Newly
Industrializing	 Countries	 (NICs).	 Furthermore,
protectionism feeds protectionism and ends up in self-
insulation and growing inefficiency."8
As a result, every country focuses unduly on bilateral
trade balance figures, rather than overall trade
balances. Therefore, they perceive the international
trade as a zero-sum game (winners takes all, the losers
take nothing), rather than a game in which everybody
benefits, which was argued by classical economists such
as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.These distortions of the
classic free trade principle are linked to basic issues
of the world trading environment.In the following, I want
to introduce some of the fundamental problems providing
the background to protectionism.
1-2. Incompatibility of Economic Policies of Developed,
Developing and 'Threshold' Countries
One of the fundamental issues in the world trading
environment is the incompatibility of the strong,
authoritarian, government-led neo-mercantilist economic
policies in developing countries, especially Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs )-type threshold countries
to which Korea belongs, with economic policies in
developed countries.
3In terms of efficiencies in implementing economic policy,
NIEs-type developing countries are in a position to
"provide everything: cheap capital, control of the
workforce, protection from outside supplies, credits for
both exports and imports, virtually free land and low
cost inputs like electricity, and then hand the package
over to a private entrepreneur." 9 This makes the
comparative advantage of natural endowment in individual
countries fade into insignificance because NIEs-type
developing countries artificially manipulate their price
competitiveness in commodities through economic policies
penetrated into the microlevel. Therefore, developed
countries have a fundamental disadvantage,' 0
 even though
a part of these measures is also available to developed
countries.
On the other hand, some developing countries have
limitations in aggressive NIEs-type economic policy
implementations because "the higher rates of growth in
industry have not been followed by a radically changed
structure of employment. In India, 70 per cent of labour
force remain in agriculture, which is the backbone of the
economy with 40 per cent of the net domestic product."1
In terms of efficiencies in decision making, NIEs-type
developing countries are often advantaged because "they
are capable of pushing radical reforms with their
autonomy vis-a-vis vested interests." 12 Therefore, they
are in a position to concentrate on much more narrow
spread of industrial sectors such as textiles, iron and
steel, shipbuilding, automobiles and electronics.
Furthermore, they have efficient decision making, use of
resources and provision of support to those industries,
providing an advantage over developed countries in terms
of ability to focus on a limited range of sectors.For
example, major decisions for economic policy
implementations in developing countries are being made by
a handful of government officials, rather than by a
legislative body as in the case in developed countries.
Decision making in most developing countries have
4centralized and authoritarian characteristics, decision
makers having no need to consider a wide range of
interests from various groups. As a result, "government
officials are not caught between the presires oi ri'ial
interest groups lobbying for favours and the civil
service is relatively insulated from the legislature.'t13
Such efficient decision making in NIEs-type developing
countries allow them to meet internal and external
changes with flexibility. For example,they set annual
export targets for commodities, and then provide
institutional and financial support to exporters in
accordance with their achievement of target. Frequent
changes are made to the criteria for support, following
changes in the international trading environment.
On the other hand, decision making in developed countries
has a de-centralized and accommodating characteristic.
Major decisions are made in a legislature, rather than
at the executive level. Decision makers, having to
consider a wider range of interests, are more open to
lobbying	 by	 organized	 labour	 and	 industrial
associations.Therefore, decision-making in developed
countries is more time-consuming and less efficient,
compared to that of developing countries. "The Western
emphasis is on the rule of law and the use of non-
discretionary controls to the maximum extent possible."'4
However, some developing countries, such as India,
maintain a democratic regime, rather than an NIEs-type
authoritarian development regime. "They do very little in
terms of reform measures going against vested elite
interests. This reduces the capacity of such regimes for
promoting economic development. This type of regime lacks
the flexibility and innovation in the economy."' 5 They
have no advantage, in terms of efficient decision making,
over developed countries.
The degree of control over the labour movement, under
strong authoritarian governments in NIE5-type developing
countries, has been high. Such restriction allows
developing countries to secure cheap and controlled
5labor. "In contrast, strong labor movements in Western
countries and their long-standing participation as part
of ruling coalitions mean that the interest of workers
must be taken into account in attempting industrial
adjustment." 16 As a result, developed countries have to
put up with higher labor cost and social overheads.
Furthermore, men and women in NIE5-type developing
countries	 are	 "subject	 to	 invidious	 racial
discrimination. Therefore, women were particularly
exploited and received much lower wages than men for
similar work, and predominated in the older textile
sector." 17 Industrialization in NIEs-type developing
countries is greatly indebted to the sacrifice of women
workers, who put up with such low levels of wage and job
security.
Regarding the degree of job security, "paternalistic
system of employment such as wages paid according to
seniority of workers and year-end bonuses for workers
promoted a strong sense of worker identification with the
company and a willingness to collaborate with the
management. In contrast, workers in developed countries
tended to see the introduction of new technologies as a
source of threat to their job security." 18 Also,
'democratic-regime' developing countries have
difficulties in suppressing labor movement and exploiting
low-wage workers because democracy brings civil and human
rights and liberties.
In terms of cultural characteristics, developing
countries have a greater impact on social developments,
helped by their cultural background (e.g. Confucianism)
and control over media. Such cultural characteristics are
not found in developed countries. In 1991, the Korean
government backed up a campaign to reduce imports by
announcing more severe tax inspection of persons
consuming luxury items, effecting particularly European
exporters.These	 cultural	 characteristics	 help	 the
governments of
	 NIEs-type developing countries to
6implement their economic policies with high efficiency
and consistency.
As a result of those differences in economic, political,
social and cultural backgrounds, there is a fundamental
difference between developing and developed countries in
terms of economic policies, and the ability to implement
any relevant policy.
1-3. Graduation and the 'Threshold' Countries
The strong neo-mercantilist policy implementation in
developing countries, with their special focus on a
limited number of promising industrial sectors, created
some labour-intensive industries able to maintain
international competitiveness and threaten counterpart
industries in developed countries. Based on these partial
successes, developed countries claimed that NIEs-type
threshold countries should accept increased obligations
in the economic sphere.Louis Turner defines the concept
of graduation as "a strand in thinking of developed
countries that NIC exporters should start 'graduating'
that is, that they should increasingly lose the
preferential treatment available to them as LDCs, and
should increasingly shoulder the burden of being just
another set of actors in the world's trading arena with
an emphasis more and more on the obligations of the NICs,
rather than on their rights."19
However, NIEs are reluctant to accept these obligations,
leading to growing trade conflicts between developed and
threshold countries in connection with the concept of
graduation.For example, the United States terminated, in
1988, its GSP status given to Korea, the reason given
that Korea had moved from the status of a developing
country to one of a developed country. There are,
however, no generally recognized yardsticks to decide the
point where a threshold country becomes developed. In the
case of Korea,many sectors, such as finance and service
sectors, are still under-developed in contrast to
others,such as electronics,which are at the forefront of
international competition. 2 ° This partial success makes
7the establishment of a yardstick for deciding the point
of graduation more difficult. Furthermore, it has caused
overproduction in certain industries and the consequences
for trade, i.e. rise of protectionism. In addition, the
confusion of terms between graduation of specific
industries, as opposed to the graduation of a country for
which the terms is normally intended, in the
international trading arena has been making trade
disputes between developed and developing countries
worse.
The first major conflicts in connection with the
graduation issue is related to the inter-industry trade
structure. The increasing sophistication of export items
from developing countries to developed countries has
produced growing competition between them in similar
product range.Furthermore, developing countries have
increasingly moved to the export of finished products,
rather than parts or sub-assemblies, as the result of
their industrialization strategy--production of final
products through an assembly of parts and equipment
imported from foreign countries, with a low level of
labor costs at home. The graduation of specific
industries in threshold countries has reversed the
original intra-industry complementarity between developed
and developing countries, for example the exports of
parts and equipments by developing countries to the same
industries in developed countries which manufacture
finished products. The graduation of these industries in
threshold countries resulted in an inter-industry trade
structure, i.e. competition in the same finished products
between developed and developing countries. Korea and the
EC have been competing in the world market for exports
of iron and steel products, electronics products and
textiles and clothing. They are declining industries in
the EC and growing industries in Korea. The fact that
Korea's major exports to the EC coincide with EC's major
export items to the world market suggests the reason for
current trade disputes in those areas between the EC and
8Korea. Also, it is ironical that Korea's graduation in
some industries has been promoted through foreign direct
investments(FDI) in Korea by developed countries such as
Japan. Developed countries made FDI in Korea as a part of
efforts to promote industrial structure adjustment by
moving their labour-intensive industries to cheap labour
countries.
Another major conflict in connection with the graduation
issue is related to reciprocity. Developed countries
have been arguing that NIEs are now fully developed
economies to which the same trade rules can be applied as
to other advanced industrial countries. However,the level
of openness in trade between developed and NIEs differs
greatly, because most tariffs of NIEs' manufactured goods
are unbound in the GATT. Specifically, NIEs get an
exceptional treatment from the GATT in relation to the
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs. Therefore, they can
maintain higher tariff levels for manufactured goods.
However, developed countries have to observe the tariff
reduction principle under the GATT. That leads to the
perception that developed countries' markets are unfairly
open to exports from NIEs, considering the difficulties
advanced countries have in penetrating NIEs' markets, and
that it is contrary to the reciprocity and the principle
of trade based on mutual benefits. As a result, major
advanced countries have used the principle of reciprocity
as a weapon and an excuse for protectionism,
	 imposing
trade restrictive measures on products from those
developing countries not offering reciprocal
treatment.The EC-Korea trade is a classic example of the
graduation issue.
1-4. Insufficiency of Regulatory Bodies for the World
Trading System
Despite the growing conflicts between developed and
developing countries, mainly originating from the
incompatibility of economic policies and the graduation
issue,	 let alone trade disputes among developed
countries,	 the General Agreement on Tariffs and
9Trade(GATT), the multilateral trading organization to
manage the international trading system, has not been
functioning well. 21 The GATT, established under the
leadership of the United States and its allies, has been
losing its functional power following the relative
weakness of the U.S.hegemony. Particularly, it showed its
limitations by accommodating the self-interests of major
trading partners, and institutional weakness in its
inability to settle international trade disputes.Such
limitations and institutional weakness could be seen in
the long drawn out Uruguay Round negotiations. 22
 The
world's major trading countries "think it would be
wonderful for the Uruguay Round to be crowned by the
liberalization of the trade policies of every country
except their own. No wonder they find it so difficult to
agree." 23 Robert Gilpin ironically describes this
situation as "the existence of a liberal trade regime in
a world composed largely of illiberal states." 2 ' As a
result of the lack of functional power to accommodate the
self-interest of every country involved, there were no
results in the GATT multilateral talks for six and a half
years since the Uruguay Round was initiated in September,
1986.(Note:during the period of writing this thesis,
participants in the multilateral negotiations finally
reached an agreement on Dec.15, 1993).25
The relative decline of U.S.hegemony and its causal
relationship with deadlock in multilateral trade talks
contributed to the growing regionalism in the world
trading arena.This regionalism was firstly caused by the
GATT's allowance of such exceptional cases as common
markets or free trade agreements, and then was expanded
by the ill-functioning of the GATT. For example, the EC
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have
agreed to set up the European Economic Area (EEA) in
1992. The United States, Canada and Mexico have concluded
an agreement to set up the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA) in 1992. The formation of NAFTA has
been regarded as a response against "Fortress Europe,"
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expected by the completion of the Single Market in the
EC. 26
 In addition, Asian and Pacific-basin countries have
set up in 1989, at the suggestion of Australia, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council(APEC), even though
it is a consultative body dealing with issues such as
harmonization of customs duties and exchange of
information on marine pollution without functioning as a
common market or free trade areas. 27 Australia and New
Zealand have also been under a free trade agreement,
named the Closer Economic Relations Pact (CERP),effective
in 1990. Furthermore, "Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia
have concluded a free trade agreement in December, 1993,
effective in the first half of 1994, as a first step in
Latin America's quest for economic integration and closer
political cooperation." 28
 In addition, Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, the Andean Group,
plan to start a customs union in 1994 as a customs union
among developing countries. Negotiations are also
underway among negotiators from Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay to set up the South American Common
Market (Mercusur) within 1994. Such growing regionalism
has created concern among the world's trading countries
about the utmost self-interest seeking by major economic
blocs.
Furthermore, the early concentration of the GATT to
lessen tariff barriers resulted in the proliferation of
non-tariff barriers,the so-called 'neo-protectionism, '29
in the 1970s and the 1980s, vis-a-vis old protectionism
in the 1930s and its acceptance of many exceptional
protective measures, such as safeguard measures due to
international balance of trade problems and sectorial
protectionism,which caused spillover effects of
protectionism to other industries. 30 As a result, there
is concurrent existence of multilateralism, bilateralism
and unilateralism (or regionalism) in international trade
since the 1970s. Namely, international trade has been
managed multilaterally in textiles and clothing sectors
under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), bilaterally
11
under voluntary export restraints (VERs), later renamed
as voluntary restraint agreements(VRAs), or orderly
marketing agreements (OMAs), and unilaterally under
unilateral impositions of quantitative restrictions or
tariff rate increases. The drastic expansion of
unilateral and bilateral measures represented the
relatively weakening influence of the GATT.
Through the closely interrelated major issues of world
trading environment around the EC and Korea, it can be
found that one trading partner exaggerates the other's
strength and also its own weakness. That could lead to
direct confrontation rather than compromise. Therefore,
Louis Turner's argument on the trade politics is very
pertinent to the current situation of world trading
environment.
2. Protectionism or Industrial Structure Adjustment?
2-1. Introduction
The result of the above mentioned problems have countries
face with the choice of either countering those problems
with protectionist measures or with a restructuring of
their industries to make them more internationally
competitive •31
The international political economy (IPE) literature 32 is
divided into those who argue that protectionism 33
 is
needed by developed countries against developing
countries to protect themselves from the loss of jobs and
the disappearance of declining industries, and others who
argue that the challenge from developing countries should
not be countered by protectionism but by industrial
readjustment leading to higher technological levels of
production.On the other hand, there are scholars who take
skeptical views about one-way industrial structure
adjustment, or, argue the ineffectiveness of
protectionism. They do not necessarily support industrial
structure adjustment or protectionism.
2-2. Protectionism or Industrial Structure Adjustment?
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Wynne Godley, Francis Cripps and others of the Cambridge
Economic Policy Group (CEPG) support protective measures
to cope with foreign threats. They point out:34
Import controls should form an integral part of any
strategy and protection from foreign competition is
essential to preserve jobs and facilitate industrial
expansion.TJ2e increased demand for import
substitutes which would follow from protection would
then provide employment.
Some scholars completely support industrial structure
adjustment by developed countries. For example,David
Greenaway argues the active adjustment of declining
industries in developed countries as follows:35
Industries which can not compete, now or in the
future, and especially those which can not compete
with standardised manufactured imports from the
developing world, should be permitted to run down,
possibly with interim measures to alleviate the
human problems associated with industrial
degeneration. The resources thereby released could
then be developed in areas of comparative advantage.
These arguments are backing industrial adjustments of
developed countries to more highly skilled and technology
intensive sectors, from labor-intensive and low-skilled
sectors where advanced countries have been losing their
comparative advantage.
Indirect support of industrial structure adjustment comes
from those who consider protectionism as inefficient in
itself, and job losses in developed countries having a
causal relationship with imports, rather than imports
themselves. They maintain that protective measures
adopted by developed countries, against imports from
developing countries, are not efficient measures to
protect job losses because of the selectivity of import
restraints and the causal relationship of import
restrictive measures. For example, exporting countries
which are not affected by a particular import restraint
could exploit the opportunity of having competitors
excluded and increase their exports into that market.
Also, companies in importing countries could exert their
efforts towards survival, against internal and external
pressures, through promoting automation and industrial
13
restructuring, but likely affecting the job maintenance
in those countries.
Louis Turner indirectly supports industrial structure
adjustment, defending the position of the Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs). According to him,36
the NICs may not be a particularly important force
in destroying jobs in Advanced Industrializing
Countries (AICs), but the emergence of these
countries has coincided with the initial impact of
micro-electronics on assembly technologies (which
will mostly affect unskilled labour) and of the oil-
price revolution, which has changed the underlying
economies of whole industrial sectors (thus
affecting skilled and unskilled labour alike). This
triple impact of the NICs, micro-electronics and
high oil prices may well have speeded the continuing
process of job destruction in the advanced
countries, and has certainly made job creation more
of an uncertain process than it has been in the
past."
Christopher Saunders also supports, indirectly,
industrial adjustment by developed countries when arguing
that "job losses are due to slow growth of demand and
changes in its pattern and the continued rise in labour
productivity not purely due to the net effect of trade
with the NICs."37
Indirect support of industrial structure adjustment also
comes from those who compare economic costs to
consumers and benefits to producers in countries which
initiate such import restraints.Their conclusions are
that the costs to consumers, caused by import restraints,
such as the restriction of consumer choices and rises in
consumer prices, are always higher than the benefits to
producers such as increases in production and maintenance
of job employment. Regarding the costs and benefits of
such protective measures, Gary Hufbauer, Diane Berliner
and Kimberly Elliott made case studies jointly for 31
sectors in the United States. Their conclusions are as
follows : 8
Costs to consumers of special protection are huge.
These costs represent a giant off-budget transfer
from consumers on the one hand to producers and
foreign suppliers on the other. Against these total
costs, the production jobs 'saved' in the affected
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industries, are, on the whole, rather modest. By far
the largest jobs saved number is in textiles and
apparel (640,000); followed by automobiles (55,000),
fishery (27,000) and dairy (25,000). As a
consequence, costs per production job saved are
quite large,usually in the range of $20,000 to
$100,000 per year, and often exceeding $150,000. The
fact that costs to consumers per production job
saved are so high underpins the strategy for an
alternative approach that would liberally compensate
departing workers for moving to new industries or
early retirement.
Therefore, it is clear most protective measures adopted
by the United States are not efficient at increasing
total benefits to producers and reducing total costs to
consumers. This conclusion by American scholars is also
supported by research done by British scholars. David
Greenaway and Brian Hindley jointly analyzed effects of
VER measures adopted by the United Kingdom against video
cassette recorders ( VCR) from Japan, motor cars from
Japan, clothing from Hong Kong and other developing
countries, and non-leather footwear from Taiwan and
Korea. The results of the joint study are as follows:39
The minimum costs of protection through VERs in the
four industries in the United Kingdom was £378
million per annum. True cost was likely to be
several times that amount. Protection did not buy
jobs for the economy as a whole. It simply shifts
them around between industries. Costs of protection
per job are very high. A large sum of British money
could be saved by abandoning the use of VERS. The
VERs did not in fact assist the achievement of any
defensible policy aim.
The same result was also drawn by the National Consumer
Council of the United Kingdom (NCC). The NCC made an
analysis about the costs to consumers in the United
Kingdom and the EC, incurred by import restraints such as
VERs in trade of cars signed with Japan, and AD measures
against imports of consumer electronics products such as
compact disk players (CDP). The NCC argues:4°
A deal between the EC and Japan will raise the
average price of each Japanese car sold by £740 and
cost EC consumers £23 billion over seven years. The
EC AD measures on electronics goods, such as CDP,
VCR and photocopiers, cost EC consumers and
businesses some £1.3 billion a year and the
U.K.consumers £270 million, On the other hand, jobs
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may be saved in one industry through those
protective measures, but at the expense of jobs
elsewhere.
The conclusion can be drawn that the costs incurred by
import restraints, to consumers, is far higher than
benefits to producers. All analyses agree with this
negative conclusion on protectionist measures, despite
such analyses not being specifically concerned with costs
and benefits incurred by consumers and producers in
exporting countries subject to those measures.If the
protective measures adopted by advanced countries are not
efficient in saving jobs, the analysis of costs to
exporting countries due to the stringent protective
measures, could be an additional attraction to support
their arguments for positive industrial structure
adjustment rather than defensive protective measures.
On the other hand, Wolfgang Hager takes a skeptical view
about the one-way industrial structure adjustment by
developed countries, whilst not necessarily advocating
protectionism. He regards industrial structure adjustment
without considering the negative effects of neo-
mercantilist policies in developing countries as
meaningless. His main arguments are centered on criticism
of the aggressive industrial policies of developing
countries which artificially decide the comparative
advantage between developed and developing countries. He
also criticizes the misleading effect of industrial
structure adjustment, to high-technology-intensive sector
from labor-intensive sector, by developed countries as
follows :41
Industrialized countries have to shed a few labor
intensive industrial activities, moving up market
in terms of both production technology and
product.Implicit in this is the notion of "natural
shelters"--dizzy heights of sophistication which
brown people (other than Japanese) will not be able
to reach. This is arrogant racism. Machine tools,
aeroplanes and the most sophisticated consumer
products are already being exported by the LDCs. One
is to point out the stable composition of final
consumer demand--the basket of things people
actually buy, and for which the rest of industry
provides the inputs. The world will need only a
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limited amount of nuclear power stations,satellites,
or ocean mining equipment, even in future; but it
will need tennis rackets, bottle openers, carpets,
and shoes.
Patrick Messerlin emphasises the negative impact of
protectionism by the EC on exports from developing
countries as a result of EC's AD measures. Also, he
concerns with retaliatory actions expected by developing
countries, caused by the negative impacts of EC'S import
restraints against them, such as their own initiations of
AD actions against developed countries. However, he does
not necessarily support industrial structure adjustment.
According to him,42
the costs for the foreign exporters are the net
result of the losses in exported quantities and the
gains in rents received in the remaining quantities
to be exported: a rough estimate suggests a net loss
of 17 per cent of the initial value of the exports
for the LDCs, and 25 per cent for the NICs. Three
years after the initiation of the AD investigation,
the EC's anti-dumping measures reduced imported
quantities from developing countries by 40 per
cent.
David Yoffie focuses upon the ineffectiveness of
protectionism,	 although not	 necessarily advocating
industrial structure adjustment.He criticizes the
strategy of NIEs in increasing their exports to the
United States. Through the analysis of the effects of
VERs and 0MAS 43
 on textiles, apparels, footwear, color
television sets and automobiles imported from those East
Asian countries--Korea, Taiwan,and Hong Kong, Yoffie
concludes as follows:44
To a large extent, exporters managed to mitigate the
effects of the United States trade barriers by
taking advantage of the accommodating nature of
American protectionist policies. Hegemonic objective
and bureaucratic politics constrained the United
States bargaining and implenmentation during the
most of the post-war period. As American hegemony
declines and decision makers learn from their
experiences in various sectors, the future remains
an open question.
His main argument is that protective measures by the
United States are ineffective in reversing the growing
trends of exports of NIEs to the United States. He gives
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as reason for this ineffectiveness the structural
problems of decision making in the United States. "There
are political and economic weakness in the structure of
modern protectionism and politics of trade have
paradoxically created opportunities for the 'weak' to
beat the 'strong' at their own game." 45 Therefore, key
points of his argument are that new NIEs will
continuously emerge in the international trading
community as long as the domestic political problems in
the United States remain unchanged, and cheating and
trans-shipment strategy of exporters is tolerated. It
follows that protectionism will be useless in
contributing to obstructing the growing exports from the
new NIEs to the United States. However, he did not define
his position between protectionism and industrial
structure adjustment as a means of coping with pressures
for developed countries through imports from developing
countries.
In sum, there are not so many academics who strongly
support protective measures, except for CEPG. Most
scholars directly or indirectly support industrial
structure adjustment, rather than protectionism.
3. Main Objectives of Thesis
3-1.First Objective--To Test Approaches to Evaluate
Determinants of Protectionism Using the Case of EC-Korea
Trade
Along with the arguments regarding the choice between
protectionism and industrial structure adjustment, the
IPE literature moved its attention to the determinants of
protectionism. This literature emphasizes the supply side
of protectionism (government behavior) such as hegemonic
stability approach and business cycle approach, and with
those specializing in the demand side of protectionism
(private company behavior) such as export dependence
approach, multinationalisation approach, exit-entry
barrier approach, strategic trade approach and voting
power and degree of collective action approach.
3-1-1. Supply-Side Approaches
3-1-1-1. Hegemonic Stability Approach
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The first approach to explain the supply factor of
protective measures, under the perspectives of IPE, 46
 is
closely related to the existence of hegemonic power.47
According to Stephen Krasner,48
there is causal relation in which the global
distribution of economic power covaries with the
degree of openness in the international trading
system. A concentration of power in the
international system will be accommpanied by an open
trading regime. Where power is diffuse, on the other
hand, closure is expected. Thus, the presence of a
hegemon--the highest concentration of power--
encourages open trading relations, the absence of a
hegemon encourages protection.
In connection with Krasner's hegemonic stability
approach, there are many arguments to test the approach
by academicians. 49 John Conybeare tested the approach
using tariff levels of the United States in 1913-25
(rising	 u.s.hegemony)	 and	 1952-62	 and	 1962-1971
(declining U.S. hegemony). According to him,5°
for all three periods,tariff averages move in the
direction opposite to that predicted by the
Krasner's approach.Therefore, one might save the
hegemony theory by distinguishing between a
regime's start-up costs, which may be high, and
its maintenance costs,	 which may be low,	 though
again the theory would have 	 to be predictively
specific.
To supplement such problems in the hegemonic stability
approach, William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera also
argue : 1
Rising .hegemons create political institutions and
policies that reward specific groups. In periods of
decline, these same groups retain their domestic
clout and continue to press for the old policies
linked to ascendancy. As a consequence, the
structure of international trade is altered in
crisis-catalyzed "fits and starts."
Therefore, there is a trend which is contradictory to the
hegemonic stability approach.
The testing of the applicability of hegemonic stability
approach was continued by Helen Mimer. She points
out: 5 2
The Krasner's approach was operated in an opposite
way in the 1920s, a rising hegemon period for the
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United States, and the 1970s, a declining hegemon
period for the United States. The hegemonic
stability approach by Krasner was not applicable in
the 1920s and the 1970s in the United States
because of three factors: Firstly, American hegemony
has not declined enough to set off the expected
protectionist response. Secondly, there was an
international regime in trade like the GATT.Thirdly,
despite the pressures for protection in the 1970s,
a different policy structure existed which helped
diffuse these pressures.
Arthur Stein also argues:53
A hegemon can not alone bring about an open trading
order and it can unilaterally reduce its own
tariffs, but this does not create an international
trading order of lower tariffs, and it can impose an
open trading regime on weak countries, but this too
does not create a global regime.
It is, therefore,very interesting to check whether the
hegemonic stability approach is applicable in the EC's
protectionism against Korea. For example, in the 1970s
and the 1980s when U.S. hegemonic power had been
declining, the United States tightened its import
restraints against Korea, and the EC followed suit,
according to the hegemonic stability approach.
3-1-1-2.Business Cycle Approach
The second approach to explain the supply factors of
protectionism by national governments is related to
business cycle perspectives. Timothy McKeown hypothesised
that "periods of economic contraction such as depressions
will shift the political balance over to the side of
protection, while periods of expansion shift the balance
in favor of free trade."54
To test the business cycle approach by McKeown, Giulio
Gallarotti set up a following model which "suggests that
changing economic conditions will alter the distribution
of tariff legislation through both supply and demand
effects. "55
As to demand effects, an expanding economy will
raise the relative voice of free traders, thus
causing demands for low tariffs to expand and demand
for high tariffs to contract. Conversely, economic
contraction will raise the relative voice of
protectionists, thus stimulating an opposite
movement in demand for each commodity. Turning to
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the supply side, movements in government supply
curves are stimulated by changes in profits forgone
and by changing legislation costs. Since an
expanding economy raises the profits that government
obtains from producing free-trade legislation, it
follows that the production of protection becomes
more expensive. More must be given up in terms of
free-trade profits, which are now greater, in order
to produce each additional unit of protection.
Conversely, economic contraction causes the profits
obtained from the production of free trade to
decrease, thereby making it cheaper to produce
protection.
However, Giulio Gallarotti also found an inconsistency of
his model with the business cycle hypothesis.
Namely,"exporting firms, regardless of economic expansion
or contraction, prefer low or no domestic tariffs because
thier input costs will be reduced and because low
domestic tariffs might serve to induce other nations to
open their markets to foreign product. tt56 The economic
expansion and contraction in the EC might be closely
linked to its inclination away from and toward
protectionism against Korea if the business cycle
approach is applicable in the SC-Korea trade.
3-1-2. Demand-Side Approaches
3-1-2-1 . Economic-Side Approaches
Facing these dilemmas from hegemonic stability and
business cycle approaches, literature in IPE changed its
focus to the analysis of demand-side factors of
protectionism, rather than supply-side factors of
protectionism.
Firstly, in connection with the test of business cycle
approach,Giulio Gallarotti finds exporting firms always
prefer free trade, and import-competing firms, on the
other hand, prefer protectionism (export dependence
approach).
Secondly, Helen Mimer focused her analysis on the degree
of integration of companies into the international
economy (multinationalization approach). She points
out
The more integrated a company was into the
international economy, the less likely the company
was to seek import restraints even when imports rose
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significantly. Therefore, firms with well-developed
multinational operations including integrated global
production and trade flows and strong exports did
not seek protection even when imports rose to high
levels.
Thirdly, Helen Mimer and David Yoffie emphasized the
strategic trade demands of companies as major
determinants of protectionism (strategic trade demands
approach). 58
 According to them,59
similar to the trade position of agricultural
exporter, who also do not have the option of
investing abroad when faced with foreign protection,
internationally oriented firms with large economies
of scale or steep learning curves will resort to
strategic trade demands in order to pry foreign
markets open, due to the fact that the combination
of these market imperfections and successful foreign
government intervention should lead internationally
oriented firms to view unconditional domestic free
trade as the worst possible outcome.
Fourthly, Vinod Aggrawal, Robert Keohane and David
Yoffie made an approach to find real determinants of
protective measures with an emphasis put on exit and
entry barriers and size of domestic industrial sectors
(exit and entry barrier approach). "The entry barriers
include the height of economic barriers restricting entry
of foreign producers into an industry (high capital
requirements, unavailable technology or high levels of
differentiation). The exit barriers are the exit or
adjustment strategies of the domestic firms (economic
distress as indicated by profitability and employment
trends and of the political resources available and the
difficulty of exit)." 6 ° Their arguments are as follows:61
Firstly, if an industry faces low barriers to entry
and exit, and also happens to be large, we would
predict a pattern of institutionalized protection
that would be unstable in the long run. As long as
the costs of lobbying remain lower than the costs of
exit, the demand for protection will remain high
(Example:textiles and apparel).
Secondly, we expect protectionism to be temporary
under the condition that the barriers to exit might
be high and the barriers to entry low, and the
industry small because new entrants will con tiune to
penetrate domestic market (Example: color TV set,
and footwear).
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Thirdly, we expect sporadic protection in industries
with high barriers to exit and high barriers to
entry that do not adjust during the period of
protection, because rising import penetration will
lead to renewed industry distress and renewed
protectionism (Example:steel and iron).
Fifthly, Stephen Marks and John McArthur added three
economic factors to determine protective measures as
follows :62
1) Comparative advantage--the greater the inherent
comparative advantage of an industry temporarily
threatened by the imports, the greater is the
likelihood that it will eventually regain its
competitive position internationally. Therefore,
industries with stronger comparative advantage
demand less protection.
2) Import penetration--the higher the share of
imports in total consumption of the products of an
industry, or the lower the industry trade balance,
the more likely is it that import competition will
be identified as the source of its difficulties and
thus the more likely is it that the industry will
seek protection.
3) Labor adjustment cost--the greater are the
adjustment costs anticipated for an industry
confronted by dislocation, the more likely are
policy makers to grant it protection from import
competition.
It is meaningful to test various economic-side factors to
determine protectionism with the viewpoint that various
protective measures are likely to be implemented for
economic reasons.Furthermore, it can be assumed that
major protective measures are adopted, based on other
than purely economic reasons when the tests of economic-
side determinants are not applicable as determinants of
protectionism in the EC- Korea trade.
3-1-2-2.Political-Side Approaches
In connection with political factors 63
 that determine
protectionism in the level of actor behavior, Richard
Caves considers two general political economy models.
"The first is an 'adding-machine' model that assumes
maximization of voter support to be the dominant policy
motive. The second is an 'interest-group' model that
stresses the costs and benefits of collective action by
industry groups." 64
 Stephen Marks and John McArthur also
argue political potency as one of major factors to
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determine protective measures. Namely,"larger industries
should be more powerful politically, in terms of votes
and dollars that can be mustered in support of their
positions. More concentrated industries exert more
effective pressure for protection.' t65 Therefore, voter
support and the degree of collective action are crucial
factors in deciding protective measures in terms of
political side.
For example, an industry group which has a large number
of members certainly have a powerful ability to demand
protection. However,"large numbers in a beneficiary group
will reduce the group's capacity for collective action,
due to the incentives for each actor to 'free-ride' on
the efforts of others. A high level of diversification
implies large numbers of actors in the exports sector and
therefore a lower ability to collude for the purpose of
influencing tariff policy." 66 Regarding the degree of
concentration and its efficiency of demands for
protective measures, Helen Mimer argued "cases where the
industry was divided reduced their capacity for effective
political influence." 67 Her argument, however, is
difficult to apply in Korea. Protective measures in Korea
seems to be established as a result of the Korean
government's initiative, rather than political influence
of Korean industries. The Korean government has been
preparing a wide range of tariff and non-tariff measures,
based on its necessity of promoting industrialization and
export	 promotion	 under the	 strong	 authoritarian
government since 1962, as seen later in Chapter II.
Therefore, those industries which have large numbers of
employees have power to demand protectionism due to their
great voting strength. However, the diversification of
export items could contribute to lessening the power to
collude for the demand of protectionism.
3-2. Second Objective:To Test M Own Hypotheses Regarding
Determinants of Protectionism Using the Case of EC-Korea
Trade
The IPE literature has concentrated on behavior of
countries which initiate import restraints, rather than
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on those Countries which were the target of these
measures. 68
 As a result, the behavior of countries
subject to import restraints, as determinants of
protectionism, has not been fully investigated so far.
Also, the literature does not address some specific
circumstances related to BC-Korea trade in connection
with determinants of protectionism. When the determinants
of EC'S protectionism against Korea are examined, Korea's
special relationship with Japan and the United States
should not be overlooked. Korea's rapid economic
development is closely linked with unique special
political and economic cooperations with those two
countries.
3-2-1.My First Hypothesis
My first hypothesis is that the BC's import restraints
against Korea have been strongly influenced by its
previous experience of industrial damage caused by
Japanese exports to the EC market in the 1960s and the
19705. 69
 This hypothesis is based on the fact that Korea
has been conducting very similar industrial and trade
strategy as Japan. Brian Bridges argued this point as
follows :70
Actions by the EC against imports from Korea are
strongly reminiscent of action taken against
Japanese imports in the second half of the 1970s.
Therefore, as if guilty by association, Korea is
being sucked into EC-Japan trading disputes; for
example, the Japanese 'threat' served as the
precedent for the EC to impose a bilateral
arrangement covering steel from Korea in 1979,
despite the fact that it was still a minor exporter
and its domestic demand in 1978-1979 actually took
up all its production.
This 'guilt by association' is closely related to the
issue of 'graduation' since there is the implied
assumption that Korea has already graduated to the
economic status of Japan, i.e. to that of a developed
country and should therefore be dealt with in the same
way.
3-2-2. My Second Hypothesis
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My second hypothesis is that the EC's protective measures
were determined by the United States' imposition of
similar measures against products from Korea. The Korean
government policy of import substitution and export-
oriented industrial development strategy has been greatly
influenced by the United States. The United States
influenced Korea not only in security aspects but also in
the government policy making direction. In addition,
Korea's specific sectors-oriented development strategy
was also a direct result of the U.S.policy change, as
seen in Chapter II.
This connection between the United States and Korea
contributed to the expansion of mutual trade relations.
As a result, the United States has been maintaining its
position as the largest importer of Korean commodities
since 1970. However, the relative weakness of hegemonic
power of the United States and growing competitiveness of
Korea's exports made the United States adopt stringent
import restraints on the one hand, and made Korea switch
its export market to the EC on the other. That caused the
EC to implement import restraints against Korea. Based on
this trend, I hypothesize:the priority of the EC in
imposing protective measures against imports of Korean
products is to consider whether or not those products are
under import restraints from the United States. If the
products are subject to import restraints from the United
States, it is possible that Korea will switch its market
to the EC, jeopardizing the industry concerned there.
3-2-3.My Third Hypothesis
My third hypothesis is that the EC's protectionism is a
function of divergent industrial and trade policies for
several strategic industries in the EC and Korea, and
their causal relationship with bilateral inter-industry
trade structure. The EC-Korea trade disputes worsened as
a result of Korea's strong neo-mercantilist policy
approach and EC'S incoherent industrial policy making at
member states' level.
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Korea began its industrialization through fostering
several industries such as textiles and clothing, iron
and steel and consumer electronics. On the other hand,
the EC has been implementing various policies to protect
these industries from foreign challenges, causing the
inter-industry trade structure problems between the EC
and Korea.
For example, textiles and clothing sectors were major
foreign exchange earners for Korea in the 1960s. Thus,
the share of those products in Korea's exports accounted
for between 20 and 40 per cent of the total since 1970.
On the other hand, the EC had been experiencing surplus
capacity problems in those industries due to aggressive
expansion of production facilities in the 1950s and the
1960s, and decreases in demands internally and externally
in the process of two rounds of oil shocks. As a result,
the EC had been forced to choose industrial structure
adjustment in those industries or postpone the structural
adjustment through the implementation of protective
measures from foreign imports. The same situation
occurred in iron and steel industry in the 1970s in both
Korea and the EC. Furthermore, Korea has been
implementing an aggressive industrial policy since the
1980s for the promotion of electronics as a strategic
industry for Korea's economic development. However, the
EC has also been fostering the electronics industry as
the most crucial industrial sector to accomplish the EC's
strong industrial revival in future.
My hypotheses can be called as a model of global
deflection of protectionist impulses, i.e. between Japan,
the United States and the EC markets. Korea's heavy
dependence on Japanese industrial parts and equipment for
industrialization and closeness of Japanese market for
Korean exports resulted in Korea's concentration of
exports to the United States. However, U.S.protectionism
later against Korean products enabled Korean exporters
switch their markets to the EC, causing EC's
protectionism against Korean products. Furthermore,
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Korea's export pattern in the EC was very similar to that
of Japanese exporters. As a result, EC's protective
measures against Korean exports were closely related to
EC's Japan Complex and Korea's market switching strategy.
3-3. Third objective---To Test Approaches to Evaluate
Effectiveness of Protectionism in Terms of Achievement or
Failure of Aims of Protective Measures Using the Case of
EC-Korea Trade
David Yoffie and Patrick Messerlin are the two major
authors who proposed approaches to evaluate the
achievement and failure of import restraints. The common
problem in their approaches is that they only consider
VERs and OMA5, or AD measures separately. Therefore,
these approaches have limitations to be applicable in the
EC-Korea trade as methods to evaluate effectiveness of
protectionism. The approaches should be complemented with
the general consideration of major types of protective
measures--quota, VERs, OMAs, AD duties impositions,
countervailing (Cv) duties impositions and price
undertakings. Also, the result of the two analyses is
completely contradictory. Specifically, David Yoffie
argues NIEs can increase their exports to the United
States, despite protective measures against their
products. However, Patrick Messerlin argues exports by
NIEs to the EC drastically decreased due to protective
measures against their products. Therefore, my third
objective of this thesis is to test the approaches by
David Yoffie and Patrick Messerlin to evaluate the
effectiveness of EC's protectionism against Korea. For
this purpose, I will analyze changes of Korea's export
figures of commodities subject to EC's import
restraints.If the result of the test coincides with
Patrick Messerlin's approach, it will be certain that
protectionism is harmful to both initiators and
recipients of import restraints, considering the result
of cost and benefit analyses in IPE literature (the costs
to consumers in initiator countries of import restraints
are always higher than the benefits to producers in these
countries) 71
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4. organization and Methodology of Thesis 72
Overall, this thesis is organized into two parts--part
one comprising Chapters 1 to 4 and part two comprising
Chapters 5 to 8.
Part one primarily presents broad analysis of
determinants and effectiveness of the EC's import
restraints against Korea through analyzing EC-Korea trade
relations in the 1970-1992 period, prior to more detailed
case analyses in part two. As a result, the part one
heavily relies on the literature covering the EC 73 and
Korea, in contrast to my case studies in the part two
where many original approaches are covered.
Chapter 1 describes industrial and trade policies, 74 and
problems in the policy decision making process in the EC
in order to examine the origins of the determinants and
the effectiveness of EC'S protectionism against Korea.
Also, this chapter examines the relationship between the
EC and its member states' implementation of industrial
and trade policies, and protectionism in the EC such as
production capacity surplus problems and their impacts on
the EC and EC member states' protective measures.
Chapter 2 deals with issues and problems of Korea's
industrial and trade policies, and policy decision making
process to look into the impact of Korea's behavior on
EC's protectionism against Korea. Especially, there is an
analysis of how Korea's neo-mercantilist policy approach
contributed to the strength and weakness of several
industries and international trade in Korea.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the connection between
bilateral economic policy changes and the EC-Korea trade
disputes, the EC-Korea trade structure development and
the EC-Korea trade disputes, and finally comparison of
protectionism in the EC and other advanced countries
against Korea.
The main purpose of Chapter 4 is to test in a broad way
1) demand and supply-side approaches regarding
determinants of protectionism, 2)my own hypotheses
regarding determinants of protectionism in the EC-Korea
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trade and 3)approaches to evaluate failure or
achievements of aims of measures by advanced countries
against developing countries such as David Yoffie and
Patrick Messerlin's analyses. However, there is a problem
in the test because I have to deal with the EC as a whole
and with the actions of individual EC member states.
Part two is the empirical work on which my analyses in
part one are based. It focuses upon specific industry-
wide analyses of determinants and effectiveness of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade in the 1970-1992
period in four industries--textiles and clothing, iron
and steel, footwear and consumer electronics. 75 The
policy making direction and demands and supply of
protective measures are different, following on the
situation of various industries. Peter Dicken argued the
difference and significance of industry-wide case studies
as follows:76
The involvement of national governments is not
uniform across all industries. Some industries are
regarded as being more important to governments than
others. The precise form of government involvement
may differ by sectors. For all these reasons, it is
important to look at specific cases.
Therefore, micro analysis of individual industries is
essential to find specific factors affecting determinants
of protectionism and achievement, or failure, of aims of
protective measures with regard to characteristics of
those industries. 77 The reason I choose those four
industries for case studies are as follows:
Firstly, those industries in the EC are faced with
growing foreign competition, compelling the EC to choose
between protectionism or industrial structure adjustment.
Therefore, there are many factors in these industries
which need analyses in terms of IPE. For example,
government intervention is most essential in these
industries for protecting job losses from competitive
pressure. Also, those industries have a high degree of
political power enough to influence a change of direction
in policy making.
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Secondly, these four industries in Korea played a pivotal
role in the nation's economic development because they
benefited from export promotion. This role was expedited
by the government's aggressive policy for mobilization of
capital, and tax and credit favor for trade and export
expansion in those industries. Exports from these four
industries represented 50.1 per cent of Korea's total
exports in 1989. Furthermore,exports of the products to
the EC accounted for 53 per cent of Korea's total
merchandise exports to that market in the same year.
Thirdly, trade disputes between the EC and Korea are
almost all concerning these four industrial sectors.
Since 1975, the EC-initiated investigations concerning
possible import restraints against Korean products
totaled 29 cases. Of the 29 cases, 18 cases (62 per cent)
were from textiles and clothing, footwear, consumer
electronics products and iron and steel sectors.
Part 2 comprises four chapters (from 5 to 8), each of
which begins with background information for case study
(general trend of world trade, the EC'S industry and
Korea's industry), and case study of each industrial
sector. The detailed contents of each case study follows
a similar pattern--introduction, the situation in the EC,
the situation in Korea, EC's decision and determinants
and effectiveness of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade.
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Chapter I. BC'S Economic Polic y and Its Impact on
Determinants of Protectionism in BC-Korea Trade
A Brief Summary of Chapter I
The constitutional, institutional, financial and
implementational frameworks determine the EC'S decision
making process. These frameworks are at the root of or at
least contribute to some determinants of EC protectionism
against Korea. They have given rise to the main
criticisms voiced by Korea against EC protectionist
measures towards Korea:1) the coexistence of BC-wide and
EC member states' protective measures against Korea, 2)
the long time delays for final decision of EC's import
restraints against Korea, and 3) the heavy dependence on
price undertakings which injures credibility of BC'S
decision making process.
Meanwhile, problems of industrial policy by EC member
states became major contributors to trade disputes
between the EC and Korea when those problems were exposed
through drastic imports from foreign countries, e.g.
Korea. In the 1970s, trade disputes between the EC and
Korea were expressed as a function of EC member states'
industrial policies and production surplus problems and
its collision with surge of imports from Korea under
strong government support. However, those trade disputes
in the 1980s occurred as a result of industrial policy
implementation by the EC and Korea in specific industries
such as electronics sector which had been concurrently
implemented, in addition to factors in the 1970s
mentioned above.
Trade disputes between the EC and Korea have worsened
since the 1980s as a result of 1) trade policies by BC
member states and a strong focus on national champions by
specific EC member states such as Italy and France, 2)
the political nature of EC trade policy as a result of
difficulties in finding EC-wide industrial damages, and
3) the relative weakness of the EC Commission(ECC) in EC
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trade policy implementation due to the fragmented
interests of heterogeneous EC member states.
1. Introduction
This chapter examines issues in the EC's industrial and
trade policies and their impact on determinants of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade. The industrial and
trade policies, together called 'economic policy' in my
thesis, are defined as " separate policy instruments to
achieve the internal objectives of non-inflationary
growth with full employment and at the same time an
external balance of international payments." 1
 For the
internal objective of non-inflationary growth with full
employment, national governments have been aggressively
carrying out industrial policy through active involvement
in industrialization and development of infant
industries. Every country also has to depend on
restriction of imports and promotion of exports for the
balance of international payments through various trade
policy instruments. As a consequence of active government
involvement in policy making, "world trade is governed by
the law of the policy gun, rather than the rule of the
law." 2
 In case of the EC, main problems in industrial and
trade policies originated from the intergovernmental
nature of the EC which has been explained by 'domestic
policy approach' 3
 rather than EC-wide policy approach.
According to Simon Bulmer,4
the national polity is the basic unit in the EC.
Each national polity has a different set of social
and economic conditions that shapes its national
interests and policy content. In formal terms, the
national government holds a key position at the
junction of national politics and Community
politics.
As a result, "divergent and occasionally mutually
exclusive analyses and prescriptions regarding industrial
problems often reflect a nationalistic bias and do not
facilitate workable solutions to the problems."5
Furthermore, the lack of political will in most
individual EC member states to strengthen EC institutions
has impeded the power of the EC Commission (ECC), the
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executive body of the EC. In the area of trade policy,
the ECC is under very divergent pressures from different
EC member states ranging from countries which are highly
protectionist (e.g. France and Italy) to those which are
more liberal (e.g.Germany and the Netherlands) even
though the tendency towards or away from protectionism
are different depending on individual industrial sectors.
For example, "unless it satisfies the aspirations of the
most protectionist among the EC member states, their
governments continue to negotiate their own bilateral
agreements." 6 This protectionist stance, however, is
vehemently opposed by the more liberal EC member states.
The ECC has relied on a more convenient way to impose EC-
wide import restraints as a result of difficulties in
accommodating divergent interests of EC member states,
based on intergovernmentalism, lowest-common denominator
bargaining and protection of sovereignty. Namely, it
imposed EC-wide import restraints against products for
which an EC-wide consensus can be reached easily, such
as those affecting very small-sized industrial sectors or
strategically important sectors including consumer
electronics products. When the EC-wide consensus is more
difficult to achieve,the ECC left the authority to impose
import restraints to each member state.
As a result of divergent interests among individual EC
member states and difficulties in accommodating these
different interests, industrial policy at the EC-wide
level has also not been fully developed. For example, the
implementation of separate industrial policies by
individual EC member states, especially by France, Italy
and the United Kingdom, in the 1950s and the 1960s,
caused many problems for the EC such as production
surplus and national champions. The existence of national
champions resulted in continued assistance by governments
of EC member states for the maintenance of ineffective
production and consequently in strong protectionist
measures against foreign challenges. Namely, EC member
states have been implementing separate protective
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measures against specific products from third party
foreign countries, despite the implementation of BC-wide
protective measures against the same products.
Thus, trade policy measures in the EC member states have
been implemented as correctives for the negative results
of industrial policy in the EC member states. However,
trade policy by individual EC member states has been
differently implemented by their political and cultural
characteristics.
For example, France is politically very centralized,
"which may be traced back to the Code Napoleon which
aimed to cover every eventuality by a framework of
rules." 7
 The French are also traditionally very
nationalistic, favoring domestic to foreign products. The
centralized political system enabled France to implement
strong industrial policy such as national champions with
clear objective of making large industrial companies to
compete in international markets, but the correctives for
the negative result of industrial policy were strong
protectionism	 against	 foreign products,	 based on
traditional nationalism.
The United Kingdom with a very centralized government
"implemented industrial policy to put an emphasis on the
creation of large national champions from around the mid-
1960s." 8 However, the degree of protectionism as
correctives of industrial policy in Britain was less
significant than in the case of France. For example,
France has implemented 13 cases of import restraints
against Korea, compared to five cases by the United
Kingdom as of 1991, as seen in Chapter III.This result
can be explained, among various reasons, by the cultural
characteristic of the British who have not so serious
preference for domestic products.
The case of Italy, however, is very exceptional. Italy is
politically decentralized. Despite the lack of authority
of the cental government, Italy initiated the policy of
national champions since 1962 through mergers and
takeovers and the extension of public ownership." 9 The
47
Italian also have a strong regional loyalty rather than a
national attachment. The number of import restraints by
Italy against Korea, however, was far less than France
and the United Kingdom, with only three cases.
The share of these three countries in total import
restraints by individual EC member states against Korea
reached 84 per cent as of 1991, strongly supporting the
causal links between the negative result of industrial
policy, and trade policy as correctives of the negative
result.
This chapter is a parallel of chapter II. Through
analyses in chapters I and II, it can be demonstrated how
industrial and trade policies, and decision making
process in the EC and Korea act as determinants of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade.
2. Common Frameworks in the EC's Economic Policy and
Decision Making Process
There are two trameworks which have caused problems in
the EC'S industrial and trade policies, and decision
making process. These frameworks have a close
relationship with current difficulties in the EC-wide
economic policy implementation, and the existence of
inefficient decision making at the EC level.
2-1.The Treaty of Rome--Constitutional Framework
The Treaty of Rome was formulated in the 1950s when the
economic and political situation was very different from
the contemporary situation. Only six countries--Belgium,
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany--
participated in the establishment of the EC at that time.
Since the Treaty of Rome was concluded by six countries
with roughly similar national economic levels, the Treaty
proved insufficient to accommodate interests of poorer
member states which joined later.
The Treaty of Rome, the legal basis for the establishment
of the EC in 1957, did not include any instruments of
industrial policy nor any legal framework for achieving a
consensus on industrial policy. Volkmar Lauber explains
this situation as follows:10
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When the Treaty of Rome was prepared, industrial
policy was not foremost in the minds of the
Community's founders. The Treaty does not even
provide a specific legal basis for industrial
policy-making, unlike the Paris Treaty which set up
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) some
eight years earlier; however, the latter treaty was
more specific in every way.
The Rome Treaty does also not satisfactorily serve a
common foreign trade policy. According to T.Hitiris,11
EC member states still retain some measures of
autonomy in external trade policy by operating, with
the Community authorization under the Article 115 of
Rome Treaty, their own lists of specific products
subject to national import restrictions, even though
they passed to the Community the power to enact
toreign trade policy in the field of tariff and
trade (Articles 11 and 113) and relation with
international organizations(Article 229) and
conclusions of association agreements (Article
238).
This constitutional tramework ot the EC has led to the
coexistence of economic policy making at the level of the
Community and at the level of individual member states.
It is, therefore, very difficult to set up any coherent
industrial strategy to accommodate interests of all
member states at the same time. This resulted in a
fragmented industrial policy at national government
level, problems such as the weakening international
competitiveness of EC industry and different standards
among EC member states, and heavy dependence on EC-wide
trade policy as a supplementary of problems caused by
individual industrial policy making.
Industrial policies pursued by member states caused
problems such as surplus capacities and national
champions as I mentioned in Section 1. Even though the
ECC has a mandate to determine export and import policies
on a Community-wide basis, EC member states still
maintain much discretion to implement trade policy at the
national level.As a result, protective measures by
individual EC member states have been drastically
increasing so far.
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2-2. Dominance of National Interests (Council of
Ministers)	 Rather Than Community-Wide Interests(EC
Commission) in Decision Making--Institutional Framework
The characteristic of the EC's decision making process
can be explained by the nature of intergovernmentalism
such as the lowest-common-denominator bargaining and
protection of sovereignty as seen above. Furthermore, the
Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 enabled individual EC
member states to wield their veto power in the decision
making of all important matters in the EC. As a result,
"the meetings of the Council of Ministers began to look
less	 like	 occasions for
	 consensus building,	 the
traditional image, and more like opportunities for
exercising what had once been known as the liberum veto,
stressing upon right of individual member states to veto
common actions. "12
The characteristic of EC's policy-making resulted in the
contlict between ECC's supranational institutionalism and
intergovernmentalism in the Council of Ministers, along
with conflict between reactive policy making by the EC
member states and the ECC's inventive policy making.
Helen Wallace points out:13
The member states depend on reactive policy
making of an incremental process along a continuum,
in which the solving of problems depends on the
gradual adjustment of existing policies in order
marginally to alter the scope of policy instruments
as problems change or become more acute. In the
Community process, the scope for incremental change
has been limited by the absence of precedent and of
a corpus of existing policies. Therefore, the
ECC has endeavored to engage in active-policy
making by interpreting its role as that of the
promoter of great leaps forward.
As a result of the difference in the direction of policy-
making process, EC member states became more reluctant to
transfer their policy decision rights to the Community
because of the uncertainty and risks inherent in the
principle of active policy making by the ECC. 14
 The
dominance of decision making by the Council of Ministers
in the 1970s resulted in difficulties in accommodating
very difterent interests among member states whenever a
special issue had to be decided. In connection with the
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conflict between the two
explains the basic problems
and the ECC as follows:1
institutions, Willem Molle
of the Council of Ministers
The ECC has a heterogeneous composition. Its
members are largely autonomous in their own fields
and have not been chosen to execute a certain
programme, but appointed by the Member States from
different political parties. The Council of
Ministers has limited power. The Council, having
assumed a larger part of the task to coordinating
Community policy, has many difficulties in
fulfilling it on account of the 'segmentation' into
'professional' Councils of Ministers where sectoral
interests prevail.
Even though "the ECC has continued to demonstrate its
increased self-confidence of recent years, reflecting its
gradually increasing role, and Delors has recognized the
need to match further integration with institutional
change and proposed a series of institutionalized
retorms," 16
 there are fundamental problems in the ECC
effectively implementing EC-wide policy. This suggests
the decision making problem can not be solved simply
through improving function ot the ECC. 17 "The more the
ECC articulated an independent position the more likely
it was that it would be excluded. Also, the ECC's powers
were unlikely to grow until the context of its work in
relations	 between	 governments	 had	 significantly
altered." 18
 The fundamental problem in EC's decision-
making process is due to the reluctance in individual EC
member states to delegate the power to the ECC.
As a result, the decision-making in the EC has been
dominated by the Council of Ministers rather than the
ECC.' 9 "The ECC had no legal powers except for those in
the field of external economic policy. It had very few
policy instruments at its disposal and extremely limited
financial resources. "20
The problems caused by the two factors have a direct
bearing on the EC's economic decision making process and,
thus, also on the issue of protectionism.
3. EC's Economic policy Decision Making Process and EC-
Korea Trade
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The problems of the EC's industrial and trade policies
are closely tied to the nature of the EC's decision
making process. The economic policy-making process in the
EC "constitutes a process through which a variety of
agencies, groups and individuals, especially different
Directorate-Generals(DGS) in the ECC, interact to perform
specific tasks and to grapple with common problems." 21 In
the decision-making process, 23 DGs in the ECC are
actively involved in the preparatory work of policy
development. 22
 This accommodation procedure can be well
illustrated with the EC's budget and the implementation
of economic policies.
3-1. Financial (Budget) Framework
The conflicts of self-interest among BC member states has
made it difficult to raise common budgets for the
implementation of BC-wide policy instruments. The trend
of each EC member state to defend their own self-interest
and reluctance to expand the Community's budget resulted
in difficulties to promote a Community-wide policy-
making. A member state is willing to make a concession to
other member states if it receives comparative concession
from them. 23 Paul Taylor describes this trend of
national interest seeking in budget matters of the EC as
follows :24
If you give me that, I will give you this. If you
don't give me this, I won't give you that.
Another problem of the BC budget is the very unequal
distribution of the revenue to various projects. In fact,
about 67 per cent of the BC budget has been used for the
implementation ot projects in agriculture and fishery
sectors in 1989. The proportion was decreased to 59 per
cent in 1990. Such disproportionate concentration on the
agriculture and fishery causes conflicts between member
states, depending on their contribution to the EC budget
and the relative magnitude of these two sectors in their
own economies. In addition, the level of the BC member
states' revenues contribution to the BC budget and
relative benefits from the budget result in conflicts
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because the revenues are decided according to the level
of VAT, customs duties and GNP related income of EC
member states.
Table I-1:Distribution of the EC's Budgets (%) (Total
Budget in 1989=45,000 M Ecu)
Expenditure	 Portion	 Revenue	 Portion
Agriculture and
Fishery	 67(59)	 Value Added Tax
	
60
Regional Policy	 10(12)	 Customs Duties
	 20
Social Policy	 7(9)	 GNP Related Income 9
Energy, Manufacturing
Industry, Transport and
Research	 3(4.7)	 Agro. Levies	 5
Development Aid
	 2	 & Contributions
Running Costs	 5
Sources:Molle,	 Willem	 (The	 Economics	 of	 European
Integration), pp.74-75.
Scott, A.A. (European Studies), pp.79-95.
Note	 :Figures in Parentheses are those in 1990.
Table I-2:Distribution of Workforce in Ec(1970)(%)
Countries	 Primary	 Manufacturing	 Services
Greece	 48	 23	 29
Portugal	 33	 36	 31
Spain	 30	 37	 33
Ireland	 27	 30	 43
Italy	 20	 43	 37
France	 14	 39	 47
Denmark	 11	 39	 50
Luxembourg	 11	 47	 42
Germany	 9	 50	 41
Netherlands	 7	 41	 52
Belgium	 5	 45	 50
United Kingdom	 3	 46	 51
Source:Barthollomew, John & Frederick Warne (Atlas of
Europe) ,p.51.
Therefore, EC member states such as the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Germany, who are contributing a
relatively high level of revenues to the EC's budget with
relatively small primary sectors, are generally opposed
to increases in the EC budget because of the small
benefits given to them, and the oversized allocation of
expenditure to agriculture and fisheries sector. 25
 On
the other hand, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland will
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strongly ask for increase in the ECtS budget because of
the relative advantage given to them.
3-2. Implementational Aspect
Because of the intergovernmental nature of EC policy, EC
member states implement their own trade policies in
accordance with the specific characteristic of their
industries. Intergovernmentalism only further deepened
the divisions among member states and exposed the limits
of the ECC as the executive body to implement EC-wide
policies. The power of the ECC has prevailed in such
areas as steel and agriculture where institutional powers
were granted. The budgetary aspect has aggravated the
conflicts between rich and poor member states in the
EC. 26 Insufficient resources in the EC-budget for EC-wide
industrial and related policies, as compared with the
level of expenses which are used by EC member states for
this purpose, have become another obstacle for the
implementation of EC-wide industrial policy.Furthermore,
the relative high share of agricultural projects in the
EC budget has caused lack of funds for other areas such
as running costs. As a result, the number of ECC staff
could not be expanded, despite its growing workload. For
example, the employment in the ECC increased by 83.3 per
cent from 6,000 staff to 11,000 staff in the 1973-86
period. However, the EC initiated 376 AD proceedings in
the 1977-1986 period, up 14 times a total of only 26 AD
proceedings in the 1970-1976 period. 27 In addition, the
number ot import restraints by the EC against Korea
increased from only one case in the 1970s to fourteen
cases in the 1980s. It is also interesting that only 30.3
per cent of total AID investigations by the EC (261 cases)
in the 1980-1987 period was terminated with imposing
possibly protective measures. 28 The higher portion of AD
cases without any protective measures can be quoted as
one example of shortage in manpower and financial
resources for further intensive investigations.The ECC
itselt recognizes the problem ot EC's AD services as
follows :29
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The Community AD services are "critically
understaffed" compared with those in the U.S.,
Canada or Australia. The number of professionals
handling cases at the ECC dropped from 94 to
89 in 1992, making a total of some 130 including
support sta.tf. Officials estimate that the
U.S.operates its AD policy with some 500
protessionals.
4. EC's Industrial Policy and EC-Korea Trade
4-1. Difficulties in EC's Industrial Policy
Because the implementation of EC-wide industrial policy
was not easy and Ec member states vied with one another
for promoting their own industries, there were inevitably
national protective measures to prevent their industries
from foreign competition. The national protective
measures by the EC member states were based on non-tariff
mechanism rather than tariff barriers. Loukas Tsoukalis
and Antonio da Silva Ferreira explain the reason as
follows :30
Since member governments had been deprived of the
instrument of tariff protection,they had to resort
to other measures, which economists lump together
under the name of non-tariff barriers, in order to
protect their national industries.
The enlargement of the Community exacerbated this
problem--the expansion of national protective measures by
EC member states. The admission of Greece in 1981 and of
Spain and Portugal in 1986 worsened the problem of EC's
declining industries such as iron and steel and
shipbuilding because these new member states were all
specializing in labour-intensive sectors, aggravating
the problems of production capacity surplus and
strengthening protectionist pressure. Susan Strange
argues "the emergence of serious problems of surplus
capacity has
	 accelerated protectionist	 trends in
governmental policy in Europe."31
As a result,the EC member states moved to adopt
protective measures, rather than implement positive
industrial adjustment policies, against foreign
competition from Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, and from
the NIEs in the 1970s and the 1980s. Such a response was
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inevitable, considering the difficulties in adopting
active industrial adjustment policy in the EC.
Therefore, the difficulties of EC-wide industrial policy,
caused by surplus capacity problems in individual EC
member states, led to active government intervention at
the level of each national government, followed by
difficulties in industrial adjustment and fierce
protectionism in the EC member states.
4-2.Chronological Analysis of EC's Industrial Policy
4-2-1. The 1950s--Period of No Outside Challenge and
Expansion of Production Facilities
In the 1950s, trade increased more rapidly than
production because world-wide demands for manufactured
goods grew very sharply with the reconstruction boom
after the Second World War. Therefore, the basic ideology
under this favorable economic environment was non-
interventionist and competition-based industrial policy.
"In the highly optimistic times of the 1950s, the Treaty
of Rome entrusted the ECC to implement the rules of
competition and to act only in the case of excessive
intervention by the governments of the member states."32
For example,the growing demands for steel in the 1950s,
due to the demand for reconstruction and replacement
following world-war II, greatly contributed to the
expansion of the production capacity in the EC. World
crude steel production in 1950 totaled 191.6 million
tonnes, which dramatically expanded to 270 million tonnes
in 1955 and 346.4 million tonnes in 1960.
In the midst of increase in demands for steel world-wide
and aggressive production expansion in Western Europe,
the EC had implemented a very aggressive EC-wide
industrial policy in the steel sector through the
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
for the purpose of curbing surplus production and setting
minimum price levels in member states. The ECSC was "able
to offer more concrete support for investment programmes
in new production capacity, acting as an intermediary in
the procurement of low-interest loans on the global
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currency market, able to offer better terms to individual
firms by virtue of its greater credit-worthiness as an
institution." 33 However, the production surplus problem
in steel could still not be solved despite the
establishment of the ECSC.
In the EC-Korea trade, there were no trade disputes in
the 1950s. This was due to 1)the world-wide growth of
demand, 2 )Korea' s import-substitution strategy, rather
than export-led policy, and 3) the minimal export share
of Korea in the world's total exports in the 1950s which
was less than 0.2 per cent, compared to 2.16 per cent in
1989, as seen in Chapter II.
4-2-2.The 1960s--Period of American Challenge and EC's
Response through National Champions
The big challenge to EC industry in the 1960s was the
active entry of U.S. MNCs into the EC market. 34 Faced
with such an American challenge, the response by the EC
member states was a policy concentration to expand the
size ot companies in the belief that "big size companies
would be necessary to etficiently cope with huge MNCs,
and with the internal competitive pressures, generated by
the creation o± the European Common Market." 35
 Volkmar
Lauber points out:36
In the 1960s, it was widely thought (particularly in
official circles) that greater size (oligopoly,
essentially), was identical with greater e.t.ticiency,
more rapid technological progress, and the like. In
the mid-1960s, many member states passed
legislation to tacilitate mergers, take-overs and
cooperation arrangements. But the member states
promoted mergers only among 'national' firms (not
necessarily--in tact, not usually--public sector
firms).
However, the trend to make national champions through
merging among national ±irms was contradictory to the
principle of economic integration of Community markets.
In addition, such national champions were not able to
stand up to the competitive edge ot U.S. MNCs. This
national policy of tostering champions generated
protective measures in the 1970s and 1980s at the level
of each member state. However, the problematic nature of
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such measures was not immediately evident because
economic growth in the 1960s provided a shield. For
example, the growth of GDP in Germany in 1961-70 period
reached 4.5 per cent, that in France 5.6 per cent and
that in Italy 5.7 per cent. Such growth rates were far
higher than that in the United States with 3.8 per cent
during the same period. Only the United Kingdom showed
lower GDP growth than the United States with 2.8 per
cent.
The EC-Korea trade relationship was still unaffected in
the lYbOs. One of the main reasons was that Korea's most
important export markets in the 1960s were the United
States and Japan, rather than the EC. Exports of
commodities in the 1960-69 period to the United States
totaled $925 million and those to Japan reached $558
million. However, exports to the BC were confined to $128
million in the same period, representing 13.8 per cent of
the export figure to the United States and 22.9 per cent
to Japan. Also, Korea's share in the world's export
figure still remained at very low level, 0.21 per cent in
1968 and 0.25 per cent in 1969.
4-2-3.The 1970s--Period of Japanese and NIBs Challenge
and BC'S Defensive Response
Compared to the 1950s and the 1960s, the 1970s saw very
important changes in the world's trading environment.
Firstly, the U.S.hegemony in the world trading system
began to decline. As a result, there was no hegemonic
power which permitted itself to be sacrificed for the
sake of world trade. The United States began to impose
very stringent import restraints against Japan. That made
Japan switch its exports from the United States to the BC
market,resulting in many trade disputes between the BC
and Japan.
Secondly, the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 also greatly
contributed to the worsening trade environment. Many
advanced countries were prone to choose the adoption of
protective measures rather than the implementation of
industrial adjustment. "Following the oil-price shock of
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1973, all West European countries introduced anti-
cyclical measures to minimize the impact of the
recession. The anti-cyclical or trade regulating measures
were in many cases defensive in that they slowed
adjustment." 37 Loukas Tsoukalis and Antonio da Silva
Ferreira describe negative impact of those policies on
the EC industries as follows:38
Industrial policies have taken an almost purely
defensive and protectionist form, while also being
typical exercise in 'ad hoc-ery. ' The practice of
subsidizing inefficient firms for long periods is an
uneconomical use of scarce resources which might be
used in developing new dynamic sectors of the
economy. The social cost of adjustment will be
considerably reduced if industrial policy is
combined with an active manpower and social policy.
But if adjustment does not take place and resources
are not diverted into more efficient use, the
problem will remain unsolved and the country
concerned will find that the cost of staying in the
international division of labor will progressively
increase.
The promotion of inefficient national champions through
the provision of subsidies in the 1960s began to be
exposed when a world-wide economic recession started in
the 1970s. The production volume in the EC exceeded
demand. Furthermore, imports from Japan began to increase
in the EC market, followed by shipments from NIE5. Major
EC member states such as France, the U.K. and Italy all
implemented defensive protective measures(negative
industrial adjustment) against imports from Japan and
NIEs. Germany, on the other hand, reacted to the new
challenges with defining global product strategies and
investing substantially in R&D (positive industrial
adjustment) .39
Because the majority of EC member states adopted very
defensive industrial policies,the ECC had difficulties in
implementing positive and forward-looking industrial
policy in the 1970s. Therefore, "the lack of a consensus
on the question of growth adjustment precluded any
proposals for more active Community policies. Common EC
policies have, therefore, tended to be defensive action
in declining sectors."4°
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Despite the world's business recession in the 1970s,
Korea began to export manufactured goods in earnest in
the 1970s under the government's strong neo-mercantilist
policy support. As a result,trade disputes began to
occur with the EC during this period. However, these
trade disputes in the 1970s were disputes between
individual EC member states and Korea, rather than
between the EC and Korea. For example,import restraints
against Korea adopted at the level of EC member states in
the 1970s totaled 13 cases, of which France accounted for
8 cases and the United Kingdom for four cases, as seen in
Chapter IV. The remaining one case was from Germany.
Korea's major export items in the 1970s were textiles and
clothing,and iron and steel products. The EC implemented
defensive policies in these industries.Therefore, trade
disputes between the EC and Korea in the 1970s were
concentrated in these industries.For example, the only
EC-wide import restraint adopted in this period was the
MFA signed in 1975 between the EC and Korea to regulate
imports of textiles and clothing from Korea.
4-2-4. The 1980s-Present--Period of Positive Adjustment
to Strategic High-Tech Industries
In the 1970s, when most countries suffered from serious
economic recession as a result of two rounds of oil
shocks, the EC recorded better economic performance than
the United States. However, the EC's industrial growth
recorded the lowest, compared to Japan and the United
States, with the start of the 1980s. Namely, in the 1981-
90 period, the EC's average GDP growth rate remained at
2.3 per cent,lower than the United States (3.0 per cent)
and Japan (4.1 per cent). Table 1-3 shows the serious
situation of industrial production in the EC. This
serious slump in output growth expedited the movement of
the EC to strengthen the political and economic
integration among EC member states through the completion
of the Single Market by 1992. John Palmer argues "the
impulse towards unity is in part a reflection of the huge
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scale of the economic problems now facing modern
industrial societies like the EC."42
Table 1-3: Growth of Industrial Production (Index
1985=100)
Countries	 81	 82	 83	 84	 85	 86	 80-85
W.Europe	 98.5	 96.9 98.0 101.0 103.8 106.5	 0.8
Japan	 102.3	 100.9 110.1 120.0 121.5 --	 4.5
USA	 102.2	 94.3 100.6 112.1 114.5 115.2	 3.0
Source:Euromonitor	 (West	 European	 Economic
Handbook, 1987 ) , p. 12
In the 1980s, there was a consensus among the EC member
states to raise international competitiveness of EC
industries through implementation of positive industrial
adjustment. The EC also chose strategic industries for
providing EC-wide assistance such as funding of R&D
projects. 43 Volkman Lauber describes these movements as
follows :'
Firstly, the high point of intervention by the
national governments of member states in favor of
declining industries was passed during this time and
the limits of such an approach became more and more
apparent.
Secondly, the Council in 1982 adopted several
Commission proposals that aimed at promoting
investment in strategic areas--energy,
biotechnology, and information technology.
Despite such a change in the direction of industrial
policies, the trade disputes between EC member states and
Korea did not change. This was an indication that the EC
member states maintained very negative views about
inflows of commodities from Japan and NIEs even though
their concerns gradually moved to positive industrial
structure adjustment. In connection with this matter,
Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans argue that "the
competitive pressure ±rom NIEs was so strong that the
general resentment against protection could not easily be
transposed to a more liberal attitude vis-a-vis the
NIEs. "45
Korea designated consumer electronics industry as a
strategic sector and provided extensive government
support in the 1980s. Unfortunately, the EC also
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implemented a program to revive the international
competitiveness of its consumer electronics sector in the
1980s. Therefore, trade disputes in the 1980s between the
EC and Korea mainly occurred in consumer electronics
sector.
In sum, the EC did not implement any fully-fledged
Community-wide industrial policy in the 1960s and the
1970s, except in the case of steel under the ECSC.
Instead, separate industrial policy instruments were
actively put into ±orce by individual EC member states.
Those policy direction caused surplus production problems
in the 1970s and thereafter in the EC. The trade disputes
between the EC member states and Korea in the 1970s
mainly resulted from those problems in the EC. However,
the consensus to toster strategic industries among EC
member states contributed to worsening trade disputes in
the electronics sector between the EC and Korea in the
1980s and therea±ter. Again, industrial policy direction
0± the EC and EC member states had a close relation with
their protectionism against Korea.
4-3. Problems of the EC's Industrial Policy and Its
Relationship with EC-Korea Trade Disputes
The most serious problems in the EC industries were
caused by negative industrial structure adjustment policy
making in EC member states since the 1950s. These
problems can be divided into production surplus and
national champions. The ±irst problem of EC industries
was production surplus.In the 1950s, the EC member states
were eagerly promoting expansion 0± production facilities
with the support trom each government to meet growing
demands caused by world-wide economic expansion. The
problems, caused by heavy expansion of production
facilities, were not exposed in the 1950s because growing
demands for the surplus production helped to avoid
industrial adjustment or protective measures against
external threat.
The second problem of EC industries was the existence of
inefficient big-size national champions. In the 1960s,
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the EC member states were eagerly implementing strategies
to expand the size of companies through mergers and
acquisition, and provision of financing from each
government to cope with American challenge--namely entry
of American MNCs into the BC market. This movement
resulted in national champions in major BC member states
such as Italy, France and the U.K. as seen above(Section
1), and provided burdens to protect these inefficient
companies from foreign penetration. For example, Finn
Sider of Italy produced 57 per cent of Italian steel
production as of 1985, whilst British Steel's share in
total steel production in the United Kingdom reached 83
per cent and Sacilor's share in French steel production
totalled 57 per cent in the year.46
These two problems were enhanced by foreign penetration
of the EC market. Namely, Japanese and NIBs companies
were extensively entering into the EC market and
threatened the existence of EC industries. The response
against this threat was to protect declining industries
rather than to engage in positive industrial adjustment.
Theretore, growing protectionism for declining industries
was the third problem, caused by the EC member states'
lack of industrial adjustment policy.
Since the 1980s, the BC began to experience low
industrial growth, compared to the United States and
Japan. This made finding a consensus among EC member
states about industrial adjustment policies even more
difficult.Since then, the EC has been implementing a
policy of fostering strategic industries on a Community-
wide basis to remain abreast with the United States and
Japan.That led to the fourth problem of EC industrial
policy. Namely, the EC expanded its defensive
protectionism to electronics sector in the 1980s in
addition to those against low knowledge-intensive
industrial sectors.
5. BC'S Trade Policy and Protectionism in BC-Korea Trade
5-i. Major Issues in BC's Trade Policy
63
The constitutional and institutional frameworks in the EC
contributed to the EC having problems in terms of trade
policy implementation. 47
 Firstly, there is the tendency
to implement trade policy to solve problems caused by
production surplus in declining industries of EC member
states. Such policies were the results of industrial
policies implemented by each member state in the 1950s-
70s. Victoria Price points out the deepening
protectionism through complementarity of the industrial
policy with trade policy as follows:48
Industrial policy is not only a substitute for trade
policy but also a complement. When used together
with trade measures, industrial policies create
virtually insuperable barriers to trade.
Secondly, there is the inequality in the implementation
of the EC's trade policy against its major trading
partners.The EC has been providing preferences to its
trading partners, according to groups divided by region.
That reflects specific relations of individual EC member
states with their previous colonies, based on historic
and political factors. 49
 The most beneficial preferences
under the preferences system, called 'pyramid of EC
preferences,' has been given to EFTA (European Free Trade
Association)	 countries,	 followed	 by	 Mediterranean
countries, ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries,
other developing countries, OECD and South Africa and
state trading countries. Therefore, developing countries
such as Korea have been ±acing a fundamental disadvantage
compared to EFTA countries, Mediterranean countries and
ACP countries in exporting products to the EC market.
These issues in ECts trade policy have been contributing
to protectionism in the EC-Korea trade. For example,
penetration of specific products from Korea into the EC
market seems not to cause any problems in the majority of
the EC-wide market. However, such entry could directly
generate bilateral trade disputes because the imports
could be a detrimental factor to a specific member state
in the EC. That was due to the fact that trade policy has
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been dominated by interests of specific member states
rather than by EC-wide interest.
5-2. Analysis of EC's Trade Policy Instruments
The issues in the EC's trade policy can be found through
examining EC's trade policy instruments. Common external
tariffs(CET) are symbols of EC's unified trade policy
making. However, the adoption of the EC-wide common
tariffs made each member state in the EC seek non-tariff
measures to protect its own industries from foreign
threats because of the low level and insufficiency of CET
to protect them. Furthermore, they exerted influence in
implementing EC-wide AD and CV duties impositions, new
Community trade instruments and rules of origins. The
proliferation of non-tariff measures (NTM) in the EC had
proved that the issues in the EC's trade policy were
exposed through the implementation of various trade
restrictive measures.
5-2-1. Pure Trade Policy Measures
5-2-1-1.	 Common External Tariffs	 (CET)	 and EC's
Reciprocity Policy
The CET represents the principle of Common Market in the
EC through harmonizing tariff rates in the EC in trading
with foreign countries. "A common trade policy through
CET is necessary for the EC because in its absence
internal trade will be impeded and the purpose of a
common market frustrated." 5 ° Jacques Pelkmans and Joyce
Tan explain the level of CET as follows:51
EC tariffs are generally low and have few peaks. The
highest peak for industrial products is 20 per cent
(e.g.trucks and certain tootwear). In 1988, total
imports trom MFN(Most-Favored-Nation treatment)
sources were dutiable at 7.3 per cent (simple
average) or 5.1 per cent (weighted average). The
standard deviation for ad-varolem tariffs is only 4
per cent, indicating a moderate dispersion across
the product range.
However, the EC'S CET has been facing severe criticisms
from academics. Among the criticisms are the limitation
of application of CET to only manufactured products,
rather than agricultural sector, and greater reductions
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of duties on primary commodities and raw materials rather
than that on finished products. Willem Molle argues:52
The agricultural sector remains the most protected
sector in the Community, and substantial tariffs and
non-tariff barriers exist for most agricultural
products. As far as tariffs are concerned, the EC
has effectively worked towards free trade, as the
Treaty of Rome had enjoined upon it. However, the
scope of the reductions is severely restricted.
The average tariff rates for manufactured goods in the EC
in 1985 was 6.7 per cent. However, the tariff rates in
Korea in 1988 was far higher than the level of the EC,
recording 16.9 per cent. The relatively low tariff level
of the EC, compared to that of Korea, resulted in trade
disputes between the EC and Korea, and made the EC ask
for reciprocity in an effort to receive guarantees for
lowering of tariff levels for some products exported to
Korea, and for favorable conditions for business
activities by EC companies in Korea. 53 Furthermore, the
low level of CET contributed to the proliferation of NTMs
due to the limitation of CET to protect specific
industries in the SC.
5-2-1-2.Generalized Scheme of Preferences(GSP)
The EC has been implementing the GSP for developing
countries to encourage exports of their products to the
EC market."The scheme offers a tariff preference:in
general, goods coming under the GSP are imported into the
EC tariff free, whereas non-GSP countries lace the full
CET. "54
However, the GSP of the EC is problematical from Korea's
point of view.Firstly, the scope of commodities subject
to GSP has been limited to semi-manufactured and
manufactured goods. Items of greatest interest to Korea
such as textiles, footwear and leather products were
excluded Irom the GSP list.
Secondly, the GSP is a unilateral grant by the SC to
Korea. In fact, the EC unilaterally decided in 1988 to
withdraw the GSP status from Korea on the grounds that
the Korean government did not grant the same treatment to
the EC as it did to the United States which received
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special and exclusive treatment when Korea introduced
laws on intellectual property rights in 1987. However,
the EC revived the GSP status to Korea from late 1991 due
to the harmonious settlement of the controversial issue
of intellectual property rights between the two parties.
Therefore, the GSP benefit for Korea could be used as a
strategy to draw out comparative reciprocity from Korea.
If EC companies do not receive equal treatment in
business in Korea from the Korean government in
comparison with companies from other countries, the EC is
easily in a position to withdraw the GSP grant
immediately.Incidentally, the United States withdrew the
GSP benefit from Korea in 1986. Even though the United
States attributed the suspension of GSP treatment to
Korea to the graduation of Korea's status to a developed
from a developing country, it was clear underlying motive
of the United States was in weakening Korea's price
competitiveness through the measure to suspend the GSP
benefit. It is, however, very ironical that the EC has
revived its GSP treatment to Korea after achieving its
goal to get the same treatment from Korea in intellectual
property right given to the United States, despite no
revival of the GSP treatment by the United States for
Korea. Considering the fact that the GSP status is given
only to developing countries, the different position
between the EC and the United States in GSP treatment for
Korea reflects the non-existence of yardstick to measure
the graduation of a developed to a developing country.
5-2-1-3.Rules of Origin
The rules of origin are related to restrictions on
investments in the EC. The BC has been regulating the
establishment in the BC of simple screw-driver plants by
foreign companies which are meant to circumvent AD
duties. Usually, the EC origin rules require that 45 per
cent of added value should be achieved in the BC-based
plant for being recognized as BC product. This origin
rule is not a serious problem in the EC-Korea trade
because of low level of direct investments by Korea in
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the EC. However, the origin rules could become very
controversial in future as Korea increases its direct
investments in the EC to tide over strengthened
protectionism against exports from Korea to the EC
market. Until 1989, a total of 10 cases of direct
manufacturing investments have been made by Korean
electronics companies in the EC, representing 71.4 per
cent of Korea's manufacturing investments in the EC
totaling 14 cases by the year. Major reasons for Korea's
direct investments in the EC are to circumvent AD duties
imposed by the EC. If Korea simply invests in the EC to
circumvent impositions of AD duties, not adding
sulficient local value in the EC, those investments are
open to EC's restriction on investments,aggravating the
EC-Korea trade disputes.
5-2-2. Protectionist Measures of the EC
As a result of misguided policies, the beginning of very
competitive imports in limited sectors from countries
like Korea, the closed character of the Korean market and
the restrictive frameworks of the EC, the EC became a
protectionist bloc. For example, individual EC member
states implemented a total of 12 import restraints
against Korea in the 1980s alone. At the same time, EC-
wide import restraints against Korea also drastically
increased to a total of 15 cases in the 1980-1992 period.
Among the 15 cases, six cases concerned consumer
electronics sector.
Table I-4:Products Under Investigations for EC-Wide
Import Restraints Against Korea as of 1992
Items	 Type of Import Restraints
Polyester Fibre	 Anti-Dumping Duties
Semiconductor(DRAMs)	 Anti-Dumping Duties
Steel Rod
	 Anti-Dumping Duties
Electronics Scale
	
Anti-Dumping Duties
Floppy Diskette	 Anti-Dumping Duties
Color TV Sets(Large-Size) Anti-Dumping Duties
Source:KFTA(Directory of Import Restraints by Advanced
Countries against Korea),p.20.
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In addition, 6 cases were pending for the imposition of
import restraints against Korea, as seen in Table 1-4.
Four cases, among the six, are in the electronics sector.
Therefore, 47.6 per cent of the total 21 cases under
import restraints and investigations tor further action
was from the electronics sector. As a result, the change
of direction in the EC's industrial policy to foster
strategic industries contributed to the growing conflicts
in the electronics sector between the EC and Korea in the
1980s.
The spreading of NTM5 in the EC55 was a result of the
ineffectiveness of tariffs to protect EC industry trom
oil shocks, rising pressure from new competitors
(especially some Asian NIEs) and the persistent current
account imbalances with major trading partners.Victoria
Price explains the motivation of increase in NTMs in the
EC as follows:56
Members of the European Community have surrendered
their rights to use tariffs to a supranational body,
namely the Commission of the Community, based in
Brussels. Tariffs, therefore, can not be used freely
to promote this or that industry and, as a result,
governments are forced back onto non-tariff measures
of various kinds, including outright subsidies.
5-2-2-1. Quotas
Quotas as policy instruments in the EC are implemented at
two levels:quotas at the EC level and at the member
states' level. 57	-
The EC has implemented a total of four EC-level quotas
against imports from Korea. The four cases are quotas for
textiles and clothing, iron and steel products, canned
mushrooms and footwear. Except for canned mushrooms in
which quotas were set by the EC unilaterally under the
clause of GATT XIX safeguard and the EC Council
Regulat jon(No.288/82), quotas of the remaining three
items have been set under VER5 signed between the EC and
Korea. The EC is using many grey area measures such as
VERs to prevent retaliation and compensation from and
against its trading partners when safeguard measures
under GATT XIX clause were officially implemented. In
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trade disputes with Korea, the EC has been using such
measures against cases in which 1)very small-size
industries were involved,2)more rapid responses were
needed or 3)there were difficulties in finding any
injuries through formal AD investigations.
Chronologically, quotas for textiles and clothing, iron
and steel products and canned mushrooms were implemented
in the 1970s, 58 whereas footwear quotas were established
in 1990. EC-wide quotas were not widely implemented in
the 1980s when new protectionism had been proliferated
because there were alternative protective measures by
individual member states. However, the EC-wide quotas
represented 25 per cent of the total number of EC-wide
import restraints (16 cases) since the 1970s against
Korea. Especially, the VERs, called "the cancer in the
trading system," 59 have very rapidly proliferated since
late 1960s, due to such special attractiveness of
recourse to quantitative measures as selectivity,
bilateralness and invisibility.
Quotas at member state level are divided into three
categories--"residual quotas(under the EC Regulation of
288/82), specific quotas for state trading countries and
national quotas for Portugal and Spain applied for the
transitional period of EC membership." 6 ° The existence of
quotas at individual EC member states' level originated
from the fact that the EC-wide Common Commercial Policy
(CCP) has not been fully developed, and bilateral trade
agreements still remain next to agreements concluded by
the EC under the Treaty of Rome (Articles 113 and 114).61
In case of EC-Korea trade, the main category of quotas at
member states' level are the residual quotas. EC member
countries had implemented or has been implementing a
total of 25 quota restrictions against imports from Korea
since 1977, which was far higher than the number of EC-
wide quota restrictions (four cases) and also 56 per cent
higher than the total number of EC-wide NTMs. Antong the
25 national-level quota restrictions, 12 cases were
effective n the 1980s. Therefore, the heavy dependence
70
on member-state level quota restrictions against Korea in
the 1980s was a major factor explaining the reason why
there were no EC-wide quota restrictions in the 1980s.
The EC-wide quotas have been established to complement
the limitations of quotas on the level of EC member
states.
5-2-2-2.Anti-Dumping (AD) Duties
AD duties have been playing a pivotal role as trade
policy instruments of the EC.In case of the EC-Korea
trade, the EC has been heavily dependent on impositions
of AD duties. Among a total of 16 import restraint
measures since the 1970s by the EC against Korea, 12
cases or 75 per cent were impositions of AD duties. The
remaining four were VER and quota restrictions.
Therefore, AD duties have been the most crucial trade
policy instruments by the EC against Korea.
Furthermore,the threat to impose AD duties by the EC
itself was connected to the settlements of trade disputes
between the EC and Korea. The settlements have been made
with two types--one is with price undertakings and the
other with VERs.62
Firstly, the Ec's threat of AD action and consideration
of their self-interest among Korean exporters made the
Korean companies conclude an agreement, called 'price
undertakings,' with the EC under which they promised to
raise export prices to the level which the EC wanted.
Among the twelve AD duties impositions against Korea,
four cases were resolved through price undertakings.
These settlements met the mutual interests.
Secondly, the threat of imposing AD duties led also to
the conclusion of VERs in cases of H-beam(rolled steel
Joint) and steel nails. The conclusion of VER5 could make
the c remove the image as a trading bloc to heavily
impose AD duties against Korea. On the other hand, Korean
exporters also could wipe out the bad image in the world
trading environment as a country which carried out many
unfair trading activities.63
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However, the EC's AD measures raise some questions about
the credibility of its implementations. For example, the
EC's rate of imposing provisional measures in the total
number of initiated cases against its trading partners is
very low with only 37 per cent in the 1980-1987 period,
as seen in Table 1-5. This compares with 73 per cent of
the United States. Therefore, foreign exporters involved
in the remaining b3 per cent of initiated cases had to
put up with damages caused by AD investigations.
Table I-5:AD Actions by EC and USA (1980-1987)
Country	 Period	 Init.(A)	 PM(B)	 Share(B/A)
EC	 1980-82	 61	 15	 24.6
1982-84	 59	 28	 47.5
1984-86	 57	 17	 29.8
1986-87	 17	 12	 70.6
Total	 194	 72	 37.0
USA	 1980-82	 66	 20	 30.3
1982-84	 65	 61	 93.8
1984-86	 124	 80	 64.5
1986-87	 41	 55	 134.1
Total	 296	 216	 73.0
Source:Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michael P.Leidy, "Dumping,
Anti-Dumping and Emergency Protection," Journal of World
Trade (October 1989), p.29.
Notes:Init.=Initiated. PM=Provisional Measures.
In actual cases between the EC and Korea, importers in
the EC switched their import sources to other countries,
which were not involved in AD measures, from Korean
exporters involved in the investigations, despite that
they were released without any suspicion of dumping
activities later.
In addition, the EC began a total of 8 AD investigations
against Korean products in the 1981-1988 period. The EC
only imposed detinitive AD duties against two cases among
the 8 cases, representing 25 per cent of the total number
of investigations. Such situation is the same in case of
EC's AD investigations against Taiwanese products. The EC
started a total of ten AD investigations against
Taiwanese products in the same period. However, the
actual impositions of definitive AD duties were confined
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to only three cases, 30 per cent of the total
investigations. Therefore, the actual rate of AD duties
imposition remained at the level of 30 per cent.
Table I-6:EC's AD Measures Against Taiwanese Products
Yl	 Items	 Results
1981 Louver Door	 Price Undertaking
1982 Steel Nuts	 No Injury
1984 Louver Door
	 No Injury
1984 Panel Door	 No Injury
1986 Tube Fitting	 No Injury
1988 Bicycle Tyre	 Price Undertaking
1988 Oxalic Acid	 Definitive AD Duties
1988 Polyester Fabric	 Definitive AD Duties
1988 Polyester Yarn	 Definitive AD Duties
1988 Glutamic Acid	 Price Undertaking
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Europe 1992, Vol.1
No.1, 1989), p.97.
Note :YI=Year of AD Investigations.
David Greenaway and Brian Hindley, regarding VERs signed
between the EC and Japan for the restriction of Japanese
exports of VCRs to the EC, criticise the credibility of
EC's AD implementation policy as follows:64
Had the Commission of the European Community been
able to demonstrate that Japanese producers were
dumping, it would have had been in a position
legally to impose anti-dumping duties on VCR imports
from Japan.The dumping argument put forward by the
Commission is almost certainly a sham. There is no
ground upon which to believe that a charge of
dumping against the Japanese producers could have
been sustained.
In connection with the EC's AD policy and its credibility
in the EC-Korea consumer electronics trade, Joyce Tan and
Jacques Pelkmans also soundly condemn the EC policy:65
If dumping is so massive (the volumes in consumer
electronics are large), why is it that the possible
losses can not normally be cross-subsidized by
other parts of big(Korean) firms:?
If the dumping margin would be high enough, it would
pay independent traders to re-export the product
back to Korea. Apparently, this does not happen. As
tarif±s are low, now, tne reason can only be a lack
of competition at the retail level of barriers in
the import/wholesale trade.
There is also a long time span for final decision of EC's
AD measures against Korea.The difficulties to reach a
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consensus among EC member states as a result of the
institutional tramework in the decision making process
also protracts the period from investigations to final
decisions for import restraints. The initiation of
investigations itself threatens Korean exporters because
EC importers had a tendency to terminate future orders
for tear of import prices being raised and internal
consumer demands being decreased in the EC as a result of
import restraints. Therefore, the time-delays made Korean
exporters lose opportunities of sales in the EC market
when they were filed under the suspicion of dumping
activities in the EC.
Table I-7:Comparison of Investigation Period of EC'S AD
Cases Against Korea
Products	 Type of IRE	 DI	 DFD	 P1
Oxalic Acid	 AD	 May 22,1987 July 18,1988 422 Days
Polyester Yarn AD
	 July 1,1987 Dec.13,1988	 530 Days
CDP	 AD	 July 6,1987 Dec.17,1989	 895 Days
Video Cassette
Tape	 AD	 Oct.14,1987 Jun.29,1989	 623 Days
Color TV	 AD	 Feb.17,1988 Apr.27,1990	 862 Days
Glutamic Acid	 PU	 Jun.6,1988	 Jun.30,1990	 754 Days
Bicycle Tire
Tube	 PU	 Apr.14,1977 Jan.19,1980 1161 Days
VCR	 PU	 Sept.25,1987 Feb.28,1989
	 521 Days
Album	 PU	 Dec.15,1988 May 22,1990
	 523 Days
Audio Cassette
Tape	 AD	 Jan.14,1989 May 14,1991
	 850 Days
Average 714.1 Days
Source:KFTA(Directory of Import Restraints by Advanced
Countries Against Korea) ,pp.103-140.
Notes: IRE=Import Restraints. DI=Date of Initiation.
DFD=Date of Final Decision.
PI=Period for Investigation.
The average period for final decision of AD impositions
in the EC is 714.1 days, which is far longer than 280 to
415 days in the United States, 245 to 285 days in Canada
and 295 days in Australia. 66 Therefore, the prolonged
period for final decision could be one obstacle to
developing harmonious trade relationships between the EC
and Korea.
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There is also sometimes a doubt concerning the ultimate
purpose of the initiation of AD procedures by the EC
against Korea, considering the EC's heavy dependence on
price undertakings67
 in the procedure.In the 1975-1992
period, the EC filed a total of 25 cases of AD
complaints, of the total cases, 18 cases received final
decisions by the end of 1991. The number of cases, such
as price undertakings and cases terminated without any
suspicion to injury, among the total of 18 cases,
numbered 11 cases, representing 64.7 per cent of the
total. On the other hand, the United States received
complaints totalling 26 cases of AD and CV duties
investigations against Korea in the 1978-91 period. The
United States actually began investigations for 24 cases
among which the definitive AD duties were imposed on 11
cases. Therefore, the portion of cases which were
terminated without any AD duties impositions was 54.2 per
cent. The credibility of AD duties implementation
mechanism in the EC was, thus, far lower than that in the
United States.68
During the 1975-1992 period, the EC terminated a total of
five AD cases against Korea without any suspicion to
dumping activities. The period for final decision for the
cases of no injury was almost the same as that for all
cases with 652 days.
Table I-8:Analysis of EC's AD Cases against Korea without
Any Suspicion
Products	 Type of IRE	 DI	 DFD	 P1
Al-Clad Cookware AD	 May 23,1985 Mar.18,1986 299 Days
Microwave Oven	 AD	 Dec.18,1986 Dec.12,1988 725 Days
Polyester Film	 AD	 Jan.12,1988 Jun.15,1991 1249 Days
Tungsten Products AD 	 Dec.15,1988 Mar.30,1990 470 Days
Poly.Staple
Fibre	 AD	 Mar.31,1990 Aug.31,1991 518 Days
Average	 652.2 Days
Source:KFTA(Directory of Import Restraints by Advanced
Countries against Korea) ,pp.409-424.
Therefore, Korean exporters suffer a unfair treatment
from the EC despite the fact that they did not carry out
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any unfair trading activities in case of those five
cases. In addition, the long-time delays for final
decision aggravated the financial damages of Korean
exporters, caused by the withdrawals of orders from EC
importers. Also, Korean exporters could not escape from
being branded as untair traders in the world's trading
circle.
Furthermore ,the constitutional and institutional
trameworks in the decision making process in the EC have
forced Korea to confront very tough import restraints in
several sensitive sectors due to the coexistence of
	 EC-
wide protective measures along with restraints by member
states, as seen in Table 1-9. Especially, France has
been imposing various quota restrictions against Korea
despite the existence of EC-wide import restraints.
Table I-9:Concurrent Import Restraints by EC and Member
States Against Korea
Sectors	 EC-Wide Measure	 Member States'Measure
Textiles	 Textiles(MFA)	 France:Silk Products
Polyester Yarn(AD)
	 (Quota)
Recycled Long
Textile Fabric
(Quota)
Italy: Synthetic Long
Textile Yarn
(Quota)
Recycled Long
Textile Fabric
(Quota)
Clothing	 Clothing(MFA)	 France:Silk Products
(Quota)
Electronics CDP(AD)
	 U.K.: Color TV &
Products	 VCR(AD)	 B&W TV Sets
Video Cassette	 (Quota)
Tape(AD)	 Music Center
Color TV(AD)	 & Kits(Quota)
Audio Cassette Tapes(AD)	 France:Radio(Quota)
Car Stereo Radio(AD)	 Color TV(Quota)
Electric &
Electronics
Equipment (Quota)
Source:KFTA(Directory of Imports Restraints by Advanced
Countries against Korea) ,pp.103-172.
5-2-2-3. countervailing (CV) Duties
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Compared to the impositions of AD duties, the EC rarely
used the imposition of countervailing (CV) duties. There
has been no CV duty impositions in the history of EC-
Korea trade. The United States has imposed only one case
oi CV duties against Korea so far. According to the
Financial Times, "level of subsidies in the United States
in 1991 was 0.5 per cent of GDP, compared to 1 per cent
of GDP in Japan and 3 per cent in the EC." 69 Therefore,
the relatively heavy dependence on subsidies in the EC
could be a factor to restrain complaints of CV duty
impositions against Korea, despite the fact that the
Korean government strongly assisted domestic industries
through various industrial policy instruments. Rather
than the CV duty imposition, the EC adopted the principle
0± comparative reciprocity to open Korean market, i.e.
the comparison of the degree of market openness in Korea
to the United States with that to the EC.
5-2-2-4.New Community Trade Instruments
The EC has adopted in 1984 "the so-called 'New Comniunity
Trade Instruments,' intended as an immediate answer to
unfair trading practices under the Community Regulation
(No.3641). While GATT procedures tend to take much time,
during which considerable and sometimes irreparable
damage can be done, the EC can now retaliate faster:the
ECC initiates actions through the new trade instruments
upon which the Council has to agree within 30 days."7°
However, this instrument has rarely been implemented so
far in EC-Korea trade. One reason is that the EC did not
need to invoke the new measures because the EC
efficiently responded against foreign penetration into
the EC market through joint use of policy instruments at
the EC-level and at the level of member states. The
second one is the "lack of a consensus within the EC
Council of Ministers to implement the instrument."71
In sum, a relatively lower CET level in the EC motivated
the EC to implement the principle of comparative
reciprocity as a yardstick for the measure of market
openness in markets 0± its trading partners. The absence
77
of tariff policy instruments at the level of EC member
states promoted individual EC member states to impose
member state level quotas, in addition to EC-wide AD
duties impositions and quotas. As a result, problems
caused by industrial policies of individual EC member
states were addressed by trade policy instruments on the
level of EC member states as well as on the level of the
whole Community.
5-3. Correlation between the Policy of Industrial
Champions and Protectionist Tendencies in Member States
of the EC
The results of EC policies have a direct influence on the
EC-Korea trade relations. Especially, there are some
differences according to the seriousness of the surplus
production capacity in connection with protective
measures by individual SC member states against Korea.
Individual SC member states with a strong focus on
national champions have not only initiated the greatest
number of protectionist measures against Korea, but have
also been instrumental in moving EC trade policy towards
a more protectionist stance against Korea. For example,
France and Italy are model cases for the promotion of
national champions through nationalization of private
industries and disbursement of large amount of national
subsidies. The two EC member states represented 64 per
cent (16 cases) of the total number of import restraints
(25 cases) against Korea so far. Therefore, Korea's
exports have been heavily dependent on Germany and the
United Kingdom in EC member states, rather than France
and Italy. For example, Korea's exports to five SC member
states--the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Belgium and
the Netherlands--represented 71.2 per cent of the
nation's total exports to the EC market, as seen in Table
1-10.
Korea's exports to the SC rely particularly on the German
market which took in 1991 32.8 per cent of Korea's total
shipments to the EC. On the other hand, Korea's exports
to France and Italy only represented 20.2 per cent of
Korea's total exports to the EC. This has to be seen in
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correlation with their share in the total number of
import restraints by BC member states against Korea
accounting for 64 per cent.
Table I-10:Korea's Exports to BC Member States(1991)
Countries Exports($M) Share(%) IRK 	 Share(%) Ratio(B/A)
	
(A)	 (Number)	 (B)
U.K.	 1,767	 18.2	 5	 20%	 1.09
Germany	 3,192	 32.8	 1	 4	 0.12
France	 1,127	 11.6	 13	 52	 4.48
Bel/Net	 1,664	 17.1	 1	 4	 0.23
Italy	 837	 8.6	 3	 12	 1.39
Denmark	 304	 3.1	 1	 4	 1.29
Total	 9,728	 100.0	 25	 100
Source:KFTA(Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1992),
pp.202-205.
Note: IRK=Import Restraints against Korea.
The EC's protectionism against Korea has been shaped by
the EC's own problems in industrial and trade policies
and unique characteristic of decision making process.
However, Korea's far different policy in economic,
political, social, cultural and moral aspects can not be
disregarded in explaining determinants of protectionism
in the EC-Korea trade. In the following chapter,
therefore, I will analyse Korea's economic policy,
decision making process, and impact of the policy and
decision making process on determinants of protectionism
in the EC-Korea trade.
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Chapter II. Korea's Economic Policy and Its Impact on
Determinants of Protectionism in BC-Korea Trade
A Brief Summary of Chapter II
Problems of Korea's industrial policy contributed to the
worsening trade disputes in trade with the EC. The
Chaebol-dominant industrial structure made the EC feel
the industrial damages, caused by Korean exports, more
seriously. Also, Korea's industrial policy, fostering
several specific industries, resulted in such fact that
the nation's exports were concentrated on several items
and finished products, rather than a wide variety of
items and parts, creating inter-industry trade structure
in trade with the BC. On the other hand,the heavy
dependence on Japanese capital and technology for the
industrial development also provoked a conception in the
BC that Korea has been giving industrial damages to the
BC industries because Korea has similarities in export
pattern and strategy with Japan and Korea's exports were
made with a time lag following Japanese exporters.
In addition, Korea built its ground for industrial
development through very aggressive trade policy
incentives for Korean exporters--financial supports such
as credit tavors and tax exemption, systematic support
such as management of foreign exchange, and institutional
supports such as establishment of industrial zones,
export promotion organizations (KOTRA and KFTA) and GTCs,
and other non-quantifiable supports such as set-up of
annual export target and holding of the Monthly Export
Promotion Meeting. Along with the support of the
government, Korean exporters were safe from foreign
challenges because of tariff protection for manufactured
goods from foreign countries, protection for service
industries and various government initiatives to reduce
consumption of foreign products.These various government
measures were enough to make Korea be branded as a neo-
mercantilist policy-oriented country, and to provoke many
trade disputes between the EC and Korea in a viewpoint
90
that the EC is relatively open, compared to the Korean
market, for exports of Korean products.
Meanwhile, the executive-dominant decision making caused
much corruption in government officials and raised
financial burden of Korean companies, resulting in an
increase in the cut-throat competition between Korean
exporters in order to expand export value, leading to
dumping activities. Also, the flexibility in decision-
making--such as changes in requirements for GTC and
changes in level of export records for credit and tax
favors--also resulted in destructive competition among
Korean exporters in foreign countries. The pragmatism and
particularism of the decision making process also
contributed Korea being branded as strong on industrial
policy implementation. Emphasis of government supports to
big-sized companies widened a gap between large business
conglomerates producing finished products and small
companies manufacturing parts. Therefore, Korea's export
pattern was standardized as finished products-centered
trade. Issues and problems of Korea's decision making
process directly contributed to the EC-Korea trade
disputes through two causal chain relationships. One is
executive dominance and flexibility in decision making
and frequent changes in the level of export records for
tax and credit benefits. These caused cut-throat
competition among Korean exporters, dumping activities
and Ec-Korea trade disputes. Another is pragmatism and
particularism in decisiom making and intensive support to
big-sized firms producing finished products. These caused
relative sluggishness in production of parts by small-and
medium-sized firms, exports centered on finished
products, inter-industry trade structure and increases in
EC-Korea trade disputes.
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the issues and problems of Korea's
industrial and trade policies, as well as the impact of
Korea's decision making process for the implementation of
those policies. Korea's industrial and trade policies are
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different from those of the EC. The EC's industrial and
trade policies aim at postponing industrial structure
adjustment and protecting declining industries from
foreign threats. However, Korea's industrial and trade
policies have been concentrating on fostering specific
industries such as textiles and clothing, iron and steel
products and consumer electronics products while at the
same time protecting them from foreign competition. Since
the same industries have attracted particular attention
in the EC as shown above, it is not surprising that trade
disputes center on these products.
2. Issues and Problems of Korea's Industrial Policy and
EC-Korea Trade
2-1. Issues in Korea's Industrial Policy
Korean industrial policy does not only have different
goals from the EC's industrial policy, but also operates
against a different economic, political, social and
cultural background. It is therefore not surprising that
these different circumstances are an important factor in
explaining the disputes in the EC-Korea trade
relationship on the Korean side. As a result, it is
necessary to provide a short overview over Korea's
industrial policy in the postwar period and link it to
the specific trade disputes between the EC and Korea.
Korea's	 industrial	 policy	 changed	 from	 import
substitution and the development of light manufacturing
products in the 1953-1961 period, to export-led
industrial development ot labour intensive products in
the 1962-1971, to export-led industrial development
policy of labor-intensive products plus import
substitution policy of heavy and chemical products in
1972-1981 and to structural adjustment period in 1982-
present. 1 Major issues of Korea's industrial policy
occurred in accordance with the changes in direction of
industrial policy implementation.
"From the end of the Korean War to the early 1960s, the
government emphasized reconstruction. The major purpose
of industrial strategy was aiming at import substitution
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in light manufacturing industries." 2 At this period,
there were no official economic development plannings and
major interest of leadership was concentrated on
political matters, not economic development.Also, the
influence of Korea in international trade was minimal
during this period. Therefore, issues in Korea's
industrial policy, which could cause EC's protectionism
against Korea, is not be found in this period.
However, the possibilities of trade disputes between the
EC and Korea began to emerge with the adoption of an
export-led industrial development policy by the Korean
government,following a military coup in 1961.Also, this
period represents a milestone to set up the official
five-year economic development planning since 1962.
For this export-led development policy, the Korean
government provided tax and credit benefits to a handful
of big-sized companies, initiated government-led export
promotion projects and suppressed labor movement, which
enabled Korea to maintain international price
competitiveness in the world market.
Furthermore,"beginning in the late 1960s and accelerating
after 1973, the Korean government adopted again an import
substitution strategy for the development of heavy
industry, including steel and non-ferrous metals,
chemicals and petrochemicals, machinery, automobiles, and
shipbuilding." 3 However, the premature implementation of
policies for heavy and chemical industries promotion
created serious problems in Korea. 4 For example "Korea's
manutacturing structure has some deformed factors where
the proportion of middle industries which connect very
labor intensive sectors to such heavy industries appears
to be relatively small." 5 As a result, Korea had to
heavily depend on imports of foreign-made intermediate
products.
In the 1980s, Korea's industrial policy direction moved
to the promotion of high-technology industries such as
the electronics sector. Such policy change was generated
by crises in labour-intensive industries in Korea due to
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the weakening price competitiveness of Korean products.
However, the policy direction also made Korea heavily
depend on foreign technology and parts for the
manufacture of finished products. Furthermore,Korea came
under pressure to liberalize its economy due to the
principle ot reciprocity demanded by major trading
partners such as the United States.
The issues in Korea's industrial policy can be summed up
as 1) strong export-led development policy implementation
through provision of intensive tax and credit benefits to
several	 big	 conglomerates,	 2)	 centralized	 and
authoritarian decision making for the economic
development through export promotion, and 3) suppression
o± labor movement to maintain cheaper wage level, 4)an
artificial manipulation of international price
competitiveness through low environmental standards
(ecological dumping),and 5)heavy dependence on imports of
foreign intermediate products for the premature
achievement of heavy and chemical industry development
projects. The strong export-led development policy raised
Koreats dependence on the United States with its largest
share in exports to the United States market. The
authoritarian decision making, suppression of labor
movement and neglect of environmental issues caused
strong alert and negative repercussion from major trading
partners in advanced countries. The premature achievement
of heavy and chemical industry development projects also
raised its dependence on Japan through its heavy
dependence on imports of intermediate products from the
neighboring country. Therefore, the issues raised in
Korea's industrial policy are closely related to the
background of Ec's protective measures against Korea.
2-2. Chronological Analysis of Korea's Industrial Policy
2-2-1.Before 1961--Period of Reconstruction through
Import Substitution
This period encompasses the period between 1948, when the
Korean government was officially established after
liberation ±rom Japan, and 1961 when Park's military coup
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occurred. During the reconstruction period after the
Korean War, the Korean government limited imports to help
import substitution industries. Along with high tariff
barriers, the government employed restrictive measures on
a wide scale. According to Edward Mason,6
the industrial development that took place during
the period of Rhee(the first President of Korea for
the 1948-1960 period) government was mainly
concentrated on non-durable consumer goods. For the
years, 1960-1961, food, beverage, tobacco, textiles,
clothing and 1ootwear accounted for nearly 70 per
cent of total manufacturing output.
However, the share of manufacturing in total GNP by
industrial origin remained at only 13.8 per cent in the
period. On the other hand, the share of primary sector
reached at 39.9 per cent and service sector at 41.0 per
cent in the period. Therefore, the contribution of the
manufacturing sector in the national economy in the
period was meaningless.
In the year of 1960, Korea's major exporting markets
among present EC member states were the United Kingdom
(the nation's fourth largest market with $1.9 million),
Belgium (fifth largest with $1.7 million) and Germany
(sixth largest with $0.6 million). The combined total
import figure of the three EC member states was $4.2
million, accounting for 13.2 per cent of total Korea's
exports in the year.In contrast to the export trend,
Korea imported far higher amount ot commodities from EC
member states, reflecting the Korean government's import
substitution policy which increased demands for major
equipment for the implementation of the policy. Germany
was the third largest exporter to the Korean market with
$41 million in 1960, Italy fourth largest with $11
million and the United Kingdom the sixth largest with $9
million. Their total exports amounting to $67 million
accounted for 20.3 per cent of Korea's import total of
$329 million in the year. That was 15 times higher than
$4.2 million imported by the United Kingdom, Germany and
Belgium for the year. 7 Therefore, the pre-1961 period can
be called a trade surplus period in favor of the EC
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member states. Also, Korea's import substitution policy--
heavily depending on exports of primary goods and import
substitution of light industrial products--did not
provoke any trade disputes between the EC and Korea. For
example, Korea's 10 largest export items in 1961 were all
from primary goods--iron ore, tungsten, raw silk,
anthracite, cuttlefish, livefish, graphite, plywood, rice
and pig wool. 8
 Also, the world-wide growth of demand and
economic boom in the 1950s contributed to peaceful trade
relations between the EC and Korea.
2-2-2 . 1962-1971---Takeoff 	 Period	 through	 Export-Led
Development
Throughout this period, the Korean government pursued two
rounds of five-year economic development plans(1962-66
and 1967-71).Kyoung-Hwie Mihn points out:9
The industrial policy of the first plan was for
import substitution of non-durable consumer goods
and industrial raw materials and intermediate goods
with prime objectives put on the construction of
basic industries and the provision of social
overhead capital.
Even though the first plan was evaluated as a rough-and-
ready measure because it was prepared in a hurry by the
military government, it had significance in various
fields. According to Leroy Jones and Ii SaKong,1°
firstly, the first plan showed the people that the
government was seriously committed to the nation's
development. secondly, rather inexperienced
political leaders and government officials began to
appreciate the complexity of the planning process
and gained useful experience for the future.
Thirdly, the overachievement o1 growth targets
during the later period also started building self-
con fidence on the part of both the people and
economic policy-makers.
In the i.961-6b period, the nation's growth rate of
industrial sector averaged 15.42 per cent, as compared to
the growth rate of the primary sector which remained at
5.4 per cent.
On the other hand "the government's industrial
development objective in the second five-year development
period was to lay the ground for self-reliant industries
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in the sectors of iron and steel, machinery, electronics
and automobiles, along with petrochemical which was a
priority industry also in the first plan." 11 At this
time, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) and the
petrochemical complexes at Ulsan were constructed.
"The most important instrument for implementing the
government industry-specific objectives were 'policy
loans.' In a country with the supply of domestic saving
falling perennially far short of the demand, the
possibility to get access to bank lending was in itself a
privilege because the borrowing cost in the non-
institutional private market was penally higher than the
commercial bank rate."12 "The subsidized loans
constituted about half of total bank loans over the 1970s
and carried nominal interest rates of around 10-15 per
cent. If inflation will be considered, real interest
rates were close to or less than zero."13
For the support of specific industries in concrete ways,
the government adopted legislative measures in the latter
half of 1960s. These legislations were aimed at machinery
and shipbuilding (both March in 1967), electronics
(January in 1969), iron and steel, and petrochemical
(both January in 1970), and non-ferrous metals(1971).14
These laws account to a considerable extent to the fact
that electronics products, ships, steel products,
petroleum products, and general machinery were included
in the top ten export items in 1970s-1990s. This strong
government involvement is referred to as neo-mercantilist
policy in the IPE literature.
In 1970, Germany, France and the United Kingdom were
among the top ten import markets for Korea with an
import value of $67 million (third largest), $52 million
(fifth), and $33 million (ninth), respectively, totaling
$152 million. In contrast, Korea only exported $27
million worth of commodities to Germany (fourth largest
export market), $14 million to the Netherlands (sixth)
and $13 million to the United Kingdom(seventh), totaling
$54 million. 15 Major export items of Korea in 1970 were
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textiles, wigs, electronics products, footwear, iron and
steel products and metallic products. Compared to export
items in 1960, the ten largest export items were mainly
from manufactured products.
In the 1960s, industrial policy in the EC was very
limited.Since Korea's share in the world's exports was no
more than 0.21 per cent in the 1960s, there was no clash
between the EC's industrial policy and Korea's export-led
neo-mercantilist policy approach.However, "Korea had
completed or was underway the construction of the basic
industries such as steel, fertilizer, cement, oil
refining, and electricity and the social infrastructure
such as highways, harbors, and irrigation facilities by
1971.Thus, Korea had transformed its industrial structure
from	 an	 agriculture	 intensive	 industry	 to	 a
manufacturing-centered economy." 16 These efforts laid,
however, the foundation for tuture trade disputes.
2-2-3. 1972-1981--Industrial Deepening Period
The ten-year period from 1972 comprises the nation's
third and fourth five-year economic development plans.In
the third ±ive-year plan period (1972-1976), "a great
effort was done to prepare domestic savings to finance
the heavy and chemical industries drive, but the amount
of domestic savings tell far short of investment
requirements. Thus, foreign borrowings expanded
enormously, and management of foreign borrowing and debt
emerged as a malor policy issue."17
Major policy directions included in the fourth five-year
plan period (1977-1981) were to reach self-sufficiency in
investment capital, to achieve a balance of payments
equilibrium, and to promote industrial restructuring and
international competitiveness.
During this period, the Korean government continued to
provide tax and credit benefits to specific industries,
along with the aggressive introduction of foreign capital
for the development 0± those industries. 18
 Therefore, six
strategic industries--steel, non-ferrous metals,
shipbuilding, machinery, electronics and chemicals--
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received very strong discriminatory favors from the
government.
Along with these aggressive government preferences, the
targeted industries were receiving strong protection as
infant industries with high import tariffs and various
import restrictions. "Thus, in 1978, the effective rate
of protection,including tariffs as well as tariff
equivalents fot NTBs, but no domestic subsidies, for them
was 72.8 per cent, whereas that of light industry was
merely 7.8 per cent. The effective rate of protection for
transportation machinery, electrical machinery, and
chemical processing products exceeded 100 per cent."19
The strong government support for specific industries and
the complete protection of the domestic market in these
industries	 against	 foreign	 imports	 raised	 the
international	 competitiveness	 of	 Korean	 products
dramatically. Especially,electronics products, ships,
steel products, general machinery and chemicals have
become the top ten export items 0± Korea since the mid-
1970s. As a result, Korea began to enjoy a trade surplus
with the EC since 1973. Korea had been recording a trade
delicit with the EC until 1972.
In its trade with Korea, the EC accumulated a trade
surplus of $517 million in the 19b0-1969 period. However
it reversed to a trade deficit of $1,805 million in the
1970-1979 period and the tigure further widened to
$11,321 million in the 1980-1989 period.20
2-2-4.	 1982-Present--Industrial Structure Adjustment
Period
This period includes the ±ifth (1982-1986) and sixth
(1987-1991) five-year economic development plans. During
this period, the world-wide trading environment had
become detrimental to Korean economy.
Firstly, Korea's industrialization strategy, depending
upon exports of cheap-labor products, began to lose its
competitive strength due to the emergence of cheaper
labor countries and growing protectionism in advanced
countries against Korean products. Chung-H. Lee argues:21
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Industrialized countries began to lose their
comparative advantage in many of their traditional
manutacturing industries and grew more
protectionist.Furthermore, developing countries such
as China and Southeast Asian countries, implemented
their rapid industrialization, specializing in the
production of low-skilled, labor-intensive items.
Korea, sanawiched between them, needed to change its
industrial structure.
Secondly, Korea's industrial policy with an emphasis on
specific industries began to lose its advantage because
ot economic inefficiencies from the artificial allocation
of resources to those industries and the small portion of
intermediate industries between large-and small-sized
industries. Kyoung-Hwie Mihn points out:22
The Korean economy has grown so much in size and
complexity that the industrial policy of the past,
based largely on preferrential support of selected
industries and partly on the protection of the home
market from toreign competition, resulted in both
resource-allocational inefficiencies and imbalance
among industrial subsectors and between large and
small firms.
As a result, Korea's dependency on foreign imports of
intermediate products caused an instability in the
national economy.
Thirdly, Korea's authoritarian regime has been gradually
changing to a more democratized society. This change was
accompanied by a strengthening of the labour movement in
Korea. Labour cost increased rapidly in the midst of such
social change. Namely, Korea's labour cost in
manufacturing rose to 594,000 won (±457) per month in
1989 and to 746,000 won (f574) in 1990 from the only
259,000 won (1199) in 1982. 23 Therefore, Korea's
industrial policy ot suppression of labour movement and
labour Costs became no longer sustainable.In the midst of
such external and internal challenges, the government
rapidly reduced its intervention and encouraged private-
sector initiatives through a series of tariff reduction
programmes, a reduction of subsidies and quotas, and an
opening of service and financial markets in order to
strengthen free market forces in the Korean economy.
Also, "extensive import liberalization measures were
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adopted to reduce the average tariff rate to 13 per cent
by 1989. The average tariff rate was forecast to fall
further, to about 8 per cent by 1993." 24 However, the
liberalization measures were not so helpful in reducing
the growing trade disputes between the EC and Korea. For
example, the number of EC's import restraints against
Korean exports totaled 13 cases in the 1990-1 g 92 period,
as compared with 14 cases in the 10-year period in the
1980s, as seen later in Chapter III.
During this period, Korea's major export items have been
textiles and clothing, electronics products, iron and
steel products, general machinery, motor vehicle, ships,
chemicals and footwear. The EC became the third largest
export market for Korea, after the United States and
Japan.Korea has been maintaining a continuous trade
surplus with the EC since 1973. In the period of 1960-
1990, Korea exported a total of $62,748 million worth of
commodities, while imports remained at $49,684 million,
leaving $13,0b4 million in trade surplus on an
accumulated basis in tavor of Korea. The trade surplus
figure compared with $57,935 million trade deficit which
Korea suffered in the same period in trade with Japan.25
Even though the total trade volume between the EC and
Korea was relatively low, compared to the J.S.-Korea, and
Japan-Korea trade figure, trade disputes with the EC
recorded the highest level since the 1980s.
2-3. Problems Arising From Korea's Industrial Policy
The Korean government's industrial policy caused many
problems in the internal and external sphere.
2-3-1. Internal Problems
Firstly, the Korean government's industrial policy to
support several large conglomerates distorted industrial
structure--the small portion of intermediate industrial
sectors. The necessity to protect the large companies
caused very heavy protective measures against foreign
imports. According to Edward Mason,26
cheap bank loans were mostly concentrated in a few
big companies called Chaebol (Korea's several big
conglomerates equivalent to Japan's Zaibatsu). Hyper
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inflation, shortage of supply, high import tariffs
and import restrictions, protected Chaebol's
monopoly prices and the domestic tax structure were
all favorable for Chaebo.L.
Secondly, the premature promotion of heavy and chemical
industries created a chronic shortage of development
funds and a dependence on foreign capital. Namely, "Korea
virtually jumped directly from the early industrial
development stage (such as foods and textiles) to more
advanced stages (such as machinery, metal products, and
printing and publishing) as a result of the government-
driven expansion 0± advanced industrial sectors in the
1970s.'127
 For the premature implementation of heavy and
chemical industries, Korea heavily depended upon
financial resources from abroad because domestic savings
were far short of the level needed. 28 It made Korean
economy very unstable, vulnerable to changes in the
international environment.
Thirdly, "as heavy and chemical industries grew in the
1970s, the gap between large and small firms expanded and
emerged as a new economic and political issue." 29
 Also,
it contributed to make Korea's industrial structure less
flexible because of the sluggishness of business
activities by small-and medium-sized firms.
2-3-2. External Problems
The three internal problems contributed to 1)a heavy
trade deficit with Japan, 2) a heavy dependence of the
nation's exports on several items, and 3)a heavy
dependence of the nation's exports on Chaebols.
Firstly,Korea heavily relied upon Japan for its heavy and
chemical industry promotion project as it was achieved
with equipment and technology trom Japan. 3 ° This became
one of the major reasons for Korea's perennial trade
deficit with Japan.Also, Korea tollowed in the steps of
Japan's industrial development with a time lag, which
accounted for the accusation that Korea was a "Second
Japan."
Secondly, as a result of promoting and tostering several
strategic industries, the destiny 0± Korea's foreign
trade performance heavily depended on shipments of
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several items such as electronics products, iron and
steel products, ships, general machinery, etc. This makes
Korea very vulnerable towards the whims of the
international markets in these product ranges.
Thirdly, the Chaebols31 account for the lion's share of
the nation's exports. Therefore, their export performance
dominates the nation's economy. For example, the export
share of large-sized companies in the nation's total
exports reached 80 per cent in 1983 of which that of
General Trading Companies (GTCs) accounted for 50.5 per
cent. This circumstance makes Korea liable to trade
restrictions by foreign countries because these big-sized
Korean companies are considered to cause conspicuous
industrial damages to them. In the EC market, Taiwan in
which small-and medium-sized companies are preponderant,
is well known to have successfully avoided trade
restraints from the EC. That is certainly one of the
advantages of Taiwanese companies in competition with
their Korean counterparts in the EC market. In addition,
Taiwan's export items to the EC market are mostly parts,
rather than finished products. This is in contrast to
Korean firms which usually provide finished products to
the EC market, rather than parts in trade with the EC
member states.
In sum, the trade trend between the EC and Korea is
evaluated by the EC authorities as a result of Korea's
strong government involvement and protectionism in
specific industries. Reflecting this perception, Korea-EC
trade conflicts began to rise since 1972 and intensified
in the 1980s. As we have seen in Chapter I, the problems
of EC's industrial policy began to be exposed in the
1970s with world-wide business recession as a momentum.
However, the problems ot Korea's industrial policy began
to	 be	 exposed	 in	 the	 1980s	 with	 new
protectionism(proliferation of NTB5 worldwide) and
emergence of new cheap labor cost countries externally,
and democratization and strong labour movement internally
as a momentum.
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3. Issues and Problems of Korea's Trade Policy
The analysis of issues and problems of Korea's trade
policy is needed for examining the impacts of Korea's
trade policy on the EC's protective measures against
Korea. In case of Korea, the issues and problems in trade
policy were caused by neo-mercantilist industrial policy
implementation.
3-1.Issues in Korea's Trade Policy
According to Kyung-Hwie Mihn, "as a legitimate branch of
industrial policies, trade and exchange rate policies in
Korea	 are	 sector-specific	 industrial	 policies."32
Therefore, Korea's industrial policy is closely
interconnected with trade policy and it is not easy to
distinguish trade policy from industrial policy. However,
Korea's trade policy can be divided into policy
instruments for the protection ot specific industries
trom foreign competition (disincentives ±or foreign
exporters) and those br the ±ostering of those
industries(incentives for Korean exporters).
Firstly, the protection of industries from foreign
imports was implemented through high tariff barriers.
Korea is flexibly using the tariff barriers because it's
tariffs are not bound by GATT. In addition, the Korean
government is using protective measures for the financial
and service markets, and does not provide appropriate
protection 0± intellectual property rights for
foreigners.
Secondly, the Korean government has been providing
support to Korean exporters tor the promotion of the
nation's exports. As a result of all these measures,
Korea's major trading partners consider Korea a country
which is distorting international comparative advantages
artificially through the provision of aggressive policy
support measures to Korean exporters. There±ore, the
issues in Korea's trade policy implementation have given
rise to trade disputes between Korea and its trading
partners, especially the EC. In the following, I will
provide further details of these Korea's measures.
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3-2. Analysis of Korea's Trade Policy Instruments
3-2-1. Disincentives for Foreign Exporters
3-2-1-1.Tariff Protection
1± the Common External Tariff(CET) is a symbol of the
EC's trade policy, the counterpart in Korea's trade
policy is the high barrier of tariff protection. For
example, average tariff rates for manufactured goods in
Korea in 1988 was 16.9 per cent, which is tar higher than
6.7 per cent in the EC in 1985, as seen in Chapter 1.33
Also, the Korean government is using various domestic tax
systems to exclude foreign imports. In the EC-Korea
trade, the Korea's high tariff rates are serious
problems. "In spirit, the Korea's discriminatory taxation
compared to domestic quasi-substitutes (liquor tax,
education tax) leads to dramatic price discrepancies
which drive these EC products to the edge of the market,
and drastically reduce actual as compared to potential
sales." 34 Especially, Korea's domestic tax rate for
acquisition 0± passenger cars, mostly foreign-made ones
with prices higher than 70 million won (f54,000) is 15
per cent, as compared to that levied on those with prices
less than 70 million won confined to 2 per cent.
Therefore, foreign products have been confronting two tax
barriers in Korea, tirstly high import tariff rates, and
secondly unequal treatment in levying domestic tariffs,
compared to Korean products.
3-2-1-2.Protection of Access to Korean Commodity,
Financial and Serivce Markets by Foreigners
In addition to high tariff protection barriers,
complicated import regulations in Korea have been big
obstacles to foreign exporters. For example, items for
imports are divided into tour categories--automatic
approval items, import surveillance items, import
diversification items and import restricted items. There
are also much discretions in the Korean government
authorities to classify the items for imports in
accordance with the categories. In case of import
restricted items, "details of restricted items are seldom
105
made public and constantly change. In general terms,
certificates br restricted items are more easily
available for machinery and industrial supplies whilst
certificates for consumer goods are much more difficult
to obtain."35
Korea is also restricting access of foreign companies to
Korea's financial and service markets. This protection
causes the EC to argue for the principle of comparative
reciprocity to restrict Korean companies from getting an
access to financial and service markets in the EC if the
EC companies are not receiving the same treatments in
Korea as the U.S.companies. Since 1987, the EC has
consistently been raising complaints about the
complexities of import regulations and the discretionary
case-by-case applications of import restriction rules,
along with askings to open Korea's financial and
insurance markets in the Korea-EC High Consultations, the
high-ranking government-level talks between the EC and
Korea. "The opening-up of the insurance and securities
markets, in such a way that EC business can enjoy
effective market access and the same competitive
opportunities, governs EC's policy in this respect.
However, Korean markets are still heavily restricted and
closed. "36
3-2-1-3.Other Disincentives for Foreign Exporters
Because Korea is an authoritarian country and has an
executive-dominant decision-making procedure, it is easy
to do nation-wide moral persuasion campaign to avoid
'excessive' expenditure on luxurious items. The EC
officially raised a complaint about the Korean
government's campaign in May, 1991 in the Korea-EC High
Consultations.
Another foreign complaint concerns Korea's inadequate
protection for pharmaceuticals, trademarks or design and
copyright for books, recordings and computer softwares.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this prompted the
EC to terminate its provision of GSP treatment to Korean
exporters in January, 1988. However, the issue was
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resolved in Korea-EC Working-Level Meeting in September,
1991 because Korea promised to provide adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, same as that
given to the United States. In this case, the EC also
applied the comparative reciprocity principle with the
termination of the GSP treatment as means to receive
protection of intellectual property rights.
3-2-2. Incentives for Korean Exporters
3-2-2-1 . Credit Allocation
"Korea began to provide concessional credit to exporters
in the 1950s, enhancing the degree of concession and the
ease of access to the credit after the transition to an
export-oriented strategy in the mid-1960s. Through the
1970s,automatic access to short-term export financing was
available to exporters at 6 to 12 percentage points below
the commercial bank loan rate." 31 Especially,"because the
ofricially set real interest rates were kept close to
zero or even negative, businessmen tended to borrow as
much as they could from banks--often in excess of the
amount needed to finance future investments." 38 Such
excess borrowing resulted in chronic inflationary
pressure on the Korean economy and started speculation on
real estates by several big business groups. "Korean
banks have still been forced to give low-interest--barely
profitable--policy loans to industries selected by the
government." 39 Therefore, the access to preferential
loans, along with cheap labour, became a foundation for
the international price competitiveness of Korean
exporters. Because the Korean government controlled all
banking institutions,the heavy dependence of private
businesses on bank loans also meant direct government
control over business.
3-2-2-2.Tax Incentives
Among the government tax incentives for exporters were
tariff exemptions on imports of intermediate goods and
capital equipment to be used in production for exports,
rebate of indirect taxes such as commodity taxes and
business taxes on intermediate inputs and export sales,
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and income tax reductions (50 per cent) on profits from
exports.
The U.S. Congress study
Korea's tax incentives
to export-led growth E
structure as follows:40
states about the contribution of
o switching import substitutions
rategy and deepening industrial
A crucial component of the transition to export-led
growth in the mid-l9bOs was that all imports used as
inputs into exports would be exempt from
quantitative import restrictions. Raw material
imports used for exports were also exempt from
tariffs. Capital goods used for export production
were exempt from tariffs until the early 1970s.
However, the Korean government is gradually changing its
tax-incentive policy to put an emphasis on "the
allocation ot resources in line with the growing reliance
on market forces because the actual benefits of tax
incentives have drastically decreased in recent years due
to the lower tax rate and the stabilization 0± interest
rates. "41
3-2-2-3 . Foreign Exchange
"Historically, the Korean government has controlled
foreign exchange in Korea. Earners of foreign exchange
have been required to transfer it to one of several
designated agencies, which in turn transfer it to the
Bank of Korea. Private companies or citizens may retain
only a small amount. The government formulates an annual
Foreign Exchange Demand and Supply Plan." 42 Due to such
control of foreign exchange, the Korean government was in
a position to counteract various problems in trading
environment very ±lexibly--when exports are decreasing,
making the exchange rate undervalued to a more feasible
level.Thus, "the maintenance 0± the effective exchange-
rate system could be one of factors which Korean
exporters can maintain the international price
competitiveness throughout the period of rapid expansion
and high GNP growth."43
However, due to the aggravating trad
	
deficits with
Korea, Korea's major trading partners, especially the
United States, strongly asked Korea to liberalize	 the
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exchange rate, criticizing the Korean government's
intervention in the exchange rate mechanism. Therefore,
Korea's exchange rate system, reflecting the pressure
from advanced countries, has been changed since March
1990 to market average exchange rate system under which
supply and demand of specific currencies set the daily
exchange rate, reducing the room of government
intervention in exchange rate mechanism. Furthermore,
"the Korean government is committed to introducing a
free-floating foreign exchange rate system in 1997 by
preparing the establishment of a sophisticated foreign
exchange market. "
3-2-2-4.Other Policy Incentives for Korean Exporters
The Korean government provided various administrative and
supportive measures for Korean exporters under the
principle of laying the foundation of the nation through
international trade (Korean word, Suchul Ibkuk).They can
be summed in the following five points.
Firstly,"the government developed export industrial zones
in Seoul, Masan (near Pusan) and Kumi (near Taegu) in the
1960s and continued the programme into the 1970s." 45 The
industrial estates were provided to Korean exporters at
greatly discounted prices. In view of the importance of
the location tactor in manufacturing, this must have
been a considerable support for Korean industry.In 1969,
the Regional Industrial Development Law was enacted under
which at least one regional industrial estate in every
provincial capital was to be established. Along with the
low purchase price for the site, utility charges such as
electricity, water, transportation, communications and
other services in the industrial zones were discounted at
a very favorable rate to support the exporters'
production activities. They also received special tariff
exemptions.
Secondly, the government set up various export support
organizations to provide practical assistance for Korean
exporters. Among them are the Korea Trade Promotion
Corporation (KOTRA)
	 and the Korea Foreign Trade
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Association (KFTA) which are responsible for assisting
Korean exporters to develop overseas markets and for
recommending various administrative measures to the
government to solve problems being confronted by Korean
exporters. In addition, the Export-Import Bank of Korea
was set up to provide financial assistance for Korean
exporters.
Thirdly, "to complement the work of the KOTRA and the
KFTA, the government launched a scheme to build up Korean
GTC5 along the lines of their Japanese counterparts.
Beginning in the early 1970s, those trading companies
that met the stringent performance and size criteria for
GTCs received special privileges in terms of access to
credit, retention of foreign exchange, and other
assistance." 46 Usually, each Chaebol has one GTC which
acts as export window for all subsidiary companies in one
conglomerate. As a result,bene±its to GTCs meant benefits
to the Chaebols. The export share of the GTCs in the
nation's total exports in 1976 accounted for 13.6 per
cent, which peaked in 1983 with 50.5 per cent and reached
at 42.5 per cent in 1991.
Fourthly, the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting began to
be held from December in 1962 to not only encourage
exchange of information but also serve as a potent
indicator of the government overriding interest in seeing
exports grow. "From 19b5 on, upwards of 100 senior
political leaders, bureaucrats, and business people met
each month to discuss export drive. The meetings were
chaired by the President himself as a symbol of the
government's commitment to exporting."47
Fifthly, "the Ministry of Trade & Industry began setting
annual export targets classified by commodity, region,
and country of destination. This had an effect of
announcing specific markets as profitable and implicitly
promising non-quantifiable government support in pursuit
of those targets." 48
 In addition, "prizes were provided
once a year on Export Day. The prizes conveyed not just
prestige, but also economic rewards, such as easier bank
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credit for non-export projects. In 1980, Export Day was
renamed Trade Day, and prizes awarded for good
performance in both exporting and importing."49
In sum, Korea built its ground for industrial development
through very aggressive trade policy incentives for
Korean exporters--financial supports such as credit and
tax exemption, systematic support such as management of
foreign exchange, and institutional supports such as
establishment of industrial zones, export promotion
organizations (KOTRA and KFTA) and GTCs, and other non-
quantifiable supports such as set-up of annual export
target and holding of the Monthly Export Promotion
Meeting. Thanks to the government's efforts, Korean
exporters were also safe ±rom foreign threats because of
1)tari±f protection tor manufactured goods from foreign
countries, 2)protection for service industries and
3)various government initiatives to reduce consumption of
foreign products. These various government measures were
enough to make Korea to be branded as a neo-mercantilist,
protective country, and to provoke many trade disputes
between the EC and Korea in a viewpoint that the EC is
relatively open, compared to the Korean market, for
exports of Korean products to the EC market.
3-3. Problems of Korea's Trade Policy
These trade policies have generated problems which are
typically for upward moving countries like Korea and
beset the country's trade relationship with its major
trading partners.Bruce Cumings points out the problems of
export-led development model adopted by countries like
Korea in the way 0± upward mobility in the world system.
According to him,5°
firstly, less developed countries(LDCs) need to
break into the system of economic exchange at a
point other than comparative advantage in labor,
that is, in marketing, better technology, or better
organization. Yet, multinationals provide most of
the markets and use 'steady-state' or obsolescent
technologies (the limitations in development of
better technology).
Secondly, limited .tactor endowments and the
small domestic markets that characterized such
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offshore production inhibit second-stage
industrialization and cause early problems of
surplus capacity(problems of surplus capacity).
Thirdly, rising competition from poor states means
that there is a critical but a short and slim lead
over competing LDC5(weakening international price
competitiveness).
Finally, core-country protectionism will arise to
the extent that declining sectors have
representation in the polity(strengthening
protectionism in advanced countries).
3-3-1. One-Side Trade Policy Favors to Large-Sized
Companies and Weakness in International Compeititiveness
A policy of favorable credit allocation made a big
difference between companies who can get access to the
preferential measures and companies who are in
difficulties to get such preference. According to Byung
Nak Song,5'
access to government-controlled bank credit
increasingly involved corruption and favouritism.
Businessmen who became wealthy under these
circumstances were widely suspected of corrupt
dealings. Because the measure 01: success for firms
was their export capability, firms tended to
increase production and export capacity as much as
possible. This forced expansion of output and
exports resulted in a high debt-equity racio,as well
as distortions in the firms' internal decision
making.
The development of large corporations has made Korea
particularly strong in the development of large-scale and
capital-intensive production. However, it also
contributed to the weakness in ilexibility in adjusting
to external and internal changes. Kore&s main problem in
exports is now the weakness of technological
competitiveness because it is very difficult to develop
products with high value added without expanding the
technological base reached by small-and medium-sized
firms. Furthermore, Korean companies did not pay much
attention to the development of new products. As a
result, the technological gap between the advanced
countries and Korea has been widening. Korean products
have also been losing their international price
competitiveness, caused by hikes in labour costs in a
process of strong labour movements in Korea. That allowed
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Korea to be chased by new cheap labour cost countries in
exports of labour intensive products. For example, Korea
recorded the lowest export growth in 1992 with 6.6 per
cent, compared to those of its major competitors such as
Hong Kong (21.2 per cent), China (18.2 per cent), Japan
(8.0 per cent), Singapore (7.7 per cent) and Taiwan (7.0
per cent).
3-3-2. Excessive Investment in Production Capacities and
High Dependence on Exports
Export-led growth strategy, resulting in the forced
expansion of investment and output by businesses, caused
the inflationary financing of investment. The excessive
demand for investment created by this type of policy
provided one of the links between the forced export
growth strategy and high inflation which persisted until
1982. Also, the excessive expansion of investment and
output caused the surplus of production capacities.
Because of the small domestic market, the efficient
operation of surplus production capacities was totally
dependent upon success of export activities. Byung Nak
Song points out this structural and perennial problem in
Korea's economy, which is prevalent so far, as tollows:52
1) It is widely believed that high inflation harmed
social justice by redistributing wealth from
creditors to debtors.
2) The high inflation rate often outstripped
the government-set bank interest rates, resulting
in negative interest rates.
3) Although that capital flight out of Korea has not
been a serious problem, many Koreans have diverted
savings from financial institutions to real estate.
4) High inflation contributed to the expansion of
the unorganized credit market or 'kerb market',
which in turn came to have a major role in
mobilizing and allocating investment funds.
5) This high inflation and its negative impact also
contributed to expanding the dependence on foreign
debt because domestic savings can not meet higher
demand for financial resources for investments.
3-3-3. Export-First Policy and Cut-Throat Competition
among Korean Exporters in World Market
The export first policy resulted Korean exporters in
concentrating immediate records of exports because all
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kinds of favors from the government such as tax and
credit benefits are given in accordance with the export
record. Therefore, they were negligent in developing
high-quality products on a long term basis, concentrating
on exports of several items for which Korean companies
have traditional comparative advantage. Also, Korean
firms did not make much efforts to develop new markets
for exports because of higher costs for new market
developments, only doing cut-throat competition
themselves in existing markets for raising export records
0± their own companies.
3-3-4. Concentration on Several Export Items and
Competitive Weakness in Changes in International Trading
Environment
Due to the neglect of the development ot new export
items and overseas markets, Korea's export markets and
items have stayed limited in scope. This made Korean
exporters vulnerable towards changes in international
markets.
Major export items in 1991 were electrical and
electronics products amounting to $20,157 million (28.0
per cent of the nation's total exports of $71,870 million
in that year), textiles with $15,478 million (21.5 per
cent), footwear with $3,836 million (5.3 per cent), iron
and steel products with $4,509 million (6.3 per cent),
ships with $4,124 million (5.7 per cent) and
transportation equipment including automobiles with
$3,057 million (4.3 per cent). The share of the six items
in the nation's exports totaled 71.2 per cent. In case of
any newly-implemented restrictive measures from foreign
countries against the export of these products, the
foundation of Korea's export-oriented economy will be
severely undermined.
Korea's major exports are also concentrating on the
United States with exports of $18,559 million in 1991
(25.8 per cent 0± the year's export total of $71,870
million), Japan with $12,35b million (17.2 per cent of
the total) and the EC with $9,728 million (13.5 per cent
of the total). The market share of the three regions in
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the nation's total exports accounted for 56.6 per cent.
Therefore, Korea's export growth or decline, furthermore
the destiny of the nation's economy, wholly rely upon the
relations with the United States, Japan and the EC.
3-3-5. Concentration of Exports on Finished Products and
Inter-Industry Trade Structure
Korea's export pattern so far put special stress on
exports of finished products rather than parts as a
result of sluggish business activities by small-and
medium-sized companies. As a result,Korea has been
maintaining inter-industry trading pattern rather than
intra-industry trading pattern, easily being a target for
import restraints by toreign countries. Also, export
shares of several big-sized companies called GTCs show an
annual average of 42.97 per cent in the 1983-1991 period.
The highest share 0± GTC5 in Korea's total exports was
50.5 per cent in 1983, and the lowest share was 38.0 per
cent in 1987.
4. Issues and Problems of Korea's Economic Policy
Decision Making Process
4-1. Issues in Korea's Economic Policy Decision Making
Process
Issues in Korea's economic policy decision mald.ng process
can be divided into tour aspects in accordance with the
peculiar characteristic 0± these decision making
procedure which is very different from those in advanced
countries such as the EC. Those four factors are 1)
executive dominance, 2) speed and flexibility, 3)
pragmatism, particularism, centralization and openness
and 4) policy implementation measures.
4-1-1. Executive Dominance
Major economic decisions in Korea have been dominated by
the executive rather than legislative which is general
feature of Korean politics.Regarding this particular
feature of Korean decision making process, Byung Nak Song
explains that "the most important characteristic of the
decision making machinery involved in formulating and
implementing economic plans and policies in Korea is that
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it is headed by the President and as such is a nation-
wide apparatus." 53 Also, Edward Mason argues "the
emasculation of the legislature in all significant
matters of policy is well known to the most causal
observer of the Korean scene."54
In the executive-dominant decision making process, the
role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) has been
crucial. The EPB, established in 1961, after the model of
Japanese Economic Planning Agency, has been "responsible
for economic planning, central budgeting, foreign capital
management and statistics, and have the authority to
coordinate policies and programs of all the economic
ministries." 55
 The decision making process by Executive
with a small number of government officials 56 was
described by Byung Nak Song as follows:57
The hierarchical order in the policy making process
is from the President to the Deputy Prime Minister,
who heads the Economic Planning Board, and then to
the head of the concerned ministry--whether the
Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of
Energy and Resources or the Minister of Agriculture
and Fisheries. Particularly, notable in the Korea's
decision making process is the role played by the
President's Economic Secretary. Although this post
is only of vice ministerial rank, the Economic
Secretary's influence on economic policy and the
stat fing of various economic ministries 0± ten has
been equal to or greater than the influence of the
Deputy Prime Minister, especially in the 1960s and
1970s.
4-1-2. Speed and Flexibility
The highly centralized decision making process and the
limitation of participants in the decision making to a
very small number of government officials facilitated the
speed and flexibility in policy formulation. "The
government officials have been generally able to avoid
the penalties of fragmented interests and disjointed
decision making process. That is in sharp contrast with
most advanced countries including the BC where various
executive departments are often at odds with one another,
not to mention ot the institutionalized tension between
the executive and the legislative branch, and decision
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making process tends to be politicized and susceptible to
the influence of particular vested interests."58
The speed and flexibility in decision making process has
been very effective especially in trade policy
tormulation. The government set various non-pecuniary
incentive measures to promote exports such as export
target setting, designation of GTCs and holding of
Monthly Export Promotion Meeting. That means the Korean
government responded changes in world-wide trading
environments	 controlling	 those	 export	 promotion
incentives with speed and flexibility.
4-1-3 .Pragmatism,	 Particularism,	 Centralization	 and
Openness
Leroy Jones argues crucial characteristic of Korea's
decision making with following four factors:59
Pragmatism--Korea's decision making has willingness
to experiment with available tool for achieving a
desired end. This is to be contrasted witn an
ideological approach that attempts to apply some
received tormulation focusing on means rather than
ends.
Particularism--It refers to the practice of making
policy decisions with a low level of generality,
permitting the government to apply a certain policy
to a limited number of clients in a specific
situation.
Centralization--Virtually all economic decisions of
any importance are made in Seoul, by the President.
Openness--This openness is a somewhat surprisingly
characteristic in an authoritarian regime and, even
in Korea, can hardly be said to extend to the
political arena. Nonetheless, within the strictly
limited realm of economic affairs, this is virtually
unlimited freedom of expression and dissent.
However, the final decision process itself is
usually closed.
Pragmatism can be found in the basic philosophy behind
Korea's industrial and trade policies, which assumed that
the higher, the faster, and the more the economy grows,
the better. Export first policy makes Korean companies do
all kinds of efforts to increase their export records,
expecting various incentives from the government when
they successfully achieved export targets set by the
government for them.
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Particularism can be found in several 'Chaebols' and
GTCs. Under the principle of pragmatism, the government
gave extensive administrative and financial supports to a
limited range of big-sized business conglomerates.
Centralization is the characteristic of the President-led
decision making process which promotes the speed and
flexibility in the government decision making.
Openness is closely related to the export first policy
under which
	 the	 government	 eagerly accommodated
complaints from the private business as 	 far as trade
expansion is concerned.
4-1-4. Policy Implementational Measures
Along with the provisions of various tax and credit
favors for export promotion, the Korean government
whipped to facilitate the implementation of decisions in
industrial and trade policies.
Firstly, "systematic and detailed investigations by the
Otfice of Tax Administration were used to discipline
firms which did not cooperate with the government
economic policies. "60
Secondly, the government used the suppression of bank
credit or recall ot loans to implement its industrial and
trade policies. Korean lirms aggressively expanded their
production capacity to increase overseas sales as much as
possible. The cost for the expansion of production
facilities largely was assigned with bank loans at very
low interest rates. Therefore, the threat of suspending
the bank loans became an intimidatory measure for them
enough to feel a danger for the survival in their
businesses.
Thirdly, "the government has used the disconnection of
infrastructure services such as electricity, water, roads
and telephones to punish firms that do not comply with
the government economic policies."61
Various incentives under industrial and trade policies
did much toward industrialization and export promotion in
Korea. However, these disincentives also contributed to
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have the government implement its policy goals with
speed, efficiency and flexibility.
4-2. Problems of Korea's Decision Making Process
4-2-1. Executive Dominance Decision Making and BC-Korea
Trade Disputes
In connection with the executive dominance, personal
contacts with government officials are a traditional
means of influence in East Asia, and Korea is no
exception. Also, the range of discretionary decisions in
working-level administrative fields are very wide,
raising the possibility of corruptions of government
officials. The wide range of discretionary decisions can
be additional burdens to Korean firms as cost of
production. The additional cost eventually has become a
burden to consumers, forcing in extreme cases Korean
firms to sell their products at domestic market with
prices far higher than those to be sold at international
markets. Theretore, Korean companies have been frequently
involved in AD investigations by advanced countries, even
though such factor can not be an excuse for dumping by
Korean exporters.
Korea can be easily targets of criticism from advanced
countries as a country where the government strongly
involves all kinds of economic decisions with an
executive dominance. Especially, establishment of state-
run trade support organizations,such as KOTRA and
Export-Import Bank of Korea, can be used as a good excuse
for attacking Korea's market operating mechanism as the
government-oriented statist organization.
4-2-2. Speed and Flexibility and BC-Korea Trade Disputes
The speed and flexibility in decision making has also
many defects. Leroy Jones and Ii SaKong point out:62
In Korea, journalists regularly deplore the
hastiness of such measures as the 1971 Law on
Restraining Real Estate Investment, which is claimed
to have resulted from a twenty-four hour study and
the 1973 Law on Price Stability, which is said to
have taken a comparatively leisurely three days of
preparation. Businessmen often complain about the
sudden shifts in policy direction and (at a
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decidedly lower lever of importance) academics are
regularly trustrated when their critiques of policy
became outdated before reaching print.
Also, "the overexpansion of heavy industries and of
shipbuilding in the late 1970s were examples of failures
resulting from the government excessive direction, along
with the rough-and-ready decision."63
The frequent changes in flexibility in the requirement of
GTCs, such as the reduction in numbers of GTCs and
increase in requirement of export record to be eligible
as GTCs, caused the cutthroat competition among Korean
GTCs in overseas markets themselves. They dumped their
products only for raising export records and for being
remained as GTCs as means of receiving enormous
benefits from the government. Eventually, the speed and
flexibility in the decision making process resulted in
international trade disputes with foreign countries.
4-2-3. Pragmatism and Particularism and EC-Korea Trade
Disputes
The pragmatism also caused the preferential incentives
leaned to the large-sized export firms. As a result,
small-and medium-sized companies have not secured any
status as parts suppliers tor large companies which is
ideal for the strength of the nation's economic
structure. This resulted in Korea's industrial structure,
concentration on exports 0± finished products, rather
than parts.
The particularism, applied by "rule of man rather than
rule of law, gave great scope for official discretion"64
This particularism made major trading partners of Korea
be under the impression that the Korean government
actively involves in manipulating industrial and trade
structures to the direction which is best suited to
Korean exporters.
In sum, the executive-dominant decision making caused
much corruption in government officials and raised
financial burdens of Korean companies. That burdens
became a reason to do cut-throat competition among Korean
exporters in foreign markets to expand export value,
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leading to dumping activities. Also, the flexibility in
decision making--such as changes in requirements for GTC5
and changes in level of export records for credit and tax
benefits--also resulted in destructive competition among
Korean exporters in foreign countries. The pragmatism and
particularism of decision making process also contributed
Korea to be branded as strong neo-mercantilist policy
implementing country. Emphasis of government supports to
big-sized companies widened a gap between large business
conglomerates producing finished products and small
companies manufacturing parts. Therefore, Korea's export
pattern was standardized as finished products-centered
trade.
Issues and problems of Korea's decision making process
directly contributed to the EC-Korea trade disputes
through two causal chain relationships. One is executive
dominance and flexibility in decision making,and frequent
changes in the level of export records for tax and credit
favors from the government. These caused cutthroat
competition among Korean exporters, dumping activities in
foreign markets and EC-Korea trade disputes. Korean
companies actually dumped in the EC market. As I
mentioned in Chapter II, EC'S AD investigations against
Korean products which led to definitive AD duty
impositions numbered 7 cases in a total of 18 AD
investigations in the 1975-1992 period. However, it is
noteworthy that dumping is normally considered to be an
abuse as an open market. The other is pragmatism and
particularism in decision making and intensive support to
big-sized companies producing finished products. That
caused relative sluggishness in production of parts by
small-and medium-sized companies, exports centered on
finished products, inter-industry trade structure and
increases in the EC-Korea trade disputes.
However, such direction of decision making is emasculated
because Korea is now standing at crossroads in which
policy directions should be adopted to accommodate
political and economic liberalizations requested at home
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and abroad. As a result,Korea's decision making mechanism
has been con±rontlng many challenges internally and
externally even though it greatly contributed to the
promotion of export on the one hand and the fierce trade
disputes with foreign countries on the other.
In addition to problems in economic policy and decision
making process in the EC and Korea, there are many
factors contributing to determinants of protectionism in
the EC-Korea trade as a result of these problems. These
factors include clashes of divergent industrial and trade
policies, establishment of bilateral inter-industry trade
structure and development of bilateral trade disputes in
specific industrial sectors. They are acting as major
determinants of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade and
are caused by problems in economic policy and unique
characteristic 0± economic policy decision making
process. In addition, it is necessary to make a
comparative analysis of protective measures by EC member
states and advanced countries against Korea for the
purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the EC's
protective measures against Korea. In the following, I
will delve into this in more detail.
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Chapter III. Divergent Economic Policies and Trade
Structures between the BC and Korea and Their Impact on
Determinants and Effectiveness of Protectionism in BC-
Korea Trade
A Brief Summary of Chapter III
The Changes in Divergent Economic Policies between the BC
and Korea and Bilateral Trade Disputes
The EC-Korea trade disputes have a direct functional
relationship with 1) the EC's measures to provide against
the period after the completion of the Single Market and
its attendant protective measures by the EC in EC's
problem industries, 2) EC's intensive programme to revive
the competitiveness of consumer electronics in the SC,
and its collision with Korea's aggressive industrial
policy and export promotion in those products to the EC
market, 3) Korea's neo-mercantilist policy to support a
limited range of industrial sectors and concentration of
exports of several products to the SC market, and 4)
difficulties of market access for SC products to Korea,
caused by high tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) in
Korea. In addition, the EC's protective measures have an
indirect functional relationship with i)EC's perception
that Korea is providing unequal treatment to the EC,
compared to that of the United States, and its attendant
comparative reciprocity principle application by the EC
against Korea, and 2) Korea's trading pattern and
strategy similar with those of Japan in the EC market and
its attendant protective measures by the SC against
Korea.
The Changes in Trade Structure between the BC and Korea
and Bilateral Trade Disputes
The three factors---1) the specialization of trade in a
limited range of items in bilateral trade, 2) the
characteristic of inter-industry trade structure, and 3)
the weakening competitiveness of EC'S products, which
maintained traditionally strong competitiveness against
Korea, were all symptoms that there was inevitably an
increase in trade disputes between the EC and Korea.
However, the trade balance moved in favor of the SC in
128
1991 and 1992. The reversal in bilateral trade balance in
the period was due to 1) Korea's weakening international
price competitiveness in labour-intensive products, 2)
EC's tight import restraints against Korea's major export
items and 3) the difficulties in developing alternative
export items by Korea to the EC market after import
restraints by the EC against Korea's major export items,
and 4) sharp appreciation of Korean won against major BC
currencies such as German mark, French franc and British
pound.
Trade Balance between the BC and Korea and Bilateral
Trade Disputes
The trade disputes between the EC and Korea were not a
function of trade surplus or deficit. Instead, Korea's
concentration on exports of several items and overlap of
these export items with products in EC's declining
industries contributed to the worsening bilateral trade
disputes. Namely, bilateral trade disputes were caused by
changes in Korea's major export items in the 1970-1992
period to the EC and changes in EC's problem industries
in the same period. That explains the reason for many
trade disputes between the EC and Korea, despite the
insignificance of Korea's total export volume to the BC
market.
1. Introduction
I already mentioned the issues and problems of divergent
economic policies between the BC and Korea in Chapters I
and II. In this chapter, however, I will chronologically
analyse clashes between the economic policies of the BC
and Korea and the impact of these clashes on the
bilateral trade structure in the 1970-1992 period. Then,
I will look into the impact of the trade structure on
developments of bilateral trade disputes as determinants
of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade. My final concern
in this chapter is to look closely at the impact of their
trade structure on the effectiveness of protectionism in
the BC-Korea trade	 through comparative analysis of
effectiveness	 of	 protective measures	 by advanced
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countries against Korea. Through the analyses of this
chapter, it can be found 1) why clashes between the
economic policies of the EC and Korea is inevitable, 2)
why an inter-industry trade structure between the EC and
Korea has been established, 3) why the EC-Korea trade
disputes are concentrated on a limited number of several
industrial sectors and 4) how the policy clashes and
trade structure influence the effectiveness of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade.
2. The Changes in Divergent Economic Policies of the EC
and Korea and Bilateral Trade
2-1. The 1970s
The EC faced in the 1970s declining industrial sectors
after a period of seeking to expand them in connection
with growing world-wide demands in the 1950s and after a
period of building up European champions to cope with
the American challenge in the 1960s.These problems began
to emerge due to world-wide economic recession after two
rounds of oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, as I mentioned in
Chapter I. The EC adopted three different, often
contradictory policies for the management of their
declining and maturing industries. According to Jose De
La Torre and Michel Bacchetta,'
first and foremost has been the EC's commitment to a
policy of encouraging competition among companies
from member countries. Secondly, the EC provided
protection from external competitive forces to a
number of industries, temporarily reversing its
liberal trade position, yet consistent to the extent
possible with the maintenance of internal
competition. Thirdly, the European landscape is
littered with attempts to coordinate industrial
development policies, whether applied to growth or
declining sectors, investment incentives and
disincentives, regional development, etc.
HoWever, different interests of EC member states in
industrial sectors and ditterences in industrial policy
as a whole, along with their disbelief in EC institutions
hindered the formation of an EC-wide industrial policy.
Therefore, the different interests of member states and
the different characteristic of specific industries
prompted the EC to adopt trade policy instruments to
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protect threatened industries--textiles, footwear,
household electrical appliances, etc. Unfortunately,
industries in which EC has been confronting industrial
structure adjustment problems have been promising growing
industries for the Korean side. Those industries
benefited from the extensive support of the Korean
government. As I mentioned in Chapter II, the Korean
government set the 1962-1971 period as the take-off
period for non-durable consumer goods and industrial raw
materials and laid the ground for providing assistance to
self-reliant industries such as iron and steel,
machinery, electronics and automobiles. Also, continuous
assistance was given to traditional foreign exchange
earner of Korean industry, such as textiles and clothing
which was the largest export item of Korea in the 1970-
1987 period. In this period, various kinds of
administrative and financial support measures were
provided by the Korean government to expand export
performance and to carry out successively import
substitution policy to key industries. As a result,
"Korea has developed strong international competitiveness
in the capital intensive shipbuilding industry, a target
of industrial policy in the late 1970s. Korea also showed
strength in a range of consumer electronics products that
are technology-intensive, excelling in the more
standardized(simple assembly) segments. Yet, Korea has
also increased competitiveness in toys, and sporting
goods, a low technology light-manufacturing sector that
is typically labour-intensive."2
Table 111-1: Korea's Exports and Imports to and from the
EC in the 1970s($1M)
Year	 70	 71	 72	 73	 74	 75	 76	 77	 78	 79
Exports 65 75 149 345 512 754 1151 1397 1851 2337
Imports 208 253 262 294 336 538 674 803 1374 2094
Balance-143-j.78 -113 +51 +176 +216 +477 +594 +477 +243
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Major Statistics
of Korean Economy 1992), p.202.
131
Originally, Korea had been recording trade deficit with
the EC until 1972, as seen in Table 111-1. However, the
situation changed in 1973 due to the aggressive
industrial policy in Korea. The composition of the EC
exports according to the trade balance shows clearly the
strength and weakness of the EC'S industry. In 1978,
"EC's export items which are showing trade surplus with
Korea were general machinery, industrial machinery,
machine tools,transportation equipment and motors whose
percentage in surplus figure with Korea represented more
than 75 per cent.In addition to machinery, organic
chemicals and dyes also included in the list of items
showing trade surplus. Therefore, the EC only showed
competitive strength in machinery and chemicals against
Korean products in the 1970s."3
On the other hand, "EC recorded trade deficit in 14
sectors among a total of 24 sectors of which six areas
were from raw material processing industries, along with
five	 from	 final	 consumer	 products.	 Only
telecommunications machinery and office machinery
registered trade deficits with Korea among total
machinery and chemical items. In the EC's total trade
deficits recorded in 1978 with Korea, about 55 per cent
were in clothing ($640 million) and textiles fabrics
($1 60 million)." 4 Therefore, a major reason responsible
for the EC's trade deficits in the 1970s was the great
success of Korea's textiles exports to the EC market.
On the other hand, Korea's import substitution policy for
key industrial sectors contributed to raising the
dependence on foreign-made general machinery and
transportation equipment. For example, Korea's largest
import item in 1970 was general machinery with 29.7 per
cent of total imports ($1,984 million) and the third
largest item transportation equipment. Also, "general
machinery was the second largest import item in 1975,
following petroleum which became the largest item for
imports due to the price hike as a result of first oil
shock. Transportation equipment again ranked as the
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fourth largest. Even though the EC recorded trade surplus
in these sectors with Korea,its trade deficits in
textiles and clothing outstripped those figure." 5 That is
likely due to Korea's heavy dependence upon imports of
machinery to Japan and the United States and Korea's
aggressive fostering policy for the industry, along with
the lack in marketing activities by EC companies in
increasing sales to Korean market. For example, the EC's
exports of general machinery to the United States totaled
$1,029 million, those to EFTA countries $2,581 million,
and those to Eastern Europe $2,539 million in 1978, as
compared with those to Japan confined to $182 million and
those to Korea $185 million. Therefore, the EC showed
remarkable weakness in exports to Japanese and Korean
markets.
The textiles and clothing industries played a decisive
role in the bilateral trade balance between the EC and
Korea. My first case study is therefore on the textiles
and clothing industries (Chapter V). In addition,iron and
steel products and tootwear industries in the EC suffered
from surplus capacity and weakened international
competitiveness.On the other hand, these industries
benefited strongly trom the Korean government's active
support. Thus, the two sectors are also included in
individual case studies in Charters VI and VII.
respectively.
2-2. The 1980s
In the early 1980s, the EC realized the limit of its
economic policy to protect declining industries and
resistance to industrial structure adjustment pressures.
The EC's industrial output had been far behind that of
the United States and Japan. As a result, there was a
sense of growing crisis among EC member states, caused by
the possibility that the EC could further decline
economically.Thus, as I mentioned in Chapter I, there was
a consensus among EC member states about the necessity to
raise international competitiveness of EC industries
through coherent EC-wide industrial policy. Under the
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consensus,the EC began to tackle industrial adjustment
and targeted several sectors such as energy, bio-
technology and information technology as strategic
industries for promotion on the Community-wide basis.
Loukas Tsoukaljs and Robert Strauss point out:6
The 1980s was the period for the EC concentrating on
positive adjustment whose emphasis was put on
industrial policies, exchange rates and
macroeconomic coordination.The economic crisis and
the gradual weakening of the post-war world economic
order have surely also contributed to this change of
priorities.
As a consenquence, the EC began to limit assistance to
the Community's declining industries and instead to
strengthen support for high-tech industries. That caused
the greatest number of trade disputes in consumer
electronics between the EC and Korea later in the 1980s.
For Korea, the 1980s was the period when advanced
countries strengthened trade restraints against imports
trom developing countries such as Korea to protect
themselves against industrial damages caused by cheap
imports. On the other hand,least developed economies such
as China and the ASEAN countries threatened Korea with
their superior price competitiveness. Therefore, Korea
had to tace growing competition at the same time from
newly emerging exporters and import restraints from
developed countries.
Along with these trends, major advanced countries,
especially the United States, strongly demanded the
opening of the Korean market for foreign imports, along
with pressure to appreciate the Korean won (Korean
currency) against U.S.dollar. In accordance with this
request, the Korean government adopted a policy of
liberalizing the domestic market for foreign
products,along with increasing the role of private
initiative rather than government intervention policy.
For example, "Korea's import liberalization ratio
increased from b8.6 per cent in 1980 to 97.3 per cent in
1991, and that tor agricultural products will be up to
92.1 per cent within 1994 from 84.7 per cent in 199i."
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In addition, the Korean government began to provide
strong support to companies in high-tech industries as a
response to these dual challenges from advanced countries
and least developing countries.
The Korean government's support to high-tech industries
and aggressive export activities in these product ranges
by Korean companies enabled Korea to maintain its trade
surplus with the EC in the 1980s. Korea's trade surplus
between 1980 and 1985 was characterized by ups and downs.
Table:III-2:Korea's Exports and Imports to and from the
EC in the 1980s($1M)
Year	 80	 81	 82	 83	 84 85	 86	 87	 88	 89
Exports 2543 2686 2826 3037 3216 2555 4308 6597 8132 7394
Imports 1584 1925 1732 2152 2713 2317 3215 4613 6042 6492
Balance +959 +761+1094 +885 +772 +238+1090+1984+2090 +902
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Major Statistics
of Korean Economy 1992), p.202.
However, in the period of 1986-1988, the trade surplus
figure showed a trend of continuous increase, as seen in
Table 111-2. In this three-year period, the EC initiated
a total of 15 cases of AD investigations against imports
of Korean products, which accounted for 93.5 per cent of
lb cases initiated in the 1980s. When the trade surplus
of Korea was reduced to $902 million in 1989 from the
1988's $2,090 million, there were no AD proceedings by
the EC.The trade surplus in 1990 was further reduced to
$434 million in 1990 and finally reversed to a deficit in
1991 of $180 million, as seen later. However, the EC's AD
investigations still recorded four cases in 1990 and two
cases in 1991. Theretore, the trade surplus or deficit
was not closely related to the EC's protectionism against
Korea. Instead, several factors are responsible for these
trade disputes between the EC and Korea. These factors
include 1)Korea's concentration of exports to a limited
range of products and Korea's policy to stimulate exports
of these products, 2) difficulties of market access for
EC products--consumer goods like cars and agricultural
products, caused by Korea's high tariff and non-tariff
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barriers, and more favorable treatment given to the
United States by the Korean government in the purchase of
telecommunications equipment and government biddings.
Comparing the 1970s with the 1980s, EC's trade deficit
with Korea expanded to $3,140 million from merely $460
million, which reflects the EC's weakening international
competitiveness of commodities against Korean products.
For example, Korea concentrated on exports of industrial
and consumer electronics products in the 1980s under the
intensive government support for export promotion. That
enabled Korea's industrial and consumer electronics
products to show strong international competitiveness in
the EC market. In 1990, Korea's exports of electronics
products accounted for 35.2 per cent of its total exports
to the EC, amounting to $8,876 million.
The 1980s was the period when both the EC and Korea
concentrated on fostering high-tech industries,
respectively. However, Korea was in a position to expand
its exports to the EC market, thanks to the brisk export
pertormance in electronics products. That was the result
of Korea specializing in simple labour-intensive assembly
process ci electronics products, rather than the
development of technology and parts for the manufacture
of finished products. Therefore, the electronics sector,
especially consumer electronics sector, emerged as an
area where trade disputes between the EC and Korea
occurred very frequently. The consumer electronics sector
and color TV set industry is to be analyzed in details in
Chapter VIII.
2-3. The Period of 1990-1992
Since the middle part of the 1980s, the EC has been
implementing aggressive projects to strengthen and
tighten its integration among member states for the
completion of the Single Market. These projects aim at
raising the EC's international competitiveness in
technology and commodity manufacturing through improving
cooperation among member states and expanding intra-EC
trade. However, there are many difficulties in carrying
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out these goals. For example, some areas such as fiscal
harmonization, the finalization of the Common Market for
certain service areas, transportation and approximation
of technical standards are still pending settlements.
Also,there have been many internal squabbles about
turther political integration and other economic
issues.These difficulties in completing the single market
accounts partly for the fact that the EC still does not
change its tight policy instruments to restrict imports
from Korea in the 1990s even though it has been recording
a trade surplus with Korea.
On the other hand, Korea has been adopting market opening
strategy in accordance with requests and complaints from
major advanced countries including the EC. Major measures
included in the strategy are expansion of the range of
imports liberalization, financial market liberalization,
and protection of intellectual property rights. Also, the
Korean government encourages investments by Korean
companies in the EC member states to provide against
growing protectionism from the EC. At the same time,
Korea is facing many difficulties, after the remarkable
growth in the 1980s, and problems in promoting further
industrialization and trade expansion, due to the
limitation of its cheap-labour dependent development
policy and worsening international trade environment.
At this point, the EC-Korea trade disputes also have been
influenced by Korea-U.S. and Korea-Japan relations.
Namely, ECts main complaint against Korea is Korea's
discrimination against the EC, compared to the treatment
given to the United States. The EC is complaining that
Korea is giving special treatment to the United States in
trade and economic matters. The drastic increases in
exports of Korean products into the EC market also
reminds the EC of the industrial injury caused by
Japanese firms in the 1970s and the 1980s. This
encourages the perception that Korea is seeking the same
entry strategy into the EC market as Japanese firms.
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On the other hand, Korea complains about the EC's
allowance of residual national quantitative restrictions
to individual member states, complicated import
regulations by individual EC member states such as French
administrative procedure of asking all imported cars to
be transported into a specific place for	 customs
clearance, and AD legislation and proceedings in the EC.
In its trade with the EC, Korea recorded in 1991 a
deficit of $180 million for the first time since 1972
when trade deficit was recorded for Korea, as seen in
Table 111-3.
Table 111-3: Korea's Exports and Imports to and from the
EC in the 1990-1992 Period($1M)
Year	 1990	 1991	 1992
Exports	 8844	 9728	 9233
Imports	 8410	 9908	 9908
Balance	 +434	 -180	 -675
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Major Statistics
ci Korean Economy 1992), p.202.
The trade deficit further widened to $675 million in
1992. The reasons why Korea recorded trade deficit with
the EC can be found partially through a structural
analysis of export and import commodities in the
bilateral trade in Tables 111-4 and 111-5.
The average growth of Korea's exports to EC remained at
9.995 per cent in the three-year period, compared to a
sharp growth of imports from the EC to 17.8 per cent in
the same period. Korea's major export items to the EC,
electrical and electronics products and textiles and
clothing, increased moderately in the three-year period.
Exports of electrical and electronics products increased
by 6.8 per cent, which is lower than the three-year
average, due to BC'S concentration of import restraints
on such items as VCR, color TV, CDP, MWO, car stereo
radio and semiconductor (DRAM). Shipments of textiles and
clothing also showed only a slight increase influenced by
restrictive measures ci the BC under the multi-fibre
arrangement (MFA) and additional AD duty imposition
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against Korea's polyester yarns, and import restraints
against these products by EC member states, in addition
to the MFA.
Table:III-4:Korea's	 Exports	 to the	 EC by Major
Commodities ($ 1M , %)
Order Items	 Year	 Change
	
1989	 1990	 1991
1	 Electrical &
Electronics Products 2568	 3160	 3374	 +6.8
2	 Textiles & clothing 	 1887	 1903	 2086	 ^9.6
3	 Machinery & Transport
Equipment	 589	 1116	 1400	 +25.4
4	 Daily Necessities	 983	 1227	 1257	 +2.5
5	 Steel & Metallic
Products	 574	 482	 544	 +12.9
6	 Plastic,Rubber &
Leather Products	 359	 395	 410	 +3.7
7	 Chemical Products	 136	 247	 293	 +18.6
8	 Primary Products	 181	 219	 212	 -3.3
9	 Sundries	 82	 90	 113	 +25.6
10	 Non-Metallic Minerals	 35	 33.4	 32.6	 -2.3
Total	 7394	 8844	 9728	 +9.995
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Korea and the
World--Key Statistics 1991), p.45.
Table III-5:Korea's Imports from the EC by Major
Commodities($1M, %)
Order Items
	 Year	 Change
	
1989	 1990	 1991
1	 Machniery & Transport.
Equipment	 2566	 3782	 4471	 +18.2
2	 Chemical Products	 1870	 2056	 2278	 +10.8
3	 Steel & Metallic
Products	 539	 521	 928	 +78.1
4	 Electrical & Electronics
Products	 613	 930	 906	 -2.6
5	 Agriculture & Fisheries 382	 438	 562	 +28.4
6	 Textiles & Clothing	 274	 368	 383	 +4.3
7	 Others	 167	 218	 259	 +18.5
8	 Minerals	 83	 96	 104	 +8.3
Total	 6492	 8410	 9908	 +17.8
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Korea and the
World--Key Statistics 1991), p.45.
On the other hand, the EC's shipments of machinery and
transportation equipment and chemical products, having
been traditionally competitive against foreign products,
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showed an increasing trend in the three-year period.
Also, EC's exports of steel and metallic products and
agricultural and fisheries sharply increased, recording
growth rates of 78.1 per cent and 28.4 per cent,
respectively. The comparison of trade performance in four
categories--electrical and electronics products, textiles
and clothing, machinery and transport equipment, and
chemical products--between EC and Korea can be found in
Table 111-6.
Table 111-6: EC's Trade Performance in Major Commodities
with Korea ($1M)
Items	 EC's Exports	 EC's Imports	 Balance
(Korea's Imports) (Korea's Exports)
1989 1990 1991 1989 1990 1991	 1989 1990 1991
EEP	 613 930 906 2568 3160 3374 -1995-2230-2468
TC	 274 368 383 1887 1903 2086 -1613-1535-1703
MTE	 2566 3782 4471	 589 1116 1400 ^1977+2666+3071
CP	 1870 2056 2278	 136 247 293 +1734+1809+1985
Total(B) 5323 7136 8038 5180 6426 7153
	 +143 +710 +885
TAC(A)	 6492 8410 9908 7394 8844 9728
	 -902 -434 +180
B/A	 82% 85% 81% 70% 73% 	 74%
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Major Statistics
of Korean Economy 1992), pp.217-252.
Note:EEP=Electrical and Electronics Products.
TC=Textiles and Clothing.
MTE=Machinery and Transport Equipment.
CP=Chemical Products.TAC=Total of All Commodities.
The EC's trade surplus with Korea in machinery and
transport equipment, and chemical products is far higher
than its trade deficit in electrical and electronics
products, and textiles and clothing. Especially, the EC's
trade surplus of these four categories--$885 million in
1991, helped the EC record an overall trade surplus of
$180 million with Korea in the year.Therefore, the EC's
aim--to protect its sutfering sectors such as textiles
and clothing and consumer electronics from cheap Korean
imports, and to request a wider opening of Korean market
for the EC's strong industrial sectors such as machinery
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and chemicals--seem to be successful at the beginning of
the 1990s.
Through the analysis of economic policy changes in the EC
and Korea in the 1990s, as well as trade structure
changes engendered by those policy changes, it can be
concluded that the trade balance is less important factor
as a determinant of protectionism in the bilateral trade
relationship. On the contrary, as seen in Summary of this
chapter, the EC's protectionism in the 1990-1992 period
has a direct functional relationship with 1) the EC's
measure to provide for the period after the completion of
the single market and its attendant protective measures
by the EC for EC's problem industries, 2) EC's intensive
programme to revive the competitiveness of consumer
electronics products in the EC and its collision with
Korea's active industrial policy and export promotion in
those products to the SC market, 3) Korea's neo-
mercantilist policy to support a limited range of
industrial sectors such as consumer electronics and
concentration of exports of several products to the EC
market, and 4) the continued difficulty of market access
tor EC products to Korea, caused by high tariff and non-
tariff barriers in Korea. In addition, the EC's
protective measures in the period has an indirect
functional relationship with 1) EC's perception that
Korea is providing unequal treatment to the EC, compared
to the treatment of the United States and its attendant
comparative reciprocity principle application by the EC
against Korea, and 2) Korea's trading pattern and
strategy similar with that of Japan in the EC market and
its attendant protective measures by the EC against
Korea.
3. SC-Korea Trade Structure and Mutual Competitiveness of
Commodities
The SC is a very important market for Korea to the extent
that Korea's trade performance in the EC market
influences the nation's overall trade situation. However,
the Korean market is not worthy of serious considerations
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for the EC. Despite this difference in significance, EC-
Korea trade disputes have been increasing. Therefore, it
is necessary to examine the relationship between the
trade structure and mutual competitiveness8 of
commodities on the one hand and the trade disputes
between the EC and Korea on the other hand. For the
purpose, I will firstly examine in this section the
difference in importance of mutual markets between the EC
and Korea, and then analyse the competitiveness of
commodities in the EC and Korea and its relationship with
bilateral trade disputes.
3-1.The Degree of Significance of Mutual Markets between
EC and Korea
To compare the degree 0± significance of mutual markets
between the EC and Korea, I chose the trade statistics in
1987 with several reasons. Firstly, the EC began to
implement various measures to promote intra-EC trade
since the adoption 0± the white paper in 1985 for the
completion of the single market. Therefore, the year of
1987 could be a period to check the achievement of these
measures in intra-EC trade. Secondly, the EC recorded the
highest growth rate of exports (43.4 per cent) to the
Korean market in 1987 in the history of bilateral trade.
Thirdly, Korea's GNP recorded the highest growth of 13.0
per cent in 1987 in the period of the 1980s. Because
Korea's economic growth totally depends on export
performance, it can be interpreted that Korea's export-
led development policy reached its highest stage in 1987.
Therefore, it is possible to look into the contribution
of Korea's economic policy to the EC-Korea trade by
comparing bilateral trade relations in 1987.
In 1987, the EC imported a total of $950 billion worth of
commodities from the world of which 58.2 per cent ($553
billion) were transacted as intra-EC trade and 41.8 per
cent ($ 3 97 billion) were traded as extra-EC trade, as
seen in Table 111-7.
Among the import volume dealt through extra-trade, 24.4
per cent ($ 23 2 billion) were imported from developed
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countries and only 13.3 per cent ($126 billion) were
imported from developing countries. Korea's exports in
the year to the EC market amounted to $6.597 billion,
which is only 0.07 per cent of EC's total imports, and
1.7 per cent of EC's total imports through extra-EC trade
and 5.2 per cent of EC's total imports from developing
countries. That has not changed in the case of the EC's
total exports in 1987. EC exported a total of $951
billion worth of commodities to the world among which
exports to Korea remained at $4.613 billion, only 0.49
per cent 0± the total figure. In a word, trade with Korea
is insignificant in a position of the BC.
Table 111-7: EC Trade By Area in 1987 ($1B , %)
Area	 Imports Share	 Exports Share
World	 950	 100.0	 951	 100.0
Intra-EC (EC12)
	 553	 58.2	 559	 58.8
Extra-EC	 397	 41.8	 392	 41.2
Developed Countries
	 232	 24.4	 241	 25.3
of Which
EFTA	 94	 9.9	 104	 10.9
USA	 6	 6.9	 83	 8.7
Japan	 42	 4.4	 16	 1.7
Other	 30	 3.2	 38	 4.0
Developing Countries
	 126	 13.3	 117	 12.3
State-Trading Areas
	 34	 3.6	 29	 3.0
of Which
China	 6	 0.6	 6	 0.6
Unspecified	 5	 0.5	 5	 0.5
Source: El-Agraa(Economics of the European Community),
p.425.
In contrast to the BC, Korea's exports to the EC of
$6.597 billion, represented 13.9 per cent of the nation's
total exports in the year ($47.281 billion). Korea's
imports from the EC in the year also accounted for 11.2
per cent of total imports ($41.020 billion). The BC
market is very important for the nation's economic growth
which has been heavily dependent upon trade performance.
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3-2.The Comparison of Competitiveness of Commodities in
BC and Korea and Its Relationship with Bilateral Trade
Disputes
Unfortunately, there are no analyses which evaluate
directly the competitiveness of the EC and Korea.
Therefore, the bilateral competitiveness has to be
compared through an indirect analysis of competitiveness.
Rolf Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz evaluate the
competitiveness of EC industries using the characteristic
of export competitiveness at the industry level in
comparison with those of Japan. The detailed analysis,
which will be very useful to determine the characteristic
of EC-Korea trade structure, is as follows:9
Cluster one=EC's largest loss in competition with
Japan=office machines-i-radios+motor cycles.
Japanese suppliers outstripped the rest of the
industrialized countries' suppliers and the highest
losses were born by the BC.
Cluster two=EC's second largest loss in competition
wi th Japan=tractors+TV recei vers+passenger
cars#lorries -i-cameras.
Protectionist tendencies against Japan were most
pronounced in the EC.European protectionism focused
on preserving old industries, but not prevent
successful market penetration by the most
competitive suppliers.
Cluster three=EC's third largest loss in competition
with Japan=steam boilers-i-en gines-i-machine toolsmetal
working machinery^pumps^compressors^household
eletrical equipment-i-watches.
Japanese suppliers gained in all markets and EC
incurred losses. With respect to the competitive
position, European suppliers were not able to keep
abreast of Japanese competitors in their own market.
Cluster four=EC's fourth largest loss in competition
with Japan=cornbustion engines^textiles and leather
machinery-i-telecommunications equipment -i-trailers
-i-ships-i- films-i-optical and medical instruments.
Japan gained moderately on all markets.The losers
were suppliers from BC countries except Germany,
and, even more so, from the United States.
Cluster five=the only EC's gains in competition
with Japan=power generating machinery-i-aircrafts.
In this cluster,Japanese suppliers do not
dominate.The only export stronghold of the EC as a
whole concerns the two industries in the cluster
five.
Therefore, the EC has only maintained its competitiveness
in cluster five, except for Germany's competitiveness in
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cluster four. Therefore, the trend of EC's weakening
competitiveness in major industrial areas is noticeable.
The international competitiveness of Korean industry has
been analyzed by the Office of Technology Assessment of
the Congress of the United States as follows:10
Cluster one=Korea 'S Strongest International
Competi ti veness=ships and boats+toys+games#sporting
goodsi-radios.
Korea has extremely high revealed comparative
advantage (RCA). That means Korea is extremely
competitive relative to other exports in those
industries.
Cluster two=Korea's relative advantage in
international competitiveness-sound recorders+VCRs#-
household electric appliances+TV.
Korea has high RCA.That means Korea is advantaged
relative to other exports.
Cluster three=Korea's low but relative disadvantage
in international competi tiveness=office
machinery(SITC Code: 75)-i-passenger cars^refined
petroleum products-i-computers.
Korea has low but rising RCA.That means Korea is
disadvantaged to other exports but can promote those
sectors. Those sectors are	 capital intensive
areas targeted by the Korean government in the last
15 years.
Cluster four=Korea 's extreme competitiveness but
falling RCA ratios=travel goods^footwears+woven
synthetic fabric+televisionsi-rubber tires and
tubes-i-various textiles+iron and steel bars-i- iron and
steel tubes and pipes-i-iron and
	 steel plates and
sheets.
Korea is extremely competitive or relatively
advantaged to other exports, but has falling RCA
ratios. The change out of light labor-intensive
manufactures is apparent in this cluster in which
competitiveness was strong in the past, but isfalling now. Especially decline in the
competitiveness of steel and textiles and apparel
segments are noteworthy. The source of this decline
includes rising labor costs, technological changes,
and improvements in productivity that have moved
production back to the advanced industrial states.
Cluster five=Korea 's lowest international
competj tiveness=electrical machinery-i-parts and
accessories of office machines-i-office machines(SITC
Code: 751)-i-switchgear^circuits and parts-i-power
generating machinery.
Korea has low RCAs. That means Korea is
disadvantaged relative to other exports. Korea is
primarily importers rather than exporters.
Comparing these two analyses, it can be concluded the EC
has absolute international competitiveness in items such
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as power generating machinery where Korea absolutely
depends on imports. Therefore, EC's largest export items
to Korea are mainly machinery items. However, Korea's
competiveness in office machinery(SITC Code:75) is
gradually improving in contrast to a trend of weakening
competitiveness in its traditional export items such as
textiles and iron and steel products. On the other hand,
the EC's international competitiveness in these products
is declining very sharply. From these phenomena, it can
be forecast that the EC-Korea trade disputes are to shift
from the current labour-intensive sectors to
sophisticated technology-intensive sectors in future. In
addition, major industries in the EC, except for several
machinery items and aircrafts, have been losing their
international competitiveness. Korea has been also
witnessing a decline of its international competitiveness
in most products, except for ships, toys, sporting goods
and radios. Therefore, the EC and Korea are both troubled
by declining competitiveness of most commodities where
they traditionally enjoyed an advantage. These problems
are contributing to worsening trade disputes. The
analysis of structural change in bilateral trade bears
this out. Chung Soo Kim made such an analysis through the
comparison of the trade between the EC and Korea, in 1978
and 1987, respectively, and found that there are some
clear trends.
Firstly, "the EC has traditionally been concentrating on
exports of chemical products and specializing in imports
of finished consumer products in trade with Korea."11 The
sectors where EC industry has been showing the strongest
competitive edge against Korea were cosmetics in
inorganic chemicals, dyes, organic chemicals and plastic
products. Also, industrial machinery and machine tools
were products where Korea is less competitive than the
EC. On the other hand, 'the EC has been showing very weak
competitiveness against Korea in footwear, clothing and
travel goods where the EC has been specializing extremely
in imports from Korea."12
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Secondly, the EC has been strongly specializing in
exports of capital-intensive products,and imports of
labour-intensive products to and from Korea. In
connection with the level of technology, the EC has been
importing products with low-level technology and
exporting medium-level technology products from and to
Korea.
Thirdly, Korea's competitiveness against the EC has been
gradually improving. For example, telecommunications
equipment and office machines are sectors where Korea has
been recovering its competitive strength against the EC.
However, Korea still depends on exports of several items
to the EC market,despite Korea's economic development.
Namely, Korea's major export items--electrical and
electronics products, and textiles and clothing, still
accounted in the 1970-1992 period for more than 60 per
cent of total exports to the EC. This means that since
the end of the 1970s, Korea's exports to the EC have
expanded only in several export items.
Fourthly, the bilateral trade pattern between the EC and
Korea has inter-industry type characteristic rather than
intra-industry type13
 as an industrial structure between
advanced and developing countries. There is therefore
likely to be an increase in trade disputes now and in
future. 14
 Chung Soo Kim explains:'5
Bilateral trade between the BC and Korea has a
characteristic of inter-industry type rather than
intra-industry type. BC'S trade with Japan also has
the characteristic of inter-industry type. However,
BC's trade with the EFTA countries has the
characteristic of intra-industry type. As a result
of the characteristic of bilateral trade structure,
the BC has many trade disputes with Japan and Korea.
However, there are almost none in trade disputes
with the EFTA.
Finally, it is meaningful to examine the inter-
relationship between the structure of EC-Korea trade and
bilateral trade disputes through analyzing the trade
performance in the whole year of 1991 when Korea recorded
trade deficit with the EC for the first time since 1972.
In that year, Korea recorded a decrease of shipments to
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the EC market in a total of 16 items which include
household electronics products (VCR, color TV, CDP under
EC's current AD duty impositions), rubber products
(bicycle tyre tubes under the EC's price-undertaking
restraints), steel products (EC's VER applied in the
1980-1990 period), textile yarn (polyester yarn under
EC's AD duty imposition), stationery (photo albums under
EC's price-undertaking restraints), textile raw materials
(import restraints under MEA), and inorganic
chemicals(oxalic acid under EC's AD duty imposition and
glutamic acid under EC's price-undertaking restraints).
On the other hand, the EC recorded a decrease of
shipments to the Korean market in a total of 9 items
which include precision machinery and transportation
machinery, and industrial electronics ( items in which
the EC has traditionally strong competitiveness against
Korean products) and textile products (items in which the
EC has traditionally weak competitiveness against Korean
products). The relative strength of the EC in trade with
Korea, in terms of numbers of export items whose exports
were declined, contributed to the EC'S trade surplus in
bilateral trade in 1991 for the first time since 1972.
In sum, 1) the specialization of trade in a limited range
of items in bilateral trade, 2) the characteristic of
inter-industry trade structure, and 3) the weakening
competitiveness 0± the EC's products, which maintained
traditionally strong competitiveness against Korea, led
to the inevitable increase of trade disputes between the
EC and Korea. However, the trade balance moved in favor
of the EC in 1991 and 1992. The reversal in bilateral
trade balance in the period was due to EC's tight import
restraints against Korea's major export items such as
textiles and clothing and consumer electronics products.
However, Korea's concentration of exports to specific
products played a negative role in Korea's exports to the
EC market because Korea has no alternative export items
when exports of these products faced difficulties due to
EC's import restraints. In addition, Korea's weakening
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international price competitiveness in labour intensive
products as a result of frequent labour disputes
contributed to the decrease in exports of Korea's major
commodities. Furthermore, sharp appreciation of Korean
won	 against	 major	 BC	 currencies	 decreased	 the
profitability of Korean exports, discouraging the
exporters' drive to the EC market. For example, the value
of won appreciated in the 1987-1989 period by 23.7 per
cent against the German mark, 24.5 per cent against the
French franc and 34.6 per cent against the British pound.
4. BC-Korea Trade Disputes
4-1. The 1970s--Period of Trade Disputes in Textiles
In the 1970s, the EC's AD proceedings and VER measures
were concentrated on textiles, rubber, agro-fisheries and
chemical sectors. In this period, the EC had implemented
an EC-wide industrial policy for the protection of iron
and steel products under the ECSC Treaty. Even though AD
investigations against Korea's canned mushrooms, bicycle
tire tubes and iron and steel products were initiated in
the late 1970s, actual import restraints against those
products were implemented in 1980.
Table 111-8: EC's Import Restraints against Korea in the
197 Os
Yl	 Items	 TR
1975	 Textiles and Clothing
	 MFA
Total	 1 Case
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.20.
Note :YI=Year of Import Restraints.
TR=Type of Restraints.
The restrictions on exports of textiles and clothing from
developing countries to advanced countries were made
mutilaterally under the application of the MFA. In
addition, EC member states aggressively began to impose
import restraints against cheap textiles and clothing
from least-developed and developing countries such as
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Korea through the application of residual quota
restrictions.
At the same time, Korea had been specializing in exports
of labour-intensive products which were under tight
import restraints of the United States. The trade policy
of the United States in the 1970s was repeating the
stringent protectionism of the 1920s due to severe
economic recession. The United States began to restrict
imports of Korea's cotton products from 1965 under the
Long-Term Agreement(LTA). As a result, Korea was forced
to switch its exports to other developed countries and,
threrefore, shipments to the EC market had begun to
increase rapidly. Spurred by the sharp increase in
shipments of cotton goods from Korea, the EC also began
to impose import restrictions on those products from
Korea from 1971 under the LTA. Originally, the EC had
been delaying the application of the LTA, despite the
U..S.request to join the LTA. However, the rapid increase
in foreign imports, switched from the United States,
forced the EC to join the LTA. Therefore, the import
restraints by the EC against Korea's textiles and
clothing in the 1970s was a reflection of EC's policy to
exercise caution against imports switched from the United
States.
4-2. The 1980s--Period of Trade Disputes in Steel and
Consumer Electronics
The clear difference in trade disputes between the EC and
Korea in the 1980s, compared to those in the 1970s, was
that in addition to textiles and clothing new items such
as iron and steel products and consumer electronics
products were added to ±uel the trade conflict. Korea was
still devoted to exports of labour-intensive products
with the full support from the Korean government.
In the 1980s, the number of trade disputes between the EC
and Korea increased to 14 cases from the only one case in
the 1970s, as seen in Table 111-9. The range of products
under bilateral trade disputes was widely spread from
labour-intensive products(bicycle tyres, polyester yarn
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and tungsten products), to chemical products (oxalic
acid) and simple assembly products (microwave oven and
VCRs). Major factors contributing to the expansion of
trade disputes between the EC and Korea in the 1980s can
be summed in several points.
Table III-9:EC's Trade Complaints and Actual Import
Restraints Against Korea in the 1980s
Yl	 Items	 TR
1980	 Canned Mushroom	 Quota
1980	 Iron and Steel Products
	 Quota(VER)
1980	 Bicycle Tyre and Tubes
1985	 Cookware	 AD(NI)
1986	 Microwave Oven	 AD(NI)
1987	 H-Beam	 AD(NI)
1987	 Polyester Film
	 AD(NI)
1988	 Oxalic Acid
1988	 Steel Nails	 AD(NI)
1988	 Polyester Yarn
1988	 Tungsten Products
	 AD(NI)
1989	 CDP
1989	 VCR	 PU
1989	 Video Cassette Tape	 AD
Total	 14 Cases	 2:Price Undertakings
4 :Anti-Dumping Duties
2:Quota
6:Not Implemented
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.20 and (Trade In±ormation,Oct.15,1993),pp.68-70.
Note :YI=Year of Import Restraints.TR=Type of
Restraints. PU=Price Undertakings. NI=Not Implemented.
For cases not implemented, the year of
implementation should be that of initiation of
investigation.
Latest Developments:
CDP:EC suspended its AD investigation without any
measure on Aug.24,1993.
Bicycle Tyre and Tube:EC suspended its AD measure
under its AD Law's Sunset Clause (five years)
on Jun.1,1993.
Oxalic Acid:EC suspended its AD measure under its
Sunset Clause on July 17,1993.
VCR:EC suspended PU measure on March 1, 1994
Firstly, EC's industrial strength in household electrical
appliance,agrjcultural machinery and printing machinery
was rapidly declining in the 1980s, even though
competitiveness in consumer electronics products has
begun to recover since the late 1980s. The weakening
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international competitiveness of the EC provoked a sense
of growing crisis in the Community market, directly
leading to growing pressure from interest groups asking
for more stringent protection for ailing Community
industries.
Secondly, Korea's splendid export performance to the EC
market seriously worried EC industrialists. Korea's
exports to the EC, remaining at $128 million in the 1960-
1969 period,increased to $8,685 million in the 1970-1979
period (about 67 times higher than the value in the
previous decade) and to $45,059 million in the 1980-1989
period (an increase of about 351 times from the 1960-1969
period). Furthermore, Korea's shipments to the EC market
were concentrated on specific products such as textiles
and household electrical appliance in which EC industries
were under severe industrial adjustment pressures.
Thirdly, the southern enlargement of EC---admission of
Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EC--also contributed to
a tightening of protectionism against Korea because the
trade structure of the new EC member states was very
similar to that of Korea. Therefore, exporters of those
three countries and Korean exporters were in direct
confrontation in the EC market for sales of their
products. In this situation, the EC was forced to
restrict exports from Korea to increase intra-EC trade
among developed and developing EC member states in the
EC.
Therefore,1) EC's weakening international competitiveness
in major export items, 2) a drastic increase in shipments
of several labour-intensive products from Korea to the EC
and EC'S problems in those industries, and 3) an
admission of poor member states in the EC and the
necessities in the EC to increase the intra-EC trade
between those member states and rich member states,
became major factors to worsen trade disputes in the
1980s, compared to those in the 1970s.
4-3. The Period of 1990-1992--Drastic Expansion of
Disputes Under an Unstable Trade Environment
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In the 1990-1992 period, the EC-Korea trade disputes
continued to be in labour intensive and simple assembly
products. Korea still concentrated on exports of several
items due to its limits in developing new export items
and poor level of R&D. The EC was also under the same
situation that it had to face industrial adjustment
problems in its declining industries. Therefore,
bilateral trade disputes in the 1990s further worsened.
Table III-10:EC's Trade Complaints and Actual Import
Restraints Against Korea in the 1990-1992 Period
Yl	 Items	 TR
1990	 Glutamic Acid	 PU
1990	 Footwear	 VER
1990	 Photo Album	 Pu
1990	 Audio Cassette Tape
	 AD
1990	 Color TV Sets(Small Screen)	 AD
1990	 Pocket Lighters	 AD
1990	 Car Stereo Radio	 AD
1990	 Synthetic Fibres of Polyester
	 AD(NI)
1991	 DRAMS	 AD(UI)
1991	 Stainless Steel Rod
	 AD(UI)
1992	 Floppy Diskette	 AD(UI)
1992	 Electronics Scale	 AD(UI)
1992	 Color TV Sets(Large-Screen)	 AD(UI)
Total 13 Cases	 2:Price Undertakings
9:Anti-Dumping Duties
1: VER
1:Not Implemented
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.20 and (Trade Information,Oct.15,1993), pp.68-70.
Note : PU=Price Undertakings . NI=Not Implemented.
UI=Under Investigations.TR=Type of Import Restraints
Latest Developments:
Electronics Scale:EC imposed definitive AD duties
on Oct.18, 1993. DRAMs:EC imposed definitive AD
duties on March 17, 1993.
Synthetic Fibres of Polyester:EC imposed provisional
AD duties on July 16,1992 and extended the
application period to Nov.12,1993.
Car Stereo Radio:EC imposed definitive AD duties on
Aug.4,1992.
Namely, as seen in Table 111-10, the trade disputes
raised by the EC in the 1990s already marked 13 cases in
the 1990-1992 period, which is 92.9 per cent of 14 cases
recorded for the 10-year period in the 1980s.However, the
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trade balance began to be reversed in the favor of the EC
since the start of the 1990s as mentioned above. In 1990,
Korea's exports to the EC only increased by 19.6 per cent
to $8,844 million from the previous year's $7,394
million. However, the EC exported $8,410 million worth of
commodities to Korea in the year, up 29.5 per cent from
1989's $6,492 million. Korea's export performance in 1991
had been further sluggish with shipments to EC market up
only 9.99 per cent to $9,728 million from 1990's level.
Furthermore, Korea's exports in 1992 reduced by 5.1 per
cent to $9,233 million from the previous year's export
figure. Korea recorded decreases in exports to the EC
market,compared to the previous year's exports, in 1985,
1989 and 1992, respectively. On the other hand, exports
by the EC to Korea showed a sharp increase of 25 per cent
to $12,387 million in 1992 over the previous year's
$9,908 million.
Even though the EC had recorded trade surplus with Korea,
its import restraints against Korea were drastically
increased on the contrary.
From the analysis of trade disputes in the 1990s, some
conclusions can be drawn.Firstly, trade disputes between
the EC and Korea were due to qualitative issues rather
than quantitative issues. That was reflected by the EC's
action to expand its import restraints against Korea,
despite its trade surplus with Korea since 1991. It is
clear that the major reason of trade disputes between the
EC and Korea was the concentration of exports from Korea
to very limited industrial sectors which needed
continuous protection from foreign competition in the
eyes of the EC.
Secondly, there are fears among Community business
circle;especially from industries which have been
receiving protection through residual import restraints
at the level of EC member states, that the completion of
Single Market will act as a momentum to remove various
kinds of reliet measures adopted as exceptional cases by
individual member states. 16
 Therefore, the rush of trade
154
complaints against Korea by EC business in the 1990s,
despite its favorable trade situation with Korea,is
likely to have resulted from a concern to secure
continued relief measures for ailing industries after ttie
completion of Single Market.
5. Comparison of Protectionism at the Level of EC Member
States and the Level of RC
Due to different industrial policy implementation among
the EC member states, different industrial and trade
structures were established. Therefore, trade disputes
between individual EC member states and Korea were
different	 in accordance with the differences in
industrial and trade structures. The degree of
protectionism of EC member states was different also,
depending on their sensitiveness to specific industries
threatened by foreign imports. Also, an objective
comparison of protective measures by advanced countries
against Korea is necessary to do detailed industry-
specific case studies later, and to know how the clashes
of industrial and trade policies and trade structure
development between the EC and Korea influence the
effectiveness of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade
through comparison of the effectiveness of protectionism
in trade between Korea and other developed countries.
5-1. Comparison of Protectionism in EC Member States
Against Korea
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the SC's import restraints
have been implemented at the EC-wide and individual
member state levels, respectively. 17
 The evaluation of
protectionism of EC member states can be made easily by
analyzing the number of trade restraints implemented on
an individual member state basis against Korean products.
However, it is very difficult to evaluate the degree of
protectionism of each member state which was revealed in
an EC-wide decision. A way to check the degree indirectly
is to analyze the number of import restraints adopted in
the period when each EC member state had the chairmanship
in the Council of Ministers. The Council meeting is
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chaired by the member state holding the presidency which
rotates every six months round member states, in
alphabetical order (usually Belgium-Denmark-
Deutschland(Germany)-Greece(Greek,Ellas)-Espania(Spain)-
France- Ireland- Italy- Luxembourg- the Netherlands-
Portugal-United Kingdom. The number of import restraints
against Korean products, adopted when each member state
had the presidency in the Council of Ministers, is as
Table Ill-li.
Table III-11:EC's Import Restraints against Korea and Its
Relationship with the Presidency of Council of Ministers
Country	 POP	 NTR	 POP	 MR	 Total
Belgium	 Jan-Jun(1982) 0	 Jan-Jun(1987) 0
	 0
Denmark	 Jul-Dec(1982) 0	 Jul-Dec(1987) 0
	 0
Germany	 Jan-Jun(1983) 0
	 Jan-Jun(1988) 0
	 0
Greece	 Jul-Dec(1983) 0	 Jul-Dec(1988) 2
	 2
Spain	 Jan-Jun(1989) 2
	 2
France	 Jan-Jun(1984) 0	 Jul-Dec(1989) 1
	 1
Ireland	 Jul-Dec(1984) 0
	 Jan-Jun(1990) 3
	 3
Italy	 Jan-Jun(1985) 0
	 Jul-Dec(1990) 1
	 1
Luxembourg Jul-Dec(1985) 0
	 Jan-Jun(1991) 1
	 1
Netherlands Jan-Jun(1986) 0
	 Jul-Dec(1991) 1
	 1
Portugal	 Jan-Jun(1992) 0
	 0
U.K.	 Jul-Dec(1986) 0
	 Jul-Dec(1992) 0	 0
Total	 11
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.103-140. Note: POP:Period of Presidency.
NIR:Number of Import Restraints against Korea.
On the other hand, import restraints implemented on an
individual EC member state basis against Korean products
are as Table 111-12. When the EC-member states' import
restraints have been added to their contribution to the
EC-wide import restraints, the Table 111-13 is made.
France implemented the greatest number of import
restraints against Korean products in the EC-Korea trade
with a 3b.8 per cent share of total import restraints
against Korean products, 18 followed by the United Kingdom
with 13.2 per cent share, Ireland with 10.5 per cent
share, Italy with 9.5 per cent share and Spain,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece with 5.3 per cent
share, respectively. Belgium, Denmark and Germany are EC
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member states with which Korea has not experienced
serious trade disputes in the history of the EC-Korea
trade.
Table III-12:Import Restraints by Individual EC Member
States as of 1991
Country	 Items	 TR	 Period of Impi.
Germany(1) Metallic Tableware	 Quota	 1978-
U.K.(5)	 Metallic Tableware	 Quota	 1978-
	
Color and B&W TV Sets Quota
	 1978-
Stoneware	 Quota	 1977-90
	
Music Center and Kits Quota
	 1983-86
Footwear	 Quota	 1978-90
France(13) Footwear
	 Quota	 1988-90
Radio	 Quota	 1977-
ColorTV Sets	 Quota	 1977-
Toys & Parts	 Quota	 1977-90
Umbrellas	 Quota	 1977-90
Sundries	 Quota	 1977-90
Clocks	 Suspension of issuance of
IlL When Oversupplied	 1983-90
Elec. & Electronics
Equipment	 Quota	 1977-
Textile Fabric	 Quota	 1982-92
Stoneware	 Quota	 1983-86
Quartz Watch	 Quota	 1984-87
Tiles	 Quota	 1977-86
Silk Products	 Quota	 1977-
Ireland(1) Footwear
	
Quota	 1982-90
Benelux(1) Metallic Tableware
	
Quota	 1986-
Denmark(1) Metallic Tableware	 Quota	 1984-88
Italy (3)
	 Footwear	 Quota	 1988-90
Textile Yarn	 Quota	 1982-92
Textile Fabric	 Quota	 1988-92
Total	 25 Cases	 24:Quotas
1:I/L Suspension
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.143-17 2.
Note :TR:Type of Restraints. Impl.=Implemented.
Import restraints under anti-circumvention clause
(Article 115 of Rome Treaty) was excluded. The
figures in parentheses are the number of import
restraints.
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Table 111-13: Degree of Protectionism by EC Member States
as of 1991
Country	 EWM(A)	 MSM(B)	 Total(C)	 Ratio(A+B)/38
Belgium	 0	 1	 1	 2.6
Denmark	 0	 1	 1	 2.6
Germany	 0	 1	 1	 2.6
Greece	 2	 0	 2	 5.3
Spain	 2	 0	 2	 5.3
France	 1	 13	 14	 36.8
Ireland	 3	 1	 4	 10.5
Italy	 1	 3	 4	 9.5
Luxembourg	 1	 1	 2	 5.3
Netherlands	 1	 1	 2	 5.3
Portugal	 0	 0	 0	 0
U.K.	 0	 5	 5	 13.2
Total	 11	 27	 38	 100 %
Source:Author's Own Table Making.
Note :EWM: EC-Wide Measures. MSM: Member States'
Measures. In case of restraints implemented by
Benelux countries, one case of implementation
added to each country.
Through the result of the analysis, it can be found that
tailed industrial structure adjustment implementation by
the United Kingdom, France and Italy caused them to adopt
defensive trade policies against Korea. On the other
hand, Germany did not implement serious import restraints
against Korea due to its positive industrial adjustment
policy. Therefore, the success or failure of industrial
structure adjustment policy implementation became a
factor to determine whether a specific member state in
the EC favoured protectionism against Korea or not.
5-2. Comparison of Effectiveness of Protective Measures
by EC and Other Advanced Countries against Korea
This section evaluates how the clashes of industrial and
trade policies and changes in trade structure between the
EC and Korea influence the effectiveness of the EC's
protectionism against Korea by comparing the
effectiveness of these protective measures with those of
other developed countries against Korea.
5-2-1. Comparison of Shares of Exports under Import
Restraints in Total Exports
Before such evaluation,it is useful to see Korea's
exports under import restraints from advanced countries.
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Table III-i.4:Korea's Exports under Import Restraints from
Advanced Countries ($1M, %)
Years EUR(A)	 TEAC(B)	 TE	 Ratio(B/A)
1987	 10,372	 36,437	 47,280	 28.5
1988	 10,070	 53,188	 60,696	 18.9
1989	 9,944	 52,684	 62,377	 18.9
1990	 8,394	 53,382	 64,982	 15.7
1991	 8,153	 54,014	 71,870	 15.1
1992	 6,325	 42,510	 76,632	 14.9
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.63.
Note : EUR=Export Under Restraints.
TEAC=Total Exports to Advanced Countries.
TE=Total Exports.
NIR =Number of Import Restraints.
The ratio of Korea's total exports to advanced countries
under import restraints are decreasing from 28.5 per cent
in 1987 to 14.9 per cent in 1992. Such an export trend
can be interpreted in three ways. Firstly, import
restraints by advanced countries are very effective to
reduce imports of Korean commodities, which are invoking
trade disputes, because exports of commodities under
import restraints are annually decreasing since 1987 from
$10,372 million to $6,325 million. Secondly, advanced
countries have been reducing their import restraints
against Korea. That is proved by the reduction in share
of exports, which are subject to import restraints, in
total exports. Thirdly, Korean exporters were eagerly
endeavouring to develop alternative overseas markets
where there were no import restraints against Korean
products, and to diversify export items which are not
subject to import restraints. That was proved by such
fact that Korea's total exports continuously increased
despite world-wide trade restrictions intensified.
Considering these contradictory interpretations, it is
not so easy to evaluate the degree of protectionism by
advanced countries against Korea through the comparison
of shares of exports, which are subject to import
restraints, in total exports.
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Such dilemma can be found when the share of products
under import restraints by advanced countries in total
exports of Korea is compared through individual analysis
of those shares ot products under import restraints by
the United States, the EC, Japan, Australia and Canada
against Korea in Tables 111-15 to 19. Among the five
countries, the EC imposed import restraints equivalent to
26.2 per cent of Korea's total exports to the EC market
in the 1989-92 period, as seen in Table 111-15.
Table 111-15: Korea's Exports under Import Restraints
from the EC ($ 1M , %)
Years	 TE(A)	 EUR(B)	 B/A
1989	 7,394	 1,646	 22.3
1990	 8,844	 2,504	 28.2
1991	 9,728	 2,728	 28.0
1992	 9,233	 2,347	 25.4
Total	 35,199	 9,255	 26.2
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63 and 68.
On the other hand, Korea's share of exports under
Japanese import restraints in total exports to Japan has
remained at 8.98 per cent in the 1989-92 period, as seen
in Table 111-16.
Table 111-16: Korea's Exports under Import Restraints
from Japan($1M, %)
Years	 TE(A)	 EUR(B)	 B/A
1989	 13,457	 1,396	 10.4
1990	 12,638	 1,078	 8.5
1991	 12,356	 1,166	 9.4
1992	 11,599	 856	 7.4
Total	 50,050	 4,496	 8.98
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63 and 70-71.
However, it is misleading to compare the number of import
restraints against Korea by the EC and Japan. First of
all, Japan imports a relatively high volume from Korea,
compared to that by the EC. As I mentioned in Chapter II,
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Korea heavily depends on Japanese direct investments for
industrial development.
Table III-17:Korea's Exports under Import Restraints from
the United States ($1M , %)
Years	 TE(A)	 EUR(B)	 B/A
1989	 20,639	 4,072	 19.7
1990	 19,360	 3,994	 20.6
1991	 18,559	 3,597	 19.4
1992	 18,090	 2,895	 16.0
Total	 76,648	 14,558	 18.99
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63 and 67.
Table III-18:Korea's Exports under Import Restraints from
Canada ($1M, %)
Years	 TE(A)	 EUR(B)	 B/A
1989	 1,882	 451	 23.9
1990	 1,731	 399	 23.1
1991	 1,673	 325	 19.4
1992	 1,608	 280	 17.4
Total	 6,894	 1,455	 21.1
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63 and 67-68.
Table III-19:Korea's Exports under Import Restraints from
Australia($1M, %)
Years	 TE(A)	 EUR(B)	 B/A
1989	 1,005	 107	 10.6
1990	 956	 108	 11.3
1991	 990	 88	 8.9
1992	 1,094	 82	 7.5
Total	 4,045	 385	 9.5
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63 and 71.
As a result, exports by Japanese companies in Korea to
their home country can not be undervaluated in total
exports by Korea. This difference in total import volume
between Japan and other developed countries could distort
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the real evaluation of the degree of protectionism
against Korea. In addition, Japan has a higher access to
the Korean market due to the need of Korean industry to
import plant equipment for the operation of Japanese-
invested companies in Korea. Therefore, the method to
compare the share of Korea's exports under import
restraints by a specific country to its total exports
have a clear limitation as a means to see objective
results.
5-2-2. Comparison of Number of Import Restraints by
Advanced Countries Against Korea
Another way to check the degree of protectionism is the
comparison of the number of import restraints.
Table 111-20: Import Restraints Adopted by Each Advanced
Country (Number of Cases)
Country\Year	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 Total
USA	 11	 14	 15	 15	 55
EC(Community-Level) 8
	 12	 14	 15	 49
EC(Member-Level)	 13	 12	 12	 7	 44
Canada	 17	 10	 8	 7	 42
Australia	 11	 11	 14	 15	 51
Japan	 10	 10	 10	 8	 38
Total	 70	 69	 73	 70	 282
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.63-75.
Note: All cases are calculated on an accumulative basis
(cases of continuation plus new cases).
In terms of the number 0± import restraints, the EC has
imposed the greatest number of import restraints against
Korea numbering a total of 93 cases in EC-wide and member
states' measures together in the 1989-1992 period.
However, the number of import restraints has to be
considered with changes in export volume of Korea which
were under import restraints as a way of evaluating more
logically.
In case of trade with the United States, the number of
import restraints increased from ii cases in 1989 to 15
cases in 1992. The export volume under import restraints
has decreased from $4,072 million to $2,895 million. It
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is clear that import restraints by the United States has
been effective to reverse the growing trend of exports
from Korea.
The case of trade with Australia is similar to the
U.S.case. Namely, Korea's exports under Australian import
restraints has decreased from $107 million in 1989 to $82
million in 1992 when the number of import restraints
increased to 15 cases from 11 cases.
A little different situation can be found in the case of
trade with Canada. Korea's exports under Canada's import
restraints has been reduced to $280 million in 1992 from
1989's $451 million when the number of trade restraints
was reduced from 1989's 17 cases to 7 cases in 1992. It
is, however, difficult to argue the trade restrictive
measures adopted by Canada has been very effective to
reduce competition trom Korean products.It is natural
that trade volume under import restraints should be
reduced with the decrease in the number of trade
restraints because the coverage of items under import
restraints is scaled down.
Such situation in Canada-Korea trade can be also found in
Japan-Korea trade. The number of import restraints was
reduced to 8 cases from 10 cases in the 1989-1992 period.
The export volume of Korea under Japanese import
restraints dramatically reduced from $1,396 million in
1989 to $855 million in 1992.
The number of EC-wide import restraints against Korean
products increased from 8 cases in 1989 to 15 cases in
1992. However, Korea's exports under EC's import
restraints also drastically increased by 42.6 per cent
from $1,646 million in 1989 to $2,347 million in 1992.
Such result is natural because the coverage of items
under import restraints was expanded.
Therefore, the macro-comparison of the degree of
protectionism by advanced countries against Korea, except
for the case by the United States and Australia, is very
hard one. The analysis, depending on the comparison of
shares of exports under import restraints in total
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exports of Korea, or comparison of the number of import
restraints by advanced countries against Korea, could be
a premature work to distort the real evaluation of
protectionism by these countries against Korea. Thus, one
of the reasonable methods to evaluate the effectiveness
ot import restraints is to make a commodity-by-commodity
analysis, which are subject to import restraints, using
changes of value in exports of those products.
5-2-3. General Trend of EC'S Protective Measures Due to
Policy and Trade Structure Changes between BC and Korea
Despite such problems in comparison of protectionism by
advanced countries against Korea, the EC is likely to be
imposing the greatest number of import restraints against
Korean products, compared to other advanced countries.
Namely, Korean products which are being exported under
EC's import restraints were recording the highest
figure(22.3 per cent in 1989, 28.2 per cent in 1990, 28.0
per cent in 1991 and 25.4 per cent in 1992), compared to
these figures recorded between Korea and other advanced
countries, as seen in Table 111-21. Also, the share of
import restraints by the EC and the EC member states in
total number of import restraints by advanced countries
against Korea accounted for 32.98 per cent with 93 cases
in a total of 282 cases in the 1989-92 period.
Table 111-21: The Share of Korea's Exports under Import
Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea(%)
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992
USA	 19.7	 20.6	 19.4	 lb.0
CAN	 23.9	 23.1	 19.4	 17.4
JAP	 10.4	 8.5	 9.4	 7.4
AUS	 10.6	 11.3	 8.9	 7.5
EC	 22.3	 28.2	 28.0	 25.4
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.63.
Therefore, the policy and trade structure changes between
the EC and Korea especially gave a serious impact on the
BC-Korea trade disputes, compared to Korea-United States,
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Korea-Japan, Korea-Australia and Korea-Canada trade
disputes.
In sum, the negative or positive industrial structure
adjustment policy implementation in time of favorable
economic conditions became a factor to determine whether
a specific member state in the EC was moving toward or
away from protectionism against Korea in time of
difficult economic conditions. As a result, France and
Italy (negative industrial structure adjustment) and
Germany (positive industrial structure adjustment) took a
different line toward trade relations with Korea. The EC
and the EC member states had also implemented the
greatest number of import restraints against Korea among
major advanced countries in terms of the share of Koreas
exports, which were subject to import restraints, and the
number of import restraints against Korea.
As a result of the changes in divergent economic policies
between the EC and Korea, its impact on bilateral trade
structure and its causal relationship with determinants
of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade, determinants and
effectiveness of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade can
not fully be explained with current approaches in the IPE
literature. In the following chapter, therefore, I will
broadly test various approaches in the IPE literature
concerning determinants of protectionism in relation to
the EC-Korea trade, as well as test of my hypotheses
regarding determinants of protectionism in the EC-Korea
trade. I will also broadly evaluate the effectiveness of
EC's protective measures against Korea through David
Yoffie and Patrick Messerlin's approaches.
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Chapter IV. Broad Test of IPE Approaches to Evaluate
Determinants ana E±tectiveness of Protectionism in EC-
Korea Trade
A Briet Summary of Chapter IV
IPE Approaches to Evaluate Determinants of Protectionism
and EC-Korea Trade
For the EC-Korea trade case, there are no approaches in
the literature which tully explain the determinants of
protectionism y the EC against Korea. The outcome of
the application or the major approaches to explain the
determinants or protectionism can	 e summarized as
tollows:
Test Results ol Some Approaches Regarding Determinants of
Protectionism
Approaches	 KUS	 KEC	 KECM
Hegemonic Stability	 A	 NA(IR)	 A
Business Cycle	 A	 NA	 NA
Export Dependence	 NA	 NA	 NA
Multinationalization	 NA(NM)	 NA(NM)	 NA(NM)
btrategic Trade Demands	 A	 NA	 NA
Exit-Entry Barriers	 PA	 PA	 NA
Footwear Case
	
A	 -	 NA
Color TV Case
	
NA	 -	 NA
Iron & Steel Case	 A	 A	 -
Voter Support & Collective
Action	 -	 NA	 NA
Source:Author's Own Table Making.
Notes: KUS=Korea-U.S.Trade. KEC=Korea-EC Trade.
KECM=Korea-EC Member States Trade.
A=Applicable. NA=Not Applicable.
PA=Partially Applicable. IR=Irrelevant.
NM=Not Meaningtul.
My	 Hypotheses	 Regarding	 Determinants	 of	 BC's
Protectionism Against Korea
A latent torm of "Japan Complex" had developed among EC
policy-makers, caused by the experience 0± previous
industrial damage to EC industry by Japan, affecting the
decisions made regarding protective measures against
Korean imports. The EC's erroneous comparison or Korea
with Japan resulted in the expectation by the EC that as
a 'developed country' Korea should also take over the
obligation going with such a status. The EC also
1b8
considered whether imports of specific products had been
under import restraints ±rom the United States or not in
the process or implementing protective measures against
Korea. In addition, tne EC's protective measures against
Korea had a strong causal relationship with Korea's neo-
mercantilist policy approach. The target industries or
EC's import restraints had been changed from textiles and
clothing, iron and steel products and consumer
electronics since the 1970s, depending on the change in
direction ot Korea's target industries for strong policy
supports.
Approaches to Evaluate E±fectiveness of Protectionism in
Terms of Success or Failure of Aims of Protective
Measures
David Yotrie's approach seems to be inapplicable to the
EC-Korea trade. His approach needs to be supplemented by
two factors.Firstly, the economic disadvantage and
political attractiveness of VER5 and OMA5 to countries
which implement those measures have to be considered.
Secondly, AD duty impositions must be added in his
analysis of effectiveness of import restraints by the
United States against NIEs. In the EC-Korea trade,
Patrick Messerlin's approach is applicable because only
seven items among a total of 16 items, which are subject
to EC's import restraints, showed an increasing trend of
exports in the 1987-1991 period, despite the import
restraints.
Test Results of Approaches to Evaluate Effectiveness of
Protectionism in Terms of Success or Failure of Aims of
Protective Measures Using the EC-Korea Trade Case
DYA	 PMA
Korea-US Trade
1) Textiles	 NA	 A
2) Iron and Steel	 NA	 A
3) Color Television Sets	 NA	 A
4) Album	 NA	 A
5) Pipe Fitting	 NA	 A
6) Brass Sheet and Strip	 NA	 A
7) Color Braun Tube	 NA	 A
8) Small Business Telephone System NA
	 A
9) Stainless Steel Cookingware	 NA	 A
1O)Nitro Cellulose	 NA	 A
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11)Acrylic Sweater	 NA	 A
12)Polyester Film	 NA	 A
Korea-EC Trade
1) Textiles	 A	 NA
2) Iron and Steel Products	 NA	 A
3) Footwear	 A	 NA
4) Canned Mushroom	 NA	 A
5) Oxalic Acid	 NA	 A
6) Polyester Yarn	 NA	 A
7) Compact Disk Player 	 A	 NA
8) Video Tape	 A	 NA
9) Color Television Sets 	 NA	 A
1O)Glutamic Acid 	 A	 NA
11)Bicycle Tyre Tubes 	 A	 NA
12)Video Tape Recorder	 NA	 A
13)Album	 NA	 A
14)Gas Lighter	 NA	 A
15)Audio Tape	 A	 NA
16)Car Stereo Radio	 NA	 A
Source:Author's Own Table Making.
Notes :A=Applicable.NA=Not Applicable.
DYA=David Yoffie's Approach.
PMA=Patrick Messerlin's Approach.
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I am chiefly concerned with examining
the approaches in the IPE literature to evaluate
determinants and effectiveness of protectionism with the
results of analysis in Chapters I, II and III. In the
first section, various approaches regarding determinants
of protectionism are tested using data such as past and
present import restraints against Korea by the United
States and the EC. In the second section, I will test
three hypotheses as determinants of EC's protectionism
against Korea with the help of various examples of the
EC's protective measures against Korea. In the third
section, I will test the approaches to evaluate
effectiveness of protective measures in terms of failure
or success in the EC-Korea trade.Such approaches will be
tested through examining changes in Korea's export value
or export volume to the EC market under the EC's import
restraints against Korea. My conclusion in this chapter
is that approaches regarding determinants of
protectionism in IPE literature are not fully applicable
as determinants of EC'S protectionism against Korea.
Rather than the current IPE approaches, my hypotheses are
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more effective in explaining determinants of EC's
protective measures against Korea. In connection with the
effectiveness of protectionism, I conclude that the EC's
protective measures are harmful to the industries, both
in the EC and in Korea, as mentioned in Introduction in
this thesis, but at the same time EC's import restraints
are very effective in reducing the growing imports from
Korea to the EC market. This outcome is contrary to what
should have been expected by using David Yoffie's
approach, but verifies Patrick Messerlin's approach.
2. IPE Approaches Regarding Determinants of Protectionism
and SC-Korea Trade
2-1. Supply-Side Approaches of Protectionism
2-1-1 . Hegemonic Stability Approach
According to hegemonic stability approach, the existence
of hegemonic power' contributes to the maintenance of
free trade mechanism in the hegemon state and in the rest
of the world. However, international trading order
reverses to fierce protectionism during hegemonic decline
or non-existence of hegemonic power. For the test of
hegemonic stability approach, it is very important to
consider the time period in the SC-Korea trade. Before
1969, Korea's trade with the EC was very minimal. As I
mentioned in Chapter III (Section 4-2), Korea's exports
to the EC remained at $128 million in the 1960-1969
period with imports also confined to $645 million in the
same period. The 10-year export figure of Korea to the EC
market only represented 1.47 per cent of the exports
recorded in the 1970-1979 period ($8,685 million) and
1.44 per cent of exports in the year of 1990 alone
($8,876 million). Therefore, the hegemonic stability
approach for the period before 1969 is meaningless and I
have limited the period to be considered from the 1970s
onwards.
In connection with the hegemonic decline of the United
States, Edmund Dell maintains the importance of the date,
August 15, 1971 as tollows:2
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At that date, President Nixon imposed an import
surcharge and made the dollar inconvertible. He also
demanded, as the price for returning the United
States to full participation in the international
economic system, that the other OECD countries
should take steps which would bring about a major
improvement in the American balance of payments.
Arthur Stein also argues "the decline of American
economic hegemony became fully manifest in 1971 when the
United States transformed the postwar economic order by
simultaneously instituting an import surcharge and
refusing to exchange gold for dollars, and these measures
knocked out the monetary and commercial underpinnings of
postwar international economic relationships."3
According to Helen Mimer, "American hegemony, especially
in trade and production, had declined substantially by
the 1970s, leaving the international distribution of
power in the 1970s more similar to that of the interwar
period than to that of the immediate post-World War II
period.
Furthermore, William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera argue
"unchanged American leadership prevailed up to about the
early 1970s and a new period of leadership transition may
be underway in the 1980s and the 1990s."
Therefore, it is clear that the hegemonic power of the
United States began to decline during the early 1970s.6
Table IV-1: Korea's Exports to USA in the 1970s ($1M,
Years Total Exports(A) 	 Exports to	 USA(B)	 Share(B/A)
1970	 835	 395	 47.3
1973	 3225	 1021	 31.7
1974	 4460	 1492	 33.5
1975	 5081	 1536	 30.2
1976	 7715	 2492	 32.3
1977	 10046	 3118	 31.0
1978	 12711	 4058	 31.9
1979	 15055	 4373	 29.0
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Major Statistics
of Korean Economy), pp.192 and 210.
In terms ot export value, Korea's exports to the United
States in the 1970s had been on a continuously increasing
trend from $395 million in 1970 to $4,373 million in
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1979. However, Korea's share in the U.S.market was
drastically reduced to 29 per cent in 1979 from 1970's
47.3 per cent. That is one of major indications that the
United States strengthened its import restraints against
Korea in the 1970s, compared to those measures before
1970.
Table IV-2:U.S.Import Restraints against Korea (1970-79)
Order	 Products	 Type of IRE	 Year of Impi.
1	 Textiles and clothing
	 MFA	 1975--
2. Non-Rubber Footwear
	 OMA	 1977-1981
3. Bicycle Tyres & Tubes
	 AD	 1978-1987
4. Kitchenware of Iron & Steel Increases
	 1979-1984
of Duties
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries Against
Korea) ,p.18.
Notes : IRE=Import Restraints. Impl.=Implementation.
MFA=Mult i-Fibre Arrangement.
This indication is further supported when the U.S. import
restraints are examined in terms of numbers of protective
measures. During .the hegemonic decline of the United
States in the 1970s, major protective measures adopted by
the United States against Korea was MFA signed in 1975,
to regulate imports of textiles and clothing from Korea
into the U.S. market. The United States also imposed OMA
on imports of non-rubber footwear from Korea in 1977-1981
period. These two restrictive measures by the United
States had been adopted after the restrictions against
Japanese textiles and clothing and Taiwanese non-rubber
exporters. Korean companies had been rapidly increasing
their shipments to the U.S. market through exploitation
ot opportunities arising from Japanese and Taiwanese
difficulties in exporting their products to the United
States due to quota or OMA measures against their
products.Other import restraints by the United States in
the 1970s were against Korean bicycle tires and tubes and
kitchenware of iron and steel. Import restraints by the
United States against Korea in the 1960s, however, was on
cotton fabrics only. Therefore, the hegemonic decline in
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the United States contributed to increasing the number of
import restraints against Korea.
During the 1970s, world-wide trade environment
deteriorated in the course of the oil shocks in 1973 and
1979, and also tollowing fragmentation of economic power
in the world. David Greenaway explains this fragmentation
phenomenon 0± economic power to the United States, Japan
and the EC as follows:7
The United States no longer possessed overwhelming
economic authority, since there was not a new center
0± economic power in Western Europe. The more
'collective' voice of Europe also meant that the
bargaining process had been simplified.
'Equilibrium' was soon to be disturbed by the
emergence 0± Japan as a trading power.
In connection with the worsening position of the United
States as the major hegemonic power,import restrictive
measures adopted by the United States against Korea rose
to 17 cases in the 1980-91 period, as seen in Table IV-3.
Table IV-3:U.S.Import Restraints against Korea in the
1980s-Present
Order	 Products	 Type of IRE
	 Year of Impi.
1.Canned Mushrooms	 Increase of Duties	 1980-1983
2.Special Steels	 Global Quota
	
1984--
3.Color TV Sets
	 AD	 1984--
4.Caulking Gun
	 General Exclusion	 1984'--
Order
5.Carbon & Alloy Steel	 Bilateral Quota
	
1984-1992
b.Album	 AD	 1985--
7.Offshore Platform
	
AD/CVD	 1985-1987
Jackets and Files
8.Malleable Cast Iron	 AD	 1985
Pipe Fittings	 -
9.Brass Sheet & Strip	 AD	 1986
10.Color Braun Tube	 AD	 i9
11.Stainless Steel 	 An	 i9
Cookingware	 8912.Nitro Cellulose	 AD	 i9
13.Acrylic Sweater	 An	 8714.Plastic Bag	 General Exclusion Order 	 1 8715.Erasable Programmable	 General Exclusion	 j9 --
ROM	 Order
1b.Small Business
	 AD	 1989
Telephone System
17.Polyester Film
	 AD	 1991--
Source:KFTA(Directory 0± Import Restraints bY Advanced
Countries Against Korea), pp.18-19.
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Even though the United States strengthened its import
restraints against Korea in the 1980s, Korea's export
pertormance to the United States maintained a
continuously increasing trend until 1988, as seen in
Table IV-4.
Table IV-4:Korea's Exports to USA in the 1980s-1990s($1M,
Years	 Total Exports(A)	 Exports to	 USA(B) Share(B/A)
1980	 17504	 4606	 26.3
1981	 21253	 5660	 26.6
1982	 21853	 6118	 27.9
1983	 24445	 8127	 33.2
1984	 29244	 10478	 35.8
1985	 30283	 10754	 35.5
198b	 34714	 13879	 39.9
1987	 47280	 18310	 38.7
1988	 60696	 21404	 35.3
1989	 62377	 20638	 32.9
1990	 65015	 19359	 29.8
1991	 71870	 18559	 25.8
Source:KFTA(Major Statistics ot Korean Economy), pp.192
and 210.
However, this reversed to a decreasing trend from 1989.
Korea's exports to the United States declined to $20,638
million in 1989, to $19,359 million in 1990 and to
$18,559 million in 1991, from $21,404 million in 1988.
Also, the share ot exports to the United States in
Korea's total exports was down to 25.8 per cent in 1991.
The share was the lowest one since the 1970s in the
history of the U.S.-Korea trade.
Faced with import restraints from the United States,
Korean companies tried to diversify their export items to
commodities which were not subject to protectionist
import measures.
For example, Korea's exports of chemicals, non-ferrous
metals and general machinery increased sharply in 1989
over the previous year. However, this export
diversjtjcatjon strategy began to see limitations from
the late 1980s due to the expansion 0± numbers of items
subject to the U.S..import restraints at that time,and
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Korea's weakening international price competitiveness of
major export items to the United States.
Amid the hegemonic decline in the United States and its
stringent import restraints against Korea, Korea recorded
the highest market share of exports in the EC in 1979
with 16.3 per cent in the 1978-1989 period. Since then,
the share declined in the 1980s, recording 11.9 per cent
in 1989.These trends were almost the same in the U.S.-
Korea trade, as seen above.
However, Korea's exports to the United States are
inversely proportional to those to the EC.
Table IV-5:Korea's Exports to the EC in 1978-1991($1M,%)
Years	 Total Exports(A)	 Exports to EC(B)
	 Share(B/A)
1978	 12711	 1936	 15.2
1979	 15055	 2460	 16.3
1980	 17504	 2710	 15.5
1981	 21253	 2782	 13.0
1982	 21853	 2914	 13.3
1983	 24445	 3092	 12.6
1984	 29244	 3307	 11.3
1985	 30283	 3256	 10.7
lY8b	 34714	 4326	 12.5
1987	 47280	 6618	 13.9
1988	 60695	 8160	 13.4
1989	 62377	 7414	 11.9
1990	 65015	 8875	 13.7
1991	 71870	 9728	 13.5
Source:KFTA(tlajor Statistics of Korean Economy), pp.192
and 202.
For example, the share of exports to the United States in
Korea's total exports increased from 26.6 per cent in
1981, to 27.9 per cent in 1982, to 33.2 per cent in 1983,
to 35.8 per cent in 1984 and to 35.5 per cent in 1985. On
the other hand, the figures to the EC declined from 15.5
per cent in 1980 to 13.3 per cent in 1982, to 12.6 per
cent in 1983, to 11.3 per cent in 1984 and to 10.7 per
cent in 1985. However, the share to the United States
declined to 29.8 per cent in 1990 and to 25.8 per cent in
1991 irom 1989's 32.9 per cent in contrast to the
increase in the figures to the EC to 13.7 per cent in
1990 and 13.5 per cent in 1991 from 1989's 11.9 per cent.
176
Despite the tightening import restraints by the United
States against Korea, the EC did not implement the same
degree of protectionism against Korea in the 1970s. Even
though the United States had imposed a total of four
import restrictive measures against Korea in the 1970s,
the EC only applied one import restraint on textiles and
clothing under the MFA in the same period.
Table IV-6:EC's Import Restraints against Korea in the
1970s-Present
Order Products	 Type of IRE	 Year of Impi.
1. Textiles and Clothing 	 MFA	 1975--
2. Canned Mushroom	 Bilateral Quota 1980--
3. Iron and Steel	 VER	 1980-1990
4. Bicycle Tire Tube	 AD	 1980--
5. Oxalic Acid	 AD	 1988--
6. Polyester Yarn
	 AD	 1988--
7. Compact Dick Player	 AD	 1989--
8. Video Tape Recorder	 AD	 1989--
9. Video Cassette Tape	 AD	 1989--
10. Color Television Set	 AD	 1990--
ii. Glutam].c Acid
	 AD	 1990--
12. Album	 AD	 1990--
13. Audio Cassette Tape	 AD	 1991--
14. Non-Rubber Shoes	 VER	 1990--
15. Gas Lighter	 AD	 1991--
16. Car Stereo Radio 	 AD	 1991--
Source: KFTA(Djrectory of Import Restraints by Advanced
Countries Against Korea), p.20.
However, it is ditficult to consider this phenomenon
related to hegemonic decline;it may simply have been an
accidental result. In addition, the EC-Korea trade was
unimportant to the EC at least in the 1970s, compared to
the U.5.-Korea trade.Korea's share in EC's total imports
in 1975 was only 0.23 per cent ($0.753 billion/$322.8
billion), compared to that in the U.S.total imports
marking 1.45 per cent ($1.536 billion/$105.9 billion). In
1980, however, Korea's share in EC's total imports rose
by 52 per cent to 0.35 per cent from 1975's 0.23 per
cent, far higher than the growth of 23 per cent in
Korea's share in U.S.total imports from 1.45 per cent to
1.79 per cent, reflecting market switching activities by
Korean exporters to the EC from the united States.
Furthermore, it can not be disregarded that the EC did
177
not impose many protectionist measures against Korea due
to the will of individual EC member states which do not
give that power to the ECC. In addition, EC member states
were in a position to impose individual import
restraints(residual quota measures) under the EC
Regulation(No.288/82) against Korea. Therefore, a strict
application of the hegemonic stability approach would
indicate that it is inapplicable in the EC-Korea trade in
the 1970s, but this conclusion is really irrelevant
because of the following circumstances which this
particular theory does not consider.
From the 1980s to present, import restraints by the
United States were very widely distributed, one case in
1980, one case in 1981, three cases in 1984, three cases
in 1985, two cases in 1986, three cases in 1987, three
cases in 1989 and one case in 1991, totaling 17 cases.
Contrary to this trend of U.S.import restraints,the EC
has implemented the majority of its import restraints
since 1988. Namely, the EC implemented only three cases
of protective measures against Korean products in 1980.
Then a total of 12 cases of import restraints were
imposed against Korean products, mainly consumer
electronics, since 1988. There were no import restraints
by the EC in the 1981-1987 period. The United States
adopted a total at 12 import restraints against Korea, 57
per cent of its total import restraints(21 cases) against
Korea since the 1970s, in the 1981-1987 period.
For the sake of completeness, the hegemonic stability
approach has also to be applied to trade between
individual EC member states and Korea. Since 1970, EC
member states adopted a total of 25 residual quota
restraints against Korea, as seen in Table 111-12 in
Chapter III. The number of import restraints by EC member
states against Korea since 1970 is 19 per cent higher
than the number 0± import restraints by the United States
in the same period. Therefore, the U.S.hegemonic decline
and American protectionist measures made individual EC
member states feel tree to impose protectionist measures
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against Korea as well because this provided them the
political incentive to do the same import restraints.
Therefore, the hegemonic stability approach seems to be
applicable in the EC member states-Korea trade. However,
it is ditficult to conclude whether the hegemonic
stability approach is applicable or not in the EC-Korea
trade. For the strict application, the degree of
importance of EC-Korea trade, compared to the U.S.-Korea
trade and specific characteristic of trade policy
decision mechanism between the ECC and individual EC
member states have to be considered.
2-1-2.Business Cycle Approach
According to Giulio Gallarotti, "prosperous periods,
historically, have been accommpanied by free trade, and
periods of depression by closure."8
Table IV-7:Comparison of GDP Growth Rate among Major
Advanced Countries ( %)
Years	 EC	 USA	 Japan
1961-70	 4.8	 3.8	 10.5
1911-80	 2.9	 2.7	 4.6
1981	 0.2	 2.3	 3.9
1982	 0.8	 -2.6	 2.8
1983	 1.6	 3.9	 3.2
1984	 2.3	 7.2	 5.0
1985	 2.5	 3.8	 4.7
1986	 2.6	 3.0	 2.4
1987	 2.8	 3.6	 4.3
1988	 3.8	 4.4	 5.8
1989	 3.4	 2.9	 4.8
1990	 3.1	 2.1	 4.2
1981-90	 2.3	 3.0	 4.1
1991	 0.7	 N.A.	 N.A.
Source :Somers, Frans (European Economies--A Comparative
Study),p.255. Financial Times(Closing ERM Fault Lines, FT
Editorial,June 4,1993), p.19; and Financial Times(EU
Jobless Total Heads icr 18M, Nov.1i,1993), p.2.
One of major indicators to check the period of prosperity
and depression is likely to be the growth rate of the
gross domestic product (GDP). The EC enjoyed 4.8 per cent
growth of GDP in 1961-19/0, which is far higher than the
United States' growth rate o± 3.8 per cent in the same
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period, but far lower than Japan's growth rate of 10.5
per cent, as seen in Table IV-7. However, the favorable
growth in the EC reversed to a very poor performance in
the 1970s-1980s. According to Louis Turner, "there was no
year between 1974 and 1990 when annual growth topped the
average seen in the 1960s and early 1970s."9
In the 1970s, the United States recorded the lowest GDP
growth rate, compared to those in the EC and Japan. The
United States implemented a total of four import
restraints against Korea in the period, as compared with
only one case adopted by the EC. Therefore, the business
cycle approach seems to be applicable in the U.S.-Korea
trade. However, the EC, which recorded the lowest GDP
growth rate in the 1980s, implemented 15 cases of
restrictive measures in the 1980-1991 period,compared to
17 cases by the United States. Among the 15 cases, 12
cases (80 per cent of the total) were adopted in the
1988-1991 period, as mentioned above, when the average
GDP growth recorded 2.75 per cent, higher than the 1981-
1990 average ot 2.3 per cent. From 1988, the EC's GDP
growth rate showed an increasing trend. However, the
implementation of EC's import restraints against Korea
rapidly increased since 1988, which is in a sharp
contrast to the business cycle approach. Therefore, the
business cycle approach seems to be inapplicable in the
EC-Korea trade.
For the sake of completeness, the business cycle approach
has also to be applied to trade between individual EC
member states and Korea. According to Table IV-8, Denmark
recorded very low growth of GDP in the 1961-90 period as
compared with other EC member states. However,it only
implement one import restraint against Korea in the
period. On the other hand, France, even though it
recorded the second highest GDP growth after Italy in the
1961-90 period, adopted the largest number of import
restraints (13 cases) against Korea.
If the business cycle approach is applicable, the order
of countries which implemented the most stringent import
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restraints against Korea would be the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and
Italy. However, in reality, the order 0± countries is far
ditteren--France,U.K., Italy and Germany/Belgium/the
Netherlands/Luxembourg. Especially, France and Italy
imposed tight import restraints against Korea, contrary
to their high GDP growth in the 1961-1990 period.
There±ore, the business cycle approach seems to be
inapplicable both to trade between the EC and Korea, and
individual BC member states and Korea as major
determinants of protective measures by the EC against
Korea.
Table IV-8: Comparison of GDP Growth Rate in Major EC
Member States(%)
Years	 GER	 U.K.	 FRA	 ITA	 BEL	 NET	 DEN
1961-70	 4.5	 2.8	 5.6	 5.7	 4.9	 5.1	 4.5
1971-80	 2.7	 2.0	 3.3	 3.1	 3.2	 2.9	 2.2
1981	 0.2	 -1.1	 1.2	 1.1	 -1.5	 -0.7	 -0.9
1982	 -0.5	 1.2	 2.5	 0.2	 1.5	 -1.4	 3.0
1983	 1.5	 3.8	 0.7	 1.1	 0.2	 1.4	 2.5
1984	 2.8	 1.8	 1.3	 3.2	 2.3	 3.2	 4.4
1985	 2.0	 3.6	 1.7	 2.9	 0.9	 2.6	 4.2
1986	 2.3	 3.1	 2.1	 2.9	 1.9	 2.1	 3.3
1987	 1.9	 3.8	 2.2	 3.1	 2.0	 1.3	 -1.0
1988	 3.7	 4.2	 3.4	 3.9	 4.0	 2.8	 -0.4
1989	 3.8	 2.2	 3.3	 3.5	 4.2	 3.8	 1.6
1990	 3.5	 2.1	 3.2	 3.0	 3.3	 3.0	 2.0
1981-90	 2.1	 2.4	 2.1	 2.5	 1.9	 1.8	 1.9
1961-90	 3.1	 2.4	 3.7	 3.8	 3.3	 3.3	 2.9
Source Somers, Frans (European Economies--A Comparative
Study), p.255.
2-2. Demand-Side Approaches of Protectionism
2-2-1.Export Dependence Approach
The	 supply-side	 approaches	 on	 determinants	 of
protectionism have been tested by many scholars and
supplemented with the demand-side approaches, 1 ° as
mentioned in Introduction in this thesis. One of those
demand-side approaches is export dependence approach.
According to the export dependence approach, the high
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degree of dependence on exports could weaken
protectionist inclinations ±or fear of retaliation by
countries who are major export market for initiators of
protective measures. The export dependence approach is
divided into two perspectives. One is concerned with
international economic interdependence and the other with
diversification of export items. Namely, the higher the
international economic dependence is, the lower the
demands for protective measures is (international
economic interdependence perspective). Also, the higher
the degree ot diversification of export items is, the
weaker the power to demand tor protective measures is
(diversification of export items perspective).
2-2-1-1. International 	 Economic	 Interdependence
Perspective
In connection with international economic interdependence
and protectionism, Helen Mimer argues "the increased
international economic interdependence of the post-World
War II period has been a major reason why protectionism
did not spread widely in the 1970s and early 1980s."11
Table IV-9:Exports of Major Countries and Their
GDP(1988)($1B)
Countries TE(A)	 EK(B)	 GDP(C) A/C(%) B/C(%) NIRK
USA	 321.60	 12.757	 4817.8	 6.7	 0.26	 21
JAP	 264.86	 15.929	 2843.4	 9.3	 0.56	 14
CAN	 116.84	 1.197	 484.6 24.1	 0.25	 21
EC	 429.00	 6.042	 4762.6	 9.0	 0.13	 16
Source:Orr, Bill (the Global Economy in the 90s), pp.43
and 129.
Note :TE=Totaj. Exports. EK=Exports to Korea.
NIRK=Number of Import Restraints against Korea.
Intra-EC trade was excluded in exports of the BC.
1± the international economic interdependence perspective
is applicable, the number of import restraints by the EC
against Korea would have to be lower in accordance with
the degree of dependence ot exports to the Korean market,
considering the ratio 0± exports to GDP. Among the major
trading partners with Korea, the EC recorded the lowest
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GDP dependence on exports to Korea with 0.13. However,
the EC's import restraints against Korea numbered only 16
cases in the 1970-1991 period.
On the other hand, the United States and Canada
implemented very stringent import restraints against
Korea, with 21 cases of import restraints, despite their
relatively higher GDP dependence on exports to Korea,
compared to EC's dependence on exports to Korea. Only
Japan implemented the lowest import restraints against
Korea, reflecting its high GDP dependence on exports to
Korea. Therefore, the international economic
interdependence perspective is hard to apply in the EC-
Korea trade as determinants of protectionism.
In case of EC member states, Spain, Greece and Portugal
showed very low dependence of exports to Korea on GDP.
Theretore, according to the international economic
interdependence perspective, high degree of import
restraints have to be implemented by them against Korea.
However, these countries did not adopt any import
restraints against Korea. France implemented the highest
degree of protective measures against Korea with a total
of 13 cases, despite its relatively high dependence of
exports to Korea on GDP.
Table IV-1O: Exports of EC Member States and GDP (1988)
($1B)
Countries TE(A)
	 EK(B) GDP(C)	 A/C(%) B/C(%) NIRK
BEL/LUX	 23.295	 0.361	 156.6	 14.8	 0.23	 1
Ireland	 4.839	 0.0b5	 32.5	 14.8	 0.002	 0
Italy	 54.682	 0.637	 828.9	 6.6	 0.07	 3
Germany 147.055	 2.081 1201.8	 12.2	 0.17	 1
Spain	 13.842	 0.149	 340.1	 4.06 0.04	 0
U.K.	 75.091	 0.914	 822.8	 9.1	 0.12	 4
Neth.	 29.400	 0.510	 228.3	 12.8	 0.22	 0
France	 62.015	 1.134	 949.9	 6.5	 0.11	 14
Greece	 1.895	 0.018	 52.5	 3.6	 0.03	 0
Denmark	 13.804	 0.138	 107.5	 12.8	 0.12	 1
Portugal	 3.085	 0.035	 41.7	 7.3	 0.08	 0
Source:Orr,Bill (The Global Economy in the 90s). p.43;
and KFTA (Major Statistics of Korean Economy), pp.202-
205.
Note:Intra-EC trade was excluded in total exports.
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Therefore, the international economic interdependence
perspective is also difficult to apply as determinants of
protectionism by EC member states against Korea.
2-2-1-2. Diversification of Export Items Perspective
John Conybeare maintains a high level of diversification
of export items implies large numbers of actors in the
export sector and therefore, a lower ability to collude
for the period of influencing tariff policy."12
Therefore, the high diversification of export items to
specific countries could also weaken the power to demand
protective measures. The test of this approach is only
done in case of EC member states-Korea trade because it
is not so easy to count the number of export items to
Korea in the level of the EC.
Table IV-11:Number of Export Items of EC Member States to
Korea( 1989)
Countries	 Number of Export Items
	 NIRK
Germany	 36	 1
France	 35	 14
U.K.	 4
Italy	 34	 3
Belgium	 34	 1(Benelux)
Netherlands
	 36	 0
Greece	 30	 0
Portugal	 27	 0
Spain	 34	 0
Ireland	 32	 0
Denmark	 35	 1
Luxembourg	 21	 0
Source :KFTA(EDPS Department Computer Printout).
Note	 :Items based on Ministry of Trade & Industry
Classification.
Considering the number of export items by EC member
states to Korea and the number of import restraints
against Korea, the result is completely different with
the diversification of export items perspective. In the
case of France, it has been implementing the largest
number 0± import restraints against Korea even though its
export items have been highly diversified. Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Ireland have not adopted any import restraints against
Korea or implemented only one case of restrictive
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measure, despite their low diversification of export
items. Thus, the degree of diversification of export
items is not related with weakness or strength of demands
for protectionism in trade between EC member states and
Korea. The export dependence perspective, theretore,
seems to be inapplicable in EC member states-Korea trade
as determinants of protectionism.
2-2-2. Multinationalization Approach
In connection with the degree of multinationalization and
protectionism, Helen Mimer and David Yoffie argue
' t multinational ±irms and export-dependent corporations
tended to preter lower trade barriers." 13 If this
approach is applicable to the EC-Korea trade, it is clear
that countries which own a large number of multinational
corporations (MNCs) have to be less protection-oriented
than other countries with a small number of MNCs.
Table IV-12:Number of Multinationals by Country of
Origin( 1976)
Countries of Origin NMNC
	 Share(%)	 NIRK	 Share(%)
USA	 1582	 28	 21	 24.7
Japan	 132	 2	 14	 16.5
EC	 2982	 54	 15	 17.6
Switzerland	 372	 7	 0	 0
Sweden	 210	 4	 2	 2.4
Canada	 154	 3	 21	 24.7
Australia	 134	 2	 14	 16.5
Totals	 5566	 100	 85	 100.0
Source:Robinson,	 John(Multinationals	 &	 Political
Control), p.24.
Note :NMNC=Number of Multinational Corporations.
However,it is ditficult to find a relationship between
high degree ot multinationalization and low degree of
protectionism in terms of total number of MNCs and their
countries of origin. The EC implemented stringent import
restraints against Korea, despite its highest share in
the number of MNC5 in the world, as seen in Table IV-12.
The United States also imposed very tight import
restraints against Korea in contrary to its high degree
of multiriatiorialization. However, the
multinationaj.izajton approach is applicable in trade
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between Korea-Japan, Korea-Canada and Korea-Australia. In
accordance with the low degree of multinationalization in
Japan, Canada and Australia, those three countries
imposed very stringent import restraints against Korea.
On the other hand, Switzerland and Sweden had implemented
very low degree of import restraints against Korea
despite the low level of multinationalization of their
companies. However, it is hard to argue that Switzerland
and Sweden have low level of multinationalization of
their companies, considering the small number of
population and high number of multinational companies.
Therelore, I would conclude that the multinationalization
approach is not meaningful because of the above
shortcomings.
In case of trade between EC member states and Korea, the
multinationalization approach is also not applicable.
Namely, the United Kingdom implemented the second largest
numbers 0± import restraints against Korea among the EC
member states, despite its higriest degree of
multinationalization or companies, as seen in Table IV-
13.
Table IV-13:MNCs of EC Member States(1976)
Country of Origin	 NMNC	 Share(%)	 NIRK	 Share(%)
Germany	 803	 27	 1	 4
U.K.	 1130	 38	 4	 16
Netherlands	 238	 8	 1(Bel&Lux) 4
France	 398	 13	 14	 56
Italy	 112	 4	 3	 12
Denmark	 95	 3	 1	 4
Belgium	 161	 5	 0	 0
Luxembourg	 26	 0.9	 0	 0
Ireland	 19	 0.6	 1	 4
Source:Robinson,	 John(Multinationals 	 &	 Political
Control), p.24.
France also imposed the largest number 0± import
restrictive measures against Korea, even though it has
higher degree 0± multinationalization of companies. On
the other hand, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland
had implemented only one import restraint or had not
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implemented any import restraints, despite the tact that
they owned companies not highly multinationalized.
2-2-3. strategic Trade Demands Approach
The strategic trade demands approach is that domestic
companies demand that their governments close the home
market to specific countries which impose trade barriers
against them. Therefore, the degree of country A'S
openness for country B's exporters is strategically
decided in accordance with the degree of market access to
country B by country A's businessmen. Tluis approach is
frequently applicable in trade between the United States
and Korea. 14
 For example, "the AT & T, a U.S.business
telephone systems exporter, asked in March 25,1993 the
American government to threaten Korea with a closure of
the U.S. market unless the Korean government does not
allow it to participate in an international bidding for
the purchase of business telephone system to be awarded
by the Korea Telecommunications Company in May, 1993."
The U.S. request was finally accepted by the Korean
government on July 24, 1993 when the AT & T was included
as the only foreign supplier to participate in the
Korea's bidding br the purchase of business telephone
system from 1994.
In addition, several U.S.industrial associations asked in
February in 1993 the U.S. government to designate Korea
as a Priority Foreign Country(PFC) under the U.S.Trade
Law (Article 301-Protection of Intellecutal Property
Right) for the implementation of protective measures
because Korea does not provide adequate protection of
their intellectual property rights. The associations
include International Intellectual Property Alliance,
Pharmaceutical Manutacturers Association, (J.S.Trademark
Association and Conemills Corporation.16
However, Korean market openness seems to be not so
important a factor as a determinant to the openness of
the EC market. Rather than the openness of Korean market,
the EC mainly concerns itself with equal treatment with
the United States given by Korea. For example, the EC
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abolished its GSP treatment to Korea on Jan.1, 1988 for
the reason that the Korean government did not provide the
same treatment as given to the United States in the
intellectual property right, as I mentioned in Chapter I.
Also, the EC has been repeatedly requesting a lowering of
Korea's import tariff rates of whiskey on the ground that
Korea unfavorably set the import tariff rates of whiskey,
which is a major export item of the United Kingdom, when
compared to the import tari±f rates of brandy, in the
Korea-U.S.negotiations. Therefore, the EC has been asking
either tor a reduction in Korea's import tariffs or a
provision of the fairer treatment, based on comparative
reciprocity' 7 between Korea's treatment to the United
States and that to the EC, rather than strategic trade
demands by the EC companies. There are some complicated
teelings in the EC that the EC is neglected in major
procedures of decisions of Korea's tariff levels between
Korea and the United States. The strategic trade demands
approach, theretore, is not applicable in the EC-Korea
trade as a determinant of EC's protectionism against
Korea.
2-2-4. Exit and Entry Barriers Approach
According to exit and entry barriers approach, textiles
and clothing receive institutionalized protection because
of low barriers to entry,' 8 large size of domestic
industry and easy exit barrier. Also, footwear and
television sets receive temporary protection because of
low barriers to entry, small size of domestic industry
and high exit barrier. Steel and automobiles receive
sporadic protection because ot high barriers to entry,
large size of domestic industry and high exit barrier.
This approach is drawn out trom analyzing VERs and OMAs
implemented by the United States against Japan, Korea,
Taiwan and the EC.
In case of textiles and clothing, the MFA has been
applicable both to EC-Korea and U.S-Korea trade.
Therefore, it is meaningless to test the approach
separately.
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In case 0± footwear, the United States implemented OMA in
the 1977-81 period against Korean footwear. Since then,
the United States investigated imports of Korean footwear
three times--in 1982 under U.S.Trade Law(201 Article),in
1984 under U.S.Trade Law (301 Article) and in 1989 under
U.S.Customs Law 0± 1930. However, there were no official
import restraints by the United States against Korean
tootwear since 1981.Therefore, the exit and entry barrier
approach is applicable in footwear trade between the
United States and Korea because the U.S.import restraints
against Korea were temporary in the 1977-81 period only.
However, the EC has been implementing import restraints
against Korean footwear since July, 1990. Also, France
and Italy had imposed import restraints against Korean
lootwear tor the 1988-1990 period. In addition, the
United Kingdom implemented import restraints against
Korean footwear for the 1978-90 period, along with
Ireland for the 1982-1990 period. Therefore, the EC's
import restraints against Korea in footwear is difficult
to define as either temporary or institutionalized.
However, import restraints by EC member states were
institutionalized, rather than temporary,because EC
member states were involved in protection of footwear
imports from Korea in the 1978-90 period.
In case of television sets, the United States has been
imposing AD restrictions against Korea from 1983 to the
present. The restraints have been institutionalized,
rather than temporary. Therefore, the exit-entry barrier
approach is not applicable in the U.S.-Korea color TV set
case. Korean television sets, however,have been under the
EC's import restraints since April 1990. Prior to this,
France was, and still is implementing import restraints
against Korean-made color TV sets since 1977. Therefore,
it is also hard to argue whether the exit-entry barrier
approach is applicable in the EC-Korea color TV case or
not because the import restraints have only been
initiated since 1990. However, the approach is not
applicable in EC member states-Korea color TV set case
189
because the import restraints against Korea were
institutionalized.
In case of iron and steel products, the United States had
imposed VER measure on Korean products for the 1984-1992
period. The EC also implemented the same measure for the
1980-1990 period. However, the United States has been
investigating Korean steel pipes and tubes and stainless
steel pipes and tubes since 1991 for the imposition of AD
duties. The EC also followed suit to start AD
investigation against imports of Korean steel rods.
However, there were no import restraints by EC member
states against Korean iron and steel products. Therefore,
the demands for protection in iron and steel products are
sporadic, but almost institutionalized both in the United
States and the EC.
The exit-entry barrier approach is applicable in trade of
footwear and iron and steel products between the United
States and Korea, and iron and steel products between the
EC and Korea. It is very hard to argue whether the
approach is applicable or not in footwear and color TV
trade cases between the EC and Korea. However, the
approach is not applicable in trade of color TV sets
between the United States and Korea. On the other hand,
the approach is certainly not applicable to individual EC
member states and Korea CTV trade cases. Thus, the exit-
entry barrier approach is only partly applicable in the
EC-Korea trade.
2-2-5. Voter Support and Degree of Collective Action
Approach
In connection with political power and demands for
protectionism, 19 Vinod Aggarwal, Robert Keohane and David
Yoffie argue "large industries with high levels of
resources in votes, campaign funds, political
organization and so on will be able to pay more for
protection than less well-endowed industries." 20 If such
argument is applicable to the EC-Korea trade, initiation
of investigations to impose protective measures against
products from Korea, which are closely linked to
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interests of politically powerful industrial
organizations in the EC, has high possibilities for the
adoption of definitive import restrictive measures.
Table IV-14:EC Employment in Manufacturing by Branch
(1950-90) (million persons)
Order	 Goods	 1950 1960 1Y70 1980 1990
1. Textiles,Clothing,Footwear 8.0 7.5 6.4 4.7 	 3.8
2. Transport Equipment	 3.0 4.0 4.8 4.6	 3.8
3. Food,Beverages, Tobacco	 3.5 4.0 3.9 3.6	 3.3
4. Non-Electrical Machinery 	 2.4 3.5 4.0 3.7	 3.1
5. Chemicals, Rubber	 1.8 2.5 3.0 3.1	 2.8
6. Electrical Machinery	 1.5 2.6 3.2 3.1	 2.7
7. Metal Products	 2.3 2.9 3.2 3.0	 2.5
8. Paper, Printing	 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.2	 1.9
Y.	 Wood, Furniture	 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0	 1.7
10. Others	 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.8	 1.6
11.Non-Metallic Mineral Products 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 	 1.4
12. Basic Metals	 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.8	 1.3
Totals	 30.4 36.5 38.6 35.2 29.9
Source:Molle,Willem	 (The	 Economics	 of	 European
Integration), p.280.
Since 1975, the ECC accepted almost all complaints from
the European Association of Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers (EACEM) to impose import restraints against
Korean consumer electronics. In this case, the voter
support and degree of collective action approach seems to
be applicable in the EC-Korea trade, considering the
strong political power o± the EACEM. However, the ECC
made decisions not to impose any import restraints
against such Korean products as tungsten products, steel
nails, microwave ovens, H-beam, Al-clad cookwares,
polyester film and polyester staple fibre. Major reasons
to reject demands ior import restraints are that those
products were free from suspicion of industrial injury to
EC industries.
Considering those cases of rejection for protective
measures by the EC and the magnitude of EC's major
industries, there is no actual linkage to support the
approach. Even though polyester staple fibre is included
in the largest manufacturing sector 0± the EC industry--
textiles, clothing and tootwear, it was not included in
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the items which had received protective measures.
Microwave oven and polyester film also were not included
in protective measures even though chemicals and
electrical machinery industries have large numbers of
employees. On the other hand, oxalic acid and album,
despite their minor political power as very small
industries in the EC, received protective measures from
the ECC against imports from Korean-made products. In
case of oxalic acid, the EC even accepted a complaint by
a company, Destilados Agricolas Vimbodi, SA (DAVSA), for
the AD investigation. That is an exceptional case because
most complaints by EC industries had been lodged by
politically powerful industrial organizations or unions,
rather than a company or an individual. In case of
individual EC member states-Korea trade, textiles and
clothing, and electrical and electronics products, which
have large numbers of employees, represent 36 per cent (9
cases) of total import restraints by individual EC member
states against Korea as of 1991 (25 cases). That is
almost similar to the case of small and politically weak
industries such as stoneware, tiles, sundries, and toys
and parts, which account 1cr 32 per cent (8 cases) of the
total import restraints. Therefore, purely political
determinants are not closely linked with EC and EC member
states' protectionism against Korea.
In sum, only hegemonic stability approach seems to be
applicable to EC-Korea trade, but only in the case of
trade between individual EC member states and Korea.
However, all other approaches are irrelevant, not
meaningful, or dilficult to apply in the EC-Korea trade.
In addition, the exit-entry barrier approach is only
partly applicable to the U.S.-Korea and the EC-Korea
trade. Therefore, there are no approaches which
completely satisty the search for determinants of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade.
3. My Own Hypotheses and EC-Korea Trade
3-1.EC's Protectionism against Korea and Its Relationship
with EC's Past Industrial Damages from Japanese Challenge
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My first hypothesis is closely related to the non-
existence of any yardstick to measure the graduation of a
developing state from the status ot a developing to that
of a developed country. The graduation issue is
compounded by Korea's partial graduation in specific
industries such as electronics. In addition, I want to
consider the close causal relationship between the EC's
experience with Japan and the EC's experience with
Korea:Th].s double experience created in the EC a mirror
image of Japan, as mentioned in the Introduction of my
thesis. This made the EC treat Korea as a developed
country and ask ±or acceptance of t!ie obligations at a
developed country in the international trading arena
(i.e. opening of Korea's marKet). Therefore, the EC's
import restraints against Korea have been greatly
motivated by the alleged industrial damage to EC
industries, caused by Japanese exporters in the period of
the 1950s to 1970s. This close connection between the
perceived industrial damage of the EC from Japan, and
import restraints by the EC against Korea originated from
two factors.
The mirror image which contounds Korea with Japan in the
perception of the EC can be traced in the last analysis
to the similar economic development strategy of both
countries. In addition, the similar development strategy
was reinforced by Korea's heavy dependence on imports of
machinery, equipment and parts, and technology from
Japan, ±acilitated by political circumstances and
geographic contiguity.In connection with the momentum
driving Korea towards a similar development strategy with
Japan, Bruce Cumings points out:21
Korea was able to obtain needed financing and
technology for heavy and chemical industries from
the Japanese, in part because the new programs for
the development of those industries provided the
structure necessary to receive aeclining Japanese
heavy industry. This simultaneously increased Korean
autonomy in the world at large while deepening
dependency on Japan.
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Regarding this type of dependence, Kaname Akamatsu
elaborated his famous 'flying geese' model o industrial
development in follower countries as follows:22
Time series curves for imports, import-substitution
.tor the domestic market, and subsequent exports of
given products tend to form a pattern like wild
geese flying in ranks. The cycle in given
industries--textiles, steel, automobiles, light
electronics--of origin, rise, apogee, and decline
has not simply been marked, but often mastered in
Japan. Korea has historically been receptacles for
declining Japanese industries.
This high dependence on Japanese technology for heavy and
chemical industries gave rise to two serious problems for
Korea. Firstly, Korea has been showing undue dependence
on imports from the Japanese market. The share of imports
from Japan in the nation's total imports rose from 21.3
per cent in 1960 to a heafty of 40.8 per cent in 1970.
Since then, that share always maintained more than the
level ot 20 per cent (25.9 per cent in 1991). Therefore,
Korea's trade deficit in 1991 with Japan reached $8,764
million, representing 90.8 per cent of the nation's total
trade deficit of $9,654 million recorded in the year.
Secondly, Korea was recognized as the so-called "second
Japan" because its export and development patterns always
followed geese model. For example, Korea had been heavily
dependent upon capital and equipment from Japan for
industrialization since the early 1960s, as I mentioned
in Chapter Il. That made Korea a recipient of Japan's
declining industries and mirror Japan's industrial
development, but with a time gap.
The mirror image is also reintorced by the similarity of
trade pattern between the EC-Korea and the EC-Japan. In
trade with Japan, the EC has been suffering trade
deficits since the 1970s. For example, EC'S exports to
Japan in 1987 reached $ib billion as compared with
imports trom Japan totaling $42 billion, leaving $26
billion trade deficit in disfavor of the EC. Japan's
exports to the EC market concentrated on very sensible
items to the EC such as consumer electronics and motor
cars. The relative damage to the EC due to concentration
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ot Japanese exports to several sensitive items was very
serious in addition to the chronic trade deficit problem
with Japan. "The persistent deficit in EC-Japan trade can
be solved by expanding EC'S exports to Japan, by
increasing direct investments by Japanese businesses in
the EC or by implementing import restraints on Japanese
products entering the EC." 23 Therefore, the EC initially
strengthened its import restraints against Japanese
imports into the EC market, especially against consumer
electronics goods trom Japan. The Japanese response was
an increase in direct investments in the EC. However, the
EC's response against increases in direct investments
from Japan was made through strengthening applications of
rules of origins. "It includes increased use of AD
actions against so-called 'screw-driver' assembly plants
in Europe and much more rigid interpretation of local
content requirements."24
These tactors in the EC-Japan trade relations are also
lound in the EC-Korea trade relations. Firstly, Korea
enjo'ed trace surplus with the EC by 1990 even though
this situation reversed to a trade surplus in favor of
the EC in 1991, as I mentioned in Chapter III. Secondly,
Korea's exports to the EC also concentrated on several
industrial products with which the EC had many industrial
structure adjustment problems. In the 1970s, Korea's main
export items to the EC were textiles and clothing, and
iron and steel products. Major export products by Korea
were diversified to tootwear and consumer electronics
products in the 1980s, in addition to those export items
in the 1970s.
As discussed above, these circumstance led to EC's
protectionist measures against Korea. Thus, the EC's
import restraints against Korea was a tunction 0± Korea's
heavy dependence on Japan as a model for
industrialization, and EC's similar experience of trade
with Korea to that of Japan.
The mirror image led to EC protectionism against Korea
which is similar to that against Japan, as shown
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towards.Ifl case of vCRS, the ECC began to regulate
imports of VCR5 from Japan, under VERs, effective
February in 1983. Major reason for restriction of
imports from Japan was the sharp rise in shipments of
VCRs ±rom Japan, from 2,854,903 unitS ifl 1981 to
4,94b,405 units in 1982. Following the restrictions,
other VCR exporters took the opportunity to increase
their shipments to the EC market. Specifically, Korean
exporters shipped $317,916,000 worth of VCR5 to the EC
market in 1987. The EC industry invariably acted against
import threats by filing an AD complaint, which they did
in 1987 against Korean products, four years after VER
against Japanese VCRs. As a result, Korea's exports to
the EC market reduced by 69 per cent to the only
$9b,148,000 in 1991 trom $120,187,000 in 1990.
In case of iron and steel products, Japan agreed to limit
their steel exports to the EC under the VER signed late
1975. In this case, the EC also had implemented VER
measure against Korea's steel exports to the EC market
since 1980 with a five-year time lag. Japanese steel
exports in 1975 reached 34.4 million tonnes, which was
7.b times higher than Korea's steel exports remained at
4.5 million tonnes in 1980. There±ore, it was difficult
to compare the degree of industrial damage caused by
Japanese exporters in 1975 with that by Korean exporters
in 1980 in terms ot export volume to the EC
market.Regarding this ironic issue, Louis Turner
maintains "as the 1970s progressed, some of the NICs
began to be sucked into such trade disputes where the
prime trading problem was seen to be Japan's export
success. "25
Furthermore, Korean-made DRAMs (dynamic random access
memories) were filed for complaint by European
Electronics Component Manufacturer Association (EECMA) in
1991, on the grounds that Korean exporters were dumping
in the EC market. However, the main reason behind the
complaint was the Japanese role in the process of AD
investigation against Japanese exporters in the 1987-1990
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period, when Japanese producers argued that Korean
companies were also dumping in the EC market--this
argument designed to involve Korean firms in the EC's AD
restraints. This was clearly considered in ttle subsequent
AD investigation process by the ECC. In the Notice of
Initiation 0± an Anti-Dumping Proceeding Concerning
Imports of Certain Type of Electronic Micro-Circuits
Known as DRAMs Originating in the Republic 0± Korea, EC
Commission maintains:26
It is furthermore alleged that the positive etfects
on the EC market achieved by the adoption of the
anti-dumping measures concerning imports of DRAMs
.trom Japan are significantly impaired by dumped
imports from Korea.
There±ore,it is clear that EC's explanation for the
imposition of import restrictions against Korea is that
Korean exports threaten market shares previously held by
European companies rather than reducing Japanese
shares." 27 That is the tundamental reason why the EC has
usually investigated Korean exports together with
Japanese firms in cases which are originally caused by
Japanese exporters. For example, Korea had been involved
in EC's investigations for import restraints together
with Japanese exporters in cases of CUP, VCR, audio
cassette tape, car stereo radio, DRAMs and microwave
ovens. However, Japan was excluded from the list of
countries ±or import restraint investigations by the EC
in case of color TV sets on the ground that Japan
contributed to the expansion of intra-EC production.
The EC protectionism against Japan and Korea also has a
close relationship with its perception that the EC market
is relatively open for Japanese and Korean products,
compared to the U.S. market for those products.
For example, EC's AD measures against Japanese products
account for 8.5 per cent of its total AD measures in the
1980-1987 period, which is far lower than 10.8 per cent
implemented for Japanese products by the United States.
In case of EC-Korea trade, the EC also implemented 2.3
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per cent of AD measures to imports from Korea, which is
also tar lower than 5.4 per cent by the United States.
Table IV-15:Breakdown of EC's AD Duty Impositions(%)
Countries	 80	 3l	 82	 83	 84	 85	 86	 87	 Total
JAP	 4.0 2.2
	 5.5	 9.3 9.5 5.7	 4.2 29.4	 8.5
USA	 .32.0 12.8 12.7 2.3
	
2.4	 2.9	 7.9
China	 4.0 4.3 7.3 4.7 4.8 2.9 8.3 	 4.6
NIEs	 28.0 8.5 23.6 25.6 33.3 45.7 41.7 52.9 30.5
(Korea)	 2.1	 2.9 4.2 11.8	 2.3
Sources:Messerlin,	 Patrick(Anti-Dumping 	 Laws	 and
Developing Countries), p.31.
Note:Share=Number of AD Measures against Specific
Country/Total Number of AD Measures.
Table IV-16:Breakdown of U.S.AD Duties Impositions(%)
Countries 80
	 81	 82	 83 84	 85	 86	 87	 Total
JAP	 6.5 21.4 4.9 12.8 7.1 7.8 12.9 47.1 10.8
EC	 76.1 21.4 67.2 27.7 5.7 12.5 21.4 17.6 31.4
China	 2.2	 4.9 8.5	 9.4 1.4
	 3.9
NIEs	 28.6 13.1 34.0 40.0 50.0 37.1 23.5 30.3
(Korea)	 7.1	 3.3 12.8 4.3 7.8 5.7
	 5.4
Source:Messerlin,	 Patrick(Anti-Dumping 	 Laws	 and
Developing Countries), p.31.
3-2.EC's Protectionism against Korea and Its Relationship
with U.S.Protectionism against Korea
My second hypothesis is that EC'S protective measures
against Korea were closely connected with any protective
action by the United States against Korea. If the
measures against specific products have been implemented
by the United States, the EC had not hesitated to impose
the protective measures against the same products from
Korea. Such EC's action was adopted for fear of transfer
of shipments to the EC from the United States by Korean
exporters when they had been faced with difficulties in
selling their products in the United States due to import
restraints against them. The switch of Korea's exports
from the United states to the EC can be found in the
trend of Korea's shipments to these two markets. Namely,
the share of the United States in total exports of
Korean-made products had declined to 25.8 per cent in
1991 from 47.3 per cent in 1970 and 35.5 per cent in
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1985, as I mentioned in Chapter III. On the other hand,
the share of the EC in total exports of commodities by
Korea had risen to 13.5 per cent in 1991 from merely 7.8
per cent in 1970 and 10.7 per cent in 1985. This trend
was a result that Korea has been switching its export
market to the EC since its exports to the United States
had been subject to import restraints. Actually, Korea's
exports to the United States declined to $20,638 million
in 1989, to $19,359 million in 1990 and to $18,559
million in 1991 from $21,404 million in 1988. In contrast
to this trend, Kore&s exports to the EC increased to
$8,875 million in 1990 and to $9,728 million in 1991 from
$7,414 million in 1989, as already seen in Chapter III.
Korea's strategy to switch its exports to the SC was
inevitable because Japan was relatively closed to Korean
products and had very complicated distributional
channels, which maae Korean firms difficult to penetrate.
Also, Asian or South American markets did not have high
demands for imports of Korean products.
This close connection between import restraints by the
United States against Korea and those by the EC against
Korea has been caused by two factors. The first factor is
the reversal of trade surplus ±rom the favor of the
United States to the favor of the EC in the U.S.-EC
trade. This factor contributed to the expansion of
protectionism in the United states against the EC
directly and Korea indirectly, and further exerted an
influence on the EC's import restraints against Korea. In
trade with the United States, the EC's figure of trade
surplus has been widening. "For a long period up to 1984,
the EC had a deficit on its trade balance with the United
States. Since then the deticit has turned into a huge
surplus. The scale of the change has been remarkable. In
1987, the surplus reached $17 billion compared with a $27
billion deficit in 1981, a total swing of $44 billion."28
As a result of the trade balance reversed between the EC
and the United States, bilateral trade disputes are also
worsening recently. The share of AD duty impositions by
199
the EC against the United States among the total number
ot AD duty impositions remained only 7.9 per cent in the
1980-1987 period, as seen in Table IV-15. However, the
share by the United States against the EC reached 31.4
per cent, about four times higher than those by the EC
against the United States, as seen in Table IV-16.
Theretore, the trade balance could be the yardstick to
measure the degree of protective measures in the EC-
United States trade.
The second factor is the tightening of import restraints
by the United States against Korea. From 1982, Korea's
trade with the United States reversed to be in favor of
Korea, with Korea's exports of $6,118 million and imports
of $5,956 million to and from the United States. Korea's
trade surplus with the United States peaked with $9,553
million in 1987. Since the huge trade surplus had been
recorcied in favor of Korea, the United States has been
putting a pressure on Korea to liberalize its domestic
market anci to adjust the exchange rate on market-based
mechanism. At the same time, import restraints by the
United States began to increase dramatically. As a result
of such market opening pressure and import restraints
adopted by the United States, growth rate of Korea's
exports to the United States, recording 29.1 per cent in
1986 and 31.9 per cent in 1987, declined to 16.9 per cent
in 1988 and to minus 3.6 per cent in 1989 and to minus
6.2 per cent in 1990, respectively. Finally, Korea
recorded a trade deficit of $335 million in 1991 with
exports of $18,559 million and imports of $18,894
million. The sluggishness in exports to the United States
due to tight import restraints by the United States
created a strategy by Korean exporters to develop
alternative markets such as the EC. The EC has been
maintaining similar demand patterns and tastes for
manufactured goods with those in the United States. Also,
the EC has much room to consume Korean products, rather
than Asian and South American markets, as mentioned
above. Therefore, Korea tried to diversify its export
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markets to the EC member states rather than other
markets. That became one of major reasons that similar
trade disputes between Korea and the United States could
also be found in the EC-Korea trade.
Such trend can be found in actual trade cases of textiles
and clothing, and album between the U.S.-Korea and the
EC-Korea. In the 1960s and the 1970s, many NIEs such as
Korea joined in exports of textiles to the U.S.market. At
last, Korean textiles were included in import restraints
by the United States since 1965 under the Long-Term
Agreement(LTA). However, the EC had not implemented the
measure against Korea until 1971. As a result of a vacuum
in import restraints by the EC, exports from Korea to the
EC market began to increase. Spurred by this fact, the EC
had imposed import restraints since 1971 under the LTA.
Since 1975, the United States and the EC have been
implementing import restraints at the same time against
Korean textiles and clothing under the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement(MFA). The motivation of import restraints by
the EC against Korean textiles and clothing was caused by
rush ot imports from Korea switched to the EC market,
following the LTA signed between the United States and
Korea. The textiles and clothing case will be analyzed in
details in Chapter V.
The album is another representative case. The United
States began its investigation against Korean album
makers in 1985, based on an AD complaint by the
U.S.industry. The final decision to impose AD duties was
made in April, 1989. Since the beginning of AD
investigation, Korea's exports of albums to the United
States faced difficulties. To overcome this problem,
Korean album exporters made e±forts to penetrate into
alternative markets, mainly the EC market. As a result of
the efforts, Korea's exports of albums to the EC rapidly
increased ±rom 1988, as seen in Table IV-18. Spurred by
the drastic transfer of Korea's exports from the United
States to the EC market, the EC album industry also filed
an AD complaint against Korean albums in 1988 to ask for
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redressive actions to the ECC. Since then, Korea's
exports 01 albums to the EC market began to decline.
3-3.EC's Protectionism against Korea and Its Relationship
with Korea's Strong Neo-Mercantilist Policy Approach
As seen in Chapters I, II and III, my third hypothesis is
closely related to Korea's strong neo-mercantilist
approach of industrial and trade policies, and surplus
capacity problems of specific industries in the EC member
states. If Korea's exports of specific products with
strong government supports are concentrated in the EC and
those products happen to be coincided with EC t S problem
industries, the EC enforced strict import restraints
against those products from Korea.
For example, the Korean government initiated a series of
five-year economic development plans from 1962 under
which it strongly backed up export-led economic
development policy. For the policy implementation,
textiles and clothing industries were chosen as major
toreign exchange earners. In the year of 1970, the
textiles and clothing topped the list of Korea's major
export commodities with $341.1 million, representing 40.8
per cent of the nation's total exports in the year. The
textiles and clothing enjoyed the position of Korea's
highest export items by 1987.
In case of the EC, the 1970s was the period when
problems caused by the expansion of production facilities
in EC member states since the second world war became
evident following world-wide demand contraction after two
rounds of oil shocks. There±ore, the SC was in a
difficult situation to dispose of production surplus
internally and externally. Under the situation, imports
from Korea could be an obstacle to carry out such goal.
Thus, the EC began to impose restraints against Korean
textiles and clothing as seen above. In addition, the EC
initiated AD investigations against Korean acrylic fibre
in 1972, against acrylic yarn in 1973, against acrylic
socks in 1974 and against synthetic fibre socks in 1974.
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Such trend can be also found in iron and steel case. The
Korean government had been carrying out its plan to
toster heavy industry and chemical sector since 1973.
Under the plan, such industries as iron and steel,
chemicals and petrochemicals, machinery, automobiles and
shipbuilding received intensive administrative supports
from the government. As a result, iron and steel products
ranked the third in the list of Korea's major export
commodities since 1975. Especially, the share of iron and
steel products in Korea's total exports in 1982 peaked
with 9.8 per cent, totaling $2,317 million.
Unfortunately, the iron and steel industry in the EC had
been also under surplus capacity problems in the 1970s,
due to world-wide economic recession. As a result, the EC
experienced the same problems as those in textiles and
clothing industries. Thus, the EC began to restrict
imports of Korean iron and steel products from 1980 under
VRA signed with Korea, whicn was terminated in April
1990. Before the initiation of VRA, the EC already began
AD investigations against Korean steel plate and coils in
1978.
Followed by textiles and clothing, and iron and steel
products, Korea's emphasis of policy direction to support
specific industries has been put on to high technology
industries such as consumer electronics since the early
1980s. Thanks to the aggressive government support to the
electronics industry, electronics products topped the
list of Korea's major export commodities from 1988. In
1988 alone, exports of those products represented 27 per
cent of the total exports in the year with $16,255
million.
On the other hand, the EC also put an emphasis of its
industrial policy on the promotion of consumer
electronics in the 1980s and thereafter. For the
fostering of the EC's consumer electronics industry, the
EC began to promote intra-EC trade in electronics
products and regulate imports of foreign products.
Therefore, trade disputes between the EC and Korea in the
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1980s and thereafter were concentrated on consumer
electronics such as microwave ovens, compact disk
players, video cassette tapes, audio cassette tapes,
video cassette recorders, car stereo radios, DRAM5,
floppy diskettes and color TVs, as seen in Chapter VIII
later.
4. Approaches to Analyze Effectiveness of Protectionism
in Terms of Achievement or Failure of Aims of Protective
Measures in the EC-Korea Trade
Two approaches in this type of analysis--David Yoffie and
Patrick Messerlin's--are contradictory to each other. As
seen in Introduction, David Yoffie argues U.S.import
restraints against developing countries are useless to
reduce the growing imports from these countries to the
U.S. market. 29 However, his argument on deflection to
other industrial sectors and the problem of new country
entrants is fully understood and differentiated from an
argument that is simply bilateral, i.e. that
protectionist measures do not work for a country
deploying them against any particular target country.
Table IV-17:U.S.Import Restraints against Korea
Items	 TIR	 Korea's Exports($i000)
1987	 1991
Textiles	 MFA	 2,943,832	 2,532,205
Iron and Steel	 VRA	 735,224	 694,250
Color TV	 AD	 263,941	 14S,321
Album	 AD	 1,049	 693
Pipe Fitting	 AD	 13,696	 904
Brass Sheet and Strip
	
AD	 1,475	 0
Color Braun Tube	 AD	 8,615	 7,980
Small Business Telephone Sys. AD	 16,187	 3,932
Stainless Steel Cookxngware	 AD	 66,142	 65,387
Nitro Cellulose	 AD	 359	 0
Acrylic Sweater	 AD	 314,952	 109,300
Polyester Film
	
AD	 36,350	 34,396
Plastic Bag
	
lEO	 5,551	 0
EPROM Chip
	 lEO	 4,474	 0
Totals	 4,411,847 3,597,368
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries Against Korea),
pp. 39-80.
Uote:TIR=Type ot Import Restraints.
IEO=Import Exclusion Order.
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In contrast to this argument, Patrick Messerlin regards
protective measures by the EC are very e±±ective to
reverse the growing imports from developing countries to
the EC. Theretore, it is interesting to test these
completely contradictory approaches using the case of the
EC-Korea trade.
In the U.S.-Korea trade, Korea's exports 0± products,
which have been under the U.S.import restraints, have
declined altogether ±rom $4,412 million to $3,597 million
in the 1987-1991 period, as seen in Table IV-17. As a
result of the U.S.import restraints against Korea, Korean
exporters switched their export markets to the EC member
states, as seen in Table IV-18, for products which were
under import restraints.
Table IV-18:Comparison of Korea's Exports to USA and EC
Markets
Items	 Yl	 Korea's Exports($i000)
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991
Album
to USA	 1989	 261	 403	 1049	 911	 693
to EC
	 1990	 26007	 17860	 15525	 12204
CTV
to USA	 1984	 263941 218617 177242 139587 148321
to EC
	 1990	 103b83	 25355	 16989	 15554
EPROM
to USA	 1988	 4474	 0	 0	 0
to EC	 1992	 354480 375148 605709
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries Against Korea).
pp.40, 104 and 105.
Note:YI=Year of Import Restraints.
This fact supports the conclusion that U.S.import
restraints against Korea were effective. Therefore, the
Patrick Messerlin's approach is applicable and the David
Yoftie's approach is not applicable in the U.S.-Korea
trade.
In the EC-Korea trade, Korea's exports of products, which
have been subject to the EC's import restraints, to the
EC market also declined as a result of the EC's import
restraints. Compared to Korea's exports of products under
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the EC's import restraints to the EC market in 1987, the
export figure in 1991 increased to $2,966 million from
$2,908 million, as seen in Table IV-19.
Table IV-19:EC's Import Restraints against Korea
Items	 TIR	 Korea's Exports($l000)
1987	 1991
Textiles	 MFA	 1,426,493	 1,562,442
Canned Mushroom	 Quota	 130	 37
Oxalic Acid	 AD	 284	 76
Polyester Yarn	 AD	 2,538(1988)	 223
Compact Disk Player AD
	 17,681	 37,580
Video Tape
	 AD	 77,435	 133,900
Color TV
	 AD	 118,429	 15,554
Glutamic Acid	 AD	 3,289	 9,651
Bicycle Tyre Tube	 AD	 16,462	 17,775
VCR	 AD	 317,916	 96,148
Album	 AD	 26,007	 12,204
Footwear	 VER	 554,324	 784,120
Gas Lighter	 AD	 5,107	 487
Audio Tape
	 AD	 49,564	 58,309
Car Stereo Radio	 AD	 227,557(1988) 210,956
Iron & Steel
	
VER	 64,795	 26,879(1989)
Total	 2,908,011	 2,966,341
Source:KFTA(Directory 0± Import Restraints by Advanced
Countries Against Korea), pp.103-140.
However, those exports 0± products except for items under
VERs decreased by 42.8 per cent trom $862 million to $493
million. Exports ot products under VERs such as textiles,
iron and steel products and footwear increased by 16 per
cent to $2,373 million from $2,046 million.
In terms 0± number 0± items br exports, Korea's exports
to the EC in 1991 showed increases in seven items among a
total 0± 16 items which have been subject to EC's import
restraints. However, only three items--textiles, glutamic
acid and ±ootwear--showed increases in exports In 1991 as
compared to export figure in the previous year.
Furthermore, Korea's exports to the EC of textiles in
1991 were 2 per cent lower than export figure of
$1,593.04 million peaked in 1988, and these exports
declined to $1,330.057 million in 1992 and to $i3Oi0.191
million in the Jan.-Nov. period of 1993.
	 The	 rapid
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rises of exports of glutamic acid was a result of
extraordinary expansion ot consumption in the BC in 1991.
Exports of glutamic acid had been sluggish in 1989 and
1990, reducing to $2.23 million and $2.28 million from
1988's $6.17 million. Furthermore, exports of the
products have been under a declining trend since 1993,
confined to $5.585 million in the first 11 months of the
year.
Therefore, the only item which showed a continuous
increase in shipments, despite BC's import restraints,
was tootwear even though tootwear exports to ttie EC
temporarily declined by 18 per cent in 1989 from the
previous year's figure. Such good export pertormance in
footwear was a result of its strong international
competitiveness, marking 9.3 in terms of revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) ratio (country A's total
exports ot commodity B divided by country A's total
exports of all manufactured goods in a specific year),
compared to 1.8-2.4 of iron and steel products, and 2.1-
2.9 of textiles. Again, the Patrick Messerlin's approach
is also applicable in the BC-Korea trade. However, the
David Yoffie's approach is inapplicable in the BC-Korea
trade. I found several reasons why the David Yoffie's
approach is uniformly not applicable in the U.S.-Korea
and the EC-Korea trade.
Firstly,the VER5 and OMA5 which David Yotfie uses as
basic analysis tools tor examining import restraints by
the United States have some problems as effective policy
instruments to reduce toreign imports, 3 ° as seen in EC-
Korea footwear case. According to many analyses about the
economic effects of VER and OMA, exporting countries
could get a benefit not from its wise strategy to take
advantage of importing countries' accommodating nature of
protective policy, as argued by David Yoffie, but from
pure economic result of the policy. Clemens Boonekamp
points out:31
A VER can be attractive to the exporting country. It
ofters rents which, at least in the snort run, are
windfall gains to the extent that demanci in the rest
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ot the world is elastic so that terms of trade
losses are minimal or zero. Exporting countries may
bene.tit trom VER since they collect rents resulting
from the higher prices.
Heinz Preusse also maintains the advantage to exporters
ot the VER or OMA as follows:32
When applying ordinary quotas, the ensuing revenue
income remains in the country:either with the state,
when quotas are auctioned or with the importing
parties to whom they are allocated. In tne case of
VER5, these rents are snif ted to the foreign
exporters and a real transfer abroad occurs. The
country's loss of welfare increases when foreign
exporters are given the chance of enforcing a
monopolistic pricing policy due to the
implementation of a VER.
In addition, the VERs or OMAs could cause the problems of
exploitation by other exporters,which are not suDject to
these measures, through opportunities to increase their
exports. Namely,advanced countries are usually imposing
VER5 against products from developing countries which
display a relatively low knowledge intensity. Because
entry barriers to these industries are very low, other
exporters are easily able to initiate exports of the
products by exploiting opportunities in which major
competitors are under VER measures from importing
countries. In this case, these VER measures are useless
to prevent growing penetration of imports into the
markets of advanced countries.
Secondly, the VER5 and OMA5 have some attractiveness in
allowing policy-makers' choice in terms 0± political
effects.According to Heinz Preusse, from the perspective
of IPE,the VER has following merits to importing
countries
Firstly, VERs are not subject to GATT. Therefore,
they can be implemented bilaterally and selectively
(effect ot discrimination).
Secondly, VERS can be directly negotiated between
governments and covertly implemented, i.e. secrecy
and non-transparency are seen as an advantage
(effect of non-transparency).
Thirdly, the danger ot retaliatory measures is
slight, since tree-trade interest are weakened and
foreign producers receive compensation in form of
rent incomes (effect of international
redistribution).
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Fourthly, as a rule the measures have a time-limit
and must then be renegotiated. This had led to the
conclusion that they are short-term while tariffs
are regarded rather as long-term instruments (effect
of flexibility).
First o± all, the VER5 or OMAs are very attractive for
the United States or the EC to maintain their images in
the world trade arena as trading partners observing free
traQe principle. For example, the reason to choose VER or
OMA as protective measures was because American decision
makers taced the dilemma that tariffs or quotas would
hardly have been appropriate for a government promoting
tree trade in the world. The American answer to the
dilemma was to revert to a VER and OMA. Based on such
attractiveness ot VERs, the United States and the EC have
been expanding VER5 against imports from foreign
countries. According to a recent statistics, "these two
areas together have been responsible for almost 70 per
cent	 (US$96.5 billion) 0± NTMs on the basis of their
import values in 1985. Also, the share of imports
subject to VERs in the total imports subject to NTMs in
the EC expanded to 20.8 per cent in 1988 from 13.7 per
cent in 1986. Furthermore, the share in the United States
rose to 65.1 per cent trom 57.9 per cent during the same
period." 34 As a result, major advanced countries have
been imposing VERs or OMA5, based on their political
attractiveness, despite the economic costs of those
measures. These two tactors are tundamentally different
to David Yoffie's approach which highlights the
inetfectiveness 0± VER5 or OMAs in a standpoint of
exporter's cheating or upgrading strategy.
Thirdly, the proportion of VERs and OMA5 only represent
a minor part in total cases of import restraints adopted
by advanced countries. According to Table IV-20, the
number of VERs in the total of protective measures
adopted by six major countries in the 1980-1986 period
remained at 120 cases, representing 15.1 per cent of the
794 cases in the period.On the other hand, impositions of
AD duties accounted tor the lion's share of 68.1 per cent
in the same period.
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such phenomenon can be also round in protective measures
by the United States and the EC. The share of VERs
represented only 17.3 per cent of the total of 278
protective measures adopted by the United States.The
impositions 0± AD duties accounted for the largest share
with 4b.4 per cent. The EC's impositions of AD duties
also represented 63.2 per cent of the total cases.
However,the share of VERS was confined to 30 per cent.
Therefore, it is certain that the real effect of NTMs
imposed by advanced countries against imports from
developing countries have to be evaluated through
considering the impositions of AD duties, VERs and OMAs
altogether. The evaluation of the effectiveness of import
restraints through exclusive use of VERs and OMAs is
certain to result in biased conclusion. Therefore, his
approach is not useful to evaluate real effect of import
restraints against developing countries.
Table	 IV-20:Protective	 Actions	 under	 Alternative
Instruments (1980-1986)(number of cases, %)
Countries	 AD	 CVD	 Sateguard VER	 Total
Init.Impl. Init.Impl. Impl.
	
Impi.	 Impi.
Australia 416 138
	 20	 7	 4	 1	 150
Canada	 230 152
	
11	 4	 4	 7	 167
Chile	 -	
-	 140	 -	 -	 -	 -
EC	 280 122
	 7	 3	 10	 58	 193
Japan	 1-	 1	 -	 -	 6	 6
USA	 350 129 281	 96	 5	 48	 278
Total	 1277 541 460 110	 23	 120	 794
Share	 68.1	 13.9	 2.9	 15.1	 100.0
Source:Moekman, Bernard M. & Michael P.Leidy, "Dumping,
Anti-Dumping & Emergency Protection," Journal of World
Trade (October 1989),p.28.
Note : Impi: Implemented. mit: Initiated.
Through the broad analysis of determinants and
ef±ectiveness of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade in
Part One, I found three ±acts. Firstly, current studies
in the I p
 literature can not fully provide the whole
range or determinants tor protectionism in the EC-Korea
trade. Secondly, my three hypotheses, regarding i)the
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fear of a repetition of the Japanese trade and
development model,2) Korea's switching strategy of
exports from the United States to the EC, and 3)Korea's
strong neo-mercantilist policy approach and surplus
capacity problems in the EC, as determinants of
protectionism, are peculiarly applicable in the EC-Korea
trade. Thirdly, the EC's protective measures against
Korea have been very effective in reversing the growing
trends of Korea's exports to the EC market, supporting
Patrick Messerlin's approach. However, these three facts
must necessarily be supplemented with more detailed
analysis on individual industries in the EC and Korea.
Therefore, I will do industry-specific analyses of
determinants and effectiveness of protectionism in the
EC-Korea trade in Part Two.
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Followings are AD actions initiated in July/June period
since 1983/1984.
	
AUS CAN EC USA Other AC DC
	 Total
83/84 70	 26	 33	 46	 1	 0	 176
84/85 63	 35	 34	 61	 0	 0	 193
85/86 54
	 27	 23	 63	 2	 3	 172
86/87 40	 24	 17	 41	 5	 4	 131
87/88 20	 20	 30	 31	 9	 13	 123
88/89 19
	
14	 29	 25	 12	 14	 113
89/90 23	 15	 15	 24	 5	 14	 96
90/91 46	 12	 15	 52	 9	 41	 175
91/92 76	 16	 23	 62	 21	 39	 237
92/93 61	 36	 33	 78	 8	 38	 254
Source : Dodwell, p. 6
Note :AC=Advanced Countries. DC=Developing Countries.
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Chapter V.RC/Korea Textiles & Clothing Industries and the
Bilateral Trade Dispute on Polyester Yarn
A Brief Summary of Chapter V
BC's Textiles and Clothing Industries
The BC's textiles industry has been regaining its
competitiveness due to the successful modernization of
production facilities. Its productivity has also been
recovering as a result of the modernization measures.
However, the modernization resulted in job losses in the
Community. In the clothing industry whose production
process is mostly labour-intensive, the EC has been
dependent on overseas subcontracting production. As a
result,trade balance in the clothing industry is
inevitably recording a deficit figure and creation of job
employment in the BC is becoming very difficult. The low
consumption of textiles and clothing is resulting in a
decline in demands for textiles for clothing production,
inevitably leading to surplus production in textiles
sector and tight import restraints against foreign-made
textiles.
Korea's Textiles and Clothing Industries
Korea's international competitiveness, based on low
labour cost, can not be maintained indefinitely in
textiles and clothing industries, because advanced
countries, such as the BC, have been aggressively
promoting plant modernization projects to overcome their
competitive weakness by productivity improvement. Also,
other low labour-cost countries such as China, Pakistan,
India and ASEAN countries are actively marketing their
products overseas. In the clothing sector, Korea has been
squeezed between more advanced and lesser developed
countries. Korea is not in a position to overcome its
weakening position regarding price competitiveness in
low-quality clothing market against new, low labour-cost
countries, and also can not easily penetrate high-quality
clothing	 market	 due to	 the	 technical problems.
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Furthermore, in the process of democratization, the
productivity of clothing industry has been very low
following frequent labour disputes and absolute shortage
in skilled manpower caused by concentration of labour
forces in service industry.In addition, artificial
suppression of labour costs is no longer acceptable under
the more democratic regime. Also, under the democratic
regime, job losses will be much more difficult for the
government to deal with, compared to those under the
previous authoritarian regime.
Determinants of Protectionism in Textiles and Clothing
Trade
--Previous Cases of Import Restraints by the United
States
The EC's decision to impose AD duties against Korean
polyester yarn was based on the previous case of import
restraint by the United States. Specifically, the EC
rationalized its decision by arguing that the United
States has on several occasions adopted AD measures
cumulating with existing MFA restriction. Furthermore,
the diversion of Korean exports from the United States to
the EC are closely linked to the encouragement of
protectionism by the United States.Thus, it is clear that
stringent import restraints adopted by major trading
countries have a ripple effect, expanding those measures
to	 other	 countries,	 adversely	 affecting	 trading
environment world-wide. The EC's decision was
contradictory to its official position not to introduce
further quantitative restrictions under GATT or measures
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
--Political Expediency of Protectionism
The EC expanded its import restraints against Korea in
the 1980s, despite the EC's shortage of manpower in
charge of AD investigations caused by tight budget
problems. The expansion was mainly due to political
expediency of protectionism, and relative weakness of
Korea in the international political arena. The initial
heavy dependence on protectionism led ultimately to the
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computer error in calculating the provisional AD duties
for polyester yarn, increasing AD duties for two Korean
companies. After the computer mistake, the EC showed no
initial intention to correct a Commission Regulation in
order to change the AD duties imposed: an expression of
the bureaucratic environment in the EC. The ECC's
workload has been steadily increasing under the
difficulties of no additional employment due to the tight
budget problems, very likely the major factor causing the
mistake of EC's AD duties calculation.
--Concentration of Korea's Exports to Specific EC Member
States and Growth of Exports in a Very Short Period
Korea's exports of polyester yarns to the EC were
concentrated on Spain and Italy, shipping 84.5 per cent
of total polyester yarn exports to the EC to the two EC
member states in 1986. Korea recorded a dramatic increase
in shipments of polyester yarns to the EC in a very short
period, probably the result of the cut-throat competition
among Korean exporters to the EC market because the
provision of Korean government credit and administrative
support to private companies depends on their export
records under the nation's export-led development policy.
Effectiveness of Protectionism in Textiles and Clothing
Trade
--David Yof tie's Approach
David Yoffie's approach seems to be inapplicable in trade
between the United States-Korea, and Canada-Korea textile
sectors because Korea could divert its exports from the
North American market to the EC. Korea's exports of
textiles and clothing to the EC, however, has been
showing a declining trend since the exports peaked in
1988. The approach was also not applicable in AD case for
polyester yarns by the SC.
--Patrick Messerlin's Approach
His approach is totally applicable in the EC-Korea
textiles and clothing trade. The EC successfully achieved
its goal of reversing growing trends of imports from
Korea through adoption of VERS under MFA and AD measures.
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--Import Penetration and Its Impacts on Job Losses
The argument about the import penetration and its effects
on job losses is very controversial. Productivity and job
employment has an inverse relationship. If the EC tries
to improve productivity, it inevitably sees job losses.
Therefore, it is very difficult to separate out the
effect of import penetration on job losses, from the
effects of the EC's continued modernization of production
facilities in textiles, and those of offshore processing
in clothing. The EC's modernization of textiles and
clothing industries is ahead of Korea. However, the job
losses have a close causal relationship with pressures to
increase productivity because of foreign imports.
Therefore, inter-relationship between the job losses and
foreign imports can not be disregarded.
1. Background Information for Case Study in Textiles and
Clothing Industries
1-1. General Trend of World t s Trade in Textiles and
Clothing Industries
Textiles include textile materials, textile yarn (woolen
yarn, cotton yarn, yarn of man-made fibres), and textile
fabrics (silk fabrics, cotton fabrics, woven fabrics of
man-made fibres). On the other hand, clothing is divided
into knitted or crocheted clothes,and textile fabrics
clothes. Textiles and clothing industries have a crucial
importance to the development of a developing country,
e.g. Japan in the 1950s. As a result, fierce trade
conflicts have occurred in these sectors in connection
with development stages of each country and they
exemplify the graduation issue referred to earlier. David
Greenaway describes that "textiles and clothing sectors
are located on the first rung of the ladder for
industrialization and in consequence, developed countries
have faced competition from developing countries in the
industry." 1
 The active participation in the world trade
of textiles and clothing by developing countries can be
found in the trend of international trade. Namely,
international trade by intra-developing countries, and
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exports from developing countries to developed countries
in textiles accounted for 25.5 per cent of the world's
trade figure in 1989, and in the case of clothings for
43.5 per cent.
Table V-1:Major Flows in World Trade in Textiles (1989)
Transaction	 Values($1B) Share
Intra-developed countries 	 44.3	 46
Intra-developing economies
	 14.5	 15
Exports of developing economies to
developed countries	 10.4	 10.5
Exports of developed countries to
developing economies	 9.6	 10
World	 96.7	 100
Source:GATT(International Trade 90-91, Volume II),p 60.
Table V-2:Major Flows in World Trade in clothing (1989)
Transaction	 Values($1B) Share
Exports of developing economies to
developed countries	 39.7	 41
Intra-developed countries	 34.3	 35
Exports of developed countries to
developing economies	 3.3	 3.5
Intra-developing economies	 2.5	 2.5
World	 97.3	 100
Source:GATT(International Trade 90-91,Volume II),p 64.
The more active participation of developing countries in
clothing trade, rather than textiles,is due to
maintenance of their international price competitiveness
against developed countries because "garment-making
(cutting and sewing of fabrics or cloth) and hosiery and
knitwear are essentially labour-intensive areas, thus
giving developing countries an edge over industries in
developing countries. "2
Developing countries aggressively shipped their products,
with their price competitiveness, because there were no
other ways to dispose their surplus production figure.
According to the ECC,3
textile output in developing countries represented
only 90 per cent of their needs in 1965. However,
the share increased to 115 per cent in 1985. During
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the 1970s, Third World textile exports to
industrialized countries doubled overall and
quadrupled in the clothing sector. In the NIEs,like
Korea and Hong Kong--where the manufacture of run-
of-the mill dress can cost	 nearly 40 per cent
less than in Europe,the textiles industry is
producing two and a half times as much fibre as
the domestic markets can absorb.
Such active participation in international trade by
developing countries inevitably caused trade disputes
between developed and developing countries.4
As a result of the specific characteristic of textiles
and clothing industries, "the post-war history of
international trade in the sectors has been characterized
by increasing quantitative controls on trade by the major
importing countries." 5
 In 1961, a short term arrangement
regarding international trade in cotton textiles (STA)
was concluded under the auspices of the GATT. Kent Jones
points out:6
The STA represented the first major instances of the
abandonment of GATT principles--trade liberalization
and non-discrimination--in a dispute over trade in
manufactured goods. In a declining sector of the
established industrial countries, protectionist
sentiment was strong enough to override the
disciplines of GATT rules and focus trade
restrictions against individual countries that had
gained comparative advantage in the protected
goods.
In 1962, the STA was "replaced by the long term
arrangement regarding international trade in cotton
textiles (LTA), lasting until 1973 and in turn, was
replaced by the arrangement regarding international trade
in textiles, better known as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
(MFA), which is still in force." 7
 The MFA is the only
measure to restrict the international trade of textiles
and clothing under the recognition of the GATT even
though it overtly violates the GATT's principle of non-
discrimination, trade liberalization and most-f avored-
nation (MFN) treatment. Furthermore, it regulates imports
of the products from developing to developed countries,
not restricting those from developed to developed
countries.	 Therefore,	 "the fact that the Textiles
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Committee is located within the GATT building is as if a
brothel were operated inside a cathedral.'t8
1-2.EC's Textiles and Clothing Industries
In the EC, 9 "textiles and clothing are still at the
forefront of European industry. They employ 2.5 million
people in the EC, more than 10 per cent of the industrial
workforce." 10 Furthermore, individual EC member states
have been dominating the world's textiles and clothing
exports. Namely, five EC member states--Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg and France--topped the list of the
world's ten largest textile exporters in 1989. In
addition, Italy, Germany, France, Portugal and the United
Kingdom also included in the world's ten largest
exporters of clothings in the same year. 11 Despite the
significance of these industries to the EC and the strong
position of individual EC member states in exports, the
EC has faced many problems. The first was the sharp
inflow of foreign products to the EC market. "The tonnage
of textiles exported by the EC rose by 24 per cent
between 1977 and 1984, but imports rose by 38 per cent.
It is estimated that during the last 20 years, the share
of the EC market held by imports has grown from 20 per
cent to 45 per cent."12
The second problem followed as a direct consequence of
the first: pressure from imports forced EC companies to
equip themselves with more efficient production
facilities, which, though the measure contributed to the
growth of productivity, reduced the number of jobs in
the industry. According to the ECC's analysis, "a 1 per
cent increase in productivity results in the loss of
10,000 jobs a year in the textile sector and 15,000 jobs
lost in the clothing industry. Thus, over five years,
increased productivity of 3 per cent a year at a constant
production level will lead to an overall loss of some
375,000 jobs."13
High productivity in the EC entails slow job creation.
"The high rate of unemployment in the EC may be due to
the relocating of European jobs to low-cost countries
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elsewhere." 14 Namely, EC's production in textiles
increased by 56.3 per cent to 93,900 million ECU in 1990
from 60,062 million ECU in 1980. That is a sharp contrast
to the employment trend rather reduced to 1,500,000 in
1990 which is 449,000 less than the 1980's level of
1,949,000. The situation is similar in case of clothings.
EC's production in clothings in 1990 amounted to 38,100
million ECU, which is 72.8 per cent higher than 1980's
level of 22,044 million ECU. However, the employment was
reduced to 733,200,000 from 878,728,000. Furthermore, the
EC member states have difficulties to pursue a policy of
labour market deregulation, like the United States, due
to continental Europe's social democratic aspirations."15
For example, "France has been implementing a programme
for textile employment through reducing social security
charges on a sliding scale for firms that agree on
investment to maintain or better still create jobs." 16 As
a result, it is hard to draw out a pure effect of foreign
imports on job employment in textiles and clothing
industries in the EC.
Table V-3:Production, Employment and Consumption in EC's
Textiles and Clothing Industries(1M ECU,thousand persons)
Year	 Clothing	 Textiles
P	 EM	 C	 P	 EM	 C
1980	 22,044 878,728 24,562 	 60,062 1,949 61,305
1981	 21,754 807,298 24,253 	 62,049 1,845 62,229
1982	 23,539 761,735 26,314	 66,548 1,761 66,866
1983	 26,290 772,252 28,941 	 71,304 1,724 71,686
1984	 28,290 759,326 31,492	 78,158 1,696 77,992
1985	 30,830 747,253 33,741 	 82,490 1,633 82,125
1986	 34,156 843,166 36,993 	 83,862 1,605 83,390
1987	 35,854 833,004 40,253	 84,982 1,571 85,492
1988	 36,128 779,029 41,441 	 89,630 1,552 90,419
1989	 37,761 752,979 43,486	 93,467 1,528 93,716
1990	 38,100 733,200 N/A
	
93,900 1,500	 N/A
Source:ECC(Panorama of EC Industries), pp.16-7 and 16-12.
Note : P=Production. EM=Employment. C=Consumption.
The third problem for the EC is that the dependence on
imports in consumption of textiles and clothing has been
rapidly growing. This has become a threat to EC
manufacturers sharing the common problem of how to
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dispose of their production surplus. For example, EC's
dependence rate on imports of textiles in total
consumption rose to 17.4 per cent (16,286 M.EcU/93,716
M.ECU) in 1989 from 14.7 per cent(9,021 M.ECU/61,305
M.ECU) in 1980. The dependence rate on imports is far
higher in clothing than in textiles. The share of
imports in EC's clothing consumption went up to 27.4 per
cent(11,936 M.ECu/43,486 M.ECU) in 1989 from 18.7 per
cent(4,590 M.ECU/24,562 M.ECU) in 1980. The production
surplus problem has been further worsening as a
consequence of EC's low level of consumption. 17 That can
be made clear by comparison with other advanced
countries.
Table V-4:World's Textiles and Clothing Demand Forecast
(1,000 tons)
Countries 1986
	 1995	 2000	 Average Growth Rate
1986-2000 1995-2000
AC	 20,988 25,496 27,989 	 2.1	 1.9
	
(67.0)	 (58.4)	 (56.9)
Of Which
U.S.A.	 5,937	 7,139	 7,795	 2.0	 1.8
EC	 5,075	 5,927	 6,323	 1.6	 1.3
Japan	 2,246	 2,878	 3,350	 2.9	 3.1
W.Europe	 5,695	 6,971	 7,663	 2.1	 1.9
DC	 12,788 18,091 21,166 	 3.4	 3.2
	
(33.0)	 (41.6)	 (43.1)
World
	
	 38,776 43,537 49,155
	 2.7	 2.5
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Trade(Monthly Industrial Survey, Feb.1992),
p.79.
Note : AC=Advanced Countries.DC=Developing Countries.
The figures in parentheses are shares in world's
total demand.
Anong countries in the world, EC's demands for textiles
and clothing are forecast to be the lowest with only 1.6
per cent increase in the 1986-2000 period and 1.3 per
cent in the 1995-2000 period, which is far lower than the
world's average of 2.7 and 2.5 per cent in the same
period, respectively.
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A fourth problem has been caused by a complicated result
of the previous three problems. Namely, the EC
strengthened import restraints against foreign exporters
as a way to cope with the challenges in the midst of
declines in demands and increases in foreign imports. EC
manufacturers have been eager to raise price
competitiveness through the modernization of production
facilities. As a result, the EC's production continuously
expanded, contrary to the declines of production in other
advanced countries such as the United States and Japan.
Table V-5:EC's Textiles Production at Current Prices (iN
ECU,1985=100)
year\country	 EC	 USA	 Japan
1980	 60,062(73.0)	 28,687(48.0)	 24,698(55.0)
1981	 62,049(75.0)	 37,648(63.0)	 32,680(73.0)
1982	 66,548(81.0)	 40,756(68.0)	 32,688(73.0)
1983	 71,304(86.0)	 50,480(84.0)	 37,331(83.0)
1984	 78,158(95.0)	 59,840(99.0)	 42,819(95.0)
1985	 82,490(100.0)	 60,150(100.0)	 44,950(100.0)
1986	 83,862(102.0)	 48,607(81.0)	 43,321(96.0)
1987	 84,982(103.0)	 45,660(76.0)	 41,619(93.0)
1988	 89,630(109.0)	 45,896(76.0)	 45,626(102.0)
1989	 93,467(113.0)	 N/A	 N/A
Source:ECC(Panorama of EC Industries),p. 16-19.
As seen in Table v-5, production of textiles at current
prices in the EC increased annually from the value of
60,062 million ECU in 1980 to 93,467 million ECU in 1989.
The textiles production in the United States peaked in
1985 with 60,150 million ECU, which declined to 48,607
million ECU in 1986 and 45,896 million ECU in 1988. The
situation is the same in Japan with the largest
production in 1985 with 44,950 million ECU, which
declined again to 41,619 million in 1987. However, the
production activity in Japan recovered with an increase
of 9.6 per cent to 45,626 million ECU in 1988.
In the case of clothing, as seen in Table V-6, the EC'S
production also continuously increased for ten years from
1980, except for 1981 when the production figure
decreased slightly from 1980's 22,044 million ECU to
21,754 million ECU. EC's clothing production showed a
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72.8 per cent increase to 38,100 million ECU in 1989 over
the 1980's 22,044 million ECU. The increase in production
of clothing was a result of "specialization and product
differentiation strategies, coupled with flexibility and
the use of outward processing, rather than productivity
improvement in this sector which is highly differentiated
and subject to frequent innovation. Such strategies made
the European clothing industry able to maintain a high
degree of international competitiveness." 18 However, the
adoption of offshore production strategies by EC clothing
firms, especially German and British, resulted in job
losses in the EC's clothing industry. 19 Namely, "there is
an increasing trend for the Community manufacturers to
relocate some production of certain products or even all
production of part of their range to low wage countries.
This started earlier and has become more extensive in EC
member states where distribution is more centralized and
wages higher." 2 ° However, the ECC evaluates the trend
affirmatively as follows:21
The negative trend steadily recorded in the past few
years does not necessarily mean a weakening of the
sector. It partly reflects EC companies' growing use
of subcontracting in countries outside.
The production of clothing in the United States, however,
remained at a level less than that in 1981 with 29,679
million ECU in 1989.
Table V-6:Clothing Production in the BC and the United
States at Current Prices (1M ECU, 1985=100)
Year\Country	 BC	 USA
1980	 22,044(64.5)	 24,827(46.0)
1981	 21,754(63.7)	 33,756(62.5)
1982	 23,539(68.9)	 41,410(76.7)
1983	 26,290(76.9)	 46,445(86.0)
1984	 30,830(90.3)	 53,241(98.6)
1985	 34,156(100.0)	 53,998(100.0)
1986	 35,584(104.9)	 42,590(78.9)
1987	 36,128(105.8)	 25,947(48.1)
1988	 37,761(110.6)	 25,836(47.9)
1989	 38,100(111.5)	 29,679(55.0)
Source:ECC(Panorama of EC Industries,1991-1992),p.16-14.
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These four problems have contributed to job losses in the
EC's textiles and clothing industries.In addition, the
outward processing strategy by EC clothing companies
resulted in sharp inflows of clothing manufactured by
subsidiaries of EC companies in cheap labour cost
countries, and in sharp declines in employment in the EC
countries. 22
 I suggest that this caused the EC trade
balance to show a deficit in clothing sector as the Table
V-8 shows. At the same time, thanks to the various
strategies for strengthening international
competitiveness and raising productivity in EC's textiles
and clothing sectors, the EC's trade surplus in textiles
dramatically increased in the 1980-90 period, along with
an enormous decrease in trade deficit in clothing.
Table V-7:EC's Textiles Trade ($1M)
Year	 Exports	 Imports	 Balance
1980	 25458	 23722	 +1736
1990	 53432	 37346	 +16086
Growth Rate 109.9%	 57.4%	 826.6%
Source:GATT(Internat].onal Trade 1991-1992, Volume II),
pp.62-63.
Table V-8:EC's Clothing Trade ($1M)
Year	 Exports	 Imports	 Balance
1980	 15439	 20429	 -4990
1990	 37890	 38390	 -500
Growth Rate +145.4	 +87.9%	 -89.98%
Source:GATT(International Trade 1990-1991, Volume II),
pp.67-68.
Therefore, the EC's problems regarding textiles--mainly
job losses according to allegations of injury from the EC
industry--is caused by both the penetration of low-cost
imports into a Community market, and also by an increase
in productivity in EC firms through automation of
production facilities and outward processing activities.
The EC's efforts towards competitiveness by
modernization, and overseas subcontracting, did not
prevent job losses. Namely, "earlier studies of the
components of employment change in the United Kingdom and
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West Germany during the 1970s reached broadly similar
conclusions:that the biggest source of employment loss in
the textiles and clothing industries was productivity
growth." 23 Such productivity growth, however, was only
achieved because of the pressure of foreign producers.
Therefore, foreign imports and productivity growth have a
causal relationship with job losses.
1-3. Korea's Textiles and Clothing Industries
According to Yung Bong Kim,24
textile production has been one of Korea's most
important industrial activities. Korea's modern
industrial history began with the establishment of
textile plants in the 1910s. The textile industry
since then has led most of the other manufacturing
industries in contribution to GNP, employment
absorption, capital accumulation, and foreign
exchange earnings. In 1975, the industry accounted
for 13.4 per cent of Korean manufacturing industry
value added, and 23.8 per cent of employment.
Korea's textiles and clothing industries have been
showing some clear characteristic. Firstly,it is evident
that Korea has surplus production capacity, comparing
domestic production and demand.
Table V-9:Korea's Textiles and Clothing Supply and Demand
( $1B Won, %)
	
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 Growth
Supply (A)	 19398	 21407	 22560	 24491	 26.3
Of Which
Production(B) 17088	 18865	 19620	 20895	 22.3
Imports(C)	 2310	 2542	 2940	 3596	 55.7
Demand	 19398	 21407	 22560	 24491	 26.3
Of Which
Domestic
Consumption(D) 9070	 10866	 11273	 11466	 26.4
Exports(E)	 10328	 10541	 11287	 13025	 26.1
Supply
Surplus(A-D) 10328	 10541	 11287	 13025	 26.1
Import
Dependency
(c/D)	 25.5	 23.4	 26.1	 31.4	 23.1
Export Share
(E/B)	 60.4	 55.9	 57.5	 62.3	 3.1
Source:Korea	 Institute	 for	 Economics	 and
Technology(Monthly Industrial Survey, Feb.1992), p.85.
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Korea's textiles and clothing production surplus(B minus
D in Table V-9) in 1989 remained at 8,018 billion won.
However, the surplus went up to 9,429 billion won in
1992.
Secondly, the growth rate of exports has been less than
that of imports.Korea's imports increased by 55.7 per
cent during the 1989-1992 period which is far higher than
the export growth rate of 26.1 per cent in the period.
Consequently, the nation's import dependency ratio rose
by 23.1 per cent from 1989's 25.5 per cent to 31.4 per
cent in 1991. However, the nation's export share in total
production of textiles and clothing remained at an
increase of 3.1 per cent over the four-year period. That
is one indication that Korea is still highly dependent
upon imports of textiles raw materials such as raw cotton
which are not available locally, along with imports of
high-quality textiles from advanced countries such as the
EC and the United States, following several rounds of
import liberalization measures. Brian Bridges points
out: 2 5
EC exports to South Korea are likely to be affected
by the pace of the liberalization of the Korean
market and by the competitiveness of European
products in de-restricted sectors, as well as by the
extent to which the two traditional suppliers, Japan
and the United States, perceive and are allowed to
exploit the opportunities.
Table V-10:Korea's Textiles and Clothing Trade with the
EC($1,000)
Exports	 Imports
1990	 1991	 Growth	 1990	 1991 Growth
Textiles 500,453 485,603
	 -2.97	 238,607	 254,863 +6.8
Clothing
1,452,241 1,655,660 +14
	 363,664 409,267 +12.5
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Major Statistics
of Korean Economy 1992), pp.217-252.
Note:Trade figures before 1990 are not available. The
author has no intention to emphasize the bilateral trade
situation since 1990 with a bias because Korea has been
continuously maintaining trade surplus in textiles and
clothing trade with the EC.
231
Recent trends in textiles trade between the EC and Korea
is that Korea's imports from the BC are showing a sharply
increasing trend, along with a decrease in shipments of
textiles to the EC market, as seen in Table V-b.
However, shipments of clothing from Korea to the EC
market are still on the increasing trend, reflecting the
characteristic of clothing industry as labor-intensive
one, and the relative strength of price competitiveness
of Korean products.
However, textiles and clothing are now no longer Korea's
prime export items. These items were ranked the first in
the list of 10 largest export commodities in 1970 in
Korea with 40.8 per cent share in total export value and
with 36.2 per cent share in 1975. However, the share had
been gradually reduced to 28.6 per cent in 1980, 23.1 per
cent in 1985 and 24.8 per cent in 1987. Finally, the
textiles and clothing dropped down to the second largest
items, following electrical and electronics products
since 1988, as seen already in Chapters II and III.
Yung Bong Kim, in connection with the relative weakness
of export growth of textiles and clothing, argues:2'
So far, Korea's textiles industry, as a whole,
continues to be labor-intensive despite many changes
in its product composition. Accordingly, the average
elasticity of output for capital input appears to be
smaller than for labor input. Also, the relative
importance of the textiles industry in the Korean
economy has been declining. In addition, conditions
do not look too favorable for the future and the
expansion of the industry is expected to slow.
Consequently, Korea's textiles and clothing industries
are facing following problems.
Firstly, in the textiles sector, Korea's international
competitiveness, based on low labour cost, can not be
maintained indefinitely because advanced countries such
as the EC have been aggressively promoting plant
modernization projects to overcome the competitive
disadvantage in labour costs through productivity
improvement. Also, other low-cost countries such as
China, Pakistan, India and ASEAN countries are actively
marketing their products overseas. For example, labour
232
cost in textiles and clothing industries in 1987 in Korea
was £225 per month, which was far higher than £43.7 in
India, £23.3 in Indonesia and £56.7 in the Philippines.27
Furthermore,Korea has been squeezed between more advanced
and lesser developed countries in the clothing sector:
Korea is not in a position to overcome its weakening
price competitiveness in low-quality clothing against
that of new, low-cost countries and also can not easily
penetrate high-quality clothing market due to technical
problems •28
Secondly, the problem of Korea's clothing industry is
mainly due to its low investment in R & D activities.
Korea's R & D investment ratio in total turnover has been
merely held at 0.96 per cent which compares to 1.23 per
cent in Japan, 4 per cent in the United States and 5 per
cent in Germany and Italy.
Thirdly, in the process of democratization, the
productivity of clothing industry has been very low
following frequent labour disputes and absolute shortage
in skilled manpower caused by concentration of labour in
service industry.Furthermore, artificial suppression of
labour costs is no longer acceptable under the more
democratic regime, as I mentioned in Chapter II.
Korea's production of textiles and clothing is still in
the stage of labour-intensive production. If Korea wants
to regain its international competitiveness against cheap
labour cost countries, it must inevitably proceed to the
modernization of production facilities. However, under
the present democratic regime, job losses will be much
more difficult for the government to deal with than under
the previous authoritarian regime.
When the problems of EC and Korea's textiles and clothing
industries are compared, EC is certainly in a superior
position as a result of its successful production
facilities modernization and automation in textiles
sector, and international competitive edge of EC clothing
firms in high quality items.
2.Case Study of Polyester Yarn
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2-1. Introduction
In the EC-Korea trade, textiles and clothing are very
important because these sectors accounted for more than
20 per cent of Korea's exports to the EC market in the
1980-1990 period and represented the conflicts between
developed and developing economies seen from a standpoint
of structural adjustment issues. 	 In addition, the
modernization of industrial equipment, with its
consequential loss of jobs, prevents the successful
achievement of the EC's concurrent aims of improvements
in production and employment. Therefore, EC-Korea trade
disputes are expected to be more frequent if the
argument--that job losses in the EC are a direct result
of drastic inroads by foreign producers from rapidly
industrializing countries such as Korea--is believed to
be plausible in the EC.
Korea concluded LTA with the EC in 1971, and MFA in 1975
under which Korea restricts its exports of textiles from
natural fibre to man-made fibres (synthetic fibre such as
nylon, polyesters and acrylics) and clothing within the
limit of quotas agreed with the EC.
The first trade dispute between the EC and Korea occurred
in the area of textiles. In 1972, the EC announced that
it decided to initiate its AD investigation against
Korean acrylic fibres, which was followed by another AD
investigation against Korean acrylic stockings. These AD
investigations, however, were suspended as a result of
LTA and MFA applications in EC-Korea textiles and
clothing trade.
On the other hand, the EC initiated AD proceedings
against several textiles and clothing items from Korea
without regard to the EC-Korea textiles agreement,
concluded within the framework of MFA. These Korean
products included in the EC's AD investigations are
polyester yarn(imposition of definitive AD duties on
Dec.16,1988), polyester staple fibres (AD investigation
terminated without any suspicion to industrial damage),
and synthetic fibres of polyester
	
(imposition of
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provisional AD duties on July 16,1993). The polyester
yarn is the only case that the EC has been imposing
definitive AD duties, even though the product is included
in the category of textiles and clothing which are
quantitatively regulated under the Korea-EC textiles
argeement within MFA. Therefore, it is relevant to choose
polyester yarn as a representative case to analyze
determinants and effectiveness of protectionism in the
EC-Korea trade.
2-2. The Situation in the EC
According to Jose De La Torre and Michel Bacchetta,29
the essence of the EC's policy on textiles and
clothing has been based on two main tenets:
protection and the maintenance of internal
competition. The European Parliament also warned
that the Community textiles industry can remain
competitive and an efficient employer only if urgent
steps are taken to restrict the detrimental effects
of imports from low-cost countries.
Despite such policy direction toward protectionism in the
EC, there had been no actual adoption of import
restraints other than MFA by the EC against Korea until
1987 at the EC level because MFA restriction has been
effective since 1975.
Under the situation, Korea's exports of polyester yarn
{(polyester poy
 (NIMEXE 51.01.32) plus polyester textured
filament (NIMExE 51.01.29, 51.01.30)}, which had shown an
average shipments of merely 19 tons a year by 1985,
rapidly increased to 2,283 tons in 1986.
Table V-11:Korea's Exports of Polyester Yarn to the EC (1
ton)
Years\Items PTF	 Polyester POY Total Change
1983	 27	 0	 27	 --
1984	 12	 0	 12	 -55.6%
1985	 17	 0	 17	 +41.7%
1986	 1991	 292	 2283	 +134 Times
Total	 2047	 292	 2339	 --
Source: EUROSTAT(National Statistics).Korea Foreign Trade
Association(Case Study of Polyester Yarn), p.28.
Note : PTF=Polyester Textured Filament.
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The sharp increase in shipments from Korea happened to
coincide with EC's industrial reorganization and
restructuring through automation and modernization of
production facilities, contributing to accelerating the
decline in employment.
Surprised by the dramatic increase in shipments of Korean
polyester yarn in a very short period, the International
Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee (CIRFS), acting on
behalf of EC's complainant (ten polyester yarn
manufacturers in the EC), officially filed a complaint
with the ECC against Korean exporters of polyester yarn.
In the complaint, the CIRFS strongly argued "the market
penetration of dumped imports of POY and textured yarn
from Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey was increased from
2.1 per cent in 1983 to 10.4 per cent in 1986."°
Concerning prices by the Community producers, the CIRFS
also argued "falling prices--particularly since first and
second quarters of 1986--were essentialy due to the
increasing pressure of dumped imports from the countries
concerned by this complaint including Korea, but the
decreases go well beyond the fall in raw material cost
which resulted from decreasing oil prices."31
Other major reasons, given by the CIRFS, decisively
contributing to the filing of the AD complaint, were
sluggishness in production, increase in imports, decrease
in production capacity utilization, decrease in sales by
EC producers and decline of market share by the EC
producers.
Table V-12:Production of Polyester Yarn in the EC (1000
tons)
Year	 Tons	 Change
1982	 192
1983	 196	 +2%
1984	 202	 +3%
1985	 211	 +4%
1986	 201	 -5%
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.38.
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Firstly, EC's production of polyester yarn decreased by
4.7 per cent from 211,000 tons in 1985 to 201,000 tons in
1986. However, that was an increase of 4.7 per cent from
1982's 192,000 tons.
Secondly, extra-EC imports of polyester yarn increased by
73 per cent to 38,500 tons in 1986 from 1985's 22,253
tons.
Table V-13:Extra--EC Imports of Polyester yarn(1 ton)
Year	 Tons	 Change
1984	 18,287
1985	 22,253	 +21.7
1986	 38,500	 +73.0
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.37.
Thirdly, EC's capacity utilization rate declined by 2.4
per cent to 82 per cent in 1986 from 84 per cent in 1985.
However, the utilization rate in 1986 was far higher than
66 per cent recorded in 1982, as seen in Table V-14.
Table V-14:Capacity Utilization in the Production of All
Polyester Yarns (POY + Flat) in the EC(%)
Year	 Utilization Rate	 Change
1982	 b6
1983	 78	 +18
1984	 84	 +7.7
1985	 84	 0
1986	 82	 -2.4
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.34.
Note:In Poy production and in texturising, the rate has
certainly decreased by at least 10 per cent between
fourth quarter in 1985 and fourth quarter in 1986.
Table V-15:Sales of Textured Yarn in the EC (1000 tons)
Year	 Sales Volume	 Change(%)
1982	 153
1983	 160	 +4.6
1984	 159	 -0.6
1985	 172	 +8.2
1986	 165	 -4.0
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.35.
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Fourthly, sales of textured yarn in the EC reduced by 4.0
per cent to 165,000 tons in 1986 from 1985's 172,000
tons. However, the figure was 7.8 per cent higher than
1982's 153,000 tons, as seen in Table V-15.
Table V-16:Market Share by Community Producers(%)
Year	 Market Share	 Change
1982	 88.9
1983	 90.7	 +2.0
1984	 90.0	 -0.8
1985	 92.6	 +2.9
1986	 87.5	 -5.5
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.35.
Note:The figure in 1986 is that as of third quarter of
the year. The market share in fourth quarter of 1986 was
estimated to be dropped to the level below 80 per cent.
Fifthly, market share of EC producers declined by 5.5 per
cent from 1985's 92.6 per cent to 87.5 per cent by the
third quarter of 1986, as seen in Table V-16.
Sixthly, market share of imports from four countries
involved in pjj complaints rose to 12.275 per cent in 1986
from only 3.1 per cent in 1985. Especially, the market
share by Korea in the EC rapidly rose to 1.9 per cent in
1986 from the previous year's negligible level.
Table V-17: Market Share of Major Exporting Countries ir
the Ec(P0Y + Textured Yarn)(%)
Countries	 1985	 1986
Korea	 Negligible	 1.90
Turkey	 0.7	 3.94
Mexico	 2.0	 2.655
Taiwan	 0.4	 3.78
Total	 3.1	 12.275
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.36.
After receiving the AD complaint, the ECC decided to
initiate AD investigation and announced its decision in
the Official Journal of the European Communities on July
1, 1987. In the announcement, the ECC argues:32
The imports of the dumped products originating in
Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey primarily affected
the Italian, Belgian and the United Kingdom markets,
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where their aggregate market shares increased
respectively from 1.8 per cent, 7.8 per cent, and 4
per cent in 1983 to 17.5 per cent, 20 per cent and
11.0 per cent in 1986, alleging that injury has been
caused by massive dumped imports of the products
concerned over a relatively short period of time.
2-3. The Situation in Korea
Korea's argument was centered on the problems of
concurrent application of MFA and AD measures by the EC
and Korea's low market share in the EC market.
Korea's basic position against EC's AD complaint was that
Korea had not injured EC industry and the complaint by
the EC was in contradiction to international trading
norms. Korea's argument was that import restraints in
addition to MFA is incompatible under the GATT norm and
Korea's market share is negligible in the EC market, not
causing any industrial damages to the EC industry.
Under the position, the Korea Chemical Fibres
Association(KCFA) ,representing Korean polyester yarn
industry,submitted its opinion about the polyester yarn
case as follows:33
--The products under investigation are covered by
the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles (as extended by the GATT Textiles Committee
in July 31 1986) which provides that no trade
protective action may be taken unless the remedies
available under the MFA have been exhausted without
success.
--The MFA has been implemented by Korea-EC Textiles
Fabric Agreement signed in 1971, Korea-EC Textiles
Agreement in 1975 and by the Community through
Council Regulation (EEC) No.4136/86 of December 22,
1986 on Common Rules for Imports of Certain Textiles
Products Originating in Third Countries (OJE
387/42(1986)). Pursuant to this regulation, the
Community has negotiated a bilateral agreement with
Korea. Both Council Regulation (EEC) No.4136/86 and
the bilateral agreement between the Community and
Korea provide that the Community shall refrain, in
respect of the products covered by the Agreement,
from introducing quantitative restrictions under
Article XIX of the GATT or Article 3 of the MFA, or
from applying measures having equivalent effect.
--The Community and the Community's trading partners
have acknowledged on previous occasions that anti-
dumping measures are inappropriate in situations
where imports of a certain product are covered by
some forms of quantitative restriction.
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--The market share of Korean imports has
traditionally been small; no polyester yarn has been
exported to the Community in recent months and
present high domestic demand for polyester yarn
coupled to supply difficulties because of the recent
strikes and flooding's in Korea preclude injury in
the near future.
The EC had experiences of filing AD complaints in 1972
and 1974 against Korean acrylic fibres and acrylic
stockings, as seen above. Those products were not covered
in the LTA signed in 1971. However, the EC shortly
terminated the AD complaints against acrylic fibres and
stockings when the MFA, which includes most textiles and
clothing, was signed with Korea in 1975. With regard to
the compatibility of AD duties imposed on a product,which
is subject to quota restriction,the Australian Customs
Service(ACS), which is the government organization in
charge of dumping investigation in Australia, was on
neutral ground, saying that "a complaint of injurious
dumping in respect of goods imported under quota
restrictions would not be automatically rejected but
would be considered on its merits, and it would seem
difficult for the industry to demonstrate that the impact
of the price suppression or depression constituted
material injury where the volume of imports is limited by
a quota arrangement."34
However, there were some factors accelerating movement
toward protectionism in the EC. The first one is that
Korea's exports of polyester yarns were concentrated on
two EC member states--Spain and Italy, shipping 86.9 per
cent of polyester yarns in total exports to the EC market
to the two countries in 1986 and 87.9 per cent in the
first quarter of 1987, as seen in Table V-18. Italy and
Spain usually showed very strong pro-protectionist policy
against Korea for textiles and clothing sectors compared
to other EC member states. R.Hine explains external
policies of each EC member state against imports of
foreign textiles as follows:35
Views within the EC on textiles policy vary
considerably between countries with the U.K., France
and Italy advocating a retrictive approach, and
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Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark favouring a
more liberal regime. The former have argued
successfully that to cut protection, at a time of
recession would add to the pool of unemployment,
increase imports, destablize the home industry and
undermine its attempt to modernise.
in trade with Korea, Italy has been implementing import
restraints against Korean synthetic long textile yarns
and recycled long textile fabrics as recently as 1992,
that represents 66.7 per cent of its import restraints
against Korea numbering three cases. Spain 36 also has
been implementing 5 import restraints (two cases for
textiles) against Korea under the 115 Clause of Rome
Treaty.3
Table V-18:Korea's Exports of Polyester Yarn to the EC,
and Spain and Italy(1 ton)
1986	 1987(Jan-March)
TFY	 Poly.POY Total	 TFY Poly.POY Total
Total(A) 1991	 407	 2283	 1853	 318	 2171
Spain &
Italy(B) 1719	 372	 1985	 1602	 306	 1908
B/A	 86.3% 91.4%	 86.9%	 86.5%	 96.2% 87.9%
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), p.121.
Note:TFY=Textured Filament Yarn.
The second factor is that EC companies involved in this
case were those from Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain and
France (four German, three Spanish, one Irish, one
Italian and one French firms). They are influential
members in the decision making of the Council of
Ministers under the principle of qualified majority
mechanism. 38 For example, they can exercise their
influence over the decision of AD duties imposition at
their own in conjunction with one or two small EC member
states.
The third one is that Korea recorded a dramatic increase
in shipments of polyester yarn to the EC in a very short
period. Korea's exports showed an increase of 134 times
to 2,283 tons in 1986 from the 1985's minimal level of
shipments remained at 17 tons, as seen in Table V-li.
That was the major reason EC producers felt threatened in
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the Community market. That increase in exports by Korea
in a very limited period could well be a result of the
cut-throat competition among Korean exporters to the EC
market; As mentioned in Chapter II, Korean exporters were
eager to raise their export records because the
government's credit and administrative supports were
provided in accordance with their export performance.
2-4. EC's Decision
Despite Korea's strong resistance, the EC decided to
impose provisional AD duties on imports of polyester
yarn originating in Korea, along with those from Mexico,
Taiwan and Turkey.
Table V-19:EC's Provisional AD Duty Imposition against
Korean Polyester Yarn(%)
Companies	 Provisional AD Duties
Kohap Ltd.
	 8.1
Kolon Industries Inc.
	 5.7
Sam Yang Co.	 18.7
Tong Yang Polyester Co.
	 23.7
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Case Study of
Polyester Yarn), pp.171-180.
In terms of share in extra-EC imports in 1986(19,726
tonnes), Korea has the lowest figure of 11.6 per cent
(2,283 tons), compared to Mexico's 25.05 per cent (4,941
tons), Taiwan's 32.1 per cent (6,335 tons) and Turkey's
31.3 per cent (6,167 tons). Provisional AD duties on
Korean companies, announced on June 14,1988, were as seen
in Table V-19.9
In the provisional AD duties imposition announcement, the
EC Council of Ministers points out:°
Neither Community law nor international rules--
notably the MFA--prohibit the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, customs duties or any other measures
affecting imports subject to quantitative
restrictions, provided it is established that injury
has been caused despite the restrictions. Also,
substantial undercutting has occurred with regard to
imports into Spain and Italy--up to 35 per cent in
Italy and 41 per cent in Spain--in the case of
Korea, meaning the quantitative restrictions
introduced for these countries have therefore not
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protected them from unfair price competition nor
prevented injury.
The EC's decision, however, was contradictory to its
official position about import restraints against foreign
textiles and clothing:the EC promised "not to introduce
further quantitative restrictions under the GATT or the
MFA, or measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions" 41
 when it concluded agreements
with approximately 40 foreign suppliers to control the
imports from low-cost countries.
The EC rationalized its decision by quoting other major
trading parters' previous actions. Specifically, the EC
argued that "the United States has several occasions
adopted AD measures cumulating with existing MFA
restriction." 2 Thus, it is clear that previous examples
of stringent import restraints adopted by major trading
countries have a 'ripple effect' on others, progressively
worsening the trading environment worldwide.
However, the real problem of the EC's decision lies
elsewhere. The EC had made a major error in the process
of calculating the provisional AD duties as a result of a
computer mistake:AD duties for Korea's Samyang and Tong
Yang had been raised to 18.7 per cent and 23.7 per cent,
instead of the correct 3.4 per cent and 6.6 per cent,
respectively. After finding the EC's mistake, Van Bael &
Bellis, a Brussels-based law firm working for Korean
companies, sent a letter to ask for the amendment of the
AD duties on Aug.31 1988. However, the ECC sent a reply
to the firm as follows:'3
It appears that it is not possible for legal reasons
to correct a Commission Regulation in order to
change the amount of anti-dumping duties imposed as
requested by yourselves on behalf of two Korean
companies. Therefore, account will be taken of your
request before reaching final conclusions in this
proceeding.
The ECC's position was based on the fact that it was very
hard to recognize its error officially and the mistake,
if it is admitted, could be a damaging factor to the
credibility of its AD investigation procedure! As soon as
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it received the ECC's letter, Van Bael & Bellis again
strongly protested as follows:44
Needless to say the two Korean companies concerned
have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable
damage as a result of these mistakes, and as of the
date of publication of these high duties, orders for
these two companies from European importers have
dried up because it is indeed normal to expect that
importers who have a choice between several sources
of supply will not take the risk of buying from
companies with such high provisional anti-dumping
duties.
The law firm finally notified that "if the errors
affecting Tong Yang and Samyang are not corrected without
further delay, we will have no choice but to bring before
the Court of Justice an action for damages coupled with
an action for interim relief."45
Finally, the ECC recognized that certain calculation
errors have a significant effect on the provisional
calculation of certain dumping margins and duties with
regard to some Korean companies and announced its
Regulation {(EEc) No.2871/88 of 15 September 1988},
amending Regulation {(EEC) No. 1695/88} which imposed a
provisional AD duty on imports of polyester yarn
originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey.
Even though the definitive AD duties for Sam Yang and
Tong Yang reduced to 3.4 per cent and 4.1 per cent from
18.7 per cent and 23.7 per cent respectively(the
definitive AD duties for Kohap and Kolon were the same as
provisional AD duties), the two Korean companies incurred
enormous damages due to the erroneous calculations. In
case of Tong Yang, "since the imposition of the erroneous
AD duty, it has received no more than one order for
polyester yarn from a customer in the Communtiy. It
should be noted furthermore that this single order was
placed on 10 August 1988, on the basis of the assurance
given by Tong Yang that the AD duty would be corrected
before the shipment was made and that, therefore, the
rate of 23.7 per cent would not apply to this
shipment." 46
 Especially, Tong Yang lost many existing
customers	 due	 to the	 erroneous	 calculations of
244
provisional AD duties. The followings are three examples
of such cases:47
--The agent of a Spanish customer informed Tong Yang
that the imposition of an anti-dumping duty
resulting in the total cost of imports into Spain
(customs duty + anti-dumping duty) being raised to
32.7 per cent created a situation of 'force majeure'
and that this customer could not, under such
conditions, afford to buy the merchandise ordered
from Tong Yang.
--An Italian customer wrote that the high anti-
dumping duty and the 'precarious market conditions'
made the price offered by Tong Yang unacceptable for
him.
--The agent of French customers requested Tong Yang
not to ship the balance portion of an order made by
these customers.
The mistake by the ECC resulted from its chronic problems
of tight budget and its unclear distribution, reflected
in the manpower issues in the ECC, as I mentioned in
Chapter I. Especially relevant, the number of employees
working for pi duties-related department in the ECC was
only 70 (two employees per AD case, compared to six
employees per AD case in the United States).48
In the period of 1970-1979, EC's AD investigations
against Korean products numbered only 6 cases (average
case per year is 0.6). However, the number increased to
16 cases in the period of 1980-1989, and has already
reached 9 cases in the three years 1990-1992.
It follows that the workload of the ECC has been growing
as a result of a lower number of employees that is
necessary, due to the tight budget problems,this almost
certainly the cause of the mistake in EC's AD duties
calculation.
In sum, the actions of the United States--in imposing
import restraints in addition to quantitative
restricitons under the MFA--became a major factor in the
EC's adoption of similar protective measures against
Korea. However, the budget problem and its causal
relationship with the computer mistake challenges the
credibility of EC'S trade policy implementation method.
3. Determinants and Effectiveness of Protectionism in
Textiles and clothing Trade
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3-1. Determinants of Protectionism in Textiles and
Clothing Trade
The EC's decision to impose AD measures in addition to
MFA restriction had not been made for Purely economic
consideration. Firstly,whether or not EC member states
have trade surplus does not greatly influence the
determinants of protective measures against Korean
textiles and clothing. In general trade with Korea, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal,
Belgium, Greece and Denmark have been recording trade
deficits. Only, Italy, Germany, and France have been
enjoying trade surplus with Korea. France and Italy,
however, have been implementing very tight import
restraints against Korea even though they have general
trade surplus with Korea. On the other hand, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have not implemented
stringent import restraints against Korea despite their
trade deficits with Korea. In textiles trade, only
Belgium, Germany and Italy have been recording trade
surplus with Korea. Despite its surplus, Italy has also
been implementing very tough import restraints against
Korea.
The common point of EC member states favoring protective
measures against Korea in textiles and clothing sectors
is that their situation is one of chronic general trade
deficit with foreign countries, rather than that
specifically with Korea. Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Ireland and Denmark all enjoy trade surplus. On
the other hand, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the
United Kingdom and Greece all suffer trade deficits.49
Meanwhile, the polyester yarn case was also due to the
fact that dumped imports from Korea were concentrated on
Italy and Spain. The portion exported to Italy and Spain
accounted for 87.5 per cent of total Korea's polyester
yarn exports to the EC market in the 1986-1987(March)
period. These two countries have favored protective
measures against Korea in textiles sector as seen in
section 2-3 in this chapter. Therefore, the individual EC
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member states' influence on EC decision making process
gives some indications of the real determinants of
protectionism in EC textiles and clothing industries. In
addition, R.Hine argues increased imports from developing
countries have probably been only a relatively minor
source of textiles job losses in the EC, adding as
follows :50
Indeed, EC imports from other developed countries
(especially the United States) which were not
subject to quantity controls grew much faster than
imports from most developing countries during the
1970s. Much of the benefits from EC trade
restrictions under the MFA may have accrued to
manufacturers in other developed countries and not
to the EC interests which were supposed to be
protected.
Even though imports from developed countries to the EC
market have been growing, through the exploitation of
opportunities arising from import restraints against
'developing' countries, the EC implemented protective
measures only against 'developing' countries. That
reflects the weakness of 'developing' countries in the
international political arena.
Secondly, the U.S.AD measure against textiles and
clothing, in addition to MFA measure, encouraged the EC
to impose AD measure against Korean polyester yarn, as
seen in Section 2-4. Furthermore, the possibility that
Korea could switch its exports of textiles and clothing
to the EC market, due to import restraints by the United
States, spurred the EC's subsequent action. For example,
the conclusion of LTA between the United States-Korea,
and the EC-Korea occurred at different times. The United
States and Korea concluded the LTA in 1965. Six years
later, the EC and Korea concluded the same agreement in
1971.
Thirdly, the dramatic increase in shipments of polyester
yarn in a very short period, the concentration of exports
on the two protectionist markets--Spain and Italy, and
intense competition among Korean exporters in the EC
market functioned as major factors in the EC-Korea trade
disputes.
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However, the EC's AD measure against Korean polyester
yarn can be criticized on its unclear definition of the
'majority of EC industry's interest' regarding injury.
Korea's market share of polyester POY and polyester
textured filament remained at 0.51 per cent in the EC's
total consumption in the three quarters of 1986.
Furthermore, the share was negligible in 1985. Major
markets for Korea in the EC were only Spain and Italy,
each recording overall trade deficits with foreign
countries. According to KCFA, about "81.7 per cent of
polyester POY and polyester textured filament went to the
two countries in 1986, which rose to 87.89 per cent in
the first quarter of 1987."' In addition, it is a very
doubtful argument that EC industry, which is enjoying
87.5 per cent market share in the EC market along with 82
per cent of plant capacity utilization in this industry,
has been under threat by imports from Korea, whose market
share rose to only 1.9 per cent in 1986 from a
negligible figure in 1985. This raises some question on
how the injury to the EC industries in terms of plant
utilization, and majority of the EC industry, can be
defined. Therefore, it is not too much to admit that the
AD duties imposition was unavoidable even though Korea
provided very reasonable, comprehensive response against
EC's AD investigations.
The credibility of EC's AD policy was already evaluated
in Chapter 1(section 5-2-2-2). In addition to my view,
there are many criticisms about the credibility. Michael
Davenport argues "EC's regulations are drawn up in such a
way as to bias any dumping investigation, which is used
covertly as industrial policy, and any subsequent review,
in favour of a positive result, and the investigating
rules are set up generally to produce the desired
outcome, then either a definitive duty is imposed, or
negotiations with the exporting firm are opened to elicit
the appropriate response in the form of a price
undertaking or a VRA or both."52
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In connection with the high discretion in the AD decision
procedure in developed countries in textiles trade,
K.Koekkoek & L.Mennes point out:53
At present, it is not necessary for the
industrialized countries' producers to prove
that textiles imports from developing countries
are injurious to their industry for imposing
restrictive measures.
Therefore,initiations of AD investigations by advanced
countries are usually followed by imposition of VERS,
price undertakings or definitive AD measures. However,
there are some views supporting AD measures. For example,
David Dodwell quotes a view from a businessman in the EC
that "in a global economy full of distortions, AD
measures are the only recourse industry has."54
3-2. Effectiveness of Protectionism in Textiles and
Clothing Trade
As I mentioned in Introduction, my major concern in this
section is to evaluate the effectiveness of EC's
protectionism against Korea by analyzing changes of
Korea's export volume and value of commodities subject to
SC's import restraints. At the same time, I want to test
two completely contradictory analyses by David Yoffie and
Patrick Messerlin.
In the IPE literature, there are many studies about the
effectiveness of import restraints adopted by advanced
countries against imports of textiles and clothing on the
economy of importing countries. 55 Especially, many
studies are done on the effectiveness of protective
measures by the EC against foreign textiles and clothing.
Some scholars argue the SC has not been successful in
preventing job losses through restrictions against
imports from foreign countries, pointing out job losses
in the EC are mainly due to technological change, not due
to only inroads of foreign products to the EC market.56
R.Hine maintains:57
In the textiles and clothing industries, more than
a million jobs were lost between 1971 and 1981;
similarly, during the 1960s and 1970s more than 10
million farmers and farm workers left the land as
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employment in agriculture fell from 19 millions in
1960 to 9 millions in 1980. Most of the job losses
in the older industries are attributable to
technical change, reinforced by a slackening of
demand during the recession, rather than to inroads
made by foreign suppliers; indeed, in the case of
agriculture, the degree of self-sufficiency has
risen.
There are also studies that analyse cost and benefit of
NTMs in textiles and clothing sectors regarding EC member
states. 58
 Their conclusions are that costs to the
consumers are far higher than benefits to the producers.
As a result, they maintain that in case of NTM abolition,
the position is reversed.According to K.Koekkoek &
L . Mennes ,
depending on the assumption regarding the tariff
equivalent of 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05 per cent, global
welfare effects for the EC of abolishing the MFA is
$88 million to $374 million gains in case of
textiles and $172 million to $618 million gains in
case of clothing.The export gains for the MFA
countries consist of additional exports to the EC
due to an increase in import demand (demand effect),
plus additional exports to the EC because of
substitution for EC imports from other suppliers,
minus the rent losses. These gains amount to 1-2.5
billion U.s. dollars for textiles and 1-2.7 billion
U.s.dollars for clothing, depending on the
assumption regarding the tariff equivalent.
Table V-20:Welf are Effects for the EC of Abolishing the
MFA ($1M)
ATE	 Textiles	 Clothing
0.15	 0.10	 0.05	 0.15	 0.10 0.05
Cs	 1,594	 1,081	 549	 1,473	 983	 490
GR	 33	 27	 17	 183	 138	 78
NWG	 1,627	 1,108	 566	 1,656	 1,121 568
MRL	 -401	 -279	 -146	 -665	 -464 -243
OSL	 -852	 -613	 -332	 -373	 -275 -153
GWG	 374	 216	 88	 618	 382	 172
Source:Koekkoek, K.A. & L.B.M.Mennes(Liberalizing the
Multi-Fibre Arrangement), p.162.
Note:ATE=Alternative Tariff Equivalent. CS=Consumer
Surplus.GR =Government Revenue. NWG=National Welfare
Gain. MRL=MFA Rent Loss.OSL=Other Suppliers' Loss.
GWG=Global Welfare Gain.
Vincent Cable and Martin Weale also analyse costs and
benefits of MFA on British economy. According to them,6°
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protection of the textile industry through VER5
produced a drop in the level of real personal
disposable income of about two-thirds of 1 per cent.
To set alongside this drop is the gain in employment
of 125,000 by 1990 which can be attributed almost
entirely to the protected industries. Consumer
prices rise by 1 per cent in 1985 (1.5 per cent by
1990) and this derives from the increased cost of
imports which incorporates the economic rent from
protection. Protection reduces the economic welfare-
-personal disposable income--of British people, but
it benefits certain groups within the country, such
as workers in the protected industries.
In case of EC-Korea trade, it is not quite so easy to
evaluate the effect of EC's VER and AD measures against
Korean products in terms of costs and benefits of
protectionism. One way is to check whether or not the EC
is successful in achieving its goal of reducing growing
trends of imports from Korea through analysing the change
of export value by Korean companies to the EC market. The
EC concluded LTA with Korea in 1971 and MFA in 1975, the
latter is still in force. Therefore, I will compare
changes in Korea's exports after 1986 to compare the
effectiveness of MFA against Korean textiles and
clothing, and that of AD measure against polyester yarn
whose AD investigation initiated in 1987. Following table
shows Korea's exports of textiles and clothing under
import restraints by major advanced countries since 1986.
Table V-21:Korea's Exports of Textiles and Clothing to
Major Advanced Countries ($1000)
Countries 1986
	
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991
U.S.A.	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 3135329 2811022 2532205
Canada	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 424436	 383190 321951
EC	 1039791 1426393 1593041 1391872 1401361 1562442
Source:Korea	 Foreign	 Trade	 Association	 (Trade
Information, No.9, Vol.7, 1992), pp.67-68.
Note N/A=Not Available.
Korea's textile exports to the United States and Canada
show a marked decreasing trend, which is contrary to
David Yoffie's approach that developing countries face no
difficulties in increasing their exports to advanced
Countries despite some import restraints by those
advanced countries. Therefore, David Yoffie's approach
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may be inapplicable in this case because Korea could
divert its exports from the North American market(which
became increasingly protectionist) to the EC. Patrick
Messerlin's approach is rather more applicable in the
United States-Korea, Canada-Korea textiles and clothing
trade.
In the case of EC-Korea trade, Korea's exports to the EC
market increased by 11.5 per cent to $1,562,442,000 in
1991 from $1,401,361,000 in 1990. However, the export
level of 1991 is 2 per cent lower than that of the peak
in 1988. Korea's textiles and clothing exports dwindled
following the intensive AD investigations initiated by
the ECC in 1987 and 1988, numbering eight and six cases,
respectively, together amounting to fourteen of the total
16 cases initiated in the 1980s by the EC. Major textiles
items included in the AD investigation were polyester
yarn, polyester staple fibre and synthetic polyester
fibre.
In case of polyester yarn, the decline of Korea's exports
to the EC market was clearly dramatic.
Table V-22:Exports of Korea's Polyester Yarn to the EC
($1,000)
Year	 1988	 1989	 1990 1991 1992 1993	 1988-1992
Exports 2,537 2,973 918	 223 26	 0	 -2,511
Change	 +17.2 -69%	 -75% -88%	 -98.98(%)
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association (Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.113.
Note :The export figure in 1993 is for the period from
January to November in the year.
Korea's exports in 1988, when the EC imposed provisional
and definitive AD duties against Korean polyester yarn,
showed a good performance. The export trend was unchanged
in 1989. That is in contrast to general expectation that
the AD investigation itself would reduce shipments
immediately. However, the impact of EC'S AD duty measures
began to emerge from 1990, in which Korea's exports were
down by 69 per cent from 1989's level to only $918,000.
The decline of exports was more evident in 1992 with
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shipments remained at $26,000, down 88 per cent from the
previous year. The 1992's export figure represented a
decrease of 98.98 per cent over the 1988's export level.
Furthermore, Korea's exports of polyester yarn in 1993
(Jan-Nov) declined to zero. In addition, supply
difficulties caused by strikes in Korea, included in
KCFA's position paper, are likely to have something to do
with the success of the EC's AD measures because labour
disputes in Korea drastically increased since former
President Roh's Declaration of Democratization on June
29, 1987.Therefore, David Yoffie's approach is limitedly
applicabale to EC-Korea trade in case of MFA products.
However, the applicability of David Yoffie's approach in
the EC-Korea MFA case is doubtful when inflation and
price increase are considered. Korea's exports to BC in
1991 are lower than the 1988's level peaked, showing that
Korea's exports to the EC have problems in terms of
international price competitiveness. In case of AD
complaints, which represented lion's share of EC's import
restraints against Korean products, Korea's exports to
the EC have been facing very serious difficulties.
Therefore, Patrick Messerlin's approach is applicable in
the EC-Korea trade in case of MFA and AD measures. In a
word, EC's protective measures in textiles and clothing
have been causing increased costs both to EC consumers
and Korean exporters, casting doubt against the success
of aims of these protective measures.
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Chapter VI.EC/Korea Iron and Steel Industry and	 the
Bilateral Trade Disputes on Iron and Steel Products
A Brief Summary of Chapter VI
BC'S Iron and Steel Industry
The EC is the only exporter of iron and steel products,
among major developed countries, recording positive net
export figures presently and forecast to have positive
net exports in future. Such favorable trade performance
already existed in the EC t S textiles sector where the EC
has been recording trade surplus since 1980. The 1980s
was characterized in the EC by a steady process of
rationalization and reduction of production capacity,
which began at the end of the 1970s and caused major
cutbacks in employment. This restructuring process made
sizable productivity gains in the EC possible, and
allowed most EC firms to return to profitability. The
EC's coherent industrial policy in the iron and steel
industry greatly contributed to implementing
restructuring process through reduction of production
facilities and rationalization. However, that resulted in
employment loss in the EC industry.Major problem of EC's
iron and steel industry is a vicious circle of foreign
threats, especially unfair trade practice from eastern
European countries, provision of subsidies, production
cuts, and job losses. Therefore, the EC'S iron and steel
industry also confronts foreign threats and its causal
links with job losses, as seen in textiles and clothing
industries in chapter 5.
Korea's Iron and Steel Industry
Korea fostered its iron and steel industry as a strategic
sector under its heavy and chemical industry promotion
plan in the 1970s. Major measures include subsidies,
suppressed labour costs, shutting out of imports, etc. As
a result, the nation's exports of iron and steel
products, at $582 million in 1985, dramatically expanded
to $4,508 million in 1991. Korea's crude steel production
capacity also increased by 13.04 per cent to 26 million
tonnes in 1991 from 23 million tonnes in 1990. Korea's
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share in world crude steel production increased from 0.1
per cent in 1970 to 1.2 per cent in 1980 and to 2.3 per
cent in 1987. However, Korea's iron and steel industry is
still facing several problems. Firstly, Korea's steel
products are losing international competitiveness,
reflected in falling RCA ratios of those products.
Secondly, in the process of advanced countries recovering
their international competitiveness, the forecast of
frequent use of AD or CV duty mechanism by them is
expected to be a detrimental factor in Korea's efforts to
increase shipments to these markets. Especially
important, Korea's price competitiveness is forecast to
be weak, as basic import price rather than domestic
market price of exporters is applicable to the EC-Korea
trade as a method to calculate dumping margin in AD
investigation by the EC. The basic import price, based on
production costs of world's efficient producers, is far
higher than Korea's market price. Thirdly, Korea has to
rely totally upon imports of steel-making raw materials,
resulting in export performance absolutely influenced by
foreign suppliers of raw materials.
Determinants of Protectionism in Iron and Steel Trade
--A Causal Relationship with Import Restraints by the
United States
U.S. import restraints against EC steel exports to the
United States have encouraged the EC to take strict
measures against imports of the products from Korea.
Furthermore, the type of import restraints by the EC
against iron and steel products from Korea was copied
from that of the United States. Namely, the EC's basic
import price mechanism, applied to decide whether or not
dumping margins exist, was introduced in imitation of
Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) by the United States. The
TPM, implemented for the 1978-1982 period, induced
voluntary restraint from exporters by establishing a
system of dumping reference prices, sales below which
would lead to an investigation by the U.S. government
with the threat of further sanctions to follow.
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--Industrial Damages from Japanese Exports
The EC implemented VER in 1980 against iron and steel
products from Korea despite the fact that Korea's ability
to export declined in 1978 and 1979 as its indigeneous
demand took all the steel it could produce. Therefore,
Korea was sucked into trade disputes where the prime
problem was seen to be Japan's export success.
--Relationships of VERB with Threats to Impose AD Duties
The EC's basic import price mechanism also established
'fair value' reference prices below which an
investigation would be implemented. Because the basic
import prices were higher than Korea's domestic market
price, as seen above, Korean companies could not avoid
being subject to AD duty impositions if they refused to
accept VER with the EC. There were two precedents which
fully explain EC's practices in trade with Korea.
Firstly, the EC threatened to impose AD duties against
Korean steel plate in 1978, and finally suspended the AD
investigation, after receiving a promise from Korea to
conclude VER agreement with the EC. Secondly, the SC
threatened to initiate AD investigation against Korean H-
beam. This threat was also withdrawn after obtaining a
promise from Korea to conclude the agreement that H-beam
is exported under EC member-state quota restriction, in
addition to the EC-Korea steel agreement,
Effectiveness of Protectionism in Iron and Steel Trade
--David Yoffie's Approach
David Yoffie's approach seems to be inapplicable in the
EC-Korea iron and steel trade case because Korea could
divert its exports from the united States and the SC to
Iran, Thailand and Taiwan where there are no import
restraints against Korea. Korea's exports of iron and
steel products to the SC dramatically reduced to
$26,879,000 in 1989 from $64,795,000 in 1987. Also, the
strategic importance of iron and steel sector in the SC
has tended to negate potential conflicts of interests
among EC member states in this sector and resulted in
coherent industrial policy. Therefore, the EC iron and
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steel industry was relatively protected from domestic
decision making problems originating trom the complexity
of national interests of EC member states, compared to
other EC industries. Korea's exports of H-beam to the EC
market was so affected by the EC's threat of initiating
AD investigation that exports of H-beam to the EC reduced
from 23,033 metric tonnes in 1987 to zero in 1989.
--Patrick Messerlin's Approach
His approach is totally applicable in EC-Korea iron and
steel trade. The EC successfully achieved its goal of
reversing growing trends of imports from Korea by
implementing VERs and AD measures.
--Other	 Factors	 to	 Determine	 Effectiveness	 of
Protectionism
The effectiveness of import restraints was decided by the
international competitiveness of Korean products, which
were under import restraints by the EC, rather than the
effectiveness of measure itself. As the import restraints
by the EC were imposed on Korean iron and steel products
having a weakening international competitiveness, the EC
successfully protected its industry from import
penetration by Korea.
1.Background Information for Case Study in Iron and Steel
Industry
1-1.General Trend of World Trade in Iron and Steel
Industry
The iron and steel industry 1
 seems to be very unusual and
unrepresentative case for trade frictions between the EC
and Korea, considering a small number of trade disputes
compared to other industries, especially textiles and
clothing, and consumer electronics. However, this
industry is a representative sector in which the Korean
government provided all kinds of support measures to
promote this sector as a forefront runner of the national
economy. The EC also implemented a coherent EC-wide
industrial policy for iron and steel industry under which
enormous amount of subsidies is provided to EC steel
plants, that is far different to other EC industries.
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Therefore, this case is very important to examine the
interrelationships between policy supports, production
and trade trends and trade disputes between the EC and
Korea, despite the low number of trade conflicts.
The iron and steel industry has been a strategically
important	 sector	 in the	 general	 development of
manufacturing industries of developed countries.
Therefore, the protection of the industry, and resistance
to industrial restructuring, has been very strong. 2 In
addition, there have been strong lobbying activities by
industrial associations, such as the International Steel
Cartel founded in 1926, its successor, the European
Confederation of the Iron and Steel Industry (EUROFER),
and the International Iron and Steel Institute(IISI), for
the protection of iron and steel industry from external
competition. Robert Ballance and Stuart Sinclair describe
the characteristic of iron and steel industry and the
resistance	 to	 industrial structure 	 adjustment in
developed countries as follows:3
Starting around 1870, the steel industry in advanced
countries enjoyed a full century of growth and
expansion, spurred by the construction of vast
shipping fleets, railway systems and machines. By
virtue of its long-standing prominence, the
industry's history abounds with examples of interest
groups reactions to deep-seated structure forces and
efforts to alleviate adjustment pressures.
Table VI-1:Major Flows in World Trade in Iron and Steel
in 1989($1B, %)
	Value	 Share
Intra-Developed Countries	 57.7	 53
Exports of Developed Countries to
Developing Countries	 18.5	 17
Exports of Developing Countries to
Developed Countries	 8.2	 7.5
Intra-Developing Economies
	 5.3	 5
World	 108.6	 100
Source:GATT(Internatjonaj. Trade 90-91,Volume II),p.47.
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The majority of world trade in iron and steel industry
has been on an intra-developed countries basis,
accounting for 53 per cent of total value. Exports from
developed to developing countries also accounted for 17
per cent of total trade figure in the world. Exports of
developing economies to developed countries, however,
remained at 7.5 per cent of the total figure. Following
this world-wide trend in iron and steel trade, it is
forecast that trade disputes in this sector could mainly
occur between North-to-North trade, in addition to North-
to-South trade.
The world trading order in iron and steel sector, was
maintained within the mechanism centered on VER5, signed
between the United States and foreign suppliers to the
U.S. market, until March 31, 1992. However, the
international order was drawn into uncertainty following
the United States' suspension of all VERs concluded with
foreign steel exporting countries, announcing its
intention to invoke AD and CV duty investigations against
unfair trading practices by foreign exporters after April
1,1992	 Major reasoning behind the suspension of the
VERs was the improvement in trading environment for
U.S.steel industry, strengthening its international
competitiveness. 5 For example, Beliweather Efficiency 6 of
the United States is only 5.3 hours, compared to 5.4
hours of Japan, 5.6 hours of the United Kingdom and
Germany, 6.4 hours of Korea, 7.2 hours of Taiwan and 8.9
hours of Brazil. Especially important, exports of iron
and steel products by the United States, which had
formerly been less than 2 per cent of total iron and
steel production, had grown to about 8 per cent (6.3
million tonnes) of total production in 1991 with imports
reduced to 15.741 million tonnes in 1991 from 1990's
17.162 million tonnes.
In the production of iron and steel products in the 1950-
1970 period, there are two clear phenomena. One was the
rising share in total production of Japanese and NIBs
steelmakers and the other was the declining share of EC
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from 26 per cent and that of developing nations and
NIC5 to 23 per cent from the only 14 per cent.
Especially, the latter countries enjoy lower wage
bills, more modern plant, sometimes better access to
raw materials and can sell their products more
easily on an almost stagnant world market where
increasing competition is forcing prices down.
When world demand and production is compared, the United
States and China have production level less than their
demands, and the EC, Japan and Korea have excessive
production figures, greater than their demands--the EC
having the highest production surplus with 13 million
tons. The EC, therefore, has the same problems as Korea
in finding overseas markets for its production surplus.
The international trade outlook for iron and steel
industry is not so bright. Major iron and steel trading
countries such as the United States and the EC are moving
to provoke AD or CV duty impositions, switching from
emergency import restrictions based on GATT XIX which
were followed by VER5, in case their industries recovered
competitiveness and showed productivity improvements
sufficient to meet international competition. In the case
of AD or cv duty investigations, it takes at least one
year to complete such procedures and impose pertinent
duties against foreign products. It follows that the EC's
and the United States movement towards suspension of
their bilateral VER agreements with foreign suppliers
means that their iron and steel industry was restructured
successfully, and that their international productivity
was greatly improved.
In addition, there is a sharp confrontation between the
EC and the United States concerning public aid and
subsidies for the iron and steel industry. The EC is
strongly against the imposition of CV duties on products
receiving public aid and subsidies, because large amounts
of subsidies are provided to the EC industry. 8 However,
the United States argues that subsidy-receiving products
have to be subject to CV duties to protect the U.S.steel
industry from negative effect of imported products
manufactured at lower cost following aid and subsidies
from their governments.9
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1-2. EC's Iron and Steel Industry
In the EC,"the steel industry occupied a strategic
position in the economic development. Until the Second
World War, the EC member states produced 40-50 per cent
of world steel and accounted for about 80 per cent of
world trade." 1 ° The EC has been showing outstanding
performance in international trade and is forecast to
show the best trade activities in the near future.11
Table VI-3:World Steel Trade Forecast(1 million tonnes)
Countries	 1980	 1985	 1989	 1995	 2000
	
USA Exports	 3.8	 0.9	 4.2	 5.6	 7.2
	
Imports	 13.8	 21.6	 15.7	 15.2	 12.3
	Net Exports -10.0	 -20.7	 -11.5	 -9.6	 -5.1
	
JAP Exports	 29.7	 31.5	 19.9	 15.3	 11.3
	
Imports	 1.2	 2.9	 7.3	 11.0	 14.1
	
Net Exports +28.5	 +28.6	 +12.6	 +4.3	 -2.8
	
EC Exports	 33.0	 39.1	 25.0	 20.0	 16.1
	
Imports	 12.6	 10.2	 5.8	 8.8	 11.4
	
et Exports +20.4	 +28.9	 +19.2	 +11.2	 +4.7
Deve loping
Countries
	
Exports	 11.1	 23.1	 36.4	 60.0	 52.9
	
Imports	 43.8	 41.6	 52.4	 48.7	 50.2
	
Net Exports -32.7	 -18.5	 -16.0	 +11.3	 +2.7
World
	
Exports	 99.6	 129.1	 118.0	 133.0	 147.0
	
Imports	 100.1	 125.3	 115.0	 133.0	 147.0
	
Net Exports -0.5
	
+3.8	 +3.0	 +0	 +0
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade
(Long-Term Demand Prospects for Major Steel Products),
p.63.
Note:Values in 1995 and 2000 are forecasted figures.
The EC is the only exporter of iron and steel, among
major advanced countries, maintaining positive net export
figure at present and expected to still have positive net
exports by 2000.In terms of ferrous metals, the EC's
production since 1980 increased annually from 68,209
million ECU in 1980 to 96,344 million ECU in 1989.
However, employment in the sector was reduced from
1,094,000 in 1980 to the only b46,000 in 1989.
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Table VI-4:Production and Employment in Terms of Ferrous
Metals(1M.ECU, 1000 persons)
Year	 Production	 Employment
1980	 68,209	 1,094
1981	 70,727	 1,009
1982	 72,948	 941
1983	 73,012	 910
1984	 84,155	 844
1985	 89,716	 796
1986	 79,190	 745
1987	 74,903	 693
1988	 87,099	 657
1989	 96,344	 646
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.3-2.
The ECC points out this contradictory phenomenon as
follows :12
The 1980s were characterized by a steady process of
rationalization and reduction of capacity, which
began at the end of the 1970s and caused major
cutbacks in employment. This restructuring made
sizable productivity gains possible, and allowed
most EC firms to return to profitability.
Therefore,EC's productivity in iron and steel sector was
successfully recovered by the restructuring process, even
though it resulted in employment loss.
Table VI-5:Trade Performance of Major Iron and Steel
Producers in 1990 ($1B)
Countries	 Exports	 Imports	 Trade Balance
Germany	 15.1	 12.0	 +3.1
Bel/Lux	 9.5	 3.9	 +5.6
France	 9.0	 7.8	 +1.2
Italy	 5.9	 6.9	 -1.0
United Kingdom	 5.4	 4.8	 +0.6
Netherlands	 3.2	 4.1	 -0.9
Spain	 2.7	 2.6	 +0.1
USA	 3.5	 10.7	 -7.2
Japan	 12.5	 4.6	 +7.9
Korea	 3.6	 3.4	 +0.2
Source:GATT(International Trade 90-91, Vol.11), p.48.
In EC's production of ferrous metals, six member states
account for 87.4 per cent of the total. They are Germany
(31.2 per cent of the total), Italy (18.8 per cent),
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U.K.(15.5 per cent), France (14.2 per cent) and Belgium-
Luxembourg(7.7 per cent). These six countries represent
EC's iron and steel industry with only Italy recording a
trade deficit in this sector. 13 Their combined trade
balance is $9.5 billion surplus,which is $1.6 billion
higher than Japan's at $7.9 billion, $16.7 billion higher
than the United States' $7.2 billion trade deficit, and
$9.3 billion higher than the $0.2 billion trade surplus
recorded in Korea, as seen in Table VI-5.
Therefore, it is forecast that trade disputes in ferrous
metal sector will occur between developed countries--EC,
Japan and the United States--rather than disputes between
developed countries' declining and developing countries'
rising industries. The impressive production and trade
performance by the EC in iron and steel industry is also
recognized by the statistics of the ECC in Table VI-6.
Table VI-6:Iron and Steel Production and Trade (1 million
tonnes)
Year	 EC	 USA	 JAP	 World Total
1980
Production 127.7(17.8)	 104.0(14.5) 111.4(15.5)
	
718.6
Exports	 22.2	 3.2	 22.6	 140.0
Imports	 9.0	 9.7	 1.0	 140.0
Trade
Balance	 +13.2	 -6.5	 +21.6	 +0
1988
Productionl37.1(17.2) 	 92.7(11.6) 105.7(13.3)	 797.0
Exports	 21.0	 1.6	 17.7	 114.3
Imports	 9.7	 15.3	 6.4	 116.4
Trade
Balance	 +11.3	 -13.7	 +11.3	 -2.1
1989
Production 139.0(17.8) 	 88.0(11.2) 108.0(13.8) 	 783.0
Exports	 14.0	 4.0	 20.0	 N/A
Imports	 8.0	 4.0	 7.0	 N/A
Trade
Balance	 +6	 0	 +13	 N/A
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.3-7.
Note :Production is based upon crude steel. Exports and
imports are also based upon finished products. The
figures in parentheses are shares in world's total
production.
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The EC is the only iron and steel producing bloc to
record a continuous growth of production from 127.7
million tonnes in 1980 to 137.1 million tonnes in 1988
and to 139 million tonnes in 1989. The EC is also the
only region whose share in world total production of iron
and steel remained at the same level between 1980-1989
with 17.8 per cent.
The EC's successful restructuring and modernization of
steel and iron industry became a major reason for the
favorable	 production and	 trade performance,several
factors contributing to this su.ccess. it.tt'j', tXe. C
provided systematic support to the iron and steel
industry under the ECSC Treaty (Paris Treaty) to expire
in 2002. "Steel is the only industrial sector in which
the Commission and the Community in general have
developed a coherent policy and this policy has been in
operation for some years.1115
Secondly, there was a consensus among major steel
producers in the EC to "ask strongly for external
protection and internal stabilization measures. Germany,
which was arguing that the problems in steel industry was
cyclical and not structural, and opposing to state
control either at the national or the Community level,
also went along with the Commission for unilateral
measures in iron and steel industry."16
Thirdly, "the modernization and restructuring was
reflected in a number of mergers and acquisitions.
Therefore, more than half of EC crude steel production in
1989 was produced by only six steel companies."17
Fourthly, EC'S high GNP growth shown in the 1980s,
peaking in 1988 with 3.8 per cent compared to the only
0.5 per cent in 1982, greatly contributed to the growth
of EC steel industry. Particularly, the boom in the EC
steel industry in 1988 and 1989 was mainly fostered by
the strong growth of steel consuming industries such as
mechanical engineering, motor vehicles and construction.
According to the Korea Iron and Steel Association
(KISA) ,18
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the EC recorded a steady growth of crude steel
production since 1987 with growth rate in 1989
reaching at 1.5 per cent. Also, surplus capacity in
the EC was successfully reduced since 1980 with
capacity reduction as of 1989 totaling 42 million
tonnes (capacity utilization rate of 85 per cent).
Many iron and steel producers in the EC recorded a
good business record. In case of Ilva, an Italian
steel company with crude steel production share in
total EC production recording 8.1 per cent, achieved
$100 million net profit in iron and steel business.
Also, Unisor-Sacilor (a French company with crude
steel production share of 16.4 per cent) and British
Steel Corporation (10.2 per cent share) recognized
as the most efficient steel production companies in
the world in terms of production cost.
Fifthly, "the ECSC budget is adopted each year in
accordance with the procedures laid down in the Paris
Treaty, and is distinct from the general Community
budget. Therefore, the Commission has no budget
constraint to retrain redundant workers, interest relief
grants toward modernization, research and so on."9
Despite the successful modernisation in iron and steel
industry,the EC has been worrying about the prospects of
EC's iron and steel industry due to following reasons:20
Firstly, there has been a reduction in the tonnage
consumed which has affected all industrial
countries. This is due to recession-related
production cuts carried out in a number of steel-
based industries and to a decrease in the quantity
of steel required to produce a given product.
Secondly,there has been a substantial increase in
production levels in newly industrializing
countries, resulting not only in their breaking into
Community markets but also in a reduction in EC
producers' share of the international market, where
large quantities are often dumped at prices that
bear no relation to production costs.
This anxiety in the EC, made worse by the concern over
exports to other markets such as the United States, has
caused the EC to take strict measures against imports of
iron and steel products from NIE5 including Korea.
1-3.Korea's Iron and Steel Industry
"Korea's iron and steel industry employs over 65,000
people and accounted for 1.6 per cent of the national
economy in 1987 which was a significant improvement from
its 0.3 per cent share in 1970. Korea's annual crude
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steel production capacity is 26 million tonnes as of
1991." 21 Therefore, Korea ranked eighth largest crude
steel producer in the world in 1989, seventh largest in
1990 and sixth largest in 1991. As a result, Korea's
share in world crude steel production increased from 0.1
per cent in 1970 (0.5954 M tonnes/595.4 M tonnes) to 1.2
per cent in 1980 (8.558 M tonnes/715.6 M tonnes) and to
3 per cent in 1990 (23.125 M tonnes/769.99 M tonnes). The
nation's crude steel production capacity is forecast to
increase to 32.8 million tonnes in 1993 and 33.8 million
tonnes in 1996.22
Such a strong development of Korea's iron and steel
industry is indebted to two factors--one political and
the other economic.Politically, the U.S.plan of reducing
the level of U.S.troops in South Korea by one-third made
the policy-makers in Korea realize the necessity of
fostering its own defense industry base in iron and steel
industry. Economically,Korea felt the necessity to
diversify its export items, centered on primary and light
industrial products, into heavy industrial and chemical
items to tide over fierce import restriction from foreign
countries. Under the political and economic pressure,the
Korean government carried out an ambitious economic
structural diversification plan to change an agriculture-
based economy to that of industries such as steel,
automobile and machinery through a series of five-year
economic development plans. As a result, Korea's
industrial structure changed as seen in Table VI-7.
Table VI-7:Korea t s Industrial Structure(%)
Year	 Agriculture	 Mining &
	 Social
Fishery &	 Manufacturing	 Overhead
Forestry	 Capital &
Others
1970	 26.0	 22.4	 51.6
1980	 14.6	 31.0	 54.4
1987	 11.4	 31.5	 57.1
Source:Korea Iron and Steel Association(The Iron and
Steel Industry in Korea), p.2.
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The nation's industrial structure diversification plan
contributed to enormous growth of iron and steel
industry. Especially, the Korean government provided the
iron and steel sector with various supports such as
subsidies, suppressed labour costs, shutting out of
imports, etc., considering its strategic importance to
other major industries such as defense, shipbuilding and
automobile industries.
As a result, the nation's exports of iron and steel
products of only $582 million in 1985, were increased to
$2,457 million in 1986, $2,921 million in 1987, $3,846
million in 1988, $4,298 million in 1989, $4,237 million
in 1990 and $4,508 million in 1991! However, Korea's
self-sufficiency rate (production/domestic
consumption+exports) has remained stable, at 83.4 per
cent in 1991 and 87.9 per cent in 1992, as seen in Table
VI-8, still depending upon imports of iron and steel
products equivalent to 12.1 per cent of total consumption
in 1992.
Table VI-8:Korea's Iron and Steel Production & Trade(1000
tonnes ,
	
P	 IM	 DOC	 EX	 SSR
1991	 28,025	 5,564	 26,253	 7,336	 83.4
1992	 32,800	 4,400	 29,900	 7,400	 87.9
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Technology (Monthly Industrial Survey, Feb.1992), p.68.
Notes :P=Production. IM=Imports. DOC=Domestic Consumption.
EX=Exports. SSR=Self-Sufficiency Rate.
Korea's steel production future is forecast to be bright
because major domestic steel-consuming industries such as
shipbuilding and auto manufacturing have been playing a
pivotal role in promoting the country's rapid economic
development. The RCA ratios 23 of Korea's ships and boats
and passenger cars are showing rising trend. That means
those industries have international competitiveness
relative to other exports and maintain high levels of
consumption	 for	 domestically-made iron and steel
products,	 even though such consumption could be
encouraged by shutting out of imports.
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However, this bright prospect has been overshadowed by
several difficulties currently facing Korea's steel
industry. First of all, Korea's steel products are losing
international competitiveness, reflected in falling RCA
ratios of those products. Especially, newly emerging
developing countries with cheap labour costs have been
strong competitors against Korea which is struggling with
labour disputes during the period of transition from
authoritarian to democratic regimes. For example, Korea's
labour cost per month in iron and steel industry in 1987
was £433.6, which was far higher than India's £88.09,
Indonesia's £45.09 and the Philippines' £101.3.24
Secondly,Korea has been wholly dependent on imports of
raw materials for manufacture of its iron and steel
products. Therefore, Korea's export performance is
absolutely influenced by foreign suppliers of raw
materials. 25 Korea's production and exports are likely to
face a very unstable situation if there were some supply
problems in the world's raw materials market for iron and
steel products.
Table VI-9:Korea's Demand and Supply of Iron and Steel
Products(1980-1990)(1,000 metric tons)
Year	 Demand	 Supply	 Changes
DD	 EX	 TO	 DP IM	 TO	 in
Inventory
1980 5115	 3581	 8696	 7852	 1999	 9851	 1155
1981 b781	 4410 11191 10115	 2008 12123	 932
1982 6492	 5275 11767 10858	 1195 12053	 286
1983 7801	 5366 13167 12089	 2023 14112	 945
1984 9408	 5473 14881 13427	 2801 16228	 1347
1985 10020	 5239 15259 13931	 2547 16478	 1219
1986 10434	 5597 16531 15308	 2525 17833	 1301
1987 13642	 5743 19385 17507	 2873 20380	 995
1988 14519	 6262 20781 18887	 2730 21617	 836
1989 16946	 6448 23394 21756	 3407 25163	 1769
1990 20087	 6792 26879 24535	 4421 28956	 2077
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Korea and the
World,1991), p.20.
Notes :DD=Domestic Demand.EX=Exports.TO=Total.
DP=Domestic Production. IM=Imports.
Thirdly,Korea's export performance has been always behind
the production capacity expansion. Korea's exports of
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iron and steel products increased by 89.9 per cent for
the 10-year period from 1980's 3,581,000 metric tonnes to
1990's 6,792,000 metric tonnes, as seen in Table VI-9.
However, the production capacity rose by a hefty 212.5
per cent to 24,535,000 metric tonnes in 1990 from the
only 7,852,000 metric tonnes in 1980. Thus, Korea has
been suffering a chronic surplus capacity and a
continuous accumulation in inventory level of the
products. That could lead to increases in dumped exports
by Korean companies to dispose of surplus production, and
so cause trade disputes with importing countries.
Fourthly, frequent uses of AD or CV duty imposition
mechanisms by major steel importing countries are
expected to be a detrimental factor affecting Korea's
desire to increase shipments of iron and steel products
to those markets. Such a trend is more likely in advanced
countries working towards recovering their international
competitiveness. Korea's major iron and steel export
markets are Japan and the United States, rather than the
EC. Therefore, the U.S. action to impose AD duties
against Korean iron and steel products could be a
decisive factor contributing to sluggishness of Korea's
exports of iron and steel products.
In sum, Korea has to export low-and medium-priced iron
and steel products. However, it has been losing its
international price competitiveness and facing strong
import restraints by major importers. Korea has to import
high value iron and steel products and raw materials for
finished iron and steel products. The total dependence on
imports of steel raw materials makes Korea's steel
production very unstable, affected by the supply
situation of those raw materials.
Through my brief analysis of iron and steel sector, it
can be found that the EC and Korea have several problems
in common. Firstly, Korea has had difficulties in
penetrating into the EC and the U.S.markets following the
suspension ot Voluntary Restraint Arrangement(VRA) and
threats by the EC and the United States to initiate
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investigations for the impositions of AD and CV
duties.However, this situation is the same as faced by
the EC, which is having problems exporting iron and steel
products to its largest export market--the United States-
-atter the suspension of EC-US steel agreement. For
example, the United States initiated in 1992 a total of
38 cases of AD and CV investigations against iron and
steel products from the EC, which represented 40 per cent
of total investigations by the United States (94 cases).
Secondly, Korea and the EC are under similar pressure to
develop alternative markets for their iron and steel
products to compensate loss of exports to the United
States (for the EC) and to the EC and the United
States(for Korea). The EC's major export markets--USSR
and Eastern European countries--are in danger of economic
collapse and their demands for the EC steel are forecast
to decline. Korea also has a necessity to diversify its
export markets from Japan and the United States to other
markets under the uncertainty in the world trading
environment of iron and steel products.
2. Case Study of Iron and Steel Products
2-1. Introduction
Trade disputes in iron and steel industry between the EC
and Korea began during the 1970s. The 1970s was a period
of great contrast for the EC and Korea, as seen in Part
One. In case of the EC, the 1970s was the manifest crisis
period for steel industry. According to the ECC,26
the EC saw a drop in crude steel output in the
period, which fell by 20 per cent between 1974 and
1981 (from 15b million tonnes to 125 million
tonnes). Also,there was a slump in prices, which
fell by 50 per cent between 1974 and 1977, before
being stabilized by Community measures. There was a
sharp cutback in the number of jobs in the steel
industry from 792,000 to 549,000 between 1974 and
1981(-31 per cent). There were considerable
financial losses. Problems of industrial
productivity have been coupled with those created by
overcapaci ty.
The sluggishness in iron and steel sector was further
aggravated by low growth in the main customer sectors
such as metal products industry, mechanical engineering,
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electrical machinery, transport equipment and
construction. Also, the emergence of new producing
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, China and Korea became
a very critical issue in the Community, considering the
importance of iron and steel industry to the EC
representing a share of 3.9 per cent of total
manufacturing production in the EC in terms of ferrous
metals.
In Korea, the 1970s was the period when heavy industry
and chemical industry development plan had begun in
earnest. Under the plan, the Korean government promoted
import substitution in selected major industries such as
iron and steel by means of tax concessions and the
allocation of preferential credits. Also, market
diversification plan to increase overseas markets beyond
the United States and Japan was extensively carried out
through the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA),
established for the purpose in 1964, as mentioned in
Chapter II. As a result of the plan, iron and steel
products, which were not included in the list of the
nation's top ten export items in 1961, ranked ninth in
1970, third in 1975 and also third in 1989, even though
their position dropped to sixth in 1990. Spurred by the
export market diversification plan, Korea's exports of
iron and steel products to the EC amounted to $574
million in 1989, representing 7.8 per cent of the
nation's total exports of $7,394 million in the year to
the EC market (fifth largest export item). The market
share of iron and steel products in Korea's total exports
to the EC in 1989 was 50 per cent higher than previous
year's share of 5.2 per cent. The relative sluggishness
in EC's iron and steel industry, and Korea's aggressive
marketing strategy for iron and steel products became the
source of bilateral trade disputes between the SC and
Korea.
2-2. The Situation in the SC
The ECC describes the SC's industrial policy in iron and
steel products as follows:27
27g
The Community's steel policy is a coherent set of
measures, some aimed at restoring financial
viability to steel companies, others at helping the
industry to adapt to meet new market requirements by
1985. Conversions of steel regions to other
industries and retraining of workers must also be
assured.
The EC has been maintaining a coherent industrial policy
in iron and steel industry. On production, tithe
Commission imposed compulsory restrictions on production
and deliveries of some products like heavy plates and
sections in 1980 in the context of a manifest crisis and
this quota system has been prolonged for a year and
extended to include wire rods, thus covering about 80 per
cent of Community steel production."28
On external trade,"the ECC also established an import
monitoring system in 1977. Since January 1,1978, the ECC
has published at regular intervals import reference
prices(or basic import prices), calculated on the
production costs of firms in the most efficient exporting
countries. This system is used to trigger Community's AD
measures when steel is imported at below the reference
prices(basic import prices). In trade with Korea, the EC
applied the reference price system since December
30,1978." 29 Under the system, the EC started AD
investigations against imports of Korean steel plates in
1977. To maintain traditional steel trade flows, the SC
has also entered into co-operation agreements with its
trading partners. Since 1978, these arrangements have
been renewed each year with the major steel exporting
countries.
The ECC was still anxious that "a number of European
steel plants are old and ill equipped to face competition
from new steel producers in countries such as South Korea
and Spain." 30
 Under the serious concerns for the EC steel
industry, the ECC had been seeking fundamental measures
to solve the problems in iron and steel industry. Major
measures were conclusions of VERs with major steel
suppliers to the EC market.
Since the signing of VER with Korea in 1980, the EC's
iron and steel industry was dramatically changed. The
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successful modernization of the industry since the 1970s
led to large capacity cuts and important productivity
gains, and allowed European companies to take advantage
of the favorable economic climate in the late 1980s,
returning to profitability. Even though exports of iron
and steel products were declined by 54 per cent to 6
million tonnes from 13 million tonnes in the 1980-1990
period, apparent consumption and production rose by 27.9
per cent and 17.2 per cent in the same period,
respectively. On the other hand, employment declined by
36 per cent in the period, indicating EC's productivity
had improved measurably in the period. Therefore, the
EC's industrial policy in iron and steel industry
contributed to the growth of productivity and decline in
employment. Furthermore, import reference price system
and VERs in iron and steel products were also conducive
to the successful implementation of industrial policy
through the management of foreign threats.
Even though the EC's iron and steel industry has been
under productivity improvement and coherent industrial
policy, it still needs more production cut and has to
face business recession and foreign threats. First of
all, the major problem in the EC is a vicious circle of
foreign threats, especially unfair trade practices from
eastern European countries, provision of subsidies,
production cuts and job losses. In this process, some EC
member states are tempted to "renationalize their steel
sectors through subsidies. In addition, some problems can
be found in EC-wide industrial policy in this sector. For
example, Spain has still not received EC approval for
controversial plans to subsidize new steel-making
capacity, in exchange for cuts elsewhere." 31 Therefore,
the EC'S iron and steel industry also confronts foreign
threats and its causal links with job losses, as seen in
textiles and clothing sectors in Chapter V.
In trade with Korea, EC's exports of iron and steel
products to Korea remained at $289.631 million in 1990,
representing only 7 per cent of $4,090 million imported
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by Korea. The EC's share in Korea's iron and steel market
was thus far lower than Japan's 37.0 per cent and the
united States' 20.3 per cent. It was almost the same as
Brazil's market share in Korea's total imports of iron
and steel products. Therefore, the EC is now in a
position to raise its market share in the Korean market
as a strategy to overcome its difficulties in facing
tight import restriction from the United States and
declines of demands from the USSR and Eastern Europe.
2-3. The Situation in Korea
A major characteristic of Korea's steel industry was the
wide fluctuation of production. In years when new plants
were completed, the supply of crude steel surpassed the
domestic demand. As a result, Korean steel producers had
tne burden of production surplus.
In 1974 and 1976, Korea's iron and steel exports markedly
increased as a result of completion of the first plant of
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) in 1973 and its
second plant in 1976. Also, the subsequent completion of
POSCO's third and fourth plants contributed to expanding
the nation's exports for the 1979-1981 period. Further,
another steel company, Kwangyang Integrated Iron and
Steel Company(subsidiary of the Posco), completed its
first and second plants in 1987 and 1988, raising Korea's
steel exports for the 1988-1989 period. However,the
nation's exports of iron and steel products recorded
declines in 1978, 1985 and in 1990 when no new plants
were set up, despite huge export growth from $620 million
in 1977 to $4,508 million in 1991.
The fluctuation of the nation's steel production
capacity, and growth and decline in exports, resulted in
trade disputes with foreign countries, especially with
the EC, despite the fact that Korea's self-sufficiency
rate remained at 83.4 per cent in 1991 and international
competitiveness of iron and steel products, in terms of
RCA ratios, has been weakening continuously. For example,
Korea was not in a position to fully exploit the quota
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limit set under Korea-EC VER measure, as seen in Table
VI-lo.
Table VI-1O:Korea's EC Quota Utilization Rate (%)
Years	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Utilization Rate 23.4
	 55.7	 55.8	 50.5	 6.7
Source:Korea Iron and Steel Association(Korea-EC Steel
Consultations Working Paper, March 7,1990), p.11.
The Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade
(KIET) explains "this low utilization rate was a result
of drastic shipments from low-cost countries such as
China, Mexico and Brazil, and decline of international
market price of iron and steel products."32
Table VI-11:Intra-and Extra-Area Trade of the EC in Iron
and Steel ( 1990 )($ 1B , %)
EC t s Exports	 EC's Imports
Value	 Share	 Value	 Share
Intra-EC	 Intra-EC
Trade	 33.8	 65	 Trade	 33.9	 74.5
Germany	 8.1	 15.5 Germany	 8.6	 19
France	 6.7	 13	 France	 5.8	 12.5
Italy	 4.3	 8.5	 Italy	 3.6	 8
Netherlands 3.5
	 5.5	 Netherlands 2.6	 5.5
Bel/Lux	 3.5	 6.5	 Bel/Lux	 7.7	 17
U.K.	 3.2	 6	 U.K.	 3.1	 7
Spain	 2.0	 4	 Spain	 1.7	 3.5
Extra-EC	 Extra-EC
Trade	 18.3	 35	 Trade	 11.6	 25.5
USA	 3.1	 6	 Sweden	 2.2	 5
Switzer
-land	 1.6	 3	 Austria	 1.7	 3.5
Sweden	 1.2	 2.5	 Switzer-
land	 0.7	 1.5
Austria	 1.1	 2	 Finland	 0.6	 1.5
USSR	 1.0	 2	 Norway	 0.6	 1.5
Iran	 0.7	 1.5	 Brazil	 0.5	 1
Norway	 0.6	 1	 Yugoslavia	 0.5	 1
Korea	 0.28b	 0.6	 Korea	 0.145	 0.3
Source:GATT(International Trade 1990-1991, Volume II),
p.49.
In addition,Korea's effect on share in SC's iron and
steel market is really negligible. Korea's share in EC's
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total imports remained at 0.3 per cent, with EC's exports
to Korea confined merely to 0.6 per cent, as seen in
Table VI-li. EC's iron and steel trade is wholly
dominated by intra-EC destinations which reflect the
successful implementation of the Community-wide
industrial policy in iron and steel sector within the
guidelines of ECSC. The intra-EC trade in iron and steel
sector(69.75 per cent) was far higher than the average
figure of intra-EC trade in total, confined to less than
60 per cent.
Table VI-12:Bilateral Trade in Iron and Steel between the
EC and Korea ($M)
Years	 Korea's Exports	 Korea's Imports	 Balance
1988	 447	 527	 -80
1989	 119	 342	 -223
1990	 145	 286	 -141
1991	 133	 588	 -455
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade Industry(Korea-Ec Trade
Expansion Committee Meeting Paper, March 15, 1990), pp.
58-59.
Note:The figures include exports and imports of iron and
steel products which are under and not under Korea-EC
steel agreement.
Especially, bilateral trade in iron and steel sector
between the EC and Korea has been in favour of the EC, as
seen in Table VI-12. This trade gap in favor of the EC
has been widening continuously, reflecting a worsening in
international competitiveness of Korea's iron and steel
products.The EC's share in Korea's iron and steel exports
is very minimal, in 1990 for example, at only 7 per cent,
higher than Iran's 4.9 per cent, Thailand's 3.6 per cent
and Taiwan's 3.4 per cent, but far lower than Japan's
37.0 per cent and the United States' 20.3 per cent, as
seen in Section 2-2. This fact--Korea's export share in
the 12-nation EC market is only slightly higher than that
in Iran,Thailand or Taiwan--means that Korea's export
potential to the EC market is still wide open, as well as
implying that EC's import restraints was so stringent
that it was very difficult for Korea to penetrate the EC
market.
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Even though Korea has been recording trade deficit with
the EC in iron and steel sector, it can not be
disregarded that Korea's exports has been expanded in
specific period, following its expansion of production
facilities. In addition, the development of Korea's iron
and steel industry has been implemented with aggressive
government support as one of strategic industries. These
could cause big threats and precautions to the EC
industries which are under the situation of disposing of
surplus production, and the danger of job losses caused
by cheap foreign imports.
2-4. EC's Decision
In connection with trade disputes in iron and steel
industry with Korea, the EC implemented import monitoring
system with the application firstly of reference prices
(basic import prices:BIP) and secondly VERs.
The EC began AD investigation against Korean steel plate
in 1977. However, it terminated the investigation on
Jan.24, 1978 on the grounds that it was not necessary to
introduce additional import restrictive measures as the
VERs were etfective against exports of Korean iron and
steel products to the EC market. Just before the
announcement of the AD investigation suspension, the EC
and Korea had already started bilateral negotiations on
iron and steel trade on January 18,1978. The EC's
intention to begin AD investigation and later adopt VERs
had been disclosed by following document:33
All steel imports coming in at unreasonably low
prices will be subject to an anti-dumping duty that
will bring prices up to a reasonable minimum. The
anti-dumping system will be enforced in the first
instance for three months from 1 January 1978.
During that period, the Commission hopes to
negotiate voluntary limitations of imports with the
non-EEC suppliers. The aim is that in this way
traditional trade patterns will be as little
disturbed as possible. Commission negotiations along
these lines have already been successful in relation
to a number of third country steel exporters.
Considering the above document, the following is found as
background reasoning for the EC's decision to suspend AD
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investigation into Korean steel plates and instead
implement VERs.
Firstly, the AD investigation had been initiated as the
preliminary stage for VERs with major suppliers. Namely,
the threat of AD duty imposition was necessary to induce
the next VERs to the direction which was most beneficial
to the EC.
Secondly, the AD investigation would take time before a
final decision was made, which was likel y to be
contradictory to the interests of the Community
producers. Therefore, conclusion of VERs was more
effective, and efficient, in reducing uncertainty of
external factors.
Thirdly, the EC had already received favorable response
from the Korean government regarding participation in
bilateral talks to limit its shipments of iron and steel
products to the EC market. The VER satisfies both sides.
The EC could eliminate the poor image of being a
protectionist region of the world, with Korea also in a
position to be seen not to hold to unfair trading
practices.
The next decision by the EC was the conclusion of VER5
with Korea. After several years of negotiation, the EC
and Korea concluded an agreement in 1980 under which
Korea promised to export iron and steel products within
the limit of 218,000 tonnes a year to the EC market. The
annual quota amount was gradually increased to 224,000
tonnes, then 23b,000 tonnes and finally 243,000 tonnes.
However, there were still problems in bilateral trade of
iron and steel products even though they were subject to
VERs between the EC and Korea. Specifically, the EUROFER,
an association of EC national organizations, whose
members represented approximately 90 per cent of total
steel production in the EC member states, filed an AD
complaint in 1987 against H-beam(certain broad flanged
section, CN 7216.3300, NIMEXE 73.11-12), exported by
Korea's POSCO and Union Steel Manufacturing Company. The
major reason given of AD complaint was that they had been
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exporting H-beam below basic import price agreed between
the EC and Korea.
In the AD investigation, for the calculation of dumping
margins, the ECC compared the BIP of the EC with Korea's
export price, rather than the list price(LP) of similar
products, offered by Thyssen of Germany, British Steel
and Usinor-Sacilor of France. Before the date of AD
complaint, Korean H-beam makers were quite, or fairly
safe from AD complaints from the EC because they had been
allowed to export H-beam to the EC market with price
flexibility around the LP rather than the BIP applicable
to other suppliers with no bilateral agreements concluded
with the EC. However, Korean H-beam could not
indefinitely avoid AD complaints if the EC would apply
BIP rather than LP with some price flexibilities in
investigation into Korean H-beam, due to the high level
of BIP over Korea's domestic market price. The Korean
government sought to draw out another agreement with the
EC to get concessions in H-beam export to the EC market.
Finally, the EC and Korea agreed to set an additional
quota system at individual EC member state level, rather
than at EC level, for H-beam shipped from Korea to the EC
market, as seen in Table VI-13. Thus, the EC decided on
Feb.11, 1988 that it would not continue AD investigation
on Korean H-beam.
Table VI-13:Individual EC Member States' Import Quotas of
H-Beam from Korea(1 tonne)
Years	 1988	 1989
Total Quota
	
13,000	 20,000
of which
Germany	 5,000	 6,000
U.K.	 3,000	 4,500
Others	 5,000	 9,500
Source:Korea Iron and Steel Association(Korea-EC Steel
Consultations Working Paper, March 7,1990), p.5.
There were several intentions behind the announcement of
AD investigations by the ECC against H-beam from Korea.
Firstly, the AD investigation was a gesture by the EC to
draw more concessions from the Korean side. Because the
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ECC applied BIP mechanism, rather than LP mechanism with
some price flexibilities, the EC was in a position to
easily find dumping margins. As a result, the threat of
AD investigation against Korean H-beam could more easily
make Korean exporters agree with alternatives suggested
by the EC. The Korea Iron and Steel Association (KISA)
argued that all cases could be subject to AD duties by
the EC if the EC initiates the AD investigation through
comparison between BIP and export price.34
Secondly, the EC regarded the VERS against Korean H-beam
at the EC level was not sufficient to protect the
Community H-beam industry, resulting in the intention to
set individual EC member state quota system to prevent
concentration of shipment to specific member states.
Thirdly, the ECC fully exploited the real effect of AD
investigation which would cause big costs to exporters.
It was ironic that the ECC criticized AD measures by
other countries because of these costs to exporters and
implemented these measures itself. According to the
ECC,35
it is little wonder that the Community steel
industry regards with trepidation President Carter's
promise to U.S.steel producers 'aggressively' to
enforce anti-dumping laws. Even if, in the end,
dumping is unproven, exporters can be faced with
heavy costs during the investigation by the
U.S.authorities. The protectionism implicit in the
move can have serious repercussions on world trade.
It is contrary to the principles of GATT and both
the Community and Japan have expressed their
concern.
Literally, Korean exporters, even though dumping were
unproven in the end, still faced heavy costs during the
investigation by the EC authorities, with exports of H-
beam totally suspended.
After the applications of the import monitoring system in
the 1970s and the VERs in the 1980s, the EC finally
decided to remove the VERs against Korea, such decision
based upon brighter prospects for EC steel industry. The
ECC forecast its steel industry by 1995 as follows:36
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As far as the mid-term prospects for the development
of EC steel industry are concerned, it can be said
that they are much more favorable than they were
some years ago. The reason for this positive
assessment is especially the expected overall
economic growth for the EC of more than 3 per cent
annually tor the period 1988 to 1994. Thus, EC's
steel production will rise by 5 per cent to 1995
from the 1988's level.
And so, the EC decided to exclude Korea from the list of
countries subject to VERs concerning steel imports, the
decision taken by the EC member states meeting within the
Council on 5 March 1990. Following excellent production
in iron and steel in the EC, the BC suspended VERs signed
with Korea. Followings are reasons why the EC suspended
its VER:37
Firstly, there was a continued increase of crude
steel production thanks to the corresponding growth
of steel demands in the Community since 1987. In
case of 1989, the growth rate of crude steel
production reached 1.5 per cent as compared with
that in 1988.
Secondly, the EC successfully reduced its steel
production capacity by 42 million tonnes since 1980,
contributing to raising its plant utilization rate
to the level of 85 per cent.
Thirdly, there was a success in management of the
Community steel makers. In case of Ilvas, its net
profit amounted to $100 million.
Fourthly, there was an improved productivity of the
Community steel makers. In case of British Steel
Corporation and Usinor, they have been chosen as
companies whose production cost is the cheapest one
in the world.
Jean-Francois Bellis, a Brussels-based lawyer working for
Korea Foreign Trade Association (KFTA), explains the
effect of suspension of VER5 against Korea in a report to
the KFTA as follows:38
The effect of this exclusion is that steel imports
from Korea will be treated on the same basis as
imports from all other countries which are not
subject to the VERS. Quantitative restrictions will
accordingly not be applied to imports of steel from
Korea. It should, however, be noted that since, from
now on, the normal system is applicable to imports
of steel from Korea, these imports are exposed to
anti-dumping or anti-subsidy proceedings. While the
VERs was in force with regard to Korea, these trade
protective measures were not used.
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His explanation is supported by the present situation
regarding protectionism in the world trade of iron and
steel products. Namely, the United States, since the
suspension of its bilateral agreements with Korea on
March 31, 1992, began to use its AD investigation
mechanism in a total of 91 cases of foreign-made iron and
steel products, as seen in Table VI-14. The EC member
states represented 44 per cent (40 cases) in the total
number of AD and cv duty investigations by the United
States(91 cases). Furthermore, France, Germany and Korea
are countries, filed by AD and CV duty investigations
by the United States, in hot-rolled carbon steel plates,
cold-rolled carbon steel flat plates, corrosion resistant
carbon steel products and cut-to-length carbon steel
plate all at the same time.
Table vI-14:u.s.AD and CV Duties Complaints for Foreign
Iron and Steel Products(number of cases)
Countries\Items HRCS
	 CRCS	 CRCSP	 CLCSP
Belgium	 2(1AD,1CV) 2(1AD,1CV)	 2(1AD,1CV)
France	 2(	 "	 ) 2(	 u	 ) 2(1AD,1CV) 2(	 '	 )
Germany	 2(	 "	 ) 2(	 ) 2(	 "	 ) 2(	 "	 )
Italy	 2(	 "	 )	 2(	 )	 2(
Neth.	 1(1AD)	 1(1AD)	 2(
Spain	 2(1AD,1CV)	 2(	 )
U.K.	 2(	 "	 )	 2(
Korea	 2(1AD,1CV) 2(1AD,1CV) 2(1AD,1CV) 2(1AD,1CV)
Japan	 1(1AD)	 1(1AD)	 1(1AD)	 1(i.AD)
Others	 9(2AD,7Cv) 10(6AD,4CV) 10(5AD,5CV) 10(7AD,3CV)
Totals
21(9AD,12CV) 26(15AD,11CV) 17(9AD,8CV)27(16AD,11Cv)
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Trade Information,
July 15,1992), p.19.
Notes :}IRCS=Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Plates.
CRCS=Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Plates.
CRCSP=Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Products.
CLCSP=Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate.
The EC also followed the previous case of the United
States: the EC filed an AD complaint against Korean
stainless steel rod in October, 1991. It was the first
time since 1980 that the EC officially initiated its AD
investigation against Korean iron and steel products.
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Again, a previous case of import restraint by the United
States strongly influenced the EC to initiate AD
investigation against Korea.
Along with the bright prospects for BC'S iron and steel
industry, the EC's decision to suspend VER with Korea was
also based on following factors. First of all, Korea had
been losing its international competitiveness in the iron
and steel sector. Therefore, imports from Korea had not
been a big threat to the EC industry. Korea's low quota
utilization rate to the EC market, as seen in Table VI-
10, fully reflects the weakness of international
competitiveness of Korean products in the BC market.
Secondly, the EC has still been applying VERs with
Eastern European countries and Brazil. These countries
were the sixth and seventh largest exporters of iron and
steel products to the EC market, holding 1 per cent
market share in 1990. Korea's market share remained at
0.3 per cent. Therefore, BC was fully in a position to
protect the Community industry from inflows of Korea's
iron and steel products with AD duty imposition
mechanism, without need for any quantitative
restrictions, which were against the GATT principle.
Thirdly, the AD duty imposition mechanism--comparison
between export price and basic import price in the EC
rather than ordinary comparison between export price and
domestic price in the exporting country--provided a very
safe apparatus to easily implement AD mechanism, if the
EC iron and steel industry was faced with foreign
threats .39
Considering the fact that the United States has been
heavily using the AD duty imposition mechanism after
the suspension of VER5 with major steel producing
countries, it is expected that more cases in iron and
steel sector will be dealt with by the EC's AD mechanism
as a way to solve trade disputes between the EC and
Korea.
3. Determinants and Effectiveness of Protectionism in
Iron and Steel Trade
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3-1. Determinants of Protectionism in Iron and Steel
Trade
The determinants of EC's protective measures against
Korea changed in accordance with chronological changes in
trading environment of iron and steel products and
consuming industries of those products.4°
Firstly, business cycle became a major determinant for
the kind of protectionism, i.e. VER5 to AD, because iron
and steel industry had been influenced by business
performance of its consumers, such as shipbuilding and
automobile industry. This means at least partial
applicability of some of IPE approaches regarding
determinants of protectionism. In the 1970-1980 period,
when the EC's GDP growth was down to 2.9 per cent from
the previous decade's 4.8 per cent, the EC used AD
investigation and VERs together to prevent growing
imports of foreign products. In this period, the EC
initiated AD investigation against Korean steel plate in
1977 and VERS in 1980 against Korea's iron and steel
products. Even though the EC did not impose AD duties
against Korea's iron and steel products in the 1970-1980
period, the EC had still depended AD investigation along
with VERs to protect EC industry from threats caused by
imports from Korea. However, EC's GDP growth rate showed
favorable symptom with 3.8 per cent in 1988, 3.4 per cent
in 1989 and 3.1 per cent in 1990. That contributed to the
EC suspending VER5, and only depending on AD measure.
Secondly, wide-ranging expansion of Korea's crude steel
production and its causal relationship with temporary
increases in Korea's exports to the EC market in a very
short period also became one of major determinants of
protectionism. In 1977, the year following POSCO's second
plant completion, Korea's steel plate was filed by the
EC industry. They argued that steel plate from Korea had
been selling in the EC market below the EC'S reference
price. In addition, the EC asked to have negotiations
with the Korean government for the discussion of VERs
applied to Korea's iron and steel products to the EC
market. In 1987, the year Kwangyang's first plant was
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completed, the EUROFER filed an AD complaint against
Korean H-beam. Thus, the EC's AD complaint has a close
relationship with Korea's expansion of crude steel
production capacity.
Thirdly, U.S. import restraints against EC steel exports
have encouraged the EC to take strict measures against
imports of the products from Korea. 41 Namely, the United
States imposed VRA on EC products for the 1969-1974
period, Trigger Price Mechanism(TPM) for the 1978(March)-
1982 period, and quantitative restrictions under the
U.S.-EC Steel Agreement in 1982. 42 Furthermore, the
individual EC member states represented 44 per cent in
the total number of AD and CV duties investigations by
the United States in 1992, as seen in Section 2-4. As a
result, the United States triggered the EC's fears,
enabling the EC to seriously concern of inflows of iron
and steel products from Japan and NIEs. Therefore, the EC
showed an initiative in implementing import restraints
against Korea and the United States followed suit. 43 That
was contrary to textiles and clothing case. Namely, the
EC started VER measure against Korea in 1980 and the
United States began to implement the same measure against
Korea in 1984. The EC suspended the VER against Korea in
1990 and the United States also suspended the measure
against Korea in 1992.
However, there is not likely to be trade diversion from
the EC to the United States, triggered by the EC
protectionism, comparable to that from the United States
to the EC, triggered by the U.S.protectionism, as seen in
textiles and clothing case. Korea's iron and steel
exports to the EC, peaked with $447 million in 1988,
continously reduced to $145 million in 1990, and $133
million in 1991. The trend was also found in Korea-
U.S.trade case. Korea's steel exports to the United
States, peaked with $761 million in 1990, reduced to $698
million in 1991. Furthermore, Korea has been recording a
continuous trade deficit of $114 million in 1989, $50
million in 1990 and $261 million in 1991, in trade with
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the United States. However, Korea's total iron and steel
exports increased from $4,298 million in 1989 to $4,508
million in 1991, as seen in Section 1-3. That was due to
Korea's market diversification strategy to Iran, Thailand
and Taiwan where there were no import restraints against
Korea. Therefore, the protectionism in the United States
and the EC triggered a trade diversion from these
countries to new markets.
Meanwhile, the EC'S BIP system was introduced in
imitation of TPM of the United States. The TPM,
implemented for the 1978-1982 period, induced 'voluntary'
restraint from exporters by establishing a system of
dumping reference prices based on Japanese production
costs, sales below which would lead to an investigation
by the United States government with the threat of
further sanctions follows. 44
 The BC, however, also showed
an initiative to implement the BIP system three months
prior to TPM, effective in March, 1978. Ray Hudson and
David Sadler describe the similarity between the U.S.TPM
and the EC's BIP system as follows:45
By the end of 1977, a Basic Price System was
introduced on imports. Similar to the TPM, it
established 'fair value' reference prices below
which an investigation would be implemented.
However, unlike the U.S. scheme though, the EC
proposals included an offer to withdraw the import
pricing system if exporters were willing to
negotiate voluntary agreements based on a given
tonnage. By the end of 1978, a large number of
these deals had been concluded.
Actually, the EC suspended its AD investigation against
Korean steel plate on Jan 24,1978, because Korea agreed
to conclude VER with the EC. Therefore, the AD
investigation under BIP system used as a threat to
conclude VER.
Fourthly, EC's VER against Korea's iron and steel
products has been caused by its perception of Korea as 'a
second Japan.' When the EC concluded VER5 with 13 steel
exporting countries including Japan and Korea in 1980,
Korea's production of crude steel (8.6 million tonnes)
was only 7.7 per cent of Japan's crude steel production
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(111.4 million tonnes). Kore&s steel exports in the
year, also, remained at 4.5 million tonnes, only 13.2 per
cent of Japan's exports(34.1 million tonnes). 46
 Again,
Korea was involved in trade disputes with the EC in
connection with Japan's splendid export performance.47
Louis Turner points out:48
The EC insisted on concluding bilateral agreements
on iron and steel products with South Korea and
Brazil, even though these were minor 	 exporters
compared with the others and despite the fact that
its ability to export declined in 1978 and 1979 as
their indigenous demand took all the steel they
could produce.
In sum, the EC's policy implementation moved towards
protectionism following business recession in iron and
steel consuming industries and dramatic expansion of
exports by Korea, and moved away from protectionism after
improvement of productivity, business growth in consuming
industries(partial applicability of IPE approaches
regarding determinants of protectionism) and relative
weakness of international competitiveness of Korea's iron
and steel products. In addition to these determinants,
the mechanism for import restraints was introduced by the
EC in imitation of that of the United States, in response
to protective measures by the United States, and
perception of Korea as a second Japan.
3-2. Effectiveness of Protectionism in Iron and Steel
Trade
In connection with the effectiveness of VERs to protect
iron and steel industry against foreign imports, there
are several studies to evaluate costs and benefits of VER
measures from the position of the EC and the United
States. However, very few studies exist concerning
countries subject to import restraints by the EC and the
United States, as I mentioned in Introduction. Gary
Hufbauer estimates costs and benefits of VERs for iron
and steel industry to U.S.producers and consumers as
follows
VRAs decreased carbon steel imports by 4.5 million
tons on average over 1969-74; that the induced
2g5
increase in domestic production over this period was
2.25 million tons; the VRA premiums secured by
foreign producers were $330 million in 1974; and
that the welfare costs of the restrictions in 1974
were $380 million. In case of carbon steel ,ball-
bearings and specialty steels, special protectionism
tor these three products cost U.S.consumers about
$2.5 billion annually.
Despite high costs to U.S.consumers, U.S.producers
enjoyed great benefits--reduction of imports and increase
in domestic production. That contributed to improving
their productivity and strengthen their international
competitiveness.
Another study about the subject has done by the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development(OECD) on the U.S.restrictions on steel.
According to the OECD study,5°
the trigger price mechanism under the VRA(1978-1982)
increased domestic steel output by some 2 to 3
million metric tonnes, while the previous VER5
(1969-1974) increased the output by 3.2 million
tonnes. These estimates suggest that capacity
utilization in the U.S. steel industry rose from 74
per cent to about 77 per cent as a result of 1979
trigger prices. This increase preserved between
8,800 and 12,400 jobs (about 2 to 3 per cent of
industry employment) that would otherwise have been
lost. Each job preserved in the carbon and alloy
steel sector througn protectionism may have cost
final consumers as much as one quarter of a million
dollars.
This study also indicates U.S.producers received benefits
in production through transferring a loss to foreign
exporters and domestic consumers, even though consumers
have to put up with higher costs due to these import
restraints.
There are no specialized studies about costs and benefits
of EC steel restrictions under the VRA and other import
restrictive measures. However, the ECC officially
disclosed benefits of AD measures and VERs to protect the
Community steel industry as follows:51
The anti-dumping restrictions have continued against
imports from countries selling in Europe at prices
lower than the production costs of their most
efficient factories, while arrangements have been
made with exporting countries such as Japan, South
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Africa and East European countries, to limit their
exports (VRA). As a result, European steel imports
which amounted to 12.4 million tonnes in 1976 fell
to about 11 million tonnes in 1978, while exports
rose by nearly 9 million tonnes to total 30 million
tonnes thus saving 55,000 jobs in the European steel
industry.
Therefore, the ECC officially recognized the benefits of
VRAs to EC producers--increase in exports, decrease in
imports and protection from job losses.
The success or failure of aims of EC's VERs against Korea
can be measured through an analysis of changes in Korea's
export value and volume under the restrictive measures.
The nation's total exports of iron and steel products to
the world, which were subject to import restraints by the
EC, have shown a continuously increasing trend, in sharp
contrast to declining exports to the EC market, as seen
in Table VI-15. Numerically, exports of iron and steel
products grew by 64.5 per cent in the 1986-1989 period.
However, Korea's exports to the BC market declined by
49.9 per cent in the same period, remaining at
$26,879,000. That only represented 1.1 per cent of the
nation's total exports of iron and steel products which
were under import restraints by foreign countries. The
share of exports to the EC market in 1987 peaked with 3.6
per cent.
Table VI-15:Korea's Exports of Iron and Steel Products
under VRA to the EC($1,000)
Years	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Total Exports(A) 1,532,995 1,806,645 2,058,686 2,521,379
Exports To EC(B) 53,632 	 64,795	 28,346	 26,879
B/A	 3.5	 3.6	 1.4	 1.1
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.423.
Note:The figures include exports and imports of iron and
steel products which are under Korea-EC steel agreement.
In terms of quantities exported, the nation's exports of
iron and steel products to the EC market were further
seriously affected by VERS. Korea's exports to the EC in
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1987 totalled 94,806 metric tonfles, which reduced rapidly
to 85,892 metric tonnes in 1988 and to 12,071 metric
tonnes in 1989, as seen in Table VI-16. The general
increasing trend in exports of iron and steel products in
terms of value was due to Korean companies' efforts at
export market diversification to Iran, Taiwan and
Thailand where there were no import restraints against
Korea, as seen above, rather than the failure of aims of
protective measures by the United States and the EC to
reduce imports of these products from Korea.
Regarding H-beam filed for an AD complaint by the EUROFER
in 1987, the negative effects to Korean exporters were
far more serious, compared to the degree of decline in
exports of iron and steel products to the EC market.
Table VI-16:Korea's H-Beam Exports to the EC(1 metric
tonne)
Years	 1987	 1988	 1989
Total Exports of
Iron & Steel Products
to EC(A)	 94,806	 85,892	 12,071
H-Beam Exports to
EC(B)	 23,033	 3,162	 0
Share(B/A)	 24.3%	 3.7%	 0
Source:Korea Iron and Steel Association(Korea-EC Steel
Consultations Working Paper, March 7 1990),p.8.
Korea's H-beam exports, amounting to 23,033 metric tonnes
in 1987, reduced to 3,162 metric tonnes in 1988 and
finally to zero in 1989! The major reason for this
dramatic reduction was the change in restrictive measures
from VRA at the EC level to quota restrictions at each
member state level. Also, the threat of initiating AD
investigations contributed to reducing orders from EC
importers anxious that import prices could be raised
after the AD duty imposition. Therefore, David Yoffie's
approach seems to be inapplicable in the EC-Korea iron
and steel trade,with Patrick Messerlin's approach
applicable to this case.
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However, the most important factor which decided the
effectiveness of EC's protective measures against Korean
iron and steel products was the international
competitiveness of those products.It the Korean industry
had maintained its international competitiveness, and if
the EC had begun to impose VRA against these Korean
products, then the EC was likely to fail to prevent
growing imports of iron and steel products from Korea.
That would follow from the tactics of Korean companies to
counter such import restraints, such as using 'upgrading
strategy.
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VII.EC/Korea Footwear Industry and the Bilateral Trade
Dispute on Footwear
A Brief Summary of Chapter VII
EC's Footwear Industry
Footwear industry is a substantially labour intensive
sector. As a result,advanced countries, such as the
United States and Japan have been losing international
competitiveness. The EC, however, has continued
specializing in footwear production due to the recent
entry of Portugal and Spain into the EC and the very
unique characteristic of the Italian footwear industry,
the world largest footwear producer. Therefore, the EC
has at the same time the task to protect EC'S low-and
medium-priced footwear sector of Portugal and Spain, and
to secure the market access for Italian high-priced
footwear. The EC footwear industry, however, has
confronted many structural and policy problems. The
majority of employees in the footwear industry are women
and industrial sites are not located in industrialized
regions.	 Therefore,	 efforts	 towards	 industrial
adjustments in the industry are meeting strong
resistance. In addition, the EC's external policy in the
footwear sector lost its consistency. The EC imposed VERs
on imports to the Community, but also needed to argue the
access to foreign markets as the EC industry has a high
export specialization trend. The EC footwear industry has
been heavily dependent on foreign raw materials for its
production of leather shoes, the lion's share of EC's
footwear exports.This means that any problems caused by
leather raw material supplies from abroad can influence
the EC's export performance in the footwear industry.
Korea's Footwear Industry
Korea's footwear industry is also export-oriented and
labour-intensive sector, but located in highly urbanized
areas. As a result, Korea has faced several problems from
the perspective of IPE. Korea has been losing its
international price competitiveness, whilst import
demands from advanced countries have changed towards
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medium-and low-priced items, made by newly-emerging
developing countries, rather than for medium-and high-
priced items, made by Korea. That forced Korea to switch
its export markets from the United States to the EC.
Korean footwear companies have been heavily dependent
upon exports of their products to three advanced
countries--the United States, the EC and Japan. Newly-
emerging industrializing countries--Indonesia, Thailand
and China--are actively entering into these advanced
countries with exports of footwear, and as a result,
Korea's market share in exports of footwear to these
countries is being drastically reduced. Korean footwear
makers, even though they have their own brand names, are
very heavily dependent on world's big three importers--
Nike, Reebok and Adidas--for exports of their own brand
footwear under the contract of Original Equipment
Manufacturing (OEM), amounting to 95 per cent of Korea's
footwear exports under the OEM contract. Korea's footwear
exports are totally influenced by the three big
importers.
Determinants of Protectionism in Footwear Trade
--General Determinants
The EC's decision to implement VER against Korean
footwear had been made under the perception by the EC
that its market is relatively open to foreign imports, in
contrast to the apparent difficulties faced by EC
companies in penetrating markets of other countries.The
perception caused the EC's retaliation against closed
markets abroad.
--Specific Determinants
The VER introduced by the U.K.was motivated by the OMA of
the United States, and implemented for the 1977-1981
period. The import restraints by France and Italy had
been implemented during the process of investigations by
the United States for import restraints against Korea.
Under the U.S. tight investigation regime, Korean
companies switched their export markets to the EC to pre-
empt possible import restraints by the United States. The
result was the increase in exports of Korean footwear to
Ital y and France after 1985. It follows that the
U.S.investigations caused Italy and France to implement
VERs against tootwear imports from Korea, for the period
of Mar.1,1988-Jun.30,1990(Italy) and July 1,1988-June
30,1990 (France), and subsequently EC-wide VER, since
July 1, 1990 as of December 1993. The import restraints
by the EC had also been strengthened following similar
action by other countries, in fear of additional transfer
of exports by Korean footwear companies to the EC. The
successful experiences by Italy and France to restrict
imports of Korean footwear through VERs enabled the EC to
adopt the EC-wide VER later, rather than other types of
import restraints such as AD measure.
Effectiveness of Protectionism in Footwear Trade
--David Yoffie's Approach
David Yoffie's approach seems to be applicable to the EC-
Korea because Korea's exports of footwear to the EC
increased, despite the EC-wide VER against Korean
footwear. However, it is likely to be inapplicable to
certain individual EC member states-Korea footwear trade
case. As a result of French and Italian VERs against
Korean footwear, Korea's exports to France decreased by
26.6 per cent to $86.297 million in 1989 from $117.648
million in 1988, and those to Italy declined by 7.6 per
cent from $79.954 million to $73.878 million. In EC-Korea
footwear trade, Korea's exports sharply increased, up
10.5 per cent from $723.796 million in 1990 to 1991's
$799.975 million. However, it is noteworthy that Korea's
footwear exports to the United States have been showing a
declining trend since 1988--reduced to $1,985.040 million
in 1991 from $2,329.050 million in 1988. This approach,
therefore, is not applicable in the United States-Korea
footwear case.
	 Obviously, Korean companies' market
switching strategy, from the United States to the EC,
contributed to increasing exports to the EC market.
--Patrick Messerlin's Approach
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His approach seems to be inapplicable in the EC-Korea,
but applicable to EC member states-Korea footwear trade
case. The EC did not achieve its goal of reversing
growing imports of Korean tootwear by implementing the
VERs.
--Other Factors to Decide Failure or Success of
Protectionism in Footwear Trade
The most important factor influencing the success or
tailure of VERs in EC-Korea footwear trade is whether
exports subject to such restrictive measures have
international competitiveness. If foreign exporters
maintain the competitive edge, they can choose to switch
their export markets or adopt upgrading strategy as
circumstances dictate. If they choose market switching
strategy, their exports to former export markets would be
declined. However, their exports could be continously
increased in case that they choose upgrading strategy.
David Yoffie's approach, therefore, could be either
applicable or inapplicable, depending on types of
strategies by exporters. Patrick Messerlin's approach,
however, seems to be applicable when any protective
measures by advanced countries could be a decisive factor
against growing market penetration by products with weak
international competitiveness trom specific countries.
1. Background Information for Case Study in Footwear
Industry
1-1. General Trend of World Trade in Footwear Industry
One of the major characteristics of the footwear industry
is that the proportion of labour costs is far higher
than the average in other manufacturing industries, and
has become a determining factor of international price
competitiveness. Developing countries have therefore
naturally since the 1970s a strong competitive advantage
over advanced countries. As David Greenaway puts it,
the most important single factor affecting the
footwear market has been the shift in comparative
advantage away from the major developed market
econoni.zes(with the exception of Italy and Spain)
towards newly industrializing and developing
countries like Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and
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the Philippines and planned economies like
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. Production of
standardized .tootwear (especially footwear made of
fabric, plastic or rubber) requires relatively
little technological 'know-how' and tends to be
labour intensive.
However, this competitive advantage enjoyed by developing
countries is now being transferred to the newly-emerging
developing countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia and
China because of increasisng labour costs in Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Korea, and also following import restraints
against them by advanced countries. The newly-emerging
developing countries are already showing a superior
competitiveness in low-priced, low-quality footwear
products, compared with Korea and Taiwan.
Table VII-1:World Production of Footwear(1989)(1 million
pairs,%)
Countries	 Production	 Share
China	 2,054	 21.8
EC	 1,066	 11.7
Russia	 1,054	 11.2
Taiwan	 671	 7.1
Brazil	 600	 6.4
Korea	 550	 5.8
Total	 9,435	 100.0
Source:EC Commissjon(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.16-26.
In 1989, a total of 9,435 million pairs of footwear were
produced in the world, of which China and Russia
represented a combined figure of 33 per cent with the
production of 2,054 million pairs and 1,054 million
pairs, respectively. However, the picture looks far
different if world-wide production is considered in terms
of export value rather than production figure. Three
countries--Italy, Korea and Taiwan have absolutely been
dominating world's footwear market in terms of export
value as seen in Table VII-2. The combined share of these
three countries rose sharply to 57.3 per cent in 1990
from 42.0 per cent in 1970. Especially, Korea's share in
world exports dramatically increased to 17.7 per cent in
1990 from only 1.0 per cent in 1970. This phenomenon
311
suggests that several countries are dominating the
international trade of high-priced footwear products even
though their production figure is less than those of
China and Russia.
Table VII-2:World's Footwear Exports Trend ($ 1M , %)
1970	 1980	 1986	 1990
EX	 SH	 EX	 SH	 EX	 SH	 EX	 SH
Italy 666 39.3 3,591
	 34.2 4,803 40.1	 6,579	 28.0
Taiwan 28	 1.7 1,408	 13.4 3,038 19.0	 2,510	 11.6
Korea 17	 1.0	 871	 8.3 2,059 13.0
	 4,164	 17.7
Sub- 711 42.0 5,870
	 55.9 9,905 72.1 13,253
	 57.3
Total
World's
Total
1,693 100.0 10,498 100.0 15,982 100.0 21,600 100.0
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Technology(External and Internal Changes in Footwear
Industry and Its Impact on Korean Industry,1988),p.15.
United	 Nations(1990
	
International	 Trade	 Statistics
Yearbook, Vol.11), p.216.
Note :EX=Exports. SH=Share.
For example, "Italy has been exporting high-quality
leather shoes with price higher than $16 per pair. On the
other hand, Korea has been specializing in leather
sporting shoes with price ranging $5-16 per pair and
Taiwan in plastics shoes with prices approximating $5 per
pair." 2
 As a result, these three countries are marketing
their products in the world without severe competition to
each other because of their specialization in differing
ranges of product. It will take some time for China and
other newly-emerging developing countries to meet the
technological level of Italy, Taiwan and Korea because of
the difference in the level of production skills for
high-quality products.
Meanwhile, the major importers of footwear, the United
States and EC member states--Germany, France and the
United Kingdom,represented 63.2 per cent of the world
total imports in terms of value in 1970, with this figure
rising to 67.5 per cent in 1986, even though it was down
to 62 per cent in 1990.
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Table VII-3:World's Footwear Imports Trend($M, %)
1970	 1980	 1986	 1990
IM SH
	 IM	 SH	 IM	 SH	 IM	 SH
USA	 629 38.2 2,826 25.5	 6,857 40.1	 9,570 33.7
Germany 245 14.9 2,134 19.3	 2,303 13.5	 4,008 14.1
France	 69 4.2	 898 8.1	 1,298	 7.6	 2,058	 7.2
U.K.	 97	 5.9	 937	 8.5	 1,077	 6.3	 1,982	 7.0
Others 605 36.8 4,271 38.b
	 5,556 32.5	 10,786 38.0
Total 1,645 100.0 11,066 100.0 17,091 100.0 28,404 100.0
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Technology(External and Internal Changes in Footwear
Industry and Its Impact on Korean Industry, 1988), p.17.
United Nations(1990 International Trade Statistics
Yearbook Vol.11), p.216.
Note :IM=Imports. SH=Share.
However, the world import structure has been changing
since 1985, following the devaluation of U.S.dollars and
the strengthening of European currencies. As a result,
the share of the United States in world's total footwear
imports went down by 11.8 per cent in the 1970-1990
period, compared with a sharp rise of 13.2 per cent in
share of imports by the three EC member states in the
same period. The appreciation of the Japanese yen also
contributed to increased shipments of footwear to the
Japanese market.
Table VII-4:Advanced Countries' Footwear Import Forecast
(1 million pairs, %)
Imports Trend	 AGR
	
1988	 1990	 1992	 1995	 1988-1990 1990-1995
	
USA 1,089 1,120	 1,147 1,189	 1.4	 1.2
EC	 506	 518	 529	 542	 1.3	 0.9
	
Japan 143
	 167	 182	 193	 8.0	 3.0
	
Total 1,738 1,805	 1,858 1,924	 1.9	 1.2
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry(International
Competitiveness of Major Industries in Korea and Future
Tasks to Raise the Competitiveness, September 1990),
p.394.
Note :In case of the EC, intra-EC trade was excluded.
AGR=Average Growth Rate
As seen in Table VII-4, imports into the Japanese market
showed the highest pertormance compared to other markets
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during the 1988-1990 period with 8 per cent growth rate.
In addition, the Japanese market is forecast to be the
most promising import market for footwear in the 1990-
1995 period with 3.0 per cent annual growth rate
expected.
A clear phenomenon emerges when import figure of footwear
and world demand for footwear are compared, as seen in
Table VII-5. The EC is the bloc having the largest demand
for footwear. However, its actual import figure is less
than half the figure of imports into the United States.
This means the demand for footwear in the EC member
states has been met by supply from other EC member states
rather than from external shipments of non-EC member
states. In 1990, external supply of footwear to the EC
market only represented 38.4 per cent(518 million
pairs/1,350 million pairs) of total EC demand for the
year. This is closely related with the high sales ratio
of Italian footwear manufacturers in the EC market,
representing 70-80 per cent of their total export figure.
Table VII-5:World Footwear Demand(100 million pairs,%)
Demand	 Demand Forecast AGR
80	 85 90	 1995	 2000	 1980-90 1990-2000
World	 72.0 7b.1 80.3
	 85.0	 91.0	 1.1	 1.2
USA	 12.8 13.1 13.3
	 13.5	 13.8	 0.4	 0.3
EC	 13.0 13.2 13.5
	 13.7	 13.9	 0.4	 0.3
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry(Internationaj.
Competitiveness of Major Industries in Korea and Future
Tasks to Raise the Competitiveness), p.393.
Note:AGR=Average Growth Rate
1-2. EC's Footwear Industry
The EC produced 1,06b million pairs of footwear in 1989,
ranking second in the list of world footwear producers,
as seen above. Also, "the EC footwear market represented
a sales volume of 1,356 million pairs of shoes in 1989,
thus making the Community the world's third largest
consumer after China(with a demand level of 1,700 million
pairs of shoes) and the United States (1,359 million
pairs)." 4
 There is a clear phenomenon, regarding
production and employment in the EC footwear industry;
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each decreased at the same time, as seen in Table VII-6,
indicating that the industry is a labour intensive sector
where technological innovation can not significantly
contribute to boosting productivity.
Table VII-6:Production and Employment in EC Footwear
Industry(1 million pairs, 1,000 persons)
Year	 Production	 Employment
1980	 935	 346.5
1981	 927	 342.7
1982	 975	 328.1
1983	 935	 311.4
1984	 1193	 378.3
1985	 988	 371.2
198b	 1192	 371.0
1987	 1137	 366.1
1988	 1077	 348.4
1989	 1066	 333.0
1990	 1061	 342.0
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries,1991-
1992), p.16-26.
There are, however, several exceptions in 1982, 1984 and
1986 as a result of new admission of footwear producing
countries, such as Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain
in 198b, into the EC.
Table VII-7: Consumption and Production of Individual EC
Member States in 1989(1000 pairs)
Countries	 Consumption	 Production	 Difference
Bel/Lux	 47300	 3810	 -43490
Denmark	 22500	 4485	 -18015
Germany	 299000	 68697	 -230303
Greece	 27000	 12856	 -14144
Spain	 88300	 181263	 +92963
France	 321200	 168061	 -153139
Ireland	 16400	 2000	 -14400
Italy	 174000	 401868	 +227868
Netherlands	 55000	 7267	 -47733
Portugal	 33600	 96010	 +62410
United Kingdom	 267000	 114889	 -152111
Total	 1356000	 1066196	 -289804
Source:EC commjssjon( panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), pp .16-26 and 16-27.
There is also a close relationship between consumption,
production level, and external trade policy 0± each EC
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In terms of the number of enterprises in the footwear
sector in 1989, Italian firms account for 55.2 per cent
(8,827 firms) of a total of 16,000 firms, Spanish firms
for 15.8 per cent (2,520 firms) and Portugese firms 6.3
per cent(1,015 firms), as seen in Table VII-8. Therefore,
the combined figure of footwear companies in these three
EC member states represent 77.3 per cent of the total EC
footwear companies. The total number of footwear
companies in the EC rose by 7.2 per cent to 16,000 in
1989 from 14,924 in 1986, as seen in Table VII-8.
Table VII-9:Ec Footwear Trade in Terms of Trade Volume(1
million pairs)
Exports	 Imports	 Balance	 Trade
Years (Extra-EC) 	 (Extra-EC)	 (Intra-EC)
1980	 155.2	 307.7	 -152.5	 343
1981	 177.4	 321.6	 -144.2	 387
1982	 180.7	 315.9	 -135.2	 333
1983	 188.1	 357.7	 -169.6	 322
1984	 203.7	 384.0	 -180.3	 342
1985	 225.9	 379.9	 -154	 365
1986	 274.3	 349.8	 -75.5	 460
1987	 243.0	 482.8	 -239.8	 474
1988	 231.3	 514.6	 -283.3	 456
1989	 242.6	 507.0	 -264.4	 470
Source:EC Commissjon(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.16-28.
The major factor contributing to the increase in the
number of footwear companies was the increase in intra-EC
trade which grew from 343 million pairs in 1980 to 470
million pairs in 1989, as seen in Table VII-9. The intra-
EC trade expansion then contributed to the structural
adjustment in the footwear industry which moved from
high-wage to low-wage EC member states. Namely, the
number of companies in the footwear industry decreased in
the 1986-1989 period in Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark,
Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, whilst the
number in Spain and Portugal increased.The EC's extra-EC
trade balance in terms of trade volume has worsened in
the 1980s. Despite this trade deficit of the EC in
quantitative terms, it enjoys a trade surplus when
measured in value terms. The EC's main exporting member
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state is Italy whose share in world's total footwear
exports in terms of export value accounted for 40.1 per
cent in 1986 and 28.0 per cent in 1990, as seen in Table
vII-2. Furthermore, Italy has been specializing in
exports of high-priced footwear with price level higher
than $16 per pair. On the other hand, "the main exporters
to the EC are China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Within Europe,
the most important suppliers to the EC market are
Yugoslavia and Austria." 6
 All except Austria are
exporters specializing in low-and medium-priced footwear.
Therefore, the trade balance in terms of trade value in
EC footwear industry has been recording a surplus
continuously in the 1986-1990 period, as seen in Table
Vu-b. It is very difficult to find official trade
statistics compiled by the ECC, calculated in terms of
trade value. It would appear that the EC deliberately
emphasises the serious situation of footwear industry in
terms of trade volume, rather than the favorable aspects
of trade balance in terms of trade value.
Table VII-10:EC's Footwear Trade in Terms of Trade
Value($1,000)
Years	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Exports 8225665
	 93289b9 9239175	 9751781	 12109589
Imports b498b58
	 8279012 8692533	 8779664	 11188781
Balance +1727007 +1049957 +546642
	
+972117	 +920808
Source:united Natjons(1990 International Trade Statistics
Yearbook, Vol II), p.216.
The EC's good performance in footwear trade can also be
demonstrated by comparing export market share of the EC
with those of other countries in terms of trade value.
The EC's market share in the world's footwear exports is
higher than that of any other country, as seen in Table
Vu-il. If the export volume only is considered, China
and USSR dominate the world footwear market. However, the
EC has a share of over 50 per cent in the world's
footwear market in terms of export value, thanks to its
greater dependence on exports of high-priced items.
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Table VII-11:Comparison of World's Export Market Share in
Footwear in Terms of Trade Value(%)
Year Korea	 USA	 JAP	 EC	 Taiwan Others
1975	 4.85	 0.94	 1.02	 56.76	 7.90	 28.53
1980	 9.33	 1.50	 0.67	 57.08 15.50	 15.92
1985 13.59	 1.13	 0.51	 47.19 20.76	 16.82
1987 ib.28	 1.42	 0.22	 55.10 21.69	 5.29
1988 21.00	 NA	 NA	 52.40	 NA	 NA
1989 18.30	 NA	 NA	 51.40	 NA	 NA
1990 17.70	 NA	 NA	 51.60	 NA	 NA
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry(International
Competitiveness of Major Industries in Korea and Future
Tasks to Raise the Competitiveness),p.300.
United Nations(1990 International Trade Statistics
Yearbook,Vol.II), p.216.
As shown in Table VII-12, EC's trade specialization
index 7 is 0.06 in 1987, compared with minus 0.94 of the
United States and minus 0.91 of Japan. This fact means EC
member states, especially Italy, France and Spain, are
still specializing in exports of footwear, in contrast to
the fact that most other advanced countries such as the
United States and Japan are dependent upon imports of
foreign-made footwear.
Table VII-12:Comparison of Trade Specialization Index
Year	 Korea	 USA	 JAP	 SC	 Taiwan
1975	 0.99	 -0.94	 -0.35	 0.09	 1.00
1980	 0.99	 -0.91	 -0.63	 0.00	 1.00
1985	 0.98	 -0.9b	 -0.74	 0.07	 0.99
1987	 0.98	 -0.94	 -0.91	 0.06	 0.99
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry(International
Competitiveness of Major Industries in Korea and Future
Tasks to Raise the Competitiveness), p.300.
The EC's specialization in footwear exports is due to its
unique industrial structure, especially that in Italy,
the largest footwear producer in the EC. According to the
ECC,8
in Italy,the footwear sector hosts many small
business and	 this is proved by the fact that 64.1
per cent of Italian firms, involved in the
manufacturing of shoes, employed less than 9 people
in 1989. This has occurred since 1986 in spite of a
reduction of 8.6 per cent in the number of Italian
enterprises,mainly small businesses.
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Therefore, the unique industrial structure in the EC
footwear industry, centering on Italian firms,
contributed to forcing the EC to remain a footwear
exporter .
In addition, the EC's enlargement process to countries
with comparative advantage in footwear production such as
Portugal and Spain increased the pressure to raise EC's
barriers against imports from developing countries
because their economies are "competitive, rather than
complementary, to the economies of the core NIEs."1°
However, the EC footwear industry has several problems
due to its unique characteristics.
Firstly, the majority of employees in the footwear
industry are women, and production sites are not located
in industrialized regions. "The specific socio-cultural
role of women, in particular their family and domestic
responsibilities, also makes them relatively immobile
geographically." 11
 As a result, there are not so many
alternatives to find jobs in case of unemployment. The
effort to make industrial structure adjustment in this
industry seems to be met by strong resistance, due to the
difficulties 0± tinding alternative jobs.
Secondly, the EC tootwear industry has been heavily
dependent upon production of leather shoes. According to
Table VII-13, leather accounts for 64 per cent of
production materials ±or footwear in the EC in 1987, up
8.5 per cent from 1980's share 0± 59 per cent.
Table VII-13:Comparative European Production Trends by
Materials (%)
Materials	 80	 81	 82	 83	 84	 85	 8	 87
Leather	 59	 60	 60	 63	 63	 63	 64	 64
Synthetics 18
	
19	 20	 18	 19	 19	 19	 19
Textile	 8	 7	 6	 7	 5	 4	 3	 4
Rubber	 1	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1
Others	 N/A N/A N/A	 1	 1	 N/A N/A N/A
Slippers	 14	 13	 12	 10	 12	 12	 13	 12
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source:EC Commission(Pariorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.16-27.
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Furthermore, the EC has been singularly relying on
exports of leather footwear. In 1990, the share of
leather footwear in EC's total footwear exports reached
88.3 per cent, as seen in Table VII-14. However, the
Community has only a 80 per cent self-sufficiency rate in
raw materials for leather shoes production. Therefore,
problems of foreign supplies of leather raw materials
into the EC market can influence the EC's export
periormance of footwear.
Table VII-14:EC's Share of Leather Footwear in Total
Footwear Exports ($ 1 , 000 , %)
Years	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Total	 8225665 9328969 9239175 9751781	 12109589
Footwear
Exports (A)
Leather	 7250382 8291900 8132470 8580670	 10696041
Footwear
Exports (B)
Share(B/A) 88.1	 88.9	 88.0	 87.99	 88.3
Source : United	 Nations ( International	 Trade	 Statistics
Yearbook,1990, Vol.11), pp.21b and 766.
Thirdly, the EC's external policy in the footwear sector
is contradictory, implementing on the one hand protective
measures for its own footwear industry against foreign
imports, and demanding on the other hand the opening of
toreign markets for EC footwear exports.The EC explains
the necessity to provide protective measures for EC
footwear industry as follows:12
Up to the early 1970s, footwear was a growth
industry in the European Community. Since then its
share, both in the internal and export markets has
declined, with subsequent company closures and loss
of jobs. Partly the decline is due to cheap imports
from developing and other countries, notably Hong
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and, more recently, China.
Based on this perspective, the EC sees a need to prevent
imports of low-and medium-priced footwear from Korea,
Taiwan and China, and is pressured by Spanish and
Portugese footwear companies to impose import restraints.
However, "the BC industry still complains that market
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access for EC footwear exports to the main importing
countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Japan is hindered by high tariff or non-tariff barriers
and views the opening of these markets as a major element
in the GATT negotiations."13
1-3. Korea's Footwear Industry
For Korea, footwear was not included in its principal
export commodities by 1970. However, in 1980, footwear
emerged as the fifth largest export item following
apparel, textile yarn and fabrics, iron and steel and
foodstuff.The huge increase in Korea's footwear exports
can be explained as an indication that the country has
been exploiting its growing industrial and technological
sophistication to keep its footwear industry
internationally competitive.
Korea's footwear industry is a labour-intensive industry
sector, along with the textiles and clothing industries.
Its annual export figure amounts to $4,000 million with
an employment reaching 130,000 persons.
Table VII-15:Korea's Footwear Production and Exports(1
million pairs, %)
1980	 1988	 1990	 AGR(1988-90)
Total Production
(A) 298.2	 572.3	 511.8	 -5.75
Domestic Supply	 95.3	 121.6	 126.0	 1.8
(B)
Exports(C)	 202.9	 450.7	 385.8	 -8.1
C/A	 68.0	 78.8	 75.4	 --
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Basic Plan
for Footwear Industry Rationalization, Nov.1992), p.5.
Note:AGR=Average Growth Rate.
The industry is marked by strengths and weaknesses. The
strong points include "1) high foreign exchange earning
industry, 2) labour-intensive industry, 3) industry
located in highly urbanized area and 4) industry with
high self-sufficiency rate o± raw materials." 14 The weak
points are i)weakening international price
competitiveness due to relatively high proportion of
322
labour costs and low level of automation in production
facilities, 2) change in import demands from advanced
countries in favour of medium and low-priced items made
by newly-emerging exporters, 3)heavy dependence of
exports to three markets--United States, EC and Japan,
and 4)the lowering trend of operation rate of footwear
plants.
Regarding the strengths, firstly, Korea exported a total
of 75.4 per cent of its footwear production in 1990, as
seen in Table VII-15, which is a far higher percentage
than that of other industries.
Even though the number of footwear companies in Korea
represents only 2.1 per cent of total manufacturing
companies in 1991, exports of footwear accounted for 5.3
per cent of the nation's total exports in the year
($ 3 , 83 5 million/$71,870 million), as seen in Table VII-
16. In addition, employees in the footwear industry
account for 5.9 per cent of total employees in the
nation's manufacturing industry.
Table	 VII-16:Korea's	 Footwear	 Industry(1000
persons,$100M)
Number of	 Number of	 Exports
Companies	 Employees
All
Manufacturing
Industries(A)	 68,028	 3,054	 718.7
Footwear
Industry(B)	 1,420	 153	 38.4
B/A	 2.1	 5.9	 5.3
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association (Measure to
Raise Competitiveness of Korea's Footwear Industry,
Sept.1,1992), p.3.
As a result, the footwear industry is one of the most
important sectors in Korea's manufacturing industries
with a high export performance. In terms of export value,
Korea's share in the world's total exports of footwear
reached 17.7 per cent in 1990, ranking second after Italy
on the list of world's ±ootwear exporters, as seen in
Section 1-1.
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Table VII-17:Comparison of Raw Materials and Labor Costs
in 1990 (%)
All	 Textile	 Footwear
Manufacturing Industry	 Industry
Industries	 ACO LC	 SMC
Raw
Material
Cost	 70.3	 55.9	 58.1	 58.2	 57.7
Labor Cost	 9.9	 24.4	 31.5	 31.4	 31.7
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Basic Plan
tor Footwear Industry Rationalization, Nov.1992), p.7.
Note :ACO=All Companies.LC=Large-Sized Companies.
SMC=Small-and Medium-Sized Companies.
Secondly, Korea's footwear industry is the sector with
the highest share of labour costs among all manufacturing
sectors. The share of labour cost in footwear industry is
3.2 times higher than that of other industries, as seen
in Table VII-17. This was a most beneficial factor whilst
Korea's labour cost was very low. The highest share of
labour costs, however, became a negative factor when the
high labour costs decreased the international
competitiveness of Korea's footwear industry.
The sharp rise in labour costs happened when the
political regime could no longer artificially keep labour
costs down as a consequence of democratization since
1987. 15
 Korea's monthly labour costs per worker in
footwear in 1987 was £229.8, far higher than India's
£51.59, Indonesia's £23.3 and the Philippines' £39.72.16
Table VII-18:Location of Korea's Footwear Plants with
Population(number of plants, %)
Number of
	
Population
Plants	 Less Than	 110,000-	 510,000-	 Higher Than
100,000	 500,000	 1 Million 1 Million
292	 8	 23	 9	 252
100%	 2.7%	 7.9%	 3.1%	 86.3%
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Basic Plan
for Footwear Industry Rationalization), p.7.
Thirdly, "Korea's footwear plants are generally located
in highly urbanized areas. Specifically, 86.3 per cent of
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footwear plants in Korea are in cities whose population
is over 1 million, as seen in TaDle VII-18. Especially
noteworthy, 190 tootwear plants(65 per cent of the total
number of footwear plants in Korea) are located in the
South KyOflgSaflg Province-Pusan City area and their share
in the nation's total tootwear exports accounted for 88.4
per cent in 1990!" As a result, Korean footwear
workers are in an advantageous position when trying to
find alternative jobs in urbanized areas as a result of
job loss in the wake of industrial structure adjustment
in	 reaction	 to	 the	 weakening	 international
competitiveness.
Fourthly, "Korea's footwear industry has been attaining
99 per cent of self-sufficiency rate in main raw
materials (leather, textile fabrics, synthetic rubber,
etc.),which	 is	 far	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 other
industries." 18
 As a result, Korean footwear makers are
in the position of being able to produce shoes without
serious impact from international raw material price
fluctuation for footwear.
Table VII-19:Production Trend of Footwear in Korea (1
million pairs, %)
Years Quantity	 Share of Footwear Items
Change	 RS	 CAS LSS	 LS	 CHS OT
1987	 552.2	 2.9 23.6	 32.1	 9.1	 18.5 13.8
(+18.2%)
1988	 572.3	 2.2 21.9	 35.1	 9.6	 16.1 15.1
(+3.6)
1989	 522.6	 2.4 20.3	 35.9	 9.8	 17.9 13.7
(-8.7)
1990	 511.8	 1.8 18.5	 41.2	 9.7	 16.0 12.8
(-2.1)
1991	 344.8	 2.6 19.8	 39.8	 9.3	 16.1 13.0
(1-9)	 (-15.6%)
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Easic Plan
for Footwear Industry Rationalization), p.16.
Note :Annual Growth Rate in 1988-1990=-5.7.
RS=Rubber Shoes.CAS=Canvas Shoes.LSLeather Shoes.
LSS=Leather Sports Shoes.CHS=Chemical Shoes.
OT=Others.
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The weaknesses of Korea's footwear industry is reflected
in the downward trend of production and trade volume.
Korea's footwear production declined continuously from
1988 due to the sluggishness of exports. Production
peaked in 1988 with 572.3 million pairs, but declined to
522.6 million pairs in 1989 and to 511.8 million pairs in
1990, as seen in Table VII-19.
The footwear production in the first nine months of 1991
remained at 344.8 million pairs, a decrease of 15.6 per
cent compared to the same period of 1990. Only leather
sport shoes recorded an increase in their share of total
footwear production in the 1987-1990 period. Other shoes-
-rubber, canvas and chemical--show a declining trend in
their shares of total footwear production. Production of
footwear in terms of value also declined by 10 per cent
to 3,503 billion won ($4.4 billion) in 1991 from 3,898
billion won ($4.9 billion) in 1990.
In the field of footwear exports, Korea showed an annual
growth of 19.5 per cent during the 1986-1990 period from
$2,109 million to $4,307 million. However, Korea's
footwear exports showed a second decline in 1991,
following first ever annual decline in 1989 with $3,587
million, down 5.6 per cent from 1988's $3,801
million.Exports of footwear in 1991 amounted to $3,836
million, a decrease of 10.9 per cent from 1990's $4,307
million. The sluggish export performance further worsened
in 1992 with a decrease of 16.7 per cent recorded in the
first six months of the year.
On the other hand, Korea's imports of footwear showed an
annual growth rate of 144 per cent in the 1988-1990
period from 700,000 pairs to 4,200,000 pairs as seen in
Table VII-20. However, the level of imports is still less
than 1 per cent of Korea's total supply of footwear in
the year, totaling 516 million pairs. In contrast,
Korea's footwear exports amounted to 385.8 million pairs
in 1990, representing 74.8 per cent of its total demand
for footwear.
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Table VII-20:Footwear Supply and Demand in Korea (1
million pairs, %)
1985	 1988	 1990	 AGR
QUANT SH	 QUANT SH	 QUANT SH (85-88)(88-90)
TS	 379.1 100 573.0 100 516.0 100	 14.8 -5.4
P	 378.7	 99.9 572.3 99.9 511.8 99.2 14.7 -5.7
IM	 0.4	 0.1	 0.7	 0.1 4.2	 0.8	 20.5 144
TD	 379.1 100
	 573.0 100 516.0 100 14.8 -54
EX	 272.8	 72	 450.7 78.7 385.8 74.8 18.2 -8.1
DOC	 106.3	 28	 122.3 21.3 130.2 25.2 4.8 3.2
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Basic Plan
for Footwear Industry Rationalization), p.15.
Note :QUANT=Quantity. AGR=Average Growth Rate. SH
=Share.TS=Total Supply. P=Production. TD=Total Demand.
EX=Exports. IM=Imports. DOC=Domestic Consumption.
This sluggishness of production and exports of footwear
is caused by several factors. 19
 Firstly, Korea has been
losing its international price competitiveness as seen
above. In addition, the share of labour charge in total
production cost for Korea is 31-32 per cent, which is
also far higher than China's 8-10 per cent, Indonesia's
10-12 per cent and Thailand's 15-18 per cent.The high
share of labour costs in total production has been caused
by the minimal level of automation in footwear industry.
Only 2,357 machines for footwear manufacturing, of a
total of 102,325, had been automated as of 1992.
Furthermore, production facilities in Koreaxs footwear
sector are obsolete. For example, 43.7 per cent of
production facilities for footwear industry in Korea as
of 1991 had been installed eight years ago. Therefore,
Korea is losing its competitive edge in quality and price
compared to new exporters who are equipped with brand-new
industrial facilities.
As a result, Korea's market share in exports of footwear
to advanced countries has been drastically reduced,
caused by the active entry into the world market of
newly-emerging industrializing countries. Such brisk
penetration has been made possible by the upgrading of
technical know-how and expansion of production facilities
in these countries, promoted by investments and technical
transfer from Korea and Taiwan.
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Table VII-21:Comparison of Market Share of Leather Sports
Shoes in United States in Terms of Volume(%)
Countries	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1990	 1992(1-5)
Korea	 65.9	 69.2	 68.8	 60.3	 30.8
China	 0.2	 0.4	 1.6	 9.1	 28.4
Indonesia	 NA	 NA	 0.9	 6.5	 20.0
Thailand	 NA	 NA	 4.3	 8.3	 9.5
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Measure to
Raise Competitiveness of Korea's Footwear Industry), p.7.
Considering leather sports shoes, Korea's market share in
the United States, the largest export market for Korean
tootwear, rapidly decreased from 1988's 68.8 per cent to
60.3 per cent in 1990 and 30.8 per cent in the first five
months of 1992. By contrast, market share for Chinese
footwear in the United States in the same period rose to
9.1 per cent and 28.4 per cent in the same periods from
the only 1.b per cent, that for Indonesian footwear to
6.5 per cent and 20.0 per cent from 0.9 per cent, and
that for Thailand footwear to 8.3 per cent and 9.5 per
cent from 4.3 per cent.
Secondly, import demand by advanced countries is changing
in favour of low-and medium-priced items made by newly-
emerging developing countries rather than medium-and
high-priced items made by Korea, caused mainly by the
business recession in those advanced countries. The
following Table VII-22 shows how U.S. demands for leather
sports shoes are changing in accordance with price ranges
of footwear products.
Table VII-22:U..SImport Share of Leather Sports Shoes in
Connection with Price Range(%)
1990	 1991	 1992(1-5)
Less than $12	 38.0	 41.2	 46.2
$ 12.Oi
-$1 6.00	 32.5	 32.0	 31.6
Higher Than $16.01	 29.5	 26.9	 22.2
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Measure to
Raise Competitiveness of Korea's Footwear Industry), p.7.
Thirdly, Korean footwear companies have heavily been
depending on exports to three destinations--the EC, the
United States and Japan, where 83.6 per cent of Korean
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footwear exports went to them in 1991, as seen in Table
VII-23. Although this situation is almost the same for
other Korean manufacturing industries as in the case of
footwear production, the degree of dependence on these
three markets is extreme. Korea's dependence rate on
these markets in terms of all industries remained at 62.9
per cent in 1990. The success or failure of Korean
footwear exports is absolutely dependent upon changes in
demands from these three countries. The share of the EC
in Korea's footwear exports markedly increased from
merely 10.7 per cent of total footwear exports in 1986 to
16.8 per cent in 1990, and to 20.8 per cent in 1991.
Table VII-23:Korea's Footwear Exports by Region ($1M)
Years Total	 USA	 EC	 JAP	 Others
1986	 2109(100) 1502(71.2) 225(10.7) 132(6.3) 	 250(11.8)
1987	 2824(100) 1815(61.3) 377(14.5) 271(10.5) 361(13.7)
1988	 3801(100) 2329(64.2) 551(13.1) 398(10.3) 523(12.4)
1989	 3587(100) 2304(53.5) 470(11.2) 368(21.0) 445(14.3)
1990	 4307(100) 2592(60.2) 724(16.8) 410(9.5) 	 581(13.5)
1991	 3836(100) 1985(51.7) 799(20.8) 424(11.1) 628(16.4)
AGR
1986-88 34.2	 24.5	 56.5	 73.6	 44.6
1988-90	 9.6	 5.5	 14.6	 1.5	 5.4
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association(Basic Plan
for Footwear Industry Rationalization), p.19.
Note:AGR=Average Growth Rate.
Fourthly,the operation rate of Korea's footwear plants
has been declining every year by 8 per cent since 1989.
Especially, the operation rate was reduced to 72 per cent
in 1991, which is far lower than 85 per cent, the optimal
operation rate in the footwear industry. The decline of
the operation rate is due to a reduction of export orders
and fierce competition among Korean footwear exporters
themselves.
However, there are even more serious problems for Korea's
footwear industry. Korean footwear makers, even though
they have their own brand names, rely heavily on brand
names of the world's big three importers--Nike, Reebok
and Adidas--for exports under contract of original
equipment manufacturing(OEM). Specifically, 95 per cent
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of Korea's footwear exports have been delivered under
OEM contracts, and as a result, Korea's footwear exports
are totally influenced by these three importers. If they
reduce	 orders,	 Korea's	 footwear	 exports	 decrease
proportionally, apparently regardless of marketing
activities by Korean footwear companies themselves or
trade policies of major advanced countries.
Despite such problems for Korea's footwear industry,
Korean footwear companies have been evaluating their
international competitiveness with positive confidence.
According to a survey conducted in the period of March
10-May 25 in 1990 by the International Trade and Business
Institute of 75 footwear companies in Korea, about 80 per
cent of respondents mentioned that "their international
competitiveness has been worsening in case of low-priced
footwear against newly-emerging competitors such as
Indonesia, China and Thailand, but Korea is still showing
international competitive edge in medium-and high-priced
items in the world market." 2 ° They forecast it will not
be difficult to maintain Korea's international
competitiveness if Korea succeeds in developing high-
quality footwear items. According to them, Korea's
footwear exports to the United States are expected to
decline due to increase in shipments of low-priced items
from newly-emerging countries and the decline in demands
for high-priced items in the market. On the other hand,
Korea's exports to Japan and BC member states, where
demands for high-priced footwear are going up, are
expected to increase. The development is expected to
result in more fierce trade disputes between the EC and
Korea in footwear industry.
2. Case Study of Footwear
"Footwear, like made-up clothing, can be manufactured by
comparatively simple techniques of production. It is
therefore an activity in which many developing countries
have developed a capability to export over the last
decade or 5O."21 This attraction of simple manufacturing
techniques has made the footwear industry one of the
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industrial sectors which have given rise to many trade
disputes between the EC member states and Korea.
Before examining EC-wide protective measures against
Korean footwear later, I will briefly look at protective
measures by individual EC member states against Korean
footwear.The first EC member state to impose import
restraints against Korean footwear was the United
Kingdom. 22 The U.K. started in August 1977 to impose
protective measures against imports from Taiwan with the
approval from the ECC to set a formal quota on imports of
non-leather footwear. The import restraints against
Taiwan, however, gave opportunities to other footwear
exporters to increase their shipments to the United
Kingdom. David Greenaway explains:23
The imposition of controls on Taiwan was followed by
a dramatic increase in imports of leather and non-
leather tootwear into the United Kingdom from Korea
and Italy. Thus, a by-product of the VER agreed with
Taiwan was a VER on Korean footwear.
The U.K. implemented VER measure against Korea in 1979,
two years after the United States had begun to implement
the OMA measure against Korea's non-rubber shoes,
effective from June 28,1977,for the 1977-1981 period.24
The OMA by the United States against Korean footwear,
however, could have been a tundamental factor which led
the U.K. to adopt VER against imports from Korea as a
consequence of Korea's switched exports from the United
States to the U.K.
The second EC member state to restrict footwear imports
from Korea was Italy which began to implement VER against
Korean footwear for the period of March 1, 1988-June 30,
1990. As the world's largest producer of footwear, Italy
has several problems which were forcing it to enforce
import restrajnts.As Riccardo Gallo explains,25
structurally, an industrial structure of Italy grew
up resembling that of a developing country rather
than that of the United States and Germany. For
example, small-and medium-sized firms account for
the great bulk of Italian industrial production.
Politically, management of major companies in Italy
has a strong political orientation--particularly
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cowards the Christian Democrats and Socialist
Parties. The former has been present in government
for last 45 years without interruption and has
required management to pursue both technical and
political goals.
These two points in structural and political terms
contributed to having Italian firms heavily depend on
protective measures by the government, with particular
prominence in the Italian footwear industry.
France was the third EC member state to initiate VER
against Korean footwear. The French measure was
implemented for the period of July 1,1988-June 30,1990.
The import restraints by France and Italy were
implemented during the process of investigations by the
United States leading to the implementation of import
restraints against Korea. The U.S.footwear industry filed
a complaint against Korean non-rubber footwear in 1982.
In addition, the Footwear Industries Association of the
United States requested in 1984 its government to
regulate imports of Korean non-rubber footwear. Finally,
the International Trade Commission (ITC) of the United
States initiated an investigation in 1989 against Korean
non-rubber footwear to establish safeguard measure under
the Article 201 of the U.S.Trade Act(1974). In this
situation, Korean companies switched their export markets
from the United States to the EC to evade possible
restrictive measures by the United States. The result was
an increase in exports of Korean footwear to the EC
market. The u.S.investigations to restrict imports from
Korea influenced the measures taken by France and Italy
to implement quota restrictions against Korean footwear
for March 1,1988-June 30,1990(Italy) and for July 1,1988-
June 30,1990(France) and subsequently EC-wide VER since
July 1,1990 as of December 1993. As seen in Table VII-23,
Korea's footwear exports to the United States increased
by 32.2 per cent from 1986's $1,502 million to 1991's
$1,985 million, compared with exports to the EC up by 255
per cent from $225 million to $799 million in the same
period.
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The EC initiated on Aug.17, 1988 an EC-wide investigation
against footwear from Korea and Taiwan into the EC market
under the GATT XIX Safeguard clause, apart from import
restraints by France and Italy against Korea. The
investigation was a response from complaints by other EC
member states such as Greece, Spain, the U.K., Germany,
Denmark and Benelux countries to extend the import
restrictions against Korean and Taiwanese footwear on an
EC-wide basis rather than only to Italy and France. The
ECC pointed out the reasons to initiate investigations as
±ollows : 2 6
Firstly, the EC's footwear production in 1987 was
dropped by 5 per cent to 1,136 million pairs in
1987 from 198b's 1,194 million pairs. On the other
hand,extra-EC imports of footwear grew by 35 per
cent to 46b million pairs in 1987 from 346 million
pairs in 198b. Such a sharp rise in imports was due
to an increase in shipments from China, Korea and
Taiwan.Imports from these three countries to the EC
market totaled 397 million pairs in 1987, up 45 per
cent from 1986's 273 million pairs.
Secondly, EC member states such as Greece, the
U.K., Benelux countries, Germany and Denmark asked
to impose restrictive measures against Korean and
Taiwanese footwear. Also, other EC member states did
not object to the establisnmenr of import
restrictions on a Community-wice basis.
However, Korea refuted these arguments as is explained in
the following Korean submission to the ECC:27
Firstly, it was inconsistent with GATT regulation to
initiate investigation under GATT XIX clause if the
EC initiates the investigation only against footwear
from Korea and Taiwan, except for China and Brazil.
Under the GATT XIX clause, the investigation should
be initiated against products from all countries
without any differentiation. Especially, it was
unfair to exclude China and Brazil from the list of
investigation because China was the largest exporter
to the EC market and Brazil recorded a substantial
growth in exports to the EC market.
Secondly, Korea's exports of leather footwear to the
EC market, which the EC had insisted as products in
direct competition with EC products, only account
for 27 per cent of total footwear exports to tne EC.
About 63 per cent of tootwear exported to the EC
were plastic footwear, textile tootwear, rubber
footwear, slippers and other kinds of footwear
rather than leather .tootwear.
333
Despite the sharp contrast between the EC and Korea, both
finally concluded an agreement on Feb.23,1990 under which
"Korea decided to restrict its shipments of footwear to
the EC market to 26 million pairs (July-December in
1990), 55.12 million pairs in 1991 and 58.42 million
pairs in 1992."28
The EC's subsequent decision to regulate footwear imports
from Korea with the VERs caused much criticisms in terms
of its selectivity in application of the GATT safeguard
clause: at the stage of the initiation of the safeguard
investigation, the EC had included only Korea and Taiwan
in the list of exporters to the EC market. Korea's
previous argument that--under the safeguard clause of the
GATT, the country to impose import restrictions should
apply this measure against all countries without any
discrimination and compensate any damages caused by the
safeguard measure--was disregarded. As a result, the EC's
investigation violates the GATT clause. In addition, EC's
initiation of safeguard investigation can be interpreted
as a preliminary step towards inducing VERs, considering
absence of causal links between imports and industrial
injuries. Regarding this issue, the BEUC (Bureau Europeen
des Unions de consommateurs), which is the Brussels-based
umbrella group ±or consumer organizations in EC member
states, criticised the ECC's decision as follows:29
Tfle increase in footwear imports from South Korea
and Taiwan which occurs in 198b and 1987 poses no
tangible or long-term threat to EC footwear
production. Indeed, the Commission has failed to
prove any link between rising imports from these
countries and declining production within the EC.
There are some causal relationships between EC-wide
protective measures against Korean footwear and BC's
basic positjon.The EC's footwear industry regards its
position as very fragile,enough to induce appropriate
government policy for protection. This EC footwear
industry's position has been further strengthened by a
strong sense of not being treated as an important sector
for policy implementation at EC and national level. This
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comes, for example, in the following statement out which
relates to the European Parliament:30
In the phase of development in which industry within
the Community finds itself today, it is logical for
interests to be centered on electronics, motor
manufacture, and generally high-technology areas. On
the other hand, we should recognize that in the
European Parliament we have relatively few
opportunities to discuss the problems of the
traditional sectors such as footwear industry, which
however, are extremely important to Mediterranean
countries like Greece.
In this situation, the EC industry's request for
protectionism was spurred by the industry's unique
characteristic, i.e. a domestic oriented production
system; The EC footwear industry has been wholly
dependent upon domestic production of footwear rather
than production by plants overseas. Helen Mimer
argues :31
For firms lacking ties to the international economy,
mounting import competition produced rising demands
for extensive protection. The American (non-rubber)
footwear producers were largely domestic in their
operations in the 1970s. Beginning in the 1960s when
shoe imports began flooding the U.S.market, the
industry association, backed by almost all of the
producers, launched a campaign to obtain tariff
protection. After the early 1970s, the association
and the firms pursued this goal with increasing
intensity.
In the case of Italy, its dependence on intra-EC trade
represents 70-80 per cent of exports. Furthermore, the
average rate of intra-EC trade of EC footwear industry
accounts for about 60 per cent, as seen in Table VII-24.
Table VII-24:EC's Intra-EC Trade Figure in Footwear
Industry( %)
Years	 80	 81	 82	 83	 84	 85	 86	 87	 88	 89
Share of
I nt r a - E C
Trade
62.4 57.8 57.9 56.5 54.7 53.0 57.3 60.5 61.5 58.4
Source:EC Commission( panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.16-28.
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market for footwear from these countries. For example,
'the EC customs duty is 8 per cent for leather shoes;on
the other hand many third countries are setting up a
growing array of tariff and non-tarifi barriers," 33 as
seen in Table VII-25. This relatively low tariff barrier
in the EC has resulted in strong requests by EC footwear
industry to implement NTBs against foreign footwear
imports.
The EC is also aware that penetration by footwear from
cheap labour-cost countries into the EC market is due to
import restraints implemented by Japan, Australia, Canada
and the United States against footwear imports from such
cheap labour-cost countries because they were forced to
switch their export markets to the EC from these
countries. In connection with this matter, the ECC argues
as follows:34
The major suppliers (85 per cent) into the EC
.tootwear market are Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea
arid China whose normal outlets have been blocked by
protective measures or VERs by former customers such
as the United States, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, South Africa and Japan.
Through the review of EC's basic position in footwear
industry, it can be inferred that trade disputes between
the EC and Korea are by-products of the protective
measures by other developed countries and the EC's fear
that this leads to even more exports to the EC.
3. Determinants and Effectiveness of Protectionism in
Footwear Trade
3-1. Determinants of Protectionism in Footwear Trade
There are three determinants of the EC's protectionism
against Korean footwear. First of all, the EC's decision
to implement VERs against Korean footwear had been made
because the EC perceives its market as relatively open to
foreign imports, compared with the degree of openness of
foreign markets to EC footwear. This perception caused
the EC's retaliation against closed markets abroad. This
can be found in trade 0± leather footwear between the EC
and Korea. According to the Korea Foreign Trade
Association,3
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the EC footwear industry is in competitive
disadvantage in textile footwear, ruboer footwear
and plastics footwear. Tnere fore, exports and
production of non-leather footwear has played minor
part in the EC's production and exports of footwear.
The situation is different for leather footwear. The
EC footwear industry has continuously developed
great expertise in the production of leather
footwear. However, Korea's production has also been
shifted to higher valued footwear in recent years,
especially leather footwear.
Under this situation, Korea's exports of leather footwear
to the EC market have been dramatically increasing, in
contrast to the relative sluggishness in EC's exports of
leather sports footwear and leather shoes to the Korean
market, as seen in Table VII-26. Korea's exports of
leather footwear to the EC market increased by 714 per
cent trom 2.9 million pairs in 1985 to 23.6 million pairs
in 1988!
Table VII-26:Korea's Footwear Exports to the EC(1 million
pairs)
Items	 1985	 1988	 Growth
Leather Footwear 	 2.9	 23.6	 714%
Plastics Footwear
	 0.9	 3.6	 300
Textile Footwear	 22.2	 34.6	 55.9
Rubber Footwear	 0.7	 0.9	 28.6
Slippers	 9.5	 23.3	 145
Other Footwear	 0.9	 1.5	 66.7
Total	 37.1	 87.5	 136
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Report on EC and
Korea's Footwear and Consumer Electronics Industries),
p.57.
EC's exports of its products to Korea, however, declined
by 11.8 per cent to 77,549 pairs in 1990 from 1989's
87,959 pairs, in sharp contrast to EC's good performance
in leather footwear exports on a world-wide basis showing
10.4 per cent increase during the same period, as seen in
Table VII-27. As a result, the EC perceives the Korean
market as closed compared with the degree of openness of
the EC market; Korea's demands for EC footwear have not
increased despite a rapid economic development in Korea
because domestic demand increase was met by Korean
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producers. 36 "Although the Korean government has lessened
trade barriers by reducing export subsidies, eliminating
quotas and reducing import tariffs from 20 per cent in
the mid-1980s to 13 per cent in 1990, it has not been
enough to increase EC's footwear exports to Korea."37
For example, Korean footwear manufacturers could be
merged easily because the Korean government encourages
the mergers without imposing transfer income tax and
speicial added value tax. They are also receiving
financial support totaling 200 billion won ($2.5 million)
in the 1992-1994 period for the replacement of obsolete
facilities.
Table VII-27:EC's Leather Footwear Exports to Korea
(pairs)
NIMEXE	 Items	 1989	 1990 Growth
64031900	 Leather Sports Footwear
(Women and Men)	 31489	 24884 -21%
64035995	 Leather Footwear(Men)	 15536	 16855	 8.5
64035999	 Leather Footwear(Women) 19632	 35810 82.4
64039995	 Leather Footwear with
Outer Soles 0± Non-
Leather	 21302	 0	 0
Total EC Leather Footwear
Exports to Korea
	
87959	 77549 -11.8
Total EC Leather Footwear
Exports to the World	 328400000 362500000 10.4
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Report on EC and
Korea's Footwear and Consumer Electronics Industries),
p.61.
The vertical integrations between finished footwear
manufacturers and footwear parts suppliers have been
established under the government support. In addition,
the Korea Footwear Industries Association(KFIA)
supervises export activities by Korean footwear exporters
to prevent cutthroat competition among them through the
establishment of Footwear Trade Order Committee. Finally,
Korean footwear companies have set up Korean Footwear
Research Institute to jointly develop new technology for
the production of high-quality footwear. All these are
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contributing to preventing drastic inflows of foreign
footwear into Korea.
The second major determinant of the EC's protective
measures against Korean footwear is the protective
measures introduced by the United States against Korean
non-rubber footwear in the 1977-1981 period, along with
continuous investigations by the United States against
Korean footwear in 1982, 1984 and 1989, as seen in
Section 2.
Table VII-28:Comparison of Import Restraints by Major
Advanced Countries against Korean Footwear
Countries	 Items	 TR	 Yl
Canada	 Water Proof Rubber
	 AD	 Feb.26,1979-
Shoes	 as of 1993
Australia All Footwear 	 Customs	 Jan.1,1982-
Tariff	 as of 1993
Japan	 Leather Shoes	 Customs	 April 1,1986-
Tariff	 as of 1993
EC	 All Footwear	 VER	 July 1, 1990-
as of 1993
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
pp.18-26.Note:TR=Type of Restraints. YI=Year of Import
Restraints.
This factor was enhanced by the difficulties of Korean
exporters to switch exports to footwear markets other
than the EC market following tight import restraints in
Canada, Australia and Japan, as seen in Table VII-28.
Namely, Korean exporters diverted their exports to the EC
because of import restrictions in other industrialized
countries, especially the United States. For example,
Korea's footwear exports to the United States declined by
23.4 per cent to $1,985 million in 1991 from $2,592
million in 1990, those to Canada went down by 12.5 per
cent to $105 million from $120 million, and those to
Australia declined by 6.5 per cent to $43 million from
$46 million. However, footwear exports to the EC rose by
10.4 per cent in the same period from $724 million to
$799 million. It is, however, noteworthy that footwear
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exports by Korea to Japan grew by 3.7 per cent in the
period to $424 million from $409 million, despite
Japanese tight import restraints against Korean footwear-
-implementation of import quota system in the 1970-
198b(March) period, and customs quota system as of
December in 1993 since April in 1986. Since the decline
of footwear industry in the early 1970s in Japan, Japan's
demand for labor-intensive consumer goods such as
rootwear rapidly increased. In addition, the appreciation
of yen contributed to enabling Korean footwear exporters
to tide over Japanese import restraints with upgrading
strategy.The United States abolished the import
restraints against Korean footwear in 1981. However, the
United States continued investigations against Korean
footwear in the 1980s, based on complaints from the U.S.
footwear industry. Australia imports footwear under the
customs tariff system which allowed limited imports of
footwear from Korea, providing preferential import duties
against Korean footwear. However, Korean companies had
faced difficulties in exporting footwear beyond those
limited quantities because of a disadvantage in price
competitiveness caused by the normal application of
import duties. Canada has been imposing AD duties on
Korea's water-proof rubber shoes only, whilst the EC has
been implementing very stringent import restraints
against Korea. Namely, all kinds of Korean footwear
exports to the EC market were under the VERs mutually
agreed in 1990.
The third determinant of Ec's protective measures was a
huge increase in shipments of Korean footwear to a
specific member state in the EC. By 1986, Italy was the
largest consumer of Korean footwear among EC member
states. Italy's share of Korea's exports to the EC
market, however, began to decline since 1986 in terms of
volume and value. Specifically, its ranking for imports
of Korean footwear in the EC's four largest consuming
member states went down to the third place in 1987, to
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±ourth place in 1988-1990, and then third place in 1991,
as seen in Table VII-29.
Table VII-29:Korea t s Exports of Footwear to Individual EC
Member States in Terms of Market Share(%)
Years	 Rankings	 Member	 Share	 Share
States	 in terms of	 in terms of
export value export volume
1985	 1.	 Italy	 26.4	 26.6
2. U.K.	 22.4	 24.2
3. France	 17.4	 19.1
4. Germany	 13.5	 11.2
1986	 1.	 Italy	 23.7	 26.0
2. France	 20.3	 22.5
3. U.K.	 17.7	 19.4
4. Germany	 16.2	 11.6
1987	 1.	 France	 25.3	 26.8
2. Germany	 17.7	 12.9
3. Italy	 16.4	 19.2
4. U.K.	 16.2	 17.7
1988	 1.	 France	 21.4	 23.4
2. Germany	 19.4	 14.5
3. U.K.	 15.2	 16.6
4. Italy	 14.5	 16.8
1989	 1.	 Germany	 23.3	 18.4
2. France	 18.4	 21.1
3. U.K.	 17.1	 15.8
4. Italy	 15.7	 17.5
1990	 1.	 U.K.	 30.9	 27.2
2. Germany	 18.9	 15.6
3. France	 15.6	 17.5
4. Italy	 12.5	 15.2
1991	 1.	 U.K.	 24.9	 21.7
2. Germany	 17.9	 16.3
3. Italy	 17.6	 22.5
4. France	 14.4	 14.5
Source:Korea Footwear Industries Association (Footwear
Exports Statistics), p.1.
On the other hand, the position was also down to second
in 1987 and 1988, third in 1989, and fourth in 1990 in
terms of export volume. However, Korea's exports to Italy
in terms of export volume again rapidly rose in 1991,
indicating that EC-wjde VER since 1990 helped Korea's
exports to specific EC member state due to possible
342
concentration of Korea's footwear exports to a specific
EC member state within the EC-wide VER quota. Italy
o±ficially asked the EC to impose VER measure against
Korean footwear imports on July 20, 1987, and began to
regulate them since March 1,1988.
Following Italy, France became the largest consumer for
Korean footwear in 1987 and 1988 in terms of export value
and volume. Surprised by the rapid rise in shipments of
footwear from Korea to its market, France also requested
the EC to impose VER on Korean footwear on October
13,1987 and got an approval from the EC to apply the VER
against Korean footwear imported into the French market
tor the period between July 1,1988-June 30,1990. Again,
the French position in the list of importers for Korean
footwear slipped to second in 1989, from the largest
consumer in 1988, then third in 1990 and fourth in 1991
in terms of export value. In terms of export volume, the
French position was also down to second in 1990 and
fourth in 1991. This successful experiences of VERs,
implemented by Italy and France against Korean footwear
enabled the EC to adopt the EC-wide VER later, rather
than other protective measures such as AD action.
In contrast to other exported products such as textiles
and clothing, iron and steel products, and consumer
electronics, Japan has not played any role in EC's
protectionism against Korean footwear. That was due to
Japan's very different position in footwear trade,
compared with that of other industries mentioned above.
Japan has been recording a trade deficit in footwear
trade, specializing in imports of ±ootwear, rather than
exports which can be found as general trend in most
industrial sectors in Japan, as seen in Table VII-30.
The early industrial structure adjustment by Japan to
other industries other than footwear became the major
reason that Korea should not be regarded as a "second
Japan." The EC has had no experience of any industrial
damage from Japan's footwear industry, not, therefore,
providing any causal relationship between EC's experience
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of industrial injury from Japanese exports and its
protective measures against Korean footwear.
Table VII-30:Footwear Trade in Japan ($1, 000 , %)
Years	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Exports 44,290 37,842 36,954	 41,736	 52,089
(0.32)	 (0.24)	 (0.21)	 (0.22)	 (0.22)
Imports 49,036 784,196 1,107,715	 1,116,480 1,283,128
(2.87)	 (3.89)	 (4.90)	 (4.78)	 (4.52)
Balance-446,04b -74b,354 -1,070,761 -1,074,744 -1,231,039
Source: United	 Nat ions( International	 Trade	 Statistics
Yearbook, 1990, Vol.11), p.216.
Note	 :Figures in parentheses are Japanese share in
world's total trade figure.
3-2. Effectiveness of Protectionism in Footwear Trade
There are no studies about the impact of the EC's import
restraints against Korean footwear exports to the EC
market. However, there are several analyses of the
ettectiveness (cost and benefit comparison and import
value change in a position of importers) of import
restraints by other developed countries against footwear
imports from developing countries, including Korea.
In connection with U.S.import restrictions against
developing countries, Gary Hu±bauer, Diane Berliner and
Kimberly Elliott analysed the effect of OMAs for non-
rubber footwear trom Korea and Taiwan to the U.S. market,
ef±ective between Jun.28,1977-Jun.30,1981. According to
them, 3 8
cost of restraints to U.S.consumers .tor rhe year of
1981 alone reached $700 million. However, gains from
restraints to U.S.producers remained at $250 million
for the year, having $450 million deficit in the
U.S.economy for the year alone. Therefore, costs of
restraints to U.S.consumers per job saved were
$55,000 in 1981 with gains from restraints to
U.S.producers per job tor the year were confined to
$2,000.
During the period of restraints, the export volume of
footwear from Korea and Taiwan was reduced by 27.8 per
cent from 225.2 million pairs in 1977 to 162.5 million
pairs in 1981, as seen in Table VII-31. However, the
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export value went up by 62 per cent from $576 million to
$934 million. By comparing export volume and export
value, it is clear that Korean and Taiwanese exporters
used an up-grading strategy to the U.S. market to offset
the restraints of the export volume under the OMA.
Table VII-31:Footwear Imports Affected from Taiwan and
Korea in USA(million pairs, $M)
Year	 Volume	 Value
	
Before Restraints 1975	 119.3	 210
	
1976	 199.6	 444
	
During Restraints 1977	 225.2	 576
	
1978	 147.8	 558
	
1979	 149.3	 630
	
1980	 181.0	 883
	
1981	 162.5	 934
After Restraints	 1982	 273.8	 1398
	
1983	 362.3	 1780
	
1984	 425.4	 2131
Sources:Hufbauer,Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner and
Kimberly Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United
States--31 Case Studies), p.206.
Table VII-32:Output of Footwear Industry in USA(million
pairs, $M)
Years	 Volume	 Value
Before Restraints	 1975	 413.1	 3,145
1976	 422.5	 3,520
During Restraints	 1977	 430.9	 3,464
1978	 412.9	 3,799
1979	 402.6	 4,269
1980	 387.9	 4,620
1981	 372.0	 4,834
After Restraints 	 1982	 342.4	 4,186
1983	 344.3	 4,758
1984	 298.5	 4,053
Source:Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Diane T.Berliner and Kimberly
Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United States---31
Case Studies) ,p.211.
This conclusion can be reached through analysing
consumption and market share of imports. Even though
consumption of non-rubber footwear in the United States
declined by 6.9 per cent to 739.2 million pairs in 1981
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from 1977's 793.6 million pairs, the value of footwear
consumption rose by 41.7 per cent to $7,123 million from
$5,026 million for the same period.
Despite the OMA regulation, the non-rubber footwear
production in the United States declined by 13.7 per cent
trom 430.9 million pairs in 1977 to 372 million pairs in
1981, as seen in Table VII-32. However, in terms of
production value, the U.S. production of non-rubber
footwear rose by 39.5 per cent to $4,834 million from
$3,464 million. That means the U.S.producers of non-
rubber shoes must also have been concentrating on
developing high-quality footwear to meet consumer's
tastes, importing low-and medium-priced footwear from
foreign countries.
However, the most important thing is that after OMA
restraints, the production of non-rubber shoes has been
declining, compared with that in the periods before and
during restraints in terms of production volume and
value. The same situation is also found in employment,
industry profits and industry capacity utilization, as
seen in Table VII-33.
Table VII-33:Employment, Profits and Capacity Utilization
in U.S.Non-Rubber Footwear Industry($M, %)
Years	 EM	 PR	 ICU
	
Before Restraints 1975
	 136,000	 181	 69.1
	
197b	 144,000	 235	 75.9
	
During Restraints 1977 	 137,000	 123	 76.0
	
1978	 138,000	 150	 75.2
	
1979	 130,000	 198	 75.5
	
1980	 124,600	 323	 80.0
	
1981	 127,700	 423	 80.5
After Restraints	 1982	 121,800	 390	 73.9
	
1983	 117,300	 499	 72.1
	
1984	 108,200	 310	 63.0
Source:Hufbauer,Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner and Kimberly
Ann Elliott (Trade Protection in the United States---31
Case Studies), pp.212-214.
Notes:EM=Employment. PR=Profits. ICU=Industry Capacity
Utilization. In case of employment, it is average number
of employees in the year.
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Therefore, OMAs between the United States and Korea and
Taiwan can be evaluated, in terms of export value, as
useless in preventing imports of non-rubber footwear from
these two countries, because Korean and Taiwanese
exporters adopted the upgrading strategy to offset the
loss of export volume. Therefore, David Yoffi&s approach
seems to be applicable for this case. However, the most
important point is that production and employment in
U.S.non-rubber footwear industry has been declining
during the period of OMA restraint.The problem lies in
the basic weakness of international competitiveness of
the U.S. non-rubber footwear industry. Any trade
restrictions against foreign countries, which have a
stronger international competitiveness than the United
States, are bound to be useless in protecting production
and job employment in the United States. In contrast,
import restraints against foreign products which have a
fragile international competitive strength will be
decisive factor to reverse growing imports from them.
Table VII-34:Estimated Cost of Non-Leather Footwear
Protection in the U.K.(1982)(f.M)
Cost and Revenue	 Value
a	 Dead-Weight Loss to Consumers	 1.4
b	 Production Efficiency Loss 	 2.5
c	 i)Transfer to Taiwanese and South
Korean Suppliers	 7.5
ii)Transfer to EC, EFTA and
Mediterranean Suppliers	 22.4
iii)Transfer to Other Suppliers 	 9.8
d	 Tariff Revenue	 24.1
e	 Increase in Profits to Domestic
Producers	 49.9
f	 Total Loss to U.K.Consumers 	 117.5
g	 Total Loss to U.K.Economy
43.5(117.5-
24.1-49.9)
Source:Davjd Greenaway,and Brian Hindley(What Britain
Pays for VERfl, p.140.
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There are some studies regarding the analyses of import
restraints by the United Kingdom. David Greenaway and
Brian Hindley analysed the effectiveness of VERs
concluded between the United Kingdom and Taiwan and Korea
in the late 1970s. Their calculation of estimated costs
of non-leather footwear protection in the United Kingdom
from tariffs and VER combined in 1982 is as seen in Table
VII-34 .39
The total loss to the U.K.consumers through the
application of VER in trade with Taiwan and Korea for
non-leather footwear was £117.5 million. However, total
revenue originated ±rom the import restraints was only
£74 million(d+e). Therefore, the U.K.economy has a net
loss of £43.5 million(f-d-e) through the VER. The VER5
applied to Taiwanese and Korean exporters resulted in
raising unit export prices of non-leather footwear for
U.K.consumers.'° As a result, costs to the U.K.consumers
0± the VER were far greater than benefits to the
U.K.producers. In addition, other costs such as expenses
for lobbying import protective measures were not included
in the total costs of VER protection. If such values are
calculated, total costs are even higher.41
The most important point is that beneficiaries for the
U.K.VER measures were third countries, such as EC member
states other than the U.K., EFTA and Mediterranean
countries. As the U.K. had been implementing import
restraints against footwear from Taiwan and Korea, Italy
took the opportunity to increase its shipments of
footwear to the U.K.market because no comparable
restraints could be taken by the United Kingdom against
Italy, a member state of the BC.
Thirdly, Wendy Takacs and L. Alan also compare the costs
to U.K.consumers, caused by VERs against foreign footwear
imports from Korea and Taiwan in 1979, with the benefits
to the economy from protecting the U.K.footwear industry-
-the jobs which might be saved by preventing some foreign
competition. According to them,42
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in 1979(when all the present restrictions were in
place), the quotas prevented the displacement of, at
most, l,0b4 workers. Even the most pessimistic
calculation of rate of re-employment indicated
adjustment costs of less than £10 million (f10,000
per job saved), compared with total costs to society
of the restrictions of £57 million--E53,500 per job
saved (all at 1979 prices). Average earnings were
about £4,500 .tor a male footwear industry worker in
1979, so the total cost of a saved job was nearly 12
times annual wages every year that the protection
continued. The adjustment costs avoided by the
protection are far smaller than the costs of
protection.
However, I evaluate the success or failure 0± aims of
EC's protective measures against Korean footwear through
changes in exports from Korea to the EC market. France
began to impose VER against Korean footwear, effective on
July 1,1988 and, by June 30, 1990 when the EC-wide VER
had been implemented. Korea's exports of footwear to the
French market changed as Table VII-35 shows:
Table VII-35:Korea's Exports of Footwear to France($1000,
Years	 Total Exports	 Exports to France(B)	 B/A
To the World(A)
1985	 1,571,221	 23,528	 1.5
198b	 2,109,301	 45,630	 2.2
1987	 2,824,201	 95,363	 3.4
1988	 3,800,b59	 117,648	 3.1
1989	 3,587,462	 86,297	 2.4
1990	 4,307,057	 112,987	 2.6
1991	 3,835,944	 115,490	 3.0
Source : Korea Footwear Industries Association( Footwear
Exports Statistics) ,p.1.
Compared to exports in 1987, Korea's footwear exports in
1988 to France increased by 23.4 per cent to $117.648
million from $95.363 million. Despite this, the share of
footwear exports to the French market declined to 3.1 per
cent from 3.4 per cent; the export performance of
footwear to France was sluggish compared with that to
other markets. Furthermore, tootwear exports to France in
1989 decreased by 26.6 per cent to $86.297 million from
the previous year's figure, whilst the share of French
market in total footwear exports by Korea declined to 2.4
per cent in 1989 from 1988's 3.1 per cent. Therefore, the
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VER applied by France to footwear imports from Korea was
lound, through the comparison of imports before and after
import restraints, to be effective in slowing the growth
or imports. Theretore, David Yoffie's approach seems to
be inapplicable in France-Korea footwear VER case. In
addition, it is very interesting to note that Korea's
exports to the French market since 1990, the year when
EC-wide VER became effective on Korean footwear, has been
on an increasing trend with share of exports to France
also rising. Therefore, it is certain that the EC-wide
VER against Korean footwear provided an opportunity for
Korean exporters to increase their exports to the French
market because Korea possibly concentrated on exports to
France within the limit of EC-wide VER quota.
Italy started to restrict imports of Korean footwear,
effective during the period March 1,1988-June 30,1990,
under VER signed with Korea. Korea's exports of footwear
to the Italian market changed as Table VII-36 shows:
Table VII-36:Korea's Exports of Footwear to Italy($1000,
Year	 Total Exports	 Exports to Italy(B) B/A
To the World(A)
1985	 1,571,221	 35,853	 2.3
1986	 2,109,301	 53,294	 2.5
1987	 2,824,201	 1,877	 2.2
1988	 3,800,659	 79,954	 2.1
1989	 3,587,4o2	 73,878	 2.059
1990	 4,307,057	 90,195	 2.1
1991	 3,835,944	 140,818	 3.7
Source Korea Footwear Industries Association( Footwear
Exports Statistics), p.1.
Korea's exports of footwear to Italy in 1988 grew by 29.2
per cent to $79.954 million from $61.877 million in 1987.
However, the generally increasing trend was reversed in
1989, with exports declining by 7.6 per cent to $73.878
million. Furthermore, the share of footwear exports to
Italy as a proportion of Korea's total exports declined
from 1987's 2.2 per cent to 2.1 per cent in 1988, 2.059
per cent in 1989 and 2.1 per cent in 1990. Even though
Korea's tootwear exports to Italy temporarily increased
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in 1988, the increasing trend was reversed in 1989.
However, Korea's exports of footwear to Italy again
became an increasing trend from 1990, the first year when
the VER, previously concluded at individual EC member
states' level, was changed to that of EC-wide. The VER
applied to Korea's footwear exports to Italy was also
±ound, through the comparison of imports before and after
import restraints, to be effective in slowing the
increasing trend of shipments of footwear from Korea.
Therefore, David Yotfie's approach also seems to be
inapplicable in case of Korea's footwear exports to
Italy.
However, the decline of exports to Italy and France in
1989, compared with the previous year, can not be
regarded as specifically resulting from VER5, applicable
only to the two EC member states. It was caused, rather,
by self-restrictions of exports to EC generally by Korean
exporters following EC member states' complaints of
drastic increases in imports from Korea since 1989. At
the same time, Korean companies easily diversified their
markets for footwear to other EC member states than
France and Italy, as a consequence of VERs by the two
countries. This was possible due to strong international
competitiveness of Korean footwear.
Table VII-37:Korea's Exports of Footwear to the EC
($ 1000 , million pairs)
Years Total Exports
	 Exports to EC
	 B/A
To the World(A)	 Value(B)	 Volume(C)
1985	 1,571,221	 135,576 37.27
	 8.6
1986	 2,109,301	 224,500 54.86
	 10.6
1987	 2,824,201	 377,435 78.90	 13.4
1988	 3,800,659	 550,756 84.74
	 14.5
1989	 3,587,462	 470,213 66.47	 13.1
1990	 4,307,057	 723,796 74.91	 16.8
1991	 3,835,944	 799,975 71.47	 20.9
Source: Korea Footwear Industries Association( Footwear
Exports Statistics), p.1.
In the case of the EC, it began to regulate imports of
footwear from Korea on a Community-wide basis, effective
from July 1, 1990 to date(as of Dec.1993). Korea's
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exports of footwear to the EC market changed as Table
viI-37 shows. Korea's footwear exports to the EC in terms
of value have been continuously increasing since
1985,with the exception of 1989 when the figure recorded
a temporary decline of 14.6 per cent compared with that
of 1988. The year of 1989 was the worst for Korea's
lootwear exports to the EC market as VERs signed with
France and Italy became effective and other EC member
states had also requested to impose import restraints
against Korean footwear from August that year.
However, Korean footwear exports have increased since the
EC-wide VER in EC-Korea footwear trade was implemented.
Korea's exports of footwear in 1990 increased by 53.9 per
cent to $723.796 million from 1989's $470.213 million,
and in 1991 grew by 10.5 per cent to $799.975 million
from the 1990's export figure. Korea's footwear exports
to the EC market represented 20.9 per cent of its total
footwear exports in 1991, the highest share recorded so
far in the history of EC-Korea footwear trade.Thus, David
Yoffie's approach seems to be applicable in the EC-Korea
footwear trade. Korea definitely used upgrading strategy
to overcome the restriction of export volume to the EC
market under the EC-Korea VER. Specifically, Korea's
export volume of footwear to the EC market in 1991
declined by 4.6 per cent to 71.476 million pairs from
74.914 million pairs in 1990, despite the increase in
export value in the same period.
In contrast to the surge in shipments to the EC market,
Korea's footwear exports to the United States have been
declining since 1988--reduced to $i,985.040 million in
1991 from $2,329.050 million in 1988. The Korean
companies' subsequent market switching strategy, from the
United States to the EC, also contributed to increasing
exports to the EC. Therefore, the most important factor
which decided the ef±ectiveness of EC's protective
measures against Korean footwear was the international
competitiveness of those products. Korean footwear's
strong international competitiveness enabled Korean
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exporters to adopt market switching or product upgrading
strategies at will.
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Chapter VIII. BC/Korea Consumer Electronics Industry and
the Bilateral Trade Dispute on Color Television
A Brief Summary of Chapter VIII
BC'S Consumer Electronics Industry
The EC consumer electronics industry has successfully
carried out its structural adjustment of transferring
cheap-labour intensive assembly process to offshore
plants, minimizing labour dependency through intensive
automation of production facilities and participating in
comprehensive R&D activities for the development of new
high value-added items under the Community-wide support.
However, the EC consumer electronics industry still has
intrinsic problems with consumer electronics companies
heavily dependent upon imports of Japanese-made
electronics parts and equipment. The characteristic
distribution in the EC--the reduction of direct influence
by producers and the growth of volume purchasers who now
exert considerable influence--could cause some weakness
in EC's CTV industry in case of the penetration of
cheaper	 foreign products. The industry has been
experiencing job losses as a result of automated
production	 and	 strategies of	 rationalization and
reorganization, rather than the effects of imports.
As a result of its specific transmission/reception
method, the EC CTV market was protected against foreign
imports, unlikely the United States, until 1981. The EC
originally imposed restraints against CTV with large-size
screen, mainly Japanese CTV, and did not fully concern
inflows of small-screen CTVs, as most demand and
production in the BC had been centralized to CTVs with
large screen. However, the EC market was gradually
penetrated by East Asian countries, due to the steady
change in demand towards small-size screen CTV, which
increased from 13.3 per cent of total EC demand in 1980
to 38.1 per cent in 1989. Spurred by the rapid rise in
imports from East Asian countries, the ECC imposed AD
measures against CTV from these countries.
Korea's Consumer Electronics Industry
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Korean consumer electronics industry was developed
rapidly, in production and exports, by maintaining
massive assembly of low-and medium-quality products
helped by foreign technology. However, the Korean
industry has several problems in promoting upstream
strategy for the development of high value-added items.
First of all, Korea depends heavily upon imports of
electronics components for the manufacture of finished
products. Korea is also heavily reliant on technology
licensing agreements with foreign technology-owned
companies for the production of current electronics
products, and for the development of new products. Korean
companies changed their overseas marketing strategy from
Original Equipment Manufacturing(OEM) to Own Brand
Manufacturing(OBM). The change in marketing method
brought into effect two factors damaging to Korean
companies: Firstly, original technology developers
endeavour to protect their technology from foreign
companies in an effort to stay predominant in world-wide
marketing of electronics products, and secondly, Korean
companies face protective measures from advanced
countries since using their own brand names. Korean
electronics industry is losing its price competitiveness
against products manufactured in other low labour cost
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, with
major Trans-National Corporations(TNCs), such as Philips,
having moved their assembly process to plants in such low
labour-cost countries. Therefore, Korean companies are
attacked on all sides--price disadvantage against new
producing countries and import protective measures from
advanced countries.
Determinants of Protectionism in CTV Trade
--General Determinants
The Ec's decision to implement AD measure against Korean
CTV had been made following its previous experience of
industrial damage caused by Japanese exports to the EC
market. Therefore, Korea's exports of CTV to the EC
market became a target of EC's import restraints at a
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time when the EC were acutely aware of industrial injury
from Japanese imports.
--Specific Determinants
Firstly, the problems of EC's CTV industry, such as
built-in protection of transmission/reception method and
failure in demand forecast centering on large-screen CTV,
contributed as a determinant of protectionism in EC-Korea
trade.
Secondly, the political expediency of SC'S trade policy
mechanism, favoring protectionism rather than industrial
structure adjustment, contributed the EC to moving toward
protectionism. This is reflected in the fact that the ECC
disregarded the proposal of the Electronics Industries
Association of Korea(EIAK) which fully accepts the
request from the European Association of Consumer
Electronics Manufacturers(EACEM) to restrict export
volume to the EC market voluntarily.
Thirdly, the great political power of EACEM acted as a
determinant of EC's protectionism: most complaints by the
EACEM against Korean consumer electronics products were
accepted by the ECC for implementation of import
restraints.
Fourthly, the experiences of SC member states by import
restraints against Korean CTV seems to influence on SC'S
decision disregarding the agreement between EIAK and
EACEM, along with EC's prepossessed idea that Korean
exporters are untrustworthy in observing promise of
quantitative restrictions under VER. Despite British VER
and French residual quota restriction against Korean CTV,
Korea's CTV exports to the two SC member states sharply
increased, making the SC adopt AD measure rather than
VER.
Fifthly, the dramatic increases in shipments of Korean
CTV in a very short period, along with the large
production capacity and transshipment and switching
strategy of Korean exporters, acted as one of other major
determinants of EC's protective measures against Korea.
Effectiveness of Protectionism in CTV Trade
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--David Yoffie t s Approach
David Yoffie's approach seems to be inapplicable in the
case of CTV sector. The EC's AD measure had been very
effective in restricting market penetration by Korean CTV
producers into the EC. The EC's CTV industry has been
experiencing job losses due to unique characteristic of
the industry. Even though the EC's measure to prevent
imports from Korea was very successful, import
penetration of the EC market from other sources has been
under a continuous increasing trend, indicating that
other exporters have been exploiting opportunities
arising from not having to compete with Korean
manufacturers in the EC market. Therefore, approaches
considering only general economic or political factors
without regard to any specific characteristic of the
industry are premature in drawing a conclusion when
evaluating the effectiveness of protectionism.
--Patrick Messerlin's Approach
His approach is applicable in the EC-Korea CTV case.
Korea's small-screen CTV exports to the EC peaked in 1987
with $118 million, reduced to $103 million in 1988, to
$25 million in 1989, to $16 million in 1990 and finally
to $15 million in 1991. In addition, Korea's market share
of the Ec's total imports reduced from 46.7 per cent in
1985 to 12.5 per cent in 1990. Therefore, the EC'S AD
measure was very effective in reversing the growing
imports of CTV from Korea to the EC market.
1. Background Information for Case Study in Consumer
Electronics Industry
1-1. General Trend of World Trade in Consumer Electronics
Industry
The electronics industry "provides three broad categories
of products and services; components, which are the basis
of any electronics equipment or system; computers,
consisting of hardware, peripherals, software, and office
and industrial automation applications; and consumer
electronics." In the electronics industry, consumer
electronics include video equipment(colour and monochrome
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television receivers, video recorders and reproducers),
audio equipment(portable/personal audio equipment,
packaged audio system, and audio components/separates in
car audio) and recorded and unrecorded media for sound
and video recording. The development stages of consumer
electronics can be summarized as follows:2
In the early stages of consumer electronics, the
industry came up with a radically new product every
other decade which consequently generated an
enormous amount of sales. These innovations were
successively the gramophone (1920s), the radio
(1930s) and after the second world war, the black-
and-white television (1950s), the color television
(1960s) followed by hi-f i equipment (1970s). Most
recently, in the 1980s, the novelty was the video
recorder and related equipment, along with CD-player
and digital audio tape(DAT). Many industrialists
also believe that high definition television (HDTV)
will become the next great innovation in the 1990s.
Since the Second World War, the consumer electronics
industry emerged as one of the most dynamic growth sector
among major manufacturing industries. Robert Ballance
attributes the development in consumer electronics to
"the rapid expansion of post-war demand(notably for
radios and television sets) which was due to the rise in
real incomes, and successful waves of technological
advances which enabled producers to avoid the limitation
of market saturation by reducing prices and by
introducing new products or improved models."3
The world-wide production in consumer electronics peaked
in 1988 with $72.2 billion worth of output. However, the
production figure began to decline in 1990, to $71.99
billion, down 0.29 per cent from the 1988 figure and to
$71.56 billion in 1991, down 0.89 per cent from the
1988's figure. The decline in production value was caused
by the world-wide trend of production costs being
continuously reduced, a characteristic of consumer
electronics production.
Firstly, "a vast proportion of world demand for consumer
electronics was confined to advanced Western countries."4
In 1988, 50.7 per cent of world's total demand ($68.1
billion) was from the United States and the EC. All other
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countries,excepting the EC, Japan and the United States,
only represented 22.3 per cent of the world demand. The
limitation in demands for consumer electronics caused
keen price competition among producers and exporters of
these products, contributing to lowering the prices.
Secondly, there was continuous expansion of the number of
consumer electronics producing countries. "For several
decades, there were only three countries in the world to
produce and export consumer electronics products--the
United States, Japan and the BC. However, a second group
of countries called NIBs became increasingly important in
this sector." 5
 For example, South Korea represented 11.1
per cent of world's total production of consumer
electronics in 1988. Also, two Korean firms--Samsung and
Goldstar--ranked ninth and tenth, respectively, in the
world's 16 largest consumer electronics producing
companies as of 1989. The active NIB's involvement was
expedited by such facts as "unit costs of circuitry and
components fell substantially, making the labour costs of
assembly even more significant, and TNCs advance into
low-wage countries for the production process of
assembly." 6
 Before the offshore production by TNCs in
NIEs' markets, the NIEs were not in a position to
participate in consumer electronics market in earnest due
to high costs of entry--such as R&D. In addition to NIBs,
a third group of countries produce mainly for their
internal market: China, the USSR, and,	 to a lesser
extent, Brazil.
As a result of the change in structure of the world
consumer electronics production, the U.S.consumer
electronics industry has almost disappeared. Only one
company, zenith, was included in the list of the world's
16 largest consumer electronics companies in 1989. In
contrast, there were four BC companies, two Korean firms,
and nine Japanese firms in the same list.
The world production share of U.S.consumer electronics
producers, therefore, remained at 7.9 per cent in 1988,
which was even lower than 11.1 per cent share of South
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Korea and represented merely 16.8 per cent ($5.48/$32.2B)
of Japanese production, as seen in Table VIII-1.
Table VIII-1:Consumer Electronics Basic Figures(1988)
($B,ex-factory, %)
Production	 Imports Exports Balance Market IMR
EC	 10.7 (15.7)	 9.3	 1.2	 -8.1	 18.8 49.5%
Japan 32.2 (47.2)
	 0.7	 16.8	 +16.1	 16.1	 4.3
U.S.A.	 5.4 (7.9)	 11.2	 0.9	 -10.3	 15.7	 71.3
Korea	 7.6 (11.1)	 0.5	 5.2	 +4.7	 3	 16.6
Rest of
World 11.1 (16.3)	 -	 -	 -	 12.2
Total 68.2 (100)	 -	 -	 -	 68.1
Source:EC Commission(Improving the Functions of Consumer
Electronics Market), p.s.
Note	 :IMR=Import Ratio. The figures in parentheses are
shares in world's production.
There were net imports of consumer electronics products
by the EC and the United States, whereas there were
negligible imports from Japan and Korea. Therefore, Japan
is the principal consumer electronics producer and the EC
and the United States principal consumers, under the
trend of the U.S.production declining sharply.1
Table VIII-2:Major Consumer Electronics Companies in the
World
Rankings	 Companies	 Countries
1. Matsushita	 Japan
2. Sony	 Japan
3. Philips	 Netherlands
4. Toshiba	 Japan
5. Hitachi	 Japan
6. Thomson	 France
7. JVC	 Japan
8. Mitsubishi	 Japan
9. Samsung	 Korea
10. Goldstar	 Korea
11. Sharp	 Japan
12. Pioneer	 Japan
13. Sanyo	 Japan
14. Grundig	 Subsidiary of Thomson
15. Nokia	 Finland
16. Zenith	 U.S.A.
Source:EC	 Commission(Improving	 the	 Functioning	 of
Consumer Electronics Market), p.7.
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Thirdly, there was a Japanese dominance of consumer
electronics production. Japan accounted for 47.2 per cent
of the world's production in 1988 along with 23.6 per
cent share in world total demand. Japan has a $16.1
billion production capacity surplus. These Japanese
companies contributed to the decline in price of
consumer electronics by the adoption of various
strategies. The ECC attributes the price reduction in
consumer electronics world-wide to the Japanese
production strategy as follows:8
Japanese attention was focused on economic
reconstruction and the need to develop value-added
export-oriented manufacturing industry in order to
pay for imports of raw materials with which the
country is scarcely endowed. The result was the
major strategic thread of the electronics
industry:cost-effective high-volume production of
reliable components and final products based
initially on low labour cost but evolving rapidly to
highly automated methods. Such strategy rejects the
option of limited production for high price sales
with high margins, and chooses instead to
manufacture in such volume as to bring the price
down to a level acceptable to a wide market and so
gain greater profits albeit on small margins.
Fourthly, there has been a continued reduction of
production costs due to intensified R&D activities. For
example, "today television sets require only one-third
the number of components used in 1970 while over 70 per
cent of chassis assembly is automated. As a result,
production time has been reduced to one-tenth of its
former levels."9
In the process of change in world's consumer electronics
market structure, there are two clear phenomena. One is
the aggressive industrial policy implementation by the
world's major consumer electronics producing countries,
to strengthen their international competitiveness and the
other is the expansion of cooperative relations between
the world's major consumer electronics producing
companies to survive growing competition in the industry.
Firstly, "consumer electronics in Japan were given the
'usual treatment' reserved for targeted growth sectors.
Developing countries also adopted very active industrial
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policies for the consumer electronics sector as part of
their export-led industrialization strategy. France had
adopted a long-term strategy explicitly for consumer
electronics, mainly by encouraging Thomson as the major
television manufacturer and by implementing protective
measures." 1 ° In addition, the United States and the EC
adopted a defensive strategy to protect their consumer
electronics industry by implementing OMAs or AD measures.
Secondly,	 "strategic	 partnerships	 and	 cooperative
alliances became vital in view of the rising
technological complexity and the scale of economies in
the development and production of new products.
Confronted with large capital requirements and shortened
product-life cycles, firms may share benefits of these
alliances." 1
 Such a trend was inevitable because the
future competitiveness of consumer electronics industry
depends on the timing of introduction of new products
satisfying new consumer demands. In addition, "competing
companies can try to ensure that their particular format
becomes the industry standard by forming strategic
alliances with each other."2
In sum, consumer electronics is an industrial sector
where active industrial and trade policies by developed
and developing countries collide with each other.
Furthermore, companies in developed countries have
offshore processing of labour-intensive products, and
form strategic alliances to overcome challenges from
NIEs' companies. In addition, governments of developed
countries have been implementing various measures to
protect their consumer electronics from foreign imports.
In this situation, active neo-mercantilist industrial
policies for consumer electronics by NIEs have been the
cause of the greatest number of trade disputes between
developed countries and NIEs since the late 1980s.
1-2. EC's Conswner Electronics Industry
The ECC emphasises the importance of EC's electronics
industry as follows:13
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The Community markets for the electronics and
information technology industries, along with
telecommunications, are worth some ECU 175 billion,
or about 5 per cent the twelve's combined GDF. By
the year 2000, this turnover should reach some 10
per cent of GDP. The importance of these industries
also derives from their development of enabling
technologies with widespread economic and social
impact, which play an essential part in the
competitiveness of industry and the quality of
services.
Within the electronics industry, the consumer electronics
is one of four major sectors doing major contribution to
production and consumption, as seen in Tables VIII-3 and
VIII-4. In 1990, production of consumer electronics
accounted for 12.53 per cent of total EC electronics
production. Furthermore, EC consumption of consumer
electronics represented 17.35 per cent of total EC
electronics consumption. The consumer electronics sector
is, however, the major contributor to the worsening trade
deficit in the EC's electronics sector: EC'S trade
deficit recorded in consumer electronics sector
represented 39.06 per cent of the EC's total trade
deficit in the electronics sector.
Table VIII-3:EC' s Electronics Production(miflion Ecu)
Years	 EC	 COE	 TE	 CE	 Total
1981	 777	 14746	 16379	 8671	 47573
1982	 8576	 19580	 17593	 9850	 55599
1983	 9762	 23961	 18543	 8064	 60330
1984 12368	 29365	 20601	 7808	 70142
1985 13228	 35388	 22390	 8895	 79901
1986 13615	 35326	 22226	 12111	 83278
1987 13772	 36053	 22584	 12526	 84935
1988 14406	 41553	 22939	 12906	 91804
1989 15413	 45663	 24328	 12243	 97647
1990 15969	 49090	 25798	 13020	 103877
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-2.
Notes :EC=Electronics Components.
COE=Computer and Office Equipment.
TE=Telecommunications Equipment.
CE=Corisumer Electronics.
The EC's electronics industry, with the exception of
consumer electronics sector, recorded continuous
increases in production in the 1980-1990 period, a trend
366
also found in the figures for consumption, as seen in
Table VIII-3 and VIII-4.
Table VIII-4:EC's Electronics Consumption(million Ecu)
Years	 EC	 COE	 TE	 CE	 Total
1981	 7101	 17272	 14113	 12200	 50686
1982	 7760	 22572	 15136	 13487	 58955
1983	 9279	 27791	 16302	 13318	 66690
1984	 13197	 35048	 18250	 12925	 79420
1985	 13992	 40543	 20184	 14304	 89023
1986	 14023	 40630	 20307	 18550	 93510
1987	 14487	 42784	 21555	 19201	 98027
1988	 15832	 51221	 22848	 21055	 110956
1989	 17276	 56494	 24219	 20978	 118967
1990	 18237	 60987	 25672	 22020	 126916
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-3.
However, the only electronics sector in the EC recording
a trade surplus is telecommunications equipment, as seen
in Table VIII-5.
Table VIII-5:EC's Trade Balance in Electronics(million
Ecu)
Years	 EC	 COE	 TE	 CE	 Total
1981	 +676	 -2526	 +1759	 -3529	 -3620
1982	 +816	 -2992	 +1949	 -3637	 -3864
1983	 +483	 -3830	 +1949	 -5254	 -6652
1984	 -829	 -5683	 +1745	 -5117	 -9884
1985	 -764	 -5155	 +1570	 -5409	 -9758
1986	 -408	 -5304	 +1233	 -6439	 -10918
1987	 -715	 -6731	 +1029	 -6675	 -13092
1988	 -1426	 -9668	 +91	 -8149	 -19152
1989	 -1863	 -10831	 +109	 -8735	 -21320
1990	 -2268	 -11897	 +125	 -9000	 -23040
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-3.
There is a causal relationship between characteristics of
the EC's electronics industry, specifically the consumer
electronics sector, and its international competitive
weakness. Firstly, major consumer electronics companies
in the EC have been inactive in promoting strategies to
raise their international price competitiveness. For
example, "Japanese firms began moving assembly operations
to South Korea (and later to Singapore and Taiwan) and
U.S. firms to Mexico and Southeast Asia in order to
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lessen the burden of higher wage in their production
costs. Offshore processing became a common strategy
throughout the industry as price competition spread to
other products and markets." 14 However, "Europeans have
been slow to undertake many cost-cutting measures or to
develop any serious export programmes. This trait has led
to a fragmented production pattern with many small and
sometimes uneconomic units."15
Secondly, "the fragmented European market limits
economies of scale and leads to higher R&D and production
cost. It also prevents European firms from getting new
products first to market." 16	These factors became the
major reason for expediting a movement towards creating
inefficient national champions in the consumer
electronics sector. 17 Furthermore, European firms were
weak in adopting upstream strategy to extend both the
range of products and their function, due to the shortage
of research and technical development (R&TD) cost.
Thirdly, there were increases in defensive protectionism
after the protection given by built-in mechanism,
afforded by transmission/reception technologies, such as
SECAM in France and PAL elsewhere in case of color
television sector, expired in the 1980s. Such protective
measures were also increased for the protection of both
fragmented markets and national champions from foreign
competition. For example, there were no trade disputes in
the 1960s and the 1970s in the consumer electronics
sector between the EC and Korea. However, the EC has
imposed AD duties and price-undertaking measures, or
initiated AD investigations since the 1980s against
almost all Korean consumer electronics items--compact
disc player, video cassette tape, color television set,
audio cassette tape, car stereo radio, video tape
recorder, floppy diskette, DRAM and electronics scale.
The sensitivity of the EC producers is also due to "the
unique structure of the European market which evolved
towards the reduction of direct influence by producers
and growth of volume purchasers who now exert
368
considerable influence. This has been the key channel for
Far East producers to penetrate EC markets, and has
deprived domestic producers of a prime means of
exploiting their domestic markets."18
To cope with its competitive weaknesses, and other
problems, the EC industry has carried out various
strategies to date. Firstly, the European consumer
electronics industry speeded up concentration to meet the
competitive pressure, having only two consumer
electronics makers in the EC--Philips, the third largest
consumer electronics manufacturer in the world, and
Thomson, the sixth largest. "Philips has its overseas
plants in Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mexico, and
Thomson has its production subsidiaries in Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and China. However, their
production	 concentrates	 in	 lower-cost	 consumer
electronics products, rather than high-value electronics
equipment." 19 As a result, EC electronics companies
have to depend on imports of components from Japan for
the manufacture of high-cost electronics products. That
is the major reason the EC is recording trade deficit in
electronics components since 1984. Previously,
electronics components belonged to one of two electronics
sectors in the EC which recorded a trade surplus, the
other being telecommunications equipment sector. For
example, EC's import dependence on Japanese TV tubes is
absolute. "Japan considerably increased its tube exports
to the EC:from 1.7 million in 1974 to 1.9 million in
1977. That increase could be interpreted as the start of
a drive into the EC market, which should ultimately
result in a TV set dominance."20
Secondly, the European consumer electronics industry
actively pursued automation of the production process.
According to Peter Dicken,21
technological change has been extremely rapid in the
consumer electronics industry. A major effect has
been in increasing greatly the labor productivity.
Major firms altogether have been investing heavily
in automated production and assembly and thus,
greatly reducing the number of workers required for
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a given level of production in the consumer
electronics.
These two factors have caused declines in both number of
employees and factories in the EC consumer electronics
industry, as seen in Table VIII-6.
Table VIII-6:EC's Employment in Consumer Electronics
Years	 Employment(1000)	 Number of Factories
1980	 160	 N/A
1981	 151	 N/A
1982	 147	 N/A
1983	 146	 N/A
1984	 134	 N/A
1985	 134	 N/A
1986	 131	 N/A
1987	 127	 224
1988	 123	 165
1989	 126	 139
1990	 126	 114
1991	 130	 N/A
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-39.
Thirdly, "notwithstanding the strong competition, several
collaborations in consumer electronics sector have been
promoted between the EC and Japanese producers. Sony-
Philips and JVC-Thomson established collaborations
towards the harmonization of technical standards for
video tape recorders, along with joint research and
development between Philips and Sony for CD interactive
equipment." 22 The motive behind such cooperation could
well be that collaboration between the world's two
largest consumer electronics producers reduces
competition and provides each with a greater or more
secure share of the world market.
Fourthly, the ECC has been strongly supporting
cooperative research projects in order to improve EC
industry's competitiveness. "The projects include the
ESPRIT-Programme(European Strategic Program for Research
and Development in Information Technology), the RACE-
Project(Research in Advanced Communications Technology
for Europe), the EUREKA(European Research Coordination
Agency), the Erite-Project(Basic Research in Industrial
Technologies in Europe), and the JESSI-Project(Joint
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European Semiconductor Silicon Initiative). "23 The
support reflects the direction of the ECC's policy to
promote the development of growth industries, such as
electronics and information technology sectors.24
1-3. Korea's Consumer 1ectronics Industry
The electronics sector was not important in the early
1960s in Korea when no electronics products were included
in the list of the nation's top ten export items.
However, this had changed by 1970 by which time
electronics products had become the fifth largest export
item of Korea. This moved electronics products to the
second largest export item in 1975 and finally to the
largest export item in 1988, pushing textiles and
clothing to the second place on the list of the nation's
traditional export items. The development of Korea's
electronics sector owed much to foreign direct
investment(FDIs) in Korea by TNCs, seeking offshore
processing in cheap labour-cost countries to strengthen
their price competitiveness. "On an arrival basis, FDIs
in Korea during the 1962-1978 period in the electronics
sector amounted to $121 million. The figure represented
12.1 per cent of the total FDIs of $1,001 million in
Korea for the same period."25
However, the development of electronics industry was
further expedited by industrial policy in Korea. T. Kang
points out:26
The Korean government regarded the electronics
industry as one better suited to a country without
many natural resources and put a lot of emphasis
into consumer electronics sector. The government
concern was made clear in 1969, when the Electronics
Industry Promotion Law was enacted. The law required
routine formulation of an electronics sector plan by
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, registration of
all participants in that industry, establishment of
a promotions fund for the industry, promotion of
overseas investment and the formation of industry
complexes.
Following Korea's export-led industrialization strategy,
and the government's full-scale support, the electronics
industry grew very rapidly. The share of electronics
industry in the total production of the manufacturing
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sector rose from 2.7 per cent in 1985 to 4.6 per cent in
1989, as seen in Table VIII-7.
Table VIII-7:Korea's Electronics Production(1B.won, %)
Years	 TM(A)	 E(B)	 CE(C)	 C/A	 C/B
1975	
-	 1,180	 260	 -	 22.0
1985	 77,033	 6,338	 2,098	 2.7	 33.1
1988	 134,331 17,177
	 6,724	 5.0	 39.1
1989	 148,477 19,004	 6,876	 4.6	 36.2
1990	
-	 21,035	 7,265	 -	 34.5
1991	 -	 24,156	 7,820	 -	 32.4
AGR 1975-88	 -	 22.9	 28.4	 -	 -
1988-91	 -	 17.7	 5.2	 -	 -
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Technology(Recent Trends of Korea's Consumer Electronics
Industry and Changes of Competitive Environment), p.8.
Notes: TM=Total Manufacturing. E=Electronics Industry.
CE=Consumer Electronics. AGR=Average Growth Rate
Especially important, the consumer electronics sector
occupied a very important position in the nation's
electronics industry, raising its share in the total
production of electronics sector to 36.2 per cent in 1989
and 32.4 per cent in 1991 from 22.0 per cent in 1975.
Table VIII-8:Korea's Electronics Exports and Imports
($1M)
Years	 E	 IE	 EP	 CE	 HE
EX	 IM	 EX	 IM EX	 IM EX IM	 EX	 IM
1977 1086
	 950 120 156 466 456 448 113	 30	 209
1980 2115 1658 169 350 775 732 1019 181 101	 363
1985 4853 3668 904 956 1824 1735 1859 248 174	 679
1986 7575 5396 1449 1245 2742 2735 3058 361 198 	 984
1987 11563 6946 2353 1348 3876 3931 4904 516 279	 1082
1988 16313 9393 3225 2287 6069 5218 6436 621 365	 1180
1989 17138 10227 3484 2573 7131 5683 5947 670 413	 1209
1990 17869 11222 3480 3067 8015 6056 5726 723 490	 1298
1991 20157 13017 3894 3529 9384 6972 6054 742 541	 1652
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Major Statistics
of Korean Economy,1992), pp.226-228 and 246-247.
Notes :E=Electronics Industry. IE=Industrial Electronics.
EP=Electronics Parts . CE=Consumer Electronics.
HE=Heavy Electric Equipment.EX=Export.
IM= Import.
As seen in Tables VIII-8 and VIII-9,	 "consumer
electronics exports also increased during the 1985-1988
period	 from	 $1,859	 million	 to	 $6,436	 million,
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representing 12.28 per cent of the world total exports of
consumer electronics. Korea's share in world's total
exports of electronics products rose from 18.8 per cent
in 1985 to 35.5 per cent in 1988.1127
Table	 VIII-9:Korea's Share in World Exports of
Electronics Products ( %)
Items	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988
Insulated Wire and
Cables	 1.87	 1.65	 2.09	 2.10	 2.35
Electrical Machinery
	 1.05	 0.96	 1.05	 1.31	 2.07
Telecommunications
Equipment	 2.07	 2.20	 2.81	 3.68	 4.82
Consumer Electronics	 6.32	 6.18	 8.17	 11.92 12.28
Electrical Components
	 3.56	 3.29	 3.67	 4.29	 4.91
Household Appliances	 3.73	 3.42	 5.16	 6.64	 6.34
Information
Technology Equipment
	 0.91	 1.10	 1.52	 1.93	 2.71
Total	 19.51 18.8	 24.47	 31.87 35.48
Sources:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Report on EC and
Korea's Footwear and Consumer Electronics Industries),
p.6.
According to a detailed analysis by Korea Foreign Trade
Association regarding Korea's position in the world
electronics market,28
Korea is the world's sixth largest producer in the
electronics industry. Although it still lags behind
the United States and Japan, it is also the third
largest producer of consumer electronics products.
Korean manufacturers began to export microwave ovens
in 1980 and by 1987. They were the world's largest
producer of microwave ovens. They are the second
largest producer of color television sets and very
successful in exports of video tapes and VCR. They
are alone in a position to compete Japanese
companies in the development of DRAMs.
In 1989, Korea recorded the second largest trade surplus
with the SC in consumer electronics sector after Japan,
causing 10.6 per cent of the EC's total extra-EC trade
deficit of 8,725 million ECU in the consumer electronics
sector, as seen in Table Vill-lO. Despite such great
successes in the electronics industry, Korea has many
weak points exerting their influence over production and
trade activities in this sector.
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Table VIII-10:EC's Major Consumer Electronics Products
Traders(1989)(million ECU)
Traders	 Exports to	 Imports from	 Trade Deficit
EC	 SC	 ofEC
Japan	 5,374	 40	 5,334
Korea	 936	 10	 926
Austria	 762	 275	 487
Singapore	 709	 31	 678
USA	 622	 286	 336
China	 591	 5	 586
Taiwan	 543	 31	 512
Hong Kong	 298	 31	 267
Malaysia	 416	 5	 411
Brazil	 104	 15	 89
Thailand	 103	 5	 98
Turkey	 94	 34	 60
Total Extra-EC 10,958	 2,233	 8,725
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-43.
Table VIII-11:Korea's Exports and Imports of Electronics
Products by Region ( $ 1M , %)
Countries	 Exports	 Imports
	
1989 Share 1991	 Share	 1989	 Share 1991 Share
	
USA 2091 36.0
	 1649	 28.3	 92.5	 17.9 91.8	 17.4
CAN	 296	 5.1	 226	 3.9	 0.8	 0.1	 0.5	 0.1
EC	 979 16.9	 1080	 18.6	 40.9	 7.9 71.1	 13.4
JAP	 443	 7.6	 325	 5.6	 309.6	 59.9 270.3	 51.2
Asian
NICs 339	 5.8	 273	 4.7	 41.1	 7.9 47.1	 8.9
EFTA 355	 6.1	 268	 4.6	 9.2	 1.8 12.9	 2.4
Others
	
1297 22.4	 1996	 34.3	 22.9	 4.4 34.6	 6.5
Total
	
5800 100.0	 5817 100.0	 517.0 100.0 528.3 100.0
Source:Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and
Technology(Recent Trends of Korea's Consumer Electronics
Industry and Changes of Competitive Environment), p.11.
Firstly, Korea is heavily dependent upon imports of
electronics components from Japan for the manufacture of
finished products. T. Kang points out:29
The one Achilles heel that Korean electronics
products makers have is that a significant part of
their final product content is Japanese. For
example, in a VCR, close to 70 per cent of the parts
come from Japan. Open a Korean VCR, and one finds
Matsushita, Toshiba and other brands.
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Korea's imports of electronics products from Japan in
1991 accounted for 51.2 per cent of the nation's total
imports of the products in the year, as seen in Table
vill-li.
Secondly, Korea is also heavily dependent upon technology
licensing agreements with major companies for the
production of mature electronics products and for the
development of new products. In the beginning of Korea's
electronics industry, Korean companies usually introduced
foreign technology through technology licensing, OEM
agreements or joint ventures with foreign companies.
Technology licensing is now the only method of
introducing foreign technology since Korean companies
changed their overseas marketing strategy from original
equipment manufacturing(OEM) to own brand
manutacturing(OBM). This change in marketing method
brought into effect two factors damaging to Korean
companies:technology developers in the electronics sector
generally endeavour to protect their technology from
foreign companies in an effort to stay ahead by denying
licenses to competitors, 3 ° and in addition, Korean
companies face protective measures from advanced
countries against electronics products having Korean
brandnames.
Thirdly, the Korean electronics industry is losing its
price competitiveness against products, manufactured in
other low labour-cost countries such as Malaysia,
Thailand, India, the Philippines and Indonesia. For
example, Korea's monthly labour cost in consumer
electronics in 1987 was £298.2, far higher than India's
£96.3, Indonesia's £48.05 and the Philippines' £96.13.'
Major TNCs such as Philips moved their assembly process
to plants located in such low labour-cost countries. As a
result, Korean companies attacked on all sides--price
disadvantage against new producing countries, and import
restraints by advanced countries against Korean products
despite inflows of electronics products manufactured by
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TNCs in such low labour-cost countries into their
markets.
Fourthly, Korea's export performance in consumer
electronics entirely depends on a limited range of
consumer electronics items such as audio equipment, color
television sets, VTR and microwave ovens, representing a
very high proportion of Korea's exports of consumer
electronics products. In 1991, the share of these four
items in total consumer electronics exports was 86 per
cent. In addition, Korea heavily depends its exports of
consumer electronics products to three markets--the
United States, the EC and Japan, shipping 52.5 per cent
of its total exports of consumer electronics products to
these countries, as seen in Table VIII-li.
Finally, although Korea's industrial policy contributed
to the rapid development of Korea's consumer electronics
industry, it also acted as a negative factor following
the development of the industry's emphasis on quantity,
rather than quality:concentration on simple assembly
production rather than development of value-added items
through continuous investment in R&D. Quantitative
development only is limited by the industry's specific
characteristics--rapid innovations, higher R&D cost,
concentration of big companies and fierce competition
among world-famous manufacturers. Korea's consumer
electronics sector showed an annual average growth of 5.2
per cent in terms of production in the 1988-1991 period,
far lower than 28.4 per cent recorded in the 1975-1988
period, as seen in Table VIII-7. Furthermore, Korea
cannot easily raise its price competitiveness because it
wholly depends on imports of essential components for the
production of consumer electronics. As a result, the
labour cost of assembly is very important in deciding
export prices of consumer electronics. However, this
former strength is disappearing following increases of
labour cost in the domestic market, and emergence of new
cheap labour cost countries. Korea's consumer electronics
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industry is typical of most industries, superficially
strong but weak in substance.
2. Case Study of Color Television
2-1. Introduction
The CTV sector has been the object of frequent trade
disputes between advanced countries and NIEs. Such trade
disputes could worsen in future due to the pattern of
production and trade---geographical concentration in the
Asian region of production and division into two
regions(Asia and the EC) in trade under the situation
that the Asian countries have to dispose of their surplus
production and EC countries also have to protect their
CTV industries from foreign competition. Louis Turner and
Neil McMullen point out:32
The CTV sector is a skilled labour-intensive
industry that the leading NICs are trying to break
into, and that illuminates an interesting area in
which the AICs are having difficulty in adjusting
smoothly to competitive change. Above all, though,
colour televisions are interesting because they are
a case of an apparently technologically mature
product, increasingly fit for manufacture in the
NIC5, which rejuvenated itself as one part of a
research-intensive complex of activities in which
the AICs have been able to regain some lost ground.
In the field of world-wide CTV production, one clear
indication is the dominance of Asian producers,
accounting for 55.7 per cent of world total production in
1987, with China the world's largest single country
producer of CTV with its share of the world total
production representing 19 per cent. The dominance of
China in the world's CTV production results from the
assembly process of CTV production, which is highly
labour-intensive, employing large numbers of low-skilled,
mainly female, workers with the additional advantage of
low-labour costs, and standardized manufacturing
technology. It became very important to reduce the
production cost of finished products through economies of
scale and to use less-skilled labour force. As a result,
large CTV producers began offshore processing in cheap-
labour Asian countries. Furthermore, many Asian NIEs
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began to produce their own brandname CTV with their cheap
labour force, using technology introduced under licensing
agreements with foreign technology holders and with
components imported from advanced countries.
Table VIII-12:World's CTV Production by Region(1978-87)
Region	 Production	 Change(%)	 Share of World
	
(1,000 Units) 1978-1987	 Production(%)
1978	 1987	 1978	 1987
Asia	 21,175	 56,826	 +168.4	 35.0	 55.7
Japan	 13,116	 14,777	 +12.7	 21.7	 14.5
Korea	 4,826	 14,664	 +203.9	 8.0	 14.4
China	 517	 19,334	 +3641.6	 0.9	 19.0
Malaysia	 150	 1,240	 +726.7	 0.3	 1.2
Singapore	 725	 2,123	 +192.8	 1.2	 2.1
Europe
(excluding
USSR)	 17,656	 19,193	 +8.7	 29.1	 18.8
Germany	 4,391	 3,537	 -19.5	 7.3	 3.5
U.K.	 2,417	 3,022	 +25.0	 4.0	 3.0
Italy	 2,172	 2,233	 +2.8	 3.6	 2.2
France	 2,101	 2,184	 +4.0	 3.5	 2.1
USA	 9,309	 11,310	 +21.5	 15.4	 11.1
World Total
	
60,592 101,985	 +68.3	 100.0	 100.0
Source:Dicken, Peter(Global Shift), p.316.
The first NIE which entered successfully the CTV sector
was Japan. "The Japanese version of the strategy was
imitative. Initially, Japanese companies made use of a
labour cost advantage since the relevant wage rates were
roughly one-fifth the prevailing scale in the United
States. Later, they success±ully combined their imitative
practices with extensive offshore processing, and
diversified their export items to television sets, tape
recorders, and stereo equipment." 33 Major markets for
Japanese CTV were the United States where the
transmission/reception method was the same as in Japan.
Faced with waves of imports of CTV from Japan, the U.S.
firms responded in various ways.
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Firstly, "most companies were tempted to shift a
substantial proportion of their activities offshore."34
As a result, Zenith became the only indigeneous
manufacturer of CTV left in the United States, as I
mentioned above.
Secondly, "the U.S. firms sought legal redress. The
U.S.industry made its first dumping appeals against the
Japanese in 1968, and this strategy was developed in the
mid-1970s, with the industry lobby called
COMPACT(Committee for the Preservation of American Color
Television) leading the attack." 35
 However, this first
appeal was not settled until 1980 when Japanese
manufacturers agreed to an out-of-court settlement of $76
million. Such delay in the decision was due to
"attributes of TNCs from the United States. It is
natural that these firms strongly favour free trade in
the finished and semi-processed items exported by their
own subsidiaries, associates and affiliates in LDCs."36
Table VIII-13:Internatiorxal Trade in CTV(1990)
Region Exports % of World Imports % of World Trade
($10 00 ) Trade	 ($1000)	 Trade	 Balance
World 14739209	 100	 15879347	 100	 -1140138
Asia 6134186	 41.7	 2285333	 14.4	 +3848853
JAP	 2028858	 13.8	 158546	 0.99	 +1870312
KOR	 1351217	 9.2	 36816	 0.23	 +1314401
SIN	 1324790	 9.0	 639287	 4.0	 +685503
HK	 553621	 3.8	 784410	 4.9	 -230789
Europe
	
7436344	 50.5	 10b72787	 67.2	 -3236443
	
EC 6100166	 41.4	 9108685	 57.4	 -3008519
	
GER 2185544	 14.8	 2828954	 17.8	 -643410
	
UK 1105749	 7.5	 1090286	 6.9	 +15463
	
ITA 478814	 3.2	 1492198	 9.4	 -1013384
	
FRA 803475	 5.5	 1241967	 7.8	 -438492
USA	 534353	 3.6	 2150286	 13.5	 -1615933
CAN	 56194	 0.4	 272731	 1.7	 -216537
Source:United	 Nations(International	 Trade	 Statistics
Yearbook, 1990, Vol.11), p.669. Note	 :Market economies
only(exclude China, Taiwan, USSR and Eastern Europe).
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Following the entry of Japanese CTV into advanced
countries, many Asian NIEs have followed suit. As a
result, the Asian region has been rapidly emerging in
world-wide exports of CTV, with a share in the world's
total exports of CTV accounting for 41.7 per cent in
1990, as seen in Table VIII-13.
However, the EC was the largest exporting bloc of CTV in
the world, with its value of exports in 1990 amounting to
$6,100.166 million (41.4 per cent of world's total
exports). Germany, on a country-by-country basis, ranked
first in the list of CTV exporters with its share of 14.8
per cent in the same year. Japan and Korea ranked second
and third, respectively, in the list of the world's major
exporters of CTV in 1990.
In trade with Korea, the EC member state which first
began to impose import restraints against Korean TV was
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom started in 1977 to
impose VER against imports from Korea and Taiwan. Under
the VER measure, Korea's black and white (B/w) TV exports
to the United Kingdom were restricted to 35,000 units
each in 1977 and 1978 which was raised to 150,000 units
in 1985, and 200,000 units in 1986. The VER against
Korean B/W TV was expired in January in 1988. Along with
the VER against B/W TV, the U.K. also implemented VER
against CTV since Octover 25, 1984 under which Korean CTV
exports to the United Kingdom were regulated to 46,000
units in 1985, 100,000 units in 1986, 200,000 units in
1987 and 300,000 units in 1988. This VER against Korean
CTV was terminated in April, 1990 when the EC-wide AD
measure of 1989 became effective. Marcel Marion points
out that "Japanese manufacturers in Britain benefited
from these deals."37
The second EC member state to restrict CTV imports from
Korea is France which so far has been imposing residual
import quotas against Korean CTV since November in 1984.
The residual import quotas were set at 20,000 Units in
1985, 23,000 units each in 1986, 1987 and 1988, 40,000
units in 1989 and 50,000 units each in 1990, 1991 and
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1992. This French import restriction was partly a result
of "its electronics policy under a socialist government
since 1981 that was to relaunch the French electronics
industry. "38
Along with the import restraints at EC member state
level, the EC began to implement AD measure on an EC-wide
basis in 1989, which will be analysed later in detail in
Section 2-4. The EC-wide measure is closely related to
the characteristics of production and trade in the EC CTV
industry. The EC owes the maintenance of continuous
growth in CTV production to the unique characteristics of
the EC'S CTV industry, which helped the EC not be totally
overwhelmed by foreign imports, especially from Japan.
The Korea Foreign Trade Association analyses the reasons
as follows:39
Firstly, there was the adoption of two 'European'
standards and the refusal of the European
patent holders to grant licenses to Japanese
manufacturers.
Secondly, the fragmentation of the EC-market into
national markets with their own characteristics,
tastes, etc. made it impossible to sell one single,
standardized product in Europe.
Thirdly, the EC showed a preference for large color
television sets while the Japanese firms were
specialized in the manufacture of small-and medium-
sized televisions.
The continued concentration of CTV production in the EC,
contrary to the complete halt of production by
IJ.S.companies, the characteristic labour intensive
aspects of CTV production as compared with "the
production of electronics components such as integrated
circuits only made by machines with human assistance,"40
the expansion of local production by Japanese CTV
producers in the U.K., and extensive CTV production by
Korea have caused serious trade disputes between the EC
and Korea.	 Such trade	 disputes	 are	 inevitable,
considering the importance of CTV industry both to the EC
and Korea, as seen later in Sections 2-2 and 2-3.
2-2. The Situation in the EC
According to the ECC, "CTV accounts for 33 per cent of
the total consumer electronics market in the EC, and has
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remained as the market's leading item. The penetration
rate of imports into the EC market for CTV is only 20 per
cent, which is far lower than that for VCR(46 per cent),
camcorders(99 per cent), other audio products(89 per
cent), CDP(74 per cent) and in-car entertainment(ICE) (58
per cent)." 41 In addition, "color TV production in the
EC countries now exceeds that of the United States, with
Germany being the dominant European producer followed by
the United Kingdom, although most British production is
now by foreign, mostly Japanese, firms."42
Despite the favorable CTV production trend, deep
penetration by Asian CTV exporters of the EC market, as
seen in Table VIII-15, has inevitably caused the growth
of trade disputes between the EC and Asian CTV exporters.
There is a close link between the dramatic shipments of
Asian CTV5 to the EC market and the characteristics of
the EC CTV market:the EC's demand for CTV is mainly for
screen sizes greater than 42 cm. In 1989, demands for
this size CTV accounted for 62.8 per cent, and for more
than 52 cm alone, the figure was 46.2 per cent. As a
result, the EC has specialized in production of large-
screen CTVs, depending on imports for small-screen CTV5.
This allowed the EC to maintain its competitive strength
in the CTV sector.
Table VIII-14:Breakdown of CTV Market by Size of
Screen(%)
Years	 screen<42cm	 42cm<Screen<52cm Screen>52cm
1980	 13.3	 21	 65.7
1981	 21	 21	 58
1982	 22.8	 15.5	 61.7
1983	 25	 19.4	 55.6
1984	 31.2	 18	 50.8
1985	 31.7	 19.5	 48.8
1986	 34.7	 N/A	 65.3
1987	 36.3	 21	 42.7
1988	 41.1	 21.4	 37.5
1989	 38.1	 16.6	 46.2
Source:EC commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-40.
The Korea Foreign Trade Association analyses the demand
pattern of CTV in the EC as follows:43
382
The EC's current demand is primarily for the
replacement of old sets with large receiver sets
with screen size over 52 cm and the purchase by
households of a second set with a small screen
size. Demand for the large-size screen CTVs is
mostly met by EC producers. However, the market for
small-and medium-sized television sets is
increasingly being met by imports, originating
mainly from Korea and Hong Kong, which account for
32 per cent of the total market.
This unique demand pattern allowed the EC CTV
manufacturers to meet 68 per cent of total EC CTV demand
in 1990. However, the share of total EC production in
total EC demand was far lower than the 90 per cent
recorded in 1981. In the 1981-1990 period, the figure
declined to 68 per cent.
Table VIII-15:EC's CTV Demand and Share of EC production
and Foreign Imports in Its Demand(%)
80	 81	 82	 83	 84	 85	 86	 87	 88	 89	 90
Share of EC
Production
in Total Demands
84 90	 80	 87	 81	 85	 82	 74 73	 69	 68
Share of Imports
--Extra-EC
in Total Demands
16 10	 20	 13	 19	 15	 18	 26 27	 31	 32
of Which
Korea
N/A N/A N/A N/A
	
2	 7	 8	 7	 9	 4	 4
HK N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6	 3	 2
JAP	 6	 7	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 3	 2	 2	 3
Total Market
100 100 100	 100 100 100 100
	 100 100 100 100
Source:EC Commission(Panorama of EC Industries 1991-
1992), p.12-41.
There are several reasons why imports of foreign CTVs
into the EC market increased so rapidly within a short
period. Firstly, the built-in protective mechanism
contributed negatively to the competitiveness of EC's CTV
industry. The mechanism allowed the EC to continue the
ineffective production by many small and fragmented
companies, thus weakening price competitiveness. It also
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restricted a more aggressive approach to R&TD for the
development of new products. As a result, EC CTV
companies had to face fierce competition from Japanese
companies and later NIEs when the exclusive transmission
system licenses began to expire in the 1980s.
Secondly, the EC's import protection to prevent foreign
penetration was "mainly against the largest sets and did
little to prevent the inflow of smaller sets, for which
demand was growing most rapidly." 44
 Major EC CTV plants
were "concentrating on the production of 20 inch and 22
inch tubes at a time when demands of EC consumers seem to
be swinging in the direction of smaller sets, adding to
the vulnerability of EC industry." 45
 As a result, "no
colour picture tubes for sets smaller than twenty inches
are produced in Europe although all smaller tubes account
for at least one-third of the cost of a finished set. All
these components are imported--chiefly from Japan--
ironically. "46
Faced with such a strong foreign penetration, the ECC
began to impose import restraints against foreign
products, arguing that "it is more important to counter
unfair trade practices, and operate the Community's AD
procedures efficiently within the scope of the EC's
international obligation" 47 The EC concentrated on
restricting imports from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The
major protective measure by the EC was the imposition of
AD duties as these can be selectively applied to specific
countries, effectively evading non-differentiation and
compensation requirement under the GATT safeguard clause.
However, the market share of imports from Korea, Japan
and Hong Kong in 1990 was confined to 28 per cent(9/32)
in total extra-EC imports, as seen in Table VIII-15. The
lion's share of EC imports in the EC's total CTV demand
are from countries other than these three. Thus, the
appropriateness of intensive import restraints against
those three countries were open to question. Import
restraints against specific countries give opportunities
to other exporters to increase their shipments to the EC
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market, with, for example, EFTA and low labour-cost
countries in Southeast Asia the major beneficiaries of
the selectivity of the EC's import restraint.
Along with defensive protective measures against foreign
CTVs, the EC has completed the concentration of its CTV
sector--merging fragmented companies into two large
companies--Philips and Thomson. In addition, the ECC has
been providing strategic support to the consumer
electronics industry in R&TD area, with the result that
the EC CTV sector has maintained a relatively strong
position in the world market--in contrast to the
situation in the United States where all consumer
electronics companies left the business, except for
Zenith, as I mentioned above.
2-3. The Situation in Korea
The Korean government has provided a wide range of
supports to the consumer electronics industry, including
CTV sector, since the 1980s. Peter Dicken describes the
Korean government policy for the development of consumer
electronics industry as follows:48
1) Protectionist trade barriers---both tariffs and a
ban on the imports of foreign-made electronics.
2) Provision of low-interest capital for companies
in targeted sectors, which has given the state an
influence on industry decision-making.
3) Heavy government investment in electronics R&D,
particularly in the design of semiconductors, the
results of which are made available to Korean
producers.
As a result of this intensive support, the production of
CTV in Korea has been showing the greatest share of the
nation's total production of consumer electronics
products, 19.8 per cent in 1990. In addition, the CTV
sector recorded an annual average growth of 7.8 per cent
in production since 1987. In trade, exports of CTV
represented 23.5 per cent of Korea's consumer electronics
exports which rose to 24.5 per cent in 1991.
This expansion led to two problems which could cause
trade disputes with foreign importers, especially the EC.
Firstly, Korea recorded a trade surplus of $1,314.401
million in CTV trade with the world in 1990, the second
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largest trade surplus after Japan, sharply in contrast to
the EC's trade deficit of $3,008.519 million in that
year, as seen in Table VIII-13.
Secondly, the proportion of Korea's CTV exports under OEM
contract was relatively low at 55.2 per cent in 1986.
That means Korean CTVs were more likely to be a target of
import restraints because Korean CTV manufacturers sell
their products with their own brandnames rather than
brandnames of world-renowned importers. It is natural
that the high proportion of OEM in exports raises not so
many trade disputes because under OEM, "manufacturers
supply products to other manufacturers with the latter's
brandnames and sometimes with specifications outlined by
the purchasers," 49 and it is not likely that these
purchasers are involved in filing complaints against
imports. The share of OEM contracts in Korea's CTV
exports compares with 64.0 per cent in microwave ovens,
80.6 per cent in refrigerators, and 71.7 per cent in
audio equipment.
Table VIII-16:Korea's CTV Exports(Small+Large Screen) to
USA( $1000)
Years Total CTV Exports(A)	 CTV Exports to USA(B) B/A
1985	 374,959	 178,775	 47.7
1986	 533,502	 257,537	 48.3
1987	 795,326	 245,174	 30.8
1988	 1,174,427	 218,617	 18.6
1989	 1,168,413	 177,242	 15.2
1990	 1,351,217	 139,587	 10.3
1991	 1,505,199	 148,321	 9.8
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.51.
In addition to the above, the switch of Korea's CTV
exports from the United States to the EC brought negative
reactions from the EC CTV industry. The largest customer
for Korean consumer electronics was the United States,
with CTV exports peaking at $257 million in 1986, but
showing a continued decrease thereafter, as seen in Table
VIII-16. As a result, the market share of Korea's CTV in
the United States declined to only 9.8 per cent in 1991
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from 47.7 per cent in 1985. The major reason for the
decline in CTV exports to the United States were the
tight import restraints by the United States, forcing
Korean exporters to switch shipments of CTV to the EC in
order to develop alternative markets. As a result,
Korea's exports of small-screen CTV to the EC peaked in
1987, as seen later in Table VIII-23.
Despite the several factors contributing to trade
disputes between the EC and Korea, it is suspicious that
Korea was seen as a threat to the EC market's CTV sector,
considering Korea's CTV production structure, which is
very different from the demand pattern of the EC market.
Table VIII-17:Comparison of EC Demand with Korea's
Production of CTV(%)
EC Demands(1989)	 Korea's Production(1990)
Share of	 54.7	 1.8
CTV with
Screen
Over 25-Inch
Share of
	 45.3	 98.2
CTV with
Screen
Under 25-Inch
Source:Korea Ministry of Trade and Industry(The Current
Situation of Competitiveness in Major Industries and
Tasks for Future Development), p.11.
According to Table VIII-17, the EC's demand is largely
composed of CTV with screen size over 25-inch,
representing 54.7 per cent of total demand. This resulted
in EC's CTV production largely concentrated on large-
screen CTV5. Furthermore, EC's production of CTV with
screen size under 17-inch (43.18 cm), which are subject
to EC's AD measure, represents merely 28.4 per cent of
EC's total CTV production in 1989, 27.4 per cent in 1990,
26.9 per cent in 1991 and 27.9 per cent in 1992.°
Korea's CTV production, however, has been concentrating
on screens under 25-inch. Therefore, it is questionable
that Korean CTV can be a threat to the EC producers in
the standpoint of industrial injury allegation.
2-4. EC's Decision
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In August of 1987, the ECC received an AD complaint,
against Korean-made CTV with a screen measurement of not
more than 42 cm, from the European Association of
Consumer Electronics Manufacturers(EACEM). Faced with the
complaint, the EC announced its initiation of an AD
proceeding concerning imports of small-screen CTV from
Korea on Feb.27, 1988. In the announcement, the ECC
points out the reasons for AD investigation as follows:51
Firstly, imports of small-screen CTV from Korea
increased some 9,000 units in 1983 to 358,000 units
in 1986.
Secondly, in terms of market share, the imports from
Korea represents a development from 0.3 per cent to
an estimated 16 per cent in 1987.
Thirdly, these imports sold in the Community have
significantly undercut the prices of Community
producers (by up to 38 per cent between June 1985
and April 1987) and forced the latter to lower their
prices.
Fourthly, the consequent impact on the Community
industry is claimed to be a reduction in utilization
of capacity, forgone sales and a 6 per cent loss of
market share in 1986 despite the growth of overall
Community consumption (by 11 per cent in the same
period).
Fifthly, profits of Community producers have
allegedly been reduced and their stocks are said to
have increased (by 10 per cent in 1986).
After a long investigation period of 26 months, the ECC
decided to impose 13.0 per cent provisional AD duty on
Samsung, 10.2 per cent on Daewoo, 12.3 per cent on
Goldstar and 19.6 per cent on other Korean exporters. In
the announcement to impose provisional AD duties on
October 28,1989, the ECC strongly argued that "a loss of
over 1,000 jobs in the CTV industry had been made in
1986-87 period, and the gravity for Community industry of
the injury considerations outweighs the important
consumer interests involved." 52 The AD duties were
slightly reduced when definitive AD duties were imposed
on April 27, 1990, to 10.4 per cent from 12.3 per cent
for Goldstar and to 10.5 per cent from 13.0 per cent for
Samsung. However, some questions have to be raised about
the EC's action.
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Firstly, there is some controversy regarding the
relationship between the import penetration rate and :its
alleged injury to the EC industry. Even though Korea's
share of EC'S small screen CTV imports increased to 15.2
per cent in 1987 from only 4.2 per cent in 1985, as seen
in Table VIII-18, still 84.8 per cent of small-screen
CTVs are being imported from major CTV exporters such as
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong into the EC market without
any import restraints.
Table VIII-18:EC's Imports of Small-Screen cTv($1000)
	
1985	 Share	 1987	 Share
Korea	 25,859	 4.2	 118,429	 15.2
	
Hong Kong 9,700	 1.6	 52,700	 6.7
China	 300	 0.05	 23,300	 2.9
Total
	
Imports 610,000
	 100.0	 781,600	 100.0
Source:Korea Trade Promotion Corporation(Analysis of
Import Restriction Cases by Advanced Countries against
Korea), p.219.
Despite EC's AD measure against small screen CTV from
Korea, the EC's color TV industry's share of its total
demand had declined continuously. As seen from Table
VIII-15, EC'S share of the Community demand peaked in
1981 with 90 per cent, declining to 74 per cent in 1987
(the year when the EC initiated its AD investigation
against Korean CTV), then to 69 per cent in 1989(the year
when the EC imposed provisional AD duties against Korean
CTV) and to 68 per cent in 1990(the year when the EC
imposed definitive AD duties against Korean CTV).
Consequently, the import penetration rate of CTV into the
EC market rose to 26 per cent in 1987, 31 per cent in
1989 and 32 per cent in 1990. The EC had succeeded in
weakening the growing imports of color television sets
from Korea, as seen later in Section 3-2, but failed to
prevent a rush of imports from other countries.
Therefore, EC's import restraint provided opportunities
to some CTV exporters to increase their shipments to the
EC market at the expense of Korean exporters. Korea has
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been singled out for AD duties imposition as major
exporting countries such as Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong
have good excuses for evading import restraints. Japan
contributed to local production of consumer electronics
in the EC through direct investments, Taiwan has been
traditionally engaging in exports of electronics parts to
the EC (namely, intra-industry trade), and Hong Kong is a
country with an emphasis put on free trade.
Secondly, the argument that job losses in the CTV sector
may be due to increase in imports from Korea is
unreasonable, because rapid technological change, with
strategies of rationalization and reorganization among
consumer electronics companies on a global basis
contributes to a continuous decline of employment.
However, it can not be denied that these factors came
into action as a consequence of imports from foreign
countries such as Korea.
Since the imposition of AD duties, Korea's exports of
small-screen CTV followed a continuously declining trend,
whilst EC's import dependence on foreign CTV continued to
increase. Especially, Japan's share in imports of CTV
into the EC market increased from 7.4 per cent (2/27)to
9.4 per cent(3/32) in the 1988-1990 period, in contrast
to Korea's share in EC'S CTV imports declined to 12.5 per
cent (4/32) from 33.3 per cent (9/27). According to
Marcel Marion, it can be imagined that Japan could be
excluded from EC's AD measure but Korea be easily subject
to the measure even though the fact does not support the
injustice of EC's AD measure against Korea. Firstly, he
points out the possibility of Japan being escaped from
EC's AD investigation as follows:53
Japan set up a strategy of establishing themselves
in the EC and both importing sets of Japanese origin
and components for assembly of sets in the EC which
are hardly distinguishable from each other.
Furthermore, the long time period normally taken for
AD investigation in the EC made Japanese exporters
easily transfer production to the EC or some other
place during this time. A dumping complaint
therefore is made void and become useless.
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However, he also argues "Korea's ability to dump, and to
hide that dumping is less develped than in Japan, based
on the fact that Korea's Chaebol have not yet completed
the establishment of captive distribution networks as in
Japan, so that dumping can be discovered more easily, and
the Korean population is also smaller than that of Japan
and has less purchasing power."54
Korea, therefore, seems to be the only scapegoat for
NIEs. The possibility of the EC, having some
misconceptions about leading NIEs in connection with
Japanese success in exports in the EC, is pointed out by
Louis Turner as follows, even though the specific
application of his argument to consumer electronics and
CTV sector is questionable:55
Japan has very much remained the leading
individual target of EC concern, as the bilateral
trade balance has remained stubbornly in Japan's
favor and continued to deteriorate in 1981. Both
national governments and the ECC are deeply
dissatisfied with what they see as a lack of
adequate Japanese trade concessions to them. It is
particularly significant that the relatively free
trading West Germans retreated in 1981 to a more
protectionist position in CTV, in both cases getting
a Japanese promise of restraint. The Japanese thus
have a secure position in the demonology of Western
Europe's trade politics, and this can only bode ill
for those NIC5 which are trying, in their turn, to
establish themselves in world markets.
However, it can not be disregarded that trade stages in
Japan or Korea are far different from the EC member
States. As a result, the ECC has even been accused of
dishonesty or unfairness in the debate about EC's AD
policy. At the same time, the difference could justify
the necessity of AD measure in a position of the EC to
fill up the gap. For example, "costs that in Europe are
normally borne by the selling organization are in Japan
or Korea partly borne by the manufacturer, whereas some
profits which in Europe normally would accrue to the
manufacturers can be made by other stages in distribution
in these two East Asian countries, in the captive
distribution companies. "56
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After the EC's AD measure against Korean CTV with screen
sizes of not more than 42 cm, Korea's small-screen CTV
exports rapidly declined in the 1987-1991 period. The AD
measure encouraged Korean CTV exporters to adopt a
strategy of diversifying their CTV exports to CTV with
screen size more than 42 cm, to the EC market. As a
result, Korea's exports of large-screen CTV rapidly rose
by 287 per cent to $268.665 million in 190 from $69.487
million in 1988. The EC's CTV industry, without
exception, filed an AD complaint against the large-screen
CTV from Korea and the ECC decided to implement an AD
investigation in July, 1992. Since the announcement of
EC's AD investigation, Korea's large-screen CTV exports
to the EC market sharply declined, as seen later in
Section 3-2.
3. Determinants and Effectiveness of Protectionism in
Color TV trade
3-1. Determinants of Protectionism in Color TV Trade
One of the major determinants of protectionism in the EC-
Korea color TV trade was Japan's role in advancing into
the EC market in the early 1980s when the exclusive
transmission system expired as seen in Section 2-1. As a
result, Japan's share in EC's CTV imports peaked with 70
per cent (7/10) in 1981. The EC, however, was moving to
tighten import restraints against Japanese CTV, causing
Japanese exporters to alter their strategy from direct
exports to local production in the EC through direct
investment. Korea's maiden export of CTV to the EC market
was made in 1984, by which time the EC were acutely aware
of industrial damage caused by Japanese CTV exporters.
Furthermore, Japanese market share of EC's CTV imports
continuously decreased to the level of 7.4 per cent
(2/27) in 1988, thanks to local production by them. 57 On
the other hand, Korea's market share peaked at 46.7 per
cent (7/15) in 1985, even though it declined to 33.3 per
cent (9/27.) in 1988. As a result, the EC, concerned about
the drastic increases in exports by Korean companies,
linked the phenomenon with its previous experience of
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industrial damage caused by Japanese exporters.
Unusually, Japan was not included in the EC's AD
investigation despite its deep concentration in the
production of large-sized CTV which were directly
competing with EC producers. 58 The main reason for the
exclusion was the Japanese contribution to the production
ot consumer electronics in the EC. For example, "two-
thirds of the CTVs manufactured in Europe were now made
by Japanese companies, and more than 80 per cent of the
VCRs as of November in 1993."
The problems of the EC's CTV industry were themselves a
determinant of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade.
Namely, the unique characteristic of the EC industry,
built-in protection through transmission/reception method
and tailure in demand forecast centering on large-screen
CTV, contributed directly to the crisis of EC CTV
industry, causing heavy protective measures to be taken
in the EC later. Robert Ballance points out:60
The CTV industry's great diversity, its pace of
innovation and its rapidly changing market
opportunities, meant that troubled firms often
suffered .trom ill-advised decisions of a
managerial or marketing nature rather than from the
effects of import penetration.
A third determinant is the EC's trade policy mechanism in
consumer electronics sector, which appears to be based on
political expediency rather than on purely economic
considerations. In connection with the political nature
of protectionism, Vinod Aggarwal, Robert Keohane and
David Yoffie maintain "protectionism's economic failures
are often its political success and vice versa." 61
 This
is reflected in the fact that the ECC did not accept the
Electronics Industries Association of Korea (EIAK)'s
proposal, which fully recognized the request from EACEM
to regulate export volume of Korea's CTV5 to the EC
market. There were several rounds of business-level talks
between the EACEM and its Korean counterpart (EIAK) to
solve the trade disputes between the EC and Korea, during
which the EACEM torcefully requested the Korean side to
limit the quantity of CTV exports to the EC market at
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2,950,000 units for three years by 1990 (980,000 units in
1988, 980,000 unitS in 1989 and 990,000 units in 1990).
In reply, the EIAK counter-offered to set the voluntary
export quantity of CTV to 3,300,000 units for the three
years (1,100,000 units annually for the 1988-90 period).
After initially failing to reach any agreement, the EIAK
finally conceded on June 4,1988 to accept the EACEMs
request without reservation. However, the EIAK's decision
did not change EC's original standpoint to implement AD
measure. The EC was already in a position to proceed an
AD investigation against Korean small-screen CTV in
August, 1987, and officially announced the AD
investigation on Feb.17, 1988. The EIAK and the EACEM had
four rounds of bilateral meetings on Dec.2, 1987, Feb.24,
1988, March 15, 1988, and Nov.3, 1988, respectively,
despite the official announcement on Feb.17, 1988. The
bilateral meetings, held after EC's position was
established, seem to be gestures from the EACEM to
disguise its intention to get rescue measures from the
ECC through AD action against Korean CTV. The EC's
measure, to implement AD action regardless of the
concession by the EIAK, is against the following ECC's
orficial policy guideline:62
In any event, the anti-dumping procedure can only be
considered as a last resort. For this reason, it is
necessary to maintain detailed statistics and use
all available bilateral and multilateral
consultative bra in order to anticipate and avoid
those situations which could result in the Community
having no other choice than to rake anti-dumping
measures.
Furthermore, the strong political power of EACEM acted as
a major determinant of EC's protectionism. In the process
of decision-making, the EC seems to be at the mercy of
active lobbying by politically strong industrial
associations. As I mentioned in Chapter IV, the EC
rejected AD complaints from the Community industry
against imports of tungsten products, steel nails,
aluminium-clad	 cookware, polyester film and polyester
staple fibre. In contrast, the ECC	 imposed AD duties
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against any complaints related to consumer electronics
against Korea. Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans also point
out the political power of lobbying groups in the EC's
consumer electronics sector as follows:63
For the sector of consumer electronics, there is no
doubt that a systematic campaign by industry leads
to the maximum possible number of complaints in
practically every major product.
Such political nature of EC's protectionism is closely
related with social rigidities in the EC against rapid
restructuring and job losses. Regarding this point, Louis
Turner and Neil McMullen maintain,64
such political nature of protectionism in the
EC CTV industry is closely related with a perception
of the inability of the West European political
culture to accept the type of ruthless
rationalization of production facilities which is
found in the United States.
In addition, Robert Ballance takes rapid increases in
Japanese direct investments in the EC as an example of
such social rigidities against restructuring and job
losses. Namely, "the ready acquiescence of some countries
to a Japanese strategy of supplanting exports by foreign
investment represents an effort to acquire know-how and
to improve performance in both domestic and foreign
markets while minimizing the adjustment costs of
contraction. "65
In addition to this political and social background to
the EC's protectionism, the negative experience of EC
member states with national import restraints against
Korea seems to have influenced the BC'S decision to
disregard the agreement between EACEM and EIAK. Despite
the VER measure by the United Kingdom, Korea's CTV
exports to the U.K. market increased to $35.312 million
in 1987 from $24..318 million in 1986. This situation was
the same as in case of French residual quota against
Korean CTV. Korea's CTV exports to France went up by 278
per cent to $19.402 million in 1990 and by 190 per cent
to $14.897 million in 1991 from the only $5.135 million
in 1987. The ineffectiveness of VERS by the United
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Kingdom and France is likely due to transshipment
strategy by Korean exporters as seen later.
Furthermore, this experience enforced the ECC to
prejudice that Korean CTV exporters are untrustworthy in
observing the promise of quantitative restrictions under
VER. According to the EIAK, Mr.Moltke, director general
of DG III in the ECC, disclosed the official position
that the ECC can not trust Korea's promise of voluntary
restraints and it is a different matter to implement VER
and impose AD duties in a meeting between him and EIAK
officials on May 20, 1988. 66 The EC's deep distrust in
Korean CTV exporters is likely to be rooted from its
Japan complex. Korea's export pattern in the 1980s was
very similar to that of Japan in the 1960s-70s. Korean
CTV exporters, all subsidiaries of Chaebol, were involved
in a cutthroat competition in the EC market to raise
their export records because favors from the Korean
government wholly depended on their export performance,
as seen in Chapter II. The cutthroat competition among
Korean CTV exporters to increase their export records
enabled the EC to have lack of confidence in their
promise of quantitative restrictions in exports, and
would be one of major reasons for increases in exports by
them to the United Kingdom and France, despite the VER5.
In addition, the ECC found "a Korean company was known to
be exporting large quantities of small-screen CTVs to the
EC, with many of them being transshipped via third
countries." 67 That was a clear indication that Korea was
actually transshipping their CTVs to the EC market via
third countries. Furthermore, the ECC concluded that "a
threat of increased injury existed from Korean exports in
the future, in view of the possibility of diverting
exports from the now saturated United States market."68
Therefore, the cutthroat competition among Korean
exporters with large production capacity and their
transshipment and switching strategies also acted as
major determinants of EC's protectionism against Korea in
CTV case.
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It can not be overlooked, however, that Korea's exports
of CTV to the EC market grew dramatically in a very short
period. Korea's exports of small-screen CTV went up by
358 per cent in the 1985-1987 period because Korea's CTV
exports to individual EC member states, including the
United Kingdom and France where Korean CTVs are under
VER5, increased, based on their international price
competitiveness in the period. Furthermore, exports of
Korean large-screen CTV rose up by 287 per cent in the
1988-1990 period, as seen in Section 2-4. Therefore,
dramatic increases in Korea's shipments of CTV to the EC
market within a very short period acted as one of other
major determinants of EC's protectionism against Korea.
However, Korea's successful shipments of CTV to France
and the United Kingdom under VER5 support my argument.
Namely, VER or quota restriction against products with
strong international competitiveness is useless in
reversing the growth of imports because exporters are
able to adopt strategy of coping with VERs such as
upgrading strategy, even though the possibility of
adopting transshipment strategy by Korean exporters, as
argued by the ECC, can not be excluded. Korea's CTV was
extremely competitive relative to other exports with RCA
ratio of 7.5 in 198b.
3-2. Effectiveness of Protectionism in Color TV Trade
There are no analyses regarding the effectiveness of
import restraints by the EC against CTV imported from
other foreign countries. However, Gary Hufbauer, Diane
Berliner and Kimberly Elliott analyze the effect of OMA
signed between the United States and three East Asian
countries--Japan, Korea and Taiwan--to regulate imports
of CTV to the U.S. market from these three countries.
They firstly examined output of U.S.CTV industry,
employment in U.S. CTV industry, CTV industry capacity
utilization, changes in imports before,during and after
import restraints, and finally comparison of costs to
consumers and benefits to producers. According to their
analysis, output of U.S.CTV industry during the OMA
397
restraints continuously increased by 25 per cent to
$3,336 million in 1982 trom $2,668 million in 1978, 69
 as
seen in Table VIII-19.
After terminating the OMA restraints in 1983, the
U.S.production of CTV increased by 17.8 per cent to
$3,929 million from 1982's $3,336 million. This result
can be interpreted in two ways: Firstly, the OMA measure
was very effective in increasing the domestic production
during the period of restraints. Secondly, the
U.S.production of CTV, however, increased enormously
after the end of restraints, meaning that there were
other factors, in addition to the OMA measure, raising
the	 U.S.production,	 such as	 increased	 levels of
automation in the U.S.CTV industry.
Table VIII-19:Effect of U.S.OMA Measure Against Japan,
Korea and Taiwan(million units, $M, %)
Years	 Output	 Employment	 ICU
(Volume)	 (Value) (Production Workers)
Bet ore
Restraints
197b	 5.87	 2,071	 26,957	 60.2
During
Restraints
1978	 8.28	 2,668	 23,854	 79.6
	
1980 10.73	 3,343	 21,679	 90.7
1982	 9.71	 3,33b	 21,350	 76.5
After
Restraints
	
1983 11.64	 3,929	 21,121	 90.5
Source:Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner and
Kimberly Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United
States:31 Case Studies), p.221.
Notes:ICU=Industry	 Capacity	 Utilization.	 Production
workers are based on average numbers.
The number of production workers in the U.S. CTV industry
continuously decreased from the level before restraints
in 1976(26,957 workers), to 21,350 in 1982 and to 21,121
in 1983. Therefore, the OMA measure was not effective in
preventing job losses, nor were these losses directly
caused by import penetration. Again, the automation and
rationalization of LJ.S.CTV industry was a factor reducing
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employment, rather than inflows of foreign CTV into the
U.S.market.
Concerning industry capacity utilization, the rate before
restraints remained as 60.2 per cent in 1976, but this
rose to 90.5 per cent after restraints in 1983.
Considering both the declining trend in employment and
the rise in production, it is clear the automation and
rationalization of the industrial sector contributed to
the increase in industry capacity utilization.
Table VIII-20:Imports Affected from Japan, Taiwan and
Korea(million units, $M)
Years	 Volume	 Value
Before Restraints	 1976	 2.97	 723
During Restraints	 1978	 2.56	 821
1980	 1.05	 643
1982	 1.92	 854
After Restraints	 1983	 4.22	 1,217
Source:Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T. Berliner and
Kimberly Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United
States--31 Case Studies), p.220.
The import penetration from Japan, Taiwan and Korea into
the U.S. market for CTV continued to increase regardless
of the OMA measure, as seen in Table VIII-20. That means
the OMA measure provided opportunities to foreign
exporters to increase their exports of CTV into the
United States by adopting upgrading strategy.
Table VIII-21:U.S.Imports of CTV(million units, $M, %)
Years	 Volume Value Growth in Value
Before Restraints 1976	 3.30	 927	 -
During Restraints 1978	 2.84 1,145	 23.5
1980	 1.31 1,449	 26.6
1982	 2.35 1,543	 6.5
After Restraints 1983
	
5.21 2,006	 30.0
Source:Hurbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner and
Kimberly Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United
States--31 Case Studies), p.220.
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It can be found through a fact that imports from the
three countries in terms of volume were declined with the
figures in terms of value increased during import
restraints. During import restraints, U.S.imports of CTVs
from all sources also rapidly increased by 34.8 per cent
to $1,543 million in 1982 from $1,145 million in 1978, as
seen in Table VIII-21. That indicates other CTV exporters
expolited opportunities to increase their shipments to
the U.S.market as the United States implemented OMAS
against Japan, Taiwan and Korea.
Table VIII-22:Effects of OMA for CTV to Consumers and
Producers in the United States(1982)
Gains from Restraints	 Costs of Restraints to
to U.S.Producers	 U.S. Consumers
Total
Value	 $190 Million	 $420 MIllion
Value
Per
Worker	 $9,000	 $420,000
Sources:Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T.Berliner and
Kimberly Ann Elliott(Trade Protection in the United
States--31 Case Studies), p.224.
Finally, the costs of restraints to U.S. consumers were
far higher than gains to U.S.producers, the reverse of
the intended effect of the OMA which was to reduce the
costs to consumers and raise gains to U.S. producers, as
seen in Table VIII-22.
The analysis of the effect of U.S.OMA measure can be
applied to EC's import restraints. Considering the fact
that the EC began to impose AD duties against Korea's CTV
from 1986, it is reasonable to check both the
effectiveness of EC'S import restraints in the 1980s and
major changes in economic indicators during the period.
Firstly, the EC's production of consumer electronics has
continuously increased since 1985, up 46•4 per cent from
8,895 million ECU in 1985 to 13,020 million ECU in
1990(see Table VIII-3). Especially, CTV production in the
United Kingdom rose by 25 per cent in the 1978-1987
period, that in Italy by 2.8 per cent and that in France
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by 4.0 per cent. Only Germany recorded a decrease of 19.5
per cent in CTV production in the same period(see Table
VIII-12). The increase in CTV production in the United
Kingdom, France and Italy was partly due to Japanese
direct investments in these countries. In the 1980-1990
period, 107 new Japanese electronics plants, including
CTV ±actories, were set up in EC member states such as
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom.7°
Secondly, contrary to the production, EC's employment in
the consumer electronics sector has shown a continuous
decline in the 1980-1988 period, down 23 per cent from
lbO,000 in 1980 to 123,000 in 1988. As a result, the
number of factories in the EC consumer electronics
industry drastically declined to 114 in 1990 from 224 in
1987(see Table VIII-6).
Thirdly, EC's imports of CTV from the world continuously
increased, despite the AD measures against Korea. Exports
to the EC by Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia,
where many Japanese plants are also under operation, have
rapidly increased. The share of import penetration in the
EC's total CTV demand increased to 32 per cent in 1990
from only 10 per cent in 1981. On the other hand, Korea's
share in EC's total CTV imports declined to 12.5 per cent
(4/32) in 1990 from 46.7 per cent (7/15) in 1985(see
Table VIII-15).
Considering these three trends, the drastic decline in
both employment and number of factories in consumer
electronics industry appears to result from EC industry's
strategy of rationalization and reorganization on a
global scale. In addition, rapid technical change, which
increased greatly the productivity of the labour force,
and automated production, contributed to reducing the
number of workers required for a given level of
production.
In the EC-Korea trade, the EC's AD measure was very
effective in reducing market penetration by Korean CTV
producers into the EC market. Korea's small screen CTV
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exports to the EC market peaked with $118,429,000 in
1987, the year when the EC officially started AD
investigation against Korean small screen CTV. However,
the export value declined to $103,883,000 in 1988, to
$25,355,000 in 1989, to $16,989,000 in 1990 and finally
to $15,554,000 in 1991. Furthermore, Korea's exports of
large-screen CTV to the EC market, peaked with $268.665
million in 1990, rapidly declined to $143.509 million in
1992, the year when the EC officially started AD
investigation against Korean large-screen CTV. 71 The AD
measure by the EC against Korea's CTV exports was more
effective than similar measure by the United States,
considering the export trend of Korean CTV to the U.S.
market down by 17 per cent in the 1985-1991 period(see
Table VIII-16).
Table VIII-23:Korea's Small-Screen CTV Exports to the
EC($1000)
Years	 Total Small-Screen	 Small-Screen Exports B/A
CTV Exports(A)	 to EC(B)
1985	 N/A	 25,859	 N/A
1986	 N/A	 91,027	 N/A
1987	 532,405	 118,429	 22.2
1988	 649,391	 103,883	 15.9
1989	 640,088	 25,355	 4.0
1990	 510,132	 16,989	 3.3
1991	 608,394	 15,554	 2.6
Source:Korea Foreign Trade Association(Directory of
Import Restraints by Advanced Countries against Korea),
p.119.
Before the AD complaint, Korea's exports of small-screen
CTV to the EC market in 1987 represented 22.2 per cent of
Korea's total small-screen CTV exports in the year.
However, the export value declined by 86.9 per cent in
1991 and market share to 2.6 per cent. Therefore, David
Yoffie's approach seems to be inapplicable to the case of
CTV sector. This approach, however, is applicable in
Korea-United Kingdom, and Korea-France CTV trade. Despite
VERs by the two EC member states, Korean CTV exporters
increased shipments rapidly to these markets as seen in
Section 3-1.
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In sum, EC's CTV industry has been experiencing job
losses due to unique characteristic of the industry
itself. Even though the EC's measure to prevent imports
from Korea was very successful, import penetration into
the EC market has been under continuous increasing trend,
indicating that some exporters have been exploiting
export opportunity of not having to compete with Korean
manufacturers in the EC market. Therefore, it is clear
that approaches considering mainly economic or political
factors only without regard to characteristic of specific
industry, are liable to draw an inconclusive evaluation
of the effectiveness of protective measures.
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Conclusions
1. Introduction
This thesis has examined determinants and effectiveness
of EC's protectionism against Korea. In my research, I
found that the current studies in IPE literature do not
fully explain the determinants of protectionism in the
EC-Korea trade. Furthermore, most IPE investigations into
protectionism have been based on the United States-Korea
trade, rather than the EC-Korea trade. In addition, EC
member states have individually been implementing import
restraints against Korea besides import restraints on an
EC-wide level. Therefore, I extracted several specific
factors as determinants of protectionism which can be
primarily divided between two groups--economic and
political determinants. Economic determinants are 1)a
causal relationship between protectionism by the United
States against Korea and protectionism by the EC against
Korea, 2)Korea's neo-mercantilist policy approach and
Korea's concentration of exports to a limited range of
products and 3)inter-industry trade structure between the
EC and Korea. Political determinants are i)political
expediency of the EC's protectionism against Korea, and
2)a kind of "Japan complex" effective against Korean
exports to the EC. As a result, my hypotheses--EC's Japan
complex and its relationship with EC's import restraints
against Korea, Korea's switching strategy of exports from
the United States to the EC and its relationship with
SC's import restraints against Korea, and Korea's strong
neo-mercantilist policy approach and its relationship
with EC's import restraints against Korea--have been
proved to be effective in explaining determinants of EC-
Korea trade disputes.	 In addition,	 it has been
demonstrated that these economic and political
determinants are very useful to find out origins of SC-
Korea trade disputes.
In case of effectiveness, I also found that the
approaches in the IPE literature regarding the
effectiveness of the aims of protectionism, as used by
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David Yoffie and Patrick Messerlin, should be
complemented by some additional approaches when measuring
the effectiveness of protectionism by the EC against
Korea. In case of David Yoffie's approach, the economic
advantage and political attractiveness of VERs and OMAs
must be reconsidered. In addition, the imposition of AD
duty must be included in his analysis of the
effectiveness of import restraints by the United States
against NIEs.
Patrick Messerlints approach also needs to be
complemented with regards to the effectiveness of other
types of import restraints such as VERs, OMAs and quota
restrictions, in addition to AD duty impositions.
However, this approach is applicable in the EC-Korea
trade because only seven of a total of 16 items subject
to EC's import restraints showed an increasing trend of
exports in the 1987-1991 period, despite the import
restraints by the EC. Furthermore, footwear was the only
item showing a continuous increase in shipments from
Korea to the EC market in the same period. The followings
are the results of the application of the main IPE
approaches regarding the determinants of protectionism in
the case of trade between the EC and Korea. The time
framework for this analysis is the 1970-1992 period, as
mentioned in Introduction.
2. Determinants of Protectionism in the EC-Korea Trade
2-1. Applicability of Approaches in the IPE Literature
Regarding Determinants of Protectionism
2-1-1. Hegemonic Stability Approach
Despite the tightening of import restraints in the 1970s
by the United States against Korea during its present
hegemonic decline, the EC did not implement the same
degree of protectionism against Korea in the 1970s.
Furthermore, there were no import restraints against
Korea by the EC in the 1981-1987 period when the United
States adopted a total of 12 import restraints against
Korea, 57 per cent of its total import restraints against
Korea since the 1970s(21 cases). However, it is difficult
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to decide whether this unusual phenomenon relates really
to hegemonic decline or is Just accidental. In addition,
the EC-Korea trade was relatively unimportant to the EC,
at least in the 1970s, compared with the importance of
the trade with Korea for the United States. 1 Furthermore,
it must be noted that the EC did not impose many
protectionist measures against Korea as a result of a
lack of agreement between individual EC member states.
Therefore, the application of the hegemonic stability
approach is meaningless in the EC-Korea trade. In EC
member states-Korea trade cases, however, the
U.S.hegemonic decline contributed indirectly to the
surges in import restraints by EC member states against
Korea because this provided EC member states with the
political incentive to do the same import restraints. The
coexistence of import restraints at the EC and individual
EC member states levels resulted in the sharp contrast in
the applicability of this approach.
2-1-2.Business Cycle Approach
The EC, which recorded the lowest GDP growth rate in the
1981-1990 period, as compared with the United States and
Japan, implemented 15 cases ot restrictive measures
against Korea in the period, slightly less than the 17
cases by the United States. The number of EC's import
restraints against Korea, however, rapidly increased
after 1988, when the EC's GDP growth showed a favorable
trend. That is in sharp contrast to the business cycle
approach which suggests the contrary. In addition, this
approach seems also to be inapplicable to the level of EC
member states-Korea trade cases because France and Italy
imposed the greatest number of import restraints against
Korea, contrary to their high GDP growth in the 1961-1990
period.
2-1-3. International Economic Interdependence Perspective
Of the major trading partners with Korea, the EC recorded
the lowest GDP dependence on exports to Korea with 0.13.
However, the EC'S import restraints against Korea
numbered 16 cases as of 1991, lower than each of 21 cases
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in Canada and the United States. Of individual EC member
states, France implemented the greatest number of import
restraints against Korea, despite its relatively high GDP
dependence on exports to Korea. On the other hand, Spain,
Greece and Portugal, showing very low dependence of
exports to Korea on GDP, did not adopt any import
restraints against Korea. Therefore, this perspective is
difficult to apply in either the BC-Korea, or individual
BC member states-Korea trade as determinants of
protectionism.
2-1-4.Diversification of Export Items Perspective
It is hard to count the number of export items at the EC
level. As a result, I only considered the application of
this approach in trade between individual BC member
states and Korea. France has been implementing the
greatest number of import restraints against Korea even
though its export items were highly diversified. On the
other hand, Greece, Portugal and Spain have not adopted
any import restraints, and Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Ireland only one each, against Korea,
despite their low diversification of export items.
Therefore, the degree of diversification of export items
is not related to weakness or strength of demands for
protectionism in individual EC member states-Korea trade.
2-1-5.Multinationalization Approach
The EC implemented a relatively higher number of import
restraints against Korea, despite having the highest
number of MNC5 in the world. France, among EC member
states, imposed the greatest number of import restraints
against Korea, despite its higher degree of
multinationalization of companies. On the other hand,
Switzerland and Sweden implemented very low degrees of
import restraint against Korea despite their low level of
multinationalized companies. However, it is misleading to
argue that Switzerland and Sweden have a low level of
multinationalization of their companies as the small
populations	 combined	 with	 high	 number	 of
multinationalized companies gives the opposite result.
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These shortcomings make this approach meaningless at the
level of the EC-Korea as well as individual EC member
states-Korea trade.
2-1--6.Strategic Trade Demands Approach
The EC has been asking for the reduction of Korea's
import tariffs and for treatment based on comparative
reciprocity, rather than being based on strategic trade
demands by the EC companies, similar to Korea's treatment
of the United States. This approach is rather more
applicable in the United States-Korea trade case
2-1-7.Exit-Entry Barriers Approach
This approach seems to be applicable in trade of iron and
steel products between the EC and Korea because the
demands for protection in iron and steel products are
sporadic, and almost institutionalized both in the United
States and the EC. However, it is hard to define the EC's
import restraints against Korean footwear as either
temporary or institutionalized because the EC has been
imposing VER against Korea since 1990 to date (as of
December 1993). It is also hard to argue that the exit-
entry barrier approach is applicable in the EC-Korea CTV
case because the import restraints have only been
initiated since 1990. However, this approach is not
applicable at the level of individual EC member states-
Korea color TV trade because the import restraints
against Korea were institutionalized. In the case of
footwear, import restraints by individual EC member
States were institutionalized, rather than temporary,
with protection against footwear imports from Korea in
the 1978-90 period, contrary to this approach.
2-1-8.voter Support and Degree of Collective Action
Approach
Polyester staple fibre and microwave ovens were not
included in the list of items receiving protective
treatment even though these industries have strong
political power; oxalic acid and photo albums received
protection despite weak political power. However,
sundries, toys and parts, stoneware and tiles were
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received protective treatment from individual BC member
states despite their minor political power as very small
industries. Therefore, purely political approaches of
determinants of protectionism seem not to be applicable
at the levels of the EC-Korea, and EC member states-Korea
trade.
In conclusion, there were no IPE approaches which
completely satisfy the requirements as determinants of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade. As a result, I
propose my own hypotheses to explain determinants of
protectionism in the EC-Korea trade. For this purpose, I
made sectoral case studies in textiles and clothing, iron
and steel products, footwear and consumer
electronics(CTV) to find determinants of protectionism
which are specific to the EC-Korea trade.
2-2.Economic Determinants of Protectionism in the EC-
Korea Trade
2-2-1. A Causal Relationship with Protectionism by the
United States against Korea
One of the influential factors in the BC's decision to
implement import restraints against some imports from
Korea has been the tact that those same products were or
still are under import restraints by the United States.
As the products were subject to import restrictions by
the United States, there were subsequent increases in
shipments of the products trom Korea to the EC market.
This phenomenon enabled the ECC to have a prepossessed
idea that Korea would switch its exports of some products
to the EC when Korea's exports of these products to the
United States were under import restraints, jeopardizing
the industries concerned, and so the BC imposed import
restraints against Korea. However, the EC rejected
requests to impose import restraints on products from
Korea that the United States had no protective measures
against, on the assumption that Korea would continue to
concentrate on exports of these products to the United
States. In addition, previous cases of import restraints
by the United States encouraged the EC to adopt more
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stringent import restrictions against Korea. There are
several examples illustrating the link between U.S.
protectionist measures against Korean products and
subsequent EC protectionist measures.
2-2-1-1. The Case of Textiles and Clothing
Korean textiles have been included in import restraints
by the United States since 1965 under the Long-Term
Agreement(LTA). As a result, exports from Korea to the EC
market began to increase. Spurred by the switch of
exports from the United States to the EC, the EC began
import restrictions in 1971 under the its own LTA. The
motivation of import restrictions by the EC was directly
related to a rush of imports from Korea following the LTA
signed between the United States and Korea.
In the polyester yarn case, the additional AD duties
imposition against these products from Korea, which had
been subject to MFA restriction, became a very
controversial issue. The EC quoted that the United States
had on several occasions adopted AD measures concurrent
with existing MFA restriction. Furthermore, the diversion
of Korean exports from the United States to the EC is
closely linked to the implicit encouragement of
protectionism by the United States. Therefore, the
example of import restraints given by the United States
was ±ollowed by EC protectionist measures against Korean
polyester yarn, in addition to the MFA measure by the EC,
worsening the trading environment worldwide.
2-2-1-2. The Case of Photo Albums
The causal relationship with protectionism by the United
States against Korea can also be found in the EC-Korea
photo album trade case. Korea's exports of photo albums
to the EC market began to dramatically increase after the
AD duties were imposed by the United States against Korea
in 1985. The EC photo album industry filed an AD
complaint against Korean photo albums in 1988 to ask the
ECC for redressive actions against switched imports of
Korean photo albums from the United States. After the
implementation of price undertaking regarding Korean
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photo albums, Korea's exports of these products to the EC
market began to decline.
2-2-1-3. The Case of Footwear
In the footwear sector, import restraints by both EC
member states and the EC were also closely related to
measures by the United States. The year the United
Kingdom implemented VERs(1977) against Korean footwear
coincided with the OMAs by the United States against
Korea's non-rubber shoes, implemented for the 1977-1981
period. In addition, the import restraints by France and
Italy against Korean footwear were implemented during the
process of four rounds of investigations into possible
import restrictive measures against Korea by the United
States in 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1989. The Korean companies
switched their export markets from the United States, to
evade possible import restraints, to the EC, resulting in
an increase of exports of Korean footwear to the EC
market. Therefore, the investigations into restriction of
imports from Korea by the United States had an influence
on the measures taken by Italy and France, implementing
quota restrictions against imports of Korean footwear for
the period of March 1,1988-June 30,1990 (Italy) and July
1, 1988-June 30, 1990 (France), and on introduction of
EC-wide VER as of December in 1993 since July 1,1990.
2-2-1-4. The Case of CTV
In the color television sector, Korea CTV has been
subject to the imposition of AD duties by the United
States since Oct.12, 1983. As a result, exports of CTV
to the United States declined to $148.321 million in 1991
from 1987's $245,174 million. In addition, the United
States has been implementing AD duties against Korean CTV
Eraun tubes since Jan.6, 1987. Korea's small-screen color
TV exports to the EC market peaked in 1987 at $118.429
million. The EC began to impose AD duties from Oct.28,
1989 against Korean small-screen CTV. Furthermore, large-
screen color TV sets, which had been excluded from AD
duties, were	 then included in the list of AD
investigations by the EC from Nov.20, 	 1992. The
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U.S.import restraints against Korean color TV sets again
influenced EC's decision making for implementing import
restraints against Korea.
2-2-1-5.The Case of the EC's Rejections of Import
Restraints in the Absence of U.S.Restriction
The causal relationship of EC protectionism is
strengthened by those cases where the United States' lack
of import restraints can be causally related to the EC's
rejection of such restraint demands. For example, the EC
rejected requests for import restraints by industrial
associations against Korean products such as tungsten
products, steel nails, microwave ovens, aluminium-clad
cookware, polyester film and polyester staple fibre. Of
these six, only polyester film had been under import
restrictions by the United States, the remaining five
items free of import protective measures by the United
States. This result, however, seems also to be explained
with no consensus among EC member states and weak
industrial lobby by pertinent industrial associations.
2-2-2. Korea's Neo-Mercantilist Policy Approach and
Concentration of Exports on a Limited Range of Products
2-2-2-1 . Korea' s Neo-Mercantilist Policy
Korea's	 industrial	 policy	 of	 fostering	 specific
industries, providing various industrial incentives
including policy loans, fostering a Chaebol-oriented
economy and creating a heavy dependence upon Japan for
major equipment and technology, has been a direct
contribution to the EC-Korea trade disputes. The highly-
centralized economic interventionism of Korean
government, which partially explains how Korea could
develop its economy through the promotion of exports, led
to the negative effect of causing many trade disputes
with advanced countries, especially with the United
States and the EC. When the national economy was not so
sophisticated, Korea's discretionary enforcement of
policy decisions could carry significant positive effects
for the development of national economy. However, Korea
is now standing at a cross-road where policy directions
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must be adopted to accommodate political and economic
liberalization requests at home and abroad. Therefore,
Korea's economic interventionist policies have been
confronting many challenges internally and externally.
Even though Korea has been actively implementing market
opening policy since the 1980s, Korea-EC trade disputes
are not being lessened so far. That indicates Korea-EC
trade disputes can not be solved with a simple concession
of one party to the other.
2-2-2-2. The Concentration of Korea's Exports on a
Limited Range of Products and Rapid Increases of
Shipments in a Short Period
As a result of the active industrial policy targeted to
the development of a limited range of strategic sectors,
Korea's exports concentrated on specific products. In
1990, Korea's exports of textiles and clothing to the EC
market totalled $1,802 million, representing 20.3 per
cent of its total exports to the EC that year. In
addition, exports of electronics products accounted for
35.2 per cent of its total exports to the EC market, at
$3,125 million. This partial success of Korea's exports
in a limited range of products raised the issue of
Korea's supposed graduation Irom a status of developing
to developed country, as outsiders surfering from Korea's
sectoral export success concluded from this partial
success that Korea had become an industrialized country
and had therefore to of±er equal market access to the
other advanced countries, and abolish high tariff and
non-tariff barriers for the protection of commodity and
financial and service markets. In addition, there was
cutthroat competition among Korean exporters themselves
in attempting to raise their export records as all credit
and tax favors from the Korean government were provided
on the basis of the level of exports, giving rise to
dumping activities by Korean exporters in overseas
markets.Furthermore, the aggressive government policy in
promoting exports resulted in a steep growth of Korea's
exports in a very short period, also causing many trade
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disputes following industrial damage among advanced
countries by the entry of Korean exports.
For example, Korea's exports of polyester yarns were
concentrated on two EC member states--Spain and Italy,
shipping to them 84.5 per cent of total polyester yarn
exports to the EC market in 1986. Korea also recorded a
dramatic increase in shipments of polyester yarns to the
EC in a very short period. These two factors together,
arousing fears in EC industries and thus causing requests
for protective measures against Korean products, resulted
in the EC's protectionism against Korea. Korea's exports
of textiles and clothing to the EC increased by 50.3 per
cent in the 1986-1991 period and Korea's market share of
polyester yarn in EC's total imports increased to 1.9 per
cent in 1986 from the negligible level in 1985.
Korea's footwear exports to the EC market expanded from
only $135.576 million to $799.975 million in the 1985-
1991 period. As a result, the share of EC market rose
from 8.6 per cent to 20.9 per cent of Korea's total
footwear exports in the same period. Such strong growth
in exports motivated the EC footwear industry to request
remedial measures to provide against industrial injury
from imports.
Korea's small-screen CTV exports to the EC market, as
seen in Section 2-2-1-4, increased more than four times
to $118.429 million, from $25.859 million in the 1985-
1987 period. Furthermore, exports of Korean CTV with
screen-size more than 42 cm rose by 287 per cent to
$268.665 million in 1990 from $69.487 million in 1988. In
particular, Korea's consumer electronics exports grew to
$6,054 million in 1991 from 1977's $448 million. The
splendid success of Korea's consumer electronics industry
in a very limited period provided sufficient concern for
the EC industry to ask for import restraints against
Korea.
2-2-3. Inter-Industry Trade Structure between the EC and
Korea
2-2-3-1. Impact of Inter-Industry Trade Structure
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Inter-industry trade pattern in the EC-Korea trade has
been one of the major reasons for the increase of
bilateral trade disputes between the EC and Korea. The
trade pattern resulted from Korea's development strategy
in the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Korean government
was heavily dependent upon foreign loans, rather than
loreign investments, as capital resources to fill the gap
between the capital required for industrial development
and domestic savings. As a result, Korea's export pattern
to date has put special stress on exports of finished
products rather than parts, causing inter-industry trade
structure, rather than intra-industry trade structure in
trade with major trading partners. For example, Korea
introduced a total of $2,731.1 million in foreign loans
in the year of 1978 alone, which was far higher than
$1,001.244 million in foreign investments introduced for
seventeen years in the 1962-1978 period. "Among foreign
investments in the 1962-1978 period, those from Japan
represented 53.5 per cent of the total at $535.282
million, followed by the United States with $161.816
million (16.2 per cent). The Netherlands topped the list
of investors from EC member states during the same
period, with only $51.545 million, followed by France
with $12.087 million, the United Kingdom with $10.937
million and Germany with $6.616 million." 2 Therefore, the
relatively low level of foreign investments by EC member
states became the major reason for inter-industry trade
between the EC and Korea. On the other hand, Korea's
heavy dependence on Japanese investments resulted in a
relatively small number of trade disputes between Japan
and Korea helped by intra-industry trade structure,
despite the expansion of economic relations between the
two countries. For example, Korea had been exporting, to
Japan, electronics parts, iron and steel products and
organic chemicals all of which are included in the top
ten export items to Japan, and was also importing these
same products as major import items included in top ten
imports from Japan.
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In addition, the range of both Korea's export markets and
export items were limited in scope, due to the negligence
o± developing new overseas markets and export items,
respectively, resulting in Korea's brisk or sluggish
export periormance dependent upon economic environmental
changes for a small number of products and markets.
There are certain additional factors which are
responsible for the inter-industry trade structure
between the EC and Korea. The EC has continued to
concentrate on exports of labour-intensive products such
as textiles and clothing, iron and steel products, and
footwear, following strong resistance to industrial
structure adjustment pressures among EC member states,
and enlargement of EC membership to such countries as
Greece, Portugal and Spain which have these labour-
intensive industries. In addition, the EC is still the
world's largest exporter of consumer electronics, thanks
to the EC-wide aggressive industrial policy in this
sector. These factors on both sides resulted in a head-on
collision in specific industrial sectors under an inter-
industry trade structure.
As a result, the EC-Korea trade became an example of
problems associated with inter-industry trade rather than
intra-industry trade. The EC has few trade disputes with
the EFTA countries and the United States, but has many
trade disputes with Japan. Considering the fact that the
EC-EFTA and EC-United States trade patterns are both
intra-industry trade, and that EC-Japan trade pattern is
inter-industry trade, the EC-Korea trade pattern is
certainly a major cause of bilateral trade disputes.
2-2-3-2. Growing Trade Disputes in Specific Sectors
The EC-Korea trade disputes worsened regardless of any
changes in bilateral export and import volume, indicating
that the major cause of bilateral trade disputes was the
characteristic type of inter-industry bilateral trade.
The EC's imports from Korea in the 1990-1991 period only
increased by 9.6 per cent to $9,728 million from $8,876
million, whilst its exports to Korea in the same period
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were up by 17.7 per cent to $9,908 million from $8,421
million, and as a result the EC recorded a trade surplus
with Korea in 1991. In contrast to this, however, trade
disputes in the three years 1990-1992 numbered 13 cases,
almost equal to the 14 cases recorded during the previous
10 years.
Rather than by the overall trade balance, the EC's import
restraints were caused by sectoral imbalances resulting
from the inter-industry trade structure between the EC
and Korea. EC's import restraints against Korea have been
concentrated on products in which Korea has falling RCA
ratios, such as textiles and clothing, iron and steel
products and consumer electronics, as a result of a head-
on collision in the specific industries. That reflects
Korea's failure to develop new export items through R&D,
which led to Korea's displacement from its major markets
by new, cheap labour-cost countries. On the other hand,
Korea's imports of machinery from the EC has been
increasing continuously, retlecting Korea's efforts to
switch import sources for machinery towards the EC and
away from Japan and the United States. If the trend of
EC's import restraints on products with falling RCA ratio
continues, along with Korea's failure to develop new
export items and the continuation of Korea's import
source diversification to the EC, the trade deficit of
Korea with the EC is expected to increase in future,
supported by the fact that Korea's trade deficit of $180
million with the EC in 1991 widened further to $352
million in 1992.
2-3. Political Determinants of Protectionism in the EC-
Korea Trade
2-3-1. Political Expediency o1 the EC's Protectionism
against Korea in Its Actual Policy Implementation
Procedures
2-3-1-1.Low Rate of Actual Imposition of EC's Import
Restraints
There are several examples which support the political
nature of EC'S protectionism against Korea. First of all,
the proportion of investigations into import restraints
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terminating with no suspicion of injury to EC's
industries was very high, at 64.7 per cent in the 1975-
1992 period, far higher than the 54.2 per cent figure for
the United States. This fact supports the argument that
the EC has been doing investigations into possible
protective measures against Korea, all due to the
political expediency of imposing protective measures to
satisfy growing demands from EC industries, and to the
relative weakness of Korea in the international political
arena. Korean exporters had to accept the loss of
business incurred by the investigations, such as
withdrawals of orders by EC importers, despite the fact
that they were cleared of any unfair trading activities
in 64.7 per cent of the total investigations initiated by
the EC.
2-3-1-2.EC's	 Resistance	 to	 Industrial	 Structure
Adjustment Pressures
As I mentioned in section 2-2-3-2, EC's import restraints
against Korea were mainly concentrated on products which
had been losing their international competitiveness in
terms of RCA ratios, such as textiles and clothing, iron
and steel products and consumer electronics products, to
accommodate political pressures from the industries
opposing industrial structure adjustment. Through the
case analyses in this thesis, it was found that Korean
exporters, who were subject to the EC's import
restraints, were only in a position to expand their
shipments to the EC market if their international
competitiveness was strong. On the other hand, in terms
of employment, the EC did not effectively protect its
industries from foreign imports through the
implementation of import restraints. In reaction to
foreign competition, efforts were being made to increase
productivity through modernization of production
facilities in the fields of textiles, iron and steel
products and consumer electronics products. Offshore
processing activities have also been carried out by the
EC industries in clothing and consumer electronics
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sectors. Both activities worked against employment in the
EC, negating the purely economic argument for restriction
of imports to aid employment. The SC'S argument that
imports are the sole cause of unemployment is therefore
doubtful.
2-3-1-3. AD Investigations as a Preliminary Stage to
Obtain Concessions
The EC used the means of initiating AD investigations
against Korean products as a ploy to obtain concessions
from Korea to make it voluntarily restrict export volumes
to the EC market. This is another aspect of the EC's
partially political nature of some cases of protectionism
against Korea. For example, the EC announced in 1972 that
it had decided to initiate AD investigations against
Korean acrylic fibres and acrylic stockings. However, the
EC stopped the AD investigations after reaching agreement
with Korea in 1975 in which Korea voluntarily restricted
its exports 0± a wide range of textiles, from natural
fibre to man-made fibres. The SC also threatened to
impose AD duties against Korean steel plates in 1978, and
finally suspended the AD investigation after receiving a
promise from Korea to conclude VER5 with the EC. The EC
made a threat to initiate AD investigation against Korean
H-beam, and again the threat was withdrawn after a
promise from Korea to conclude an agreement in addition
to the EC-Korea steel agreement, under which Korea's
exports of H-beam have to be made under	 quota
restrictions	 set	 at	 individual	 EC	 member
states' level.
2-3-2. A Kind of "Japan Complex" Effective against Korean
Exports to the SC
Based on the analysis of some cases, I come to the
conclusion that the EC and EC member states have a "Japan
complex" meaning that Korea will have a similar
destructive effect on the EC as Japan had. Therefore, an
important determinant of EC's protectionism against Korea
was the EC's experience of industrial damage arising from
Japanese imports. Because Korea was regarded as a "second
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Japan," due to its similar export patterns and strategies
to those of Japan, Korea became an immediate target for
import restraints when it entered EC markets. As in the
case of Japan earlier on, this sudden and massive
appearance of Korean exports in a few sectors was
compounded by the problem of the non-existence of any
yardstick with which to measure the graduation of a
country from developing to developed status, allowing the
EC to hold a perception that Korea had completely moved
from being a developing country to one fully developed,
and so be expected to behave according to the same trade
rules as applied to other advanced industrial countries.
2-3-2-1. The CTV Case and Japan's Role in EC-Korea Trade
Disputes
The EC's decision to implement AD measure against Korean
CTV was made following its previous experience of
industrial damage caused by Japanese exports to the EC
market. Japan advanced into the EC market with exports of
CTV in the early 1980s, when the exclusive transmission
systems expired. As a result, Japan's share of EC's CTV
imports peaked with 70 per cent in 1981. However, the EC
was moving to tighten restraints against Japanese CTV
exports, causing Japanese exporters to switch its
strategy to local production in the EC market through
direct investments. Korea's exports of CTV to the EC
began in 1984, when the EC was vividly aware of
industrial damage caused by Japanese CTV exporters.
2-3-2-2.The Case of Iron and Steel Products and Japan's
Role in EC-Korea Trade Disputes
The EC implemented VER against iron and steel products
from Korea for the 1980-1990 period, despite the fact
that Korea's ability to export declined in 1978 and 1979
as its indigenous demand took all the steel it could
produce. The major reason for imposition of VER was the
EC's concern over possible sharp inflows of iron and
steel products from Korea, as happened with imports from
Japan which were subject to VER after 1975. When the EC
concluded VER5 with 13 steel exporting countries
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including Japan and Korea in 1980, Korea's production of
crude steel (8.6 million tonnes) amounted to only 7.7 per
cent of Japan's crude steel production (111.4 million
tonnes). Korea's steel exports that year were 4.5 million
tonnes, 13.2 per cent of Japan's exports(34.1 million
tonnes). Korea was sucked into trade disputes although
the prime problem was Japan's export success.
2-3-2-3.The Case of DRAMs and Japan's Role in EC-Korea
Trade Disputes
Korean-made DRAMs(dynamic random access memories) were
filed for an AD investigation by the European Electronics
Component Manufacturers Association (EECMA) in 1991.
Major reason for the AD complaint was that Korean
exporters had been dumping in the EC market. However, the
actual motivation of complaint was that during the
process of AD investigation against Japanese exporters
(1987-1990), Japanese producers argued that Korean
companies were also dumping in the EC market. This
argument was designed to involve Korean firms in the EC's
AD restraints so that they could not replace Japan's
exports, inducing the EC to imagine Korea as a second
Japan.
2-3-2-4.Japan's Role in EC's Concurrent Investigations
against Japanese and Korean Products
The EC has a tendency to include Korea in the list of
countries for investigation into possible import
restraints when the prime target is Japan. A major reason
tor concurrent investigations was that Korean exports
might also threaten market shares held by European
companies because they would exploit restraints on
Japanese exports. This concern is also partially
justified by many technical and technological linkups of
Korean companies with Japanese companies. The EC
investigated Japan and Korea together regarding anti-
dumping of CDP, CTV, VCR, audio cassette tape, car stereo
radio, DRAMS and micro-wave ovens. In some later cases,
Japan was omitted from the investigations because the EC
reasoned that Japanese producers were contributing
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greatly to intra-EC production by direct investments in
the EC such as in the case of color TV. However, there
were no examples of Korean exporters being excluded from
the investigations to leave only Japanese exporters in
the list.
2-4.Specific Determinants (or Procedures and Incidents)
of Protectionism in the EC-Korea Trade
2-4-1.Textiles and Clothing Trade
2-4-1-1. The EC's Inconsistent Policy Implementation
The EC was not consistent in implementing external trade
policy. In 1979, the EC had disclosed its position on the
relationship between the MFA and other quantitative
restrictions, arguing that agreements under MFA contain
an undertaking by the Community not to introduce further
quantitative restrictions under the GATT or the MFA, or
introduce measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions. However, the EC's position
changed completely in 1988 when it stated its belief that
neither Community law nor international rules--notably
the MFA--prohibit the imposition of AD duties, customs
duties or any other measures affecting imports subject to
quantitative restrictions, provided it is established
that injury has been caused despite the restrictions.
Such a statement of policy was contradictory to its
earlier official position not to introduce further
quantitative restrictions under the GATT or measures
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
2-4-1-2. Clerical Errors Due to the Growing Workload of
ECC
The ECC wrongly calculated, by a large margin, the
provisional AD duties against Korea's polyester yarn as a
result of a computer error. The error was caused by the
EC's acceptance of as many complaints as possible for
political reasons without having been given the material
means to process such a number of complaints. Two Korean
companies had to accept the consequence of this computer
mistake including withdrawal of orders from EC importers.
Furthermore, the ECC did not correct the miscalculation
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of provisional AD duties until Korean exporters concerned
notified their intention to file a complaint with the
European Court of Justice regarding the matter. The ECC
was reluctant to recognize its mistake officially, since,
were it known, the admission could be detrimental to the
credibility of its AD investigation procedure. Even
though definitive AD duties were reduced finally,
reflecting the computer error, two Korean companies
affected by the mistake incurred enormous damage. Among
the major causes of the mistake were the recent trend in
the EC to depend heavily on implementation of AD duties
imposition mechanism, and the relative shortage of
manpower to handle such cases, originating from the
tightness of administration budget in the EC. The heavy
workload in the ECC also prolonged final decisions for
import restraints. The average period for final decisions
of AD duties imposition in the EC was 714.1 days, far
longer than 280 to 415 days in the United States, 245 to
285 days in Canada and 295 days in Australia. Considering
that the investigations themselves could be damaging to
foreign exporters, the length of time taken for final
decisions was very detrimental to Korean exporters,
especially if they were subsequently released from the
investigations without any suspicion of injury to EC
industries.
2-4-2.Iron and Steel Trade
2-4-2-1.The Influence of U.S.Import Restraints against
Korea
The ECtS import restraints against iron and steel
products from Korea were greatly influenced by the United
States. The EC's basic import price (BIP) mechanism,
applied to decide whether or not dumping margins exist,
was introduced in imitation o 	 the Trigger Price
Mechanism (TPM) of the united States. The TPM,
implemented for the 1978-1982 period, induced voluntary
restraints by exporters in establishing a system of
dumping reference prices, sales below which would lead to
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an investigation by the U.S. government with the threat
of further sanctions to follow.
The mechanism for the calculation of dumping margin in
the iron and steel sector of the EC is not reasonable on
economic grounds. The AD investigation for iron and steel
products by the EC has so far been implemented under
Commission Decision No.2424/88 in which dumping margin is
calculated by comparing the BIP with the export price,
rather than by a comparison of the domestic market price
of exporters with their export price to the EC market.
The BIP is always higher than Korea's export price to the
EC market because it(BIP) is calculated in terms of
prices of efficient world's steel producers. As a result,
Korean exporters are easily subject to EC's AD
investigations, and Korean exporters lose their price
competitiveness if they export iron and steel products at
prices equal to or higher than BIP to the market. Korean-
made steel rods have been filed in an AD complaint by the
EC industry, in October 1991. This was the first time
that the EC officially initiated an AD investigation
against Korea's iron and steel products since 1980, when
the EC-Korea steel agreement was concluded. Before the
date of AD complaint, Korean steel makers were quite, or
fairly safe from EC'S AD complaints because they had been
allowed to export their products to the EC market with
price flexibility around the list price(LP), rather than
the BIP applicable to other suppliers with no bilateral
agreements concluded with the EC. The dumping margin
calculation mechanism of comparing the BIP with the
export price is unusual, considering the fact such a
method is contradictory to the Anti-Dumping Code of the
GATT which is to compare the domestic market price of
exporters with the export price. It follows that the EC's
mechanism is purely political, with the intention of
easily relating dumping margins with industrial injury
margins.
2-4-2-2 . Business Cycle
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The business cycle was one of the major determinants of
protectionism because the iron and steel industry had
been influenced by business of its major consumer
industries, such as shipbuilding and automobile
production. In the 1970s, when EC's GDP growth was down
to 2.9 per cent from the previous decade's 4.8 per cent,
the EC implemented AD measures and VERs together to
prevent growing imports of foreign products. During this
period, the EC implemented AD investigation against
Korean steel plate and VERs against Korean iron and steel
products. However, the EC's GDP growth rate showed a
favorable trend with 3.8 per cent in 1988, 3.4 per cent
in 1989 and 3.1 per cent in 1990, contributing to the
suspension of VERs by the EC, with subsequent dependence
on AD measures only.
2-4-2-3. Korea's Crude Steel Production Expansion and Its
Causal Relationship with Temporary Increases in Exports
to the EC Market
Wide ranging expansion of Korea's crude steel production
and its causal relationship with temporary increases in
Korea's exports to the EC market in a very short period
became one of major determinants of EC's protectionism
against Korea. In 1977, the year following POSCO's second
plant completion, Korea's steel plate was filed by the EC
industry. In addition, the EC asked to have negotiations
with the Korean government for the discussion of VERs
applied to Korea's iron and steel products to the EC
market. In the 1977-1979, Korea's exports of iron and
steel products rose by 107 per cent to 3.1 million tonnes
from 1.3 million tonnes. In 1987, the year Kwangyang's
first plant was completed, the EUROFER filed an AD
complaint against Korean H-beam. Korea's iron and steel
exports to the EC also increased by 20.8 per cent in the
1986-1987 period, even though their exports continuously
declined by 5b.3 per cent and 5.2 per cent in the 1987-
1988, and 1988-1989 periods, respectively.
Therefore, the fluctuation ot Korea's steel production
capacity and temporary growth in exports resulted in
trade disputes with foreign countries, especially with
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the EC, despite the fact that Korea's self-sufficiency
rate remained at 83.4 per cent in iYYi and international
competitiveness of Korean iron and steel products, based
on RCA ratios, has been weakening continuously.
2-4-3. Footwear Trade
2-4-3-1.The EC's Retaliation against Closed Markets
Abroad
The EC's decision to implement VER against Korean
footwear had been made under the perception by the EC
that its market was relatively open to foreign imports,
contrasting with the difficulties faced by EC companies
in penetrating markets of other countries. The EC still
considers that its footwear exports to the markets in
Japan, Australia, Canada and the United States suffer
from restrictions, in contrast to the degree of openness
of the EC market for inflows of footwear from these
countries. For example, the EC'S customs duty is 8 per
cent for leather shoes, whilst many third countries are
setting up a growing array of tariff and non-tariff
barriers. This relatively low barrier in the EC has
resulted in demands by the EC footwear industry for
implementation of import restraints against foreign
footwear.
2-4-3-2.The Successful Experience by Italy and France to
Restrict Imports of Korean Footwear
The successful experience by Italy and France to restrict
imports of Korean tootwear through VERs encouraged the EC
to adopt an EC-wide VER later, rather than other types of
import restraints such as AD action, when a majority of
EC member states filed complaints to the ECC for
redressive actions against Korean footwear. For example,
Korea's exports of footwear to France decreased by 26.6
per cent to $86.297 million in 1989 from $117.648 million
in 1988, and those to Italy declined by 7.6 per cent from
$79.954 million to $73.878 million in the same period as
a consequence of VER5 implemented by them against Korean
footwear.
2-4-.-4.Consuiner Electronics and CTV Trade
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2-4-4-1.The Built-In Protectionism and Failure in Demand
Forecast in the EC
The problems arising from the EC's CTV industry itself,
such as built-in protectionism of transmission/reception
method and failure in demand ±orecasting by concentrating
on large-screen CTV, accounts as a determinant of
protectionism in EC-Korea trade. As a result of the
expiration of the built-in protective measure afforded by
the transmission systems in the 1980s, the EC CTV
companies needed alternatives to win against fierce
competition with Japanese companies. In addition, major
EC's CTV plants were concentrating on the production of
20-inch and 22-inch tube CTVs at a time when demands of
EC consumers seemed to be swinging towards smaller sets,
adding to the vulnerability of the EC CTV industry in
terms of international competitiveness and endangering
competitiveness in small-screen CTV production. This
caused the EC industry to move in the direction of
adopting protective measures against foreign products.
2-4-4-2.specific Political Factors in CTV Trade
The political nature 0± the EC's trade policy mechanism,
favoring protectionism rather than industrial structure
adjustment, caused by social regidities, contributed to
the EC moving toward protectionism in the CTV case. This
is reflected in the fact that the ECC did not accept the
EIAK's proposal to fully accept the request from EACEM to
voluntarily restrict export volume of Korea's CTV to the
EC market. In addition, the strong political power of
EACEM acted as a determinant of EC's protectionism. For
example, the EC rejected AD complaints from EC industry
for some products, as seen in Section 2-2-1-5, but most
complaints by the EACEM against Korean consumer
electronics products, such as CTV, VTR, CDP, car stereo
radio, video cassette tape and audio cassette tape, were
accepted by the ECC for implementation of import
restraints.
2-4-4-3.Deep-Rooted Distrust of Korean CTV Exporters by
the EC
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Despite VERs by the United Kingdom and France, Korea's
CTV exports to the United Kingdom rose by 45.2 per cent
to $35.312 million in 1987 from $24.318 million in 1986,
and those to France by 278 per cent to $19.402 million in
1990 from $5.135 million in 1987. This experience led the
the ECC to suspect that Korean CTV exporters are
untrustworthy in observing the promise of quantitative
restrictions under VER. "Japan Complex" enhanced the EC's
distrust of Korean CTV exporters, originated from
industrial injury from Japanese entry into the EC market
and a very similar strategy by Korean exporters as Japan
in the EC. Korean CTV exporters, all subsidiaries of
Chaebol, engaged in cutthroat competition in the EC
market to raise their export performance, as seen in
Section 2-2-2-2! This fierce competition among Korean
exporters enabled the EC to lacJ trust in their promise
of adhering to quantitative restrictions in exports when
EIAK and EACEM had meetings for VERs and would be one of
major reasons for increases in exports by them to the
United Kingdom and France, in spite of VER5.
3.Effectiveness of Achieving the Aims of Protectionism in
the EC-Korea Trade
3-1.The IPE Literature Regarding Effectiveness of
Protectionism in the EC-Korea Trade
The IPE literature regarding the cost and benefit of
protectionism is in accord with the conclusion of higher
cost to consumers rather than benefit to producers in
countries which impose import restraints. However, in the
IPE literature regarding effectiveness of aims of
protectionism, the results of analyses by David Yoffie
and Patrick Messerlin are completely contradictory each
other. Especially, as I mentioned in Section 1, David
Yoffie's approach needs to be complemented by two
factors. Firstly, the immediate economic advantages and
political attractiveness of VERs and OMA5 must be
considered. Secondly, the impositions of AD duty must be
included in his analysis of effectiveness of import
restraints by the United States against NIE5. Patrick
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Messerlin's approach is applicable for the EC-Korea trade
because only seven out of a total of 16 items subject to
EC's import restraints, showed an increasing trend of
exports, despite the import restraints.
3-2.	 Specific	 Analysis	 of the Effectiveness of
Protectionism in the EC-Korea Trade
3-2-1 . General Comments
The effectiveness of EC's import restraints has to be
evaluated through examining AD measures, VER5, OMA5, and
others together, rather than VERs or OMAs only as fully
80 per cent of EC's total import restraints against Korea
were implemented through the imposition of AD duties. In
the EC-Korea trade, only textiles and footwear, among
four items under EC's VER or quota restrictions, had
shown increasing trends despite the EC's measures. Of a
total of 12 cases, ten of which had AD duties imposed and
price undertakings, and the remainder under
investigations for AD measures, five items--CDP, video
cassette tape, glutamic acid, bicycle tyre tube and audio
cassette tape, showed increases in shipments to the EC
market in the 1987-1991 period. However, only one--
glutamic acid recorded an increase in shipments to the EC
market in the 1990-1991 period. The sharp rise of exports
of glutamic acid was a result of extraordinary expansion
of consumption in the EC in 1991. In addition, only
footwear, subject to EC'S VER, showed a continuous
increase in shipments to the EC market in the 1987-1991
period, despite the EC's protective measures. Thus, the
impositions of import restraints resulted in decreasing
shipments of Korean products under EC's import restraints
to the EC market to $2,966.341 million from $2,908.01i
million in the 1987-1991 period.
3-2-2. The Textiles and Clothing Case
Korea's exports of textiles and clothing to the EC market
under the MFA have been increasing in the 1989-1991
period in contrast to sharp declines in exports to the
United States and Canada. However, the exports to the EC
market in 1991 dropped by 2 per cent from the export peak
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in 1988 and by 10.3 per cent from 1990's export figure.
Likewise, exports of polyester yarns to the EC, under
EC's AD measures, sharply fell to $223,000 in 1991 and
$26,000 in 1992 from $2,537,000 in 1988. Korea's
competitiveness in textiles and clothing has been
declining since 1980, limiting Korea's ability to switch
exports to the EC market from the United States and
Canada. For example, RCA ratio for knitted fabric was
0.8, with other various textiles at 2.1 to 2.9.
Therefore, the deterioration of the competitiveness of
Korea's textiles and clothing played a decisive role in
the effectiveness of EC's import restraints, more so than
other factors such as the lack of coherent policy and
domestic decision making problems of importing countries
as argued by David Yoffie.
3-2-3. The Iron and Steel Products and H-Beam Case
Korea's exports of H-beam to the SC market was severely
affected by the EC's threat to initiate AD investigation,
declining to zero in 1989 from 1987's 23,033 tonnes. The
situation was the same as in the case of iron and steel
products exported to the EC under VER between the EC and
Korea. Exports of these products to the EC market in the
1986-1989 period declined by 49.9 per cent to $26,879,000
from $53,632,000. Again, the effectiveness of import
restraints was decided by the international
competitiveness of products rather than the effectiveness
of import measures themselves. For example, RCA ratio for
iron and steel bars, rods and shapes was 2.4, that for
iron and steel plates and sheets 1.8, and iron and steel
tubes and pipes was 1.b. The import restraints by the SC
were imposed on Korean iron and steel products which had
begun to lose international competitiveness anyway,
playing as a determinant in reducing Korea's exports of
these products to the EC.
3-2-4.The Footwear Case
Exports of footwear to France and Italy decreased by 26.6
per cent and 7.6 per cent, respectively, in the 1988-1989
period since VERs by these two EC member states against
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Korea had been implemented. These declines in exports to
France and Italy can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly,
Korean footwear exporters exercised self-restrictions of
exports to the EC market generally following EC member
states' complaints of drastic increases in imports from
Korea since 1989. Secondly, Korean companies easily
diversified their markets for footwear to other EC member
states, rather than France and Italy, which are
relatively open for Korean footwear as a consequence of
VERs by these two EC member states against Korean
footwear. That was possible due to the strong
international competitiveness of Korean footwear.
In the EC-Korea footwear trade generally, Korea's exports
sharply increased, up 10.5 per cent from $723.796 million
in 1990 to 1991's $799.975 million. However, it is
noteworthy that Korea's footwear exports to the United
States have shown a declining trend since 1988, due to
changes in demands to low and medium-priced rather than
high-priced items in the United States, and not to the
weakening international competitiveness of Korean
footwear. Korea's RCA ratio for footwear reached 9.3,
which was the third highest RCA ratio among Korean-made
products, following office data processing equipment (RCA
ratio 24.5) and travel and hand bags (RCA ratio 12.3).
Therefore, Korea's strong competitiveness in footwear
contributed to the switching of export market from the
United States to the EC, and to the continued growth of
exports to the EC market. Again, the competitiveness of
Korean products played a role as a factor determining the
effectiveness of EC's import restraints.
3-2-5.The Consumer Electronics and CTV Case
The EC's import restraints against Korea's consumer
electronics were very effective in reversing the growing
trend of imports from Korea, and were all the result of
AD measures. However, VERs by the United Kingdom and
France against Korean CTV were useless in reversing the
growth of imports from Korea. That supports my argument
that VER or quota restrictions against products which
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have strong international competitiveness are ineffective
in reversing the growth of imports. Korea's CTV5 were
extremely competitive relative to other exports with RCA
ratio of 7.5 in 1986, even though such competitive
strength has been worsening every year as a result of
emergence of new cheap cost competitors and labour cost
hike in Korea. 4
 The failure of EC member states in
restricting imports from Korea through VERs encouraged
the EC to adopt EC-wide AD measure in 1989, despite the
agreement between EIAK and EACEM to voluntarily restrict
the export volume of CTV to the EC market.
The most important factor in the effectiveness of VERs in
consumer electronics sector is therefore whether or not
exporters subject to such import restraints have
international competitiveness. If they do not hold such a
competitive edge, exporters can not switch markets
easily, nor adopt an upgrading strategy. If advanced
countries seek to temporarily protect industries losing
international competitiveness, using import restraints
such as VER5, they will have difficulties in effectively
implementing such a strategy when confronting foreign
commodities having sufficient international
competitiveness to overcome import restraints. In these
circumstances, David Yoffie's approach is absolutely
applicable. However, the approach is not applicable to
the alternative case, in which any protective measures by
advanced countries could well be a decisive factor in
reversing growing market penetration by exporting
countries having weak international competitiveness.
Therefore, it is essential that David Yoffie's approach
be complemented by including specific factors regarding
EC-Korea trade such as the international competitiveness
of Korean exports, the evaluation of VER5, OMAs and AD
measures together, the demand situation of specific
products, the upgrading strategy of Korean exporters, and
decision making issues in the EC. Another matter speaking
against the EC's protectionism is that it is harmful both
to the EC consumers and the EC economy, as well as to the
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Korean exporters. Therefore, the result of protectionism
is a negative-sum game, rather than a zero-sum game or a
positive-sum game.
4.Final Comments
Through the broad and specific analyses of determinants
and effectiveness of protectionism in the EC-Korea trade,
it was found that the model of the triangular deflection
of protectionist impulses betweeen Japan, the United
States and the EC is very useful in explaining
protectionist trends in the bilateral trade. However,
future determinants and effectiveness of protectionism in
the EC-Korea trade may change, depending on the direction
of the international political economy.
4-1.The Developments of GATT Talks and EC-Korea Trade
The EC-Korea trade relationship could be influenced by
the multilateral negotiations under the GATT. Heinz
Preusse argues "replacing the new forms of protection by
non-discriminating multilateral GATT regulations should,
therefore, be regarded as a fundamental task of future
foreign economic policy, and as an essential precondition
for a further liberalization of world trade." 5 If Korea
will bind its tariffs in GATT depending on the outcome of
multilateral talks, Korea's policy to use tariff barriers
as major protective measures for Korean market against
foreign imports could give enhanced importance to non-
tariff barriers. 6 The result of multilateral talks, also,
could affect trade in agriculture and service areas when
the agreements in Uruguay Round are implemented in
January or July in 1995. In 1989, the share of
agriculture trade was 13.1 per cent of all merchandise
trade, in terms of trade value ($405 billion/$3095
billion). In addition, the world value of service trade
in the same year amounted to $3,775 billion, 22 per cent
higher than the total value of merchandise trade.8
Therefore, some settlements in the GATT talks regarding
the service and agriculture trade could emerge as
another factor influencing trade disputes between the EC
and Korea should pressure be exerted by the EC against
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Korea to observe the result of multilateral talks in
these areas.
4-2. The Expansion of Regionalism and EC-Korea Trade
The EC-Korea trade relationship could also be influenced
by both the current changes in existing economic blocs
and formation of new and existing economic blocs
worldwide. For example, the expansion of EC membership
and the formation of EEA is expected to exclude exports
from Korea to the EC or EEA as a result of increases in
intra-EC or intra-EEA trade. By the same principle,
Korea's active participation in APEC is also possible to
increase its trade with Pacific-rim countries, rather
than trade with the EC. As I mentioned in Introduction of
this thesis, the EC and the EFTA agreed to set up the EEA
in October, 1991. The EC is also planning to expand its
memberships to some Eastern European countries such as
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The United
States, Canada and Mexico officially concluded the
agreement for the establishment of the NAFTA on Aug.11,
1992. Furthermore, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia have
concluded a free trade agreement in December, 1993,
etfective in the first half of 1994, as a first step of
economic integration and closer political cooperation. A
free trade agreement has also been effective between
Australia and New Zealand since July 1, 1990. Six
Southeast Asian countries--Brunei, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore--have set
up the ASEAN. 9
 In addition, Asian and Pacific-basin
countries set up, in 1989, the APEC. 1 ° This deepening
trend towards the formation of economic blocs is
certainly against the principle of multilateralization,
non-discrimination and free trade under the GATT, even
though the formation of economic blocs contributing to
the expansion of world trade has been exceptionally
accepted under the principle of GATT. The inclusion of
developing countries in the EC (Portugal, Greece and
Spain), in the formation of EEA (possibly Eastern
European countries), and in NAFTA(Mexico) could be
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instrumental in expanding trade disputes between
developing countries not in these blocs and those
developed countries in economic blocs. 11
 In connection
with this trend, Alexis Jacquemin and Andre Sapir argue
"the cooperation among a limited number of powerful
countries should not lead to the exclusion of weak
nations, but, rather, should help reinforce international
cooperation. "12
4-3. The Possibility of Growing Green Protectionism
The growing demands from advanced countries, including
the EC, for the establishment of environmental standards
for manufactured goods 13 could be the seed of future
trade disputes between the EC and Korea. Korea has a very
poor level 0± environmental standard because it did not
consider the environmental effects of production during
the process of rapid economic development, a major reason
for Korea having an advantage over its major trading
partners in the competition on price. Such lack of
considerations of environmental issues can also be found
in Japan. "The Japanese media is reluctant to cover such
issues, especially if there is a large Japanese company
involved, in contrast to its responsibilities as a
leading industrial country." 14
 However, this habit of
ignoring environmental issues is expected to face tough
periods of environmental protection in international
trade. For example, "with the environmental lobby coming
to the fore in the EC, one already observes another
series of environmental standards being erected which may
well amount to discrimination against third countries, in
particular developing countries." 15
 Therefore, Korea and
the EC are likely to face another dimension of trade
conflict when the EC-wide environmental standards become
effective. At the same time, Korea's international
competitivenes, acquired without regard for environmental
concerns, could be lost in the growing green
protectionism and green conditionality.
Despite these negative factors which could worsen EC-
Korea trade disputes in future, there are also very
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promising factors expected to lessen the bilateral trade
disputes. Firstly, there are growing Korean direct
investments in the EC. Again Korea is copying Japan, in a
way living up to the EC's "Japan Complex," but this is
expected to achieve similar positive results because
Korean investments contribute to European employment, and
reduce many unpleasant aspects of the bilateral trade
through the gradual change of bilateral trade structure
from inter-industry to intra-industry trade. Korea's
direct investments in the EC in the 1986-1990 period
numbered 60 cases, 71.4 per cent higher than the number
of cases of Korean investments in the EC by the end of
1985 when its direct investments in the EC numbered 35
cases. Especially, Korea's direct investments in
manufacturing in the 1986-1990 period totaled 20 cases,
as compared with only one case by the end of 1985. On the
other hand, Japan's direct investments in manufacturing
in the EC in the 1986-1988 period numbered 164 cases, as
compared with Korea's 8 cases in the period. 16
 The sharp
growth of Japan's manufacturing investments in the EC is
caused by "l)the yen's continuing strength, 2)tough
regulations on local contents in the EC market and
3)international pressure to cut the trade surplus."17
Korea's main motivation to invest in the EC, however, is
to circumvent the EC's frequent AD impositions and meet
tough local content regulations. The big difference in
the level of direct investments between Japan and Korea
in the EC suggests that Korea is a nominal "Second
Japan," rather than an actual "Second Japan."
Secondly, Korea has been adopting a policy of switching
its import sources for products, mainly imported from
Japan, to the EC member states. As of 1992, Korea
successfully switched its import sources for a total of
117 items from Japan to the EC member states. 18
 Such
Korean efforts contributed to Korea recording a trade
deficit with the EC in 1991 and 1992. It was the first
time in the history of bilateral trade that Korea
recorded a trade deficit with the EC since 1972.
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4-4. The EC and Korea's Common Tasks in International
Trade Arena
From the perspective of the International Political
Economy, the realization of pure free trade is a very
difficult task. It can be concluded that world trade to
date has been hampered by many types of control and
various types of political intervention. Therefore, this
thesis tends to confirm neo-realist expectations of
increasing economic competition and neo-protectionism,
accompanying the process of regionalization. As a prior
step to establish the free trade principle and be away
from managed trade under neo-mercantilism, a world trade
order in which every trading country has the same
understanding has to be established. L. Rangarajan
enumerated six points for the creation of order in the
international trading system, as follows:19
Transparency--actions of governments likely to
injure others should not be clandestine but open,
and must be notified to an appropriate body.
Investigation--any complaint or dispute must be
investigated, the procedure for which should be an
integral part of the rules of the instrument.
Determination--there should be provision for
determining definitively whether injury is likely to
be or has been suffered.
Surveillance--the actions of all members of an
instrument must be subject to scrutiny, surveillance
and supervision.
Dispute Settlement--there should be provisions for
conciliation and arbitration.
Sanctions--the instrument ought to have a graded set
of sanctions and punishments.
Apart from the question of free trade, it will also be
very difficult to establish order in the international
trading environment, considering the principles
recommended by L. Rangarajan. Even though there is enough
room to develop harmonious bilateral trade relations
between the EC and Korea, negative developments in the
world trading environment, such as regionalism and
formation of economic blocs, 20
 dim any optimistic
forecast of EC-Korea trade relations in the future.
Despite the confused world trading environment, the EC
and Korea, as major world exporters of manufactured
products, have faced the common task of working towards
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the establishment of an order in the international
trading system. Regarding the importance of exports in
manufacturing output, Geoffrey Shepherd, Francois Duchene
and Christopher Saunders point out that "the proportion
of exports in the total combined manufacturing output of
the EC, North America and Japan was up to 17 per cent in
1978, from 13 per cent in 1970 and from only 9 per cent
in 1960." 21 Therefore, close cooperation between Korea
and the EC is expected to be crucial for the
establishment of international trading order in
manutactured goods. It is a pity that the industrial
upgrading still now continuing has little effect in
lessening trade disputes, when pursued by both parties at
the same time and in the same sectors, as demonstrated by
worsening trade disputes between the EC and Korea in the
1990s, as compared with the 1980s. However, EC-Korea
trade disputes could be reduced, as occurred in EC-EFTA
trade relationship, if both parties improve mutual
understanding of each other in economic, political,
social and cultural aspects, and subsequently endeavor to
establish intra-industry based trade relationship, with
the long-term expansion of mutual investments in each
other's economy.
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